American exceptionalism
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| − | '''American exceptionalism''' is a belief that the [[United States]] is unique, or exceptional, when compared with the historical development of other countries. It would be easy to pigeon-hole as [[nationalism]], but it is more expansive and more concentrated than that. It is a popular ideal held by many American conservatives,<ref>[http://likethedew.com/2011/10/07/michael-bailey-on-american-exceptionalism/ Michael Bailey on American Exceptionalism]</ref> though the temptation is not entirely limited to the Right. Several liberal historians and politicians have embraced certain aspects of American exceptionalism, in particular in the "vital center" and "end of ideology" views popular among American liberals in the mid 20th century following [[World War II]]. American exceptionalism is also a core belief within [[neoconservatism]]. | + | {{uspolitics}}'''American exceptionalism''' is a belief that the [[United States]] is unique, or exceptional, when compared with the historical development of other countries. It would be easy to pigeon-hole as [[nationalism]], but it is more expansive and more concentrated than that. It is a popular ideal held by many American [[conservatives]],<ref>[http://likethedew.com/2011/10/07/michael-bailey-on-american-exceptionalism/ Michael Bailey on American Exceptionalism]</ref> though the temptation is not entirely limited to the Right. Several [[liberal]] historians and politicians have embraced certain aspects of American exceptionalism, in particular in the "vital [[Centrism|center]]" and "end of ideology" views popular among American liberals in the mid 20th century following [[World War II]]. American exceptionalism is also a core belief within [[neoconservatism]]. |
| − | One major characteristic of American exceptionalism from a historiographical viewpoint is its tendency to gloss over what it would consider "bad" history,<ref>Such as slavery, treatment of the Native American, segregation, the Jim Crow South</ref> and emphasise and in many cases mythologize the founding struggles<ref>The Founding Fathers as demigods, the Constitution, Washington as the supreme example of commander-in-chief</ref> and subsequent consolidation<ref>The frontier, the | + | One major characteristic of American exceptionalism from a historiographical viewpoint is its [[Negationism|tendency to gloss over]] what it would consider "bad" history,<ref>Such as [[slavery]], [[American Indian Holocaust|treatment of the Native American]], [[segregation]], the [[Jim Crow]] South...</ref> and emphasise and in many cases [[Mythology|mythologize]] the founding struggles<ref>The [[Founding Fathers]] as [[Personality cult|demigods]], the [[US Constitution|Constitution]], [[George Washington|Washington]] as the supreme example of commander-in-chief...</ref> and subsequent consolidation<ref>The frontier, the [[West]]ern tradition, the [[immigrant]] tradition, the [[capitalist]] tradition...</ref> of what is the modern United States. |
| − | American exceptionalism may view the United States through the lens of a special [[historical determinism]] for the United States, separate from broad historical trends in the rest of the world. It may, for a variety of reasons, view the U.S. as a nation that is immune (or ''should be'' immune) from things like [[terrorism]] and [[dictatorship]]—"[[9/11|It can't happen here]]". The U.S. in turn is supposed to assume an activist role around the world in promoting "freedom" or being a "shining example" to the world (the "City on a Hill"). This sort of presumptive moral superiority <s>isn't always</s> is virtually never welcomed by other nations, and is <S>often</S> almost always resented, particularly when the U.S. has a long history of engaging in [[gunboat diplomacy]] itself. The belief by Americans in American exceptionalism is one of the reasons for worldwide resentment or dislike of the USA.<ref>Except, perhaps, for blowing up their stuff and interfering in their governments</ref> | + | American exceptionalism may view the United States through the lens of a special [[historical determinism]] for the United States, separate from broad historical trends in the rest of the world. It may, for a variety of reasons, view the U.S. as a nation that is immune (or ''should be'' immune) from things like [[terrorism]] and [[dictatorship]] — "[[9/11|It can't happen here]]". The U.S. in turn is supposed to assume an activist role around the world in promoting "[[freedom]]" or being a "shining example" to the world (the "City on a Hill"). This sort of presumptive [[moral]] superiority <s>isn't always</s> is virtually never welcomed by other nations, and is <S>often</S> almost always resented, particularly when the U.S. has a long history of engaging in [[gunboat diplomacy]] itself. |
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| + | The belief by Americans in American exceptionalism is one of the reasons for worldwide resentment or dislike of the USA.<ref>Except, perhaps, for [[Iraq War|blowing up their stuff]] and [[CIA|interfering in their governments]], yadda yadda.</ref> | ||
==Impact on American foreign policy== | ==Impact on American foreign policy== | ||
| − | From colonial days, the English speaking | + | From [[colonial]] days, the English-speaking, [[Europe]]an descended residents of what was to become the United States viewed their colonial societies and (more or less) shared [[culture]] as unique or at least virtuous. American uniqueness was a theme developed by [[Calvinist]] preachers in [[New England]], and worked itself into the foreign policy of the newly independent [[republic]]. Rather than military alliances with the European powers as part of that continent's balance of power diplomacy, political elites in the new United States sought to trade with Europe and to establish regional [[hegemony]] over its own sphere of influence ([[Latin America]]).<ref>See the [[Monroe Doctrine]].</ref> The focus was not on the entangling alliances with which Europeans tormented themselves,<ref>See George Washington's famous Farewell Address in 1796.</ref> but on ensuring Europeans did not interfere with what was perceived as an American sphere of influence. This had dual effects, such as protecting Latin America from undue European interference, but also insured America kept itself out of the struggles to assert a 'balance of power' in Europe. It is often said that the US was sympathetic to [[Britain]] diplomatically, but played little part in the 'great game' of European diplomacy. |
| − | Another way in which the United States saw itself as fundamentally different from the European powers was in its eschewing of imperial ambitions. That said, there were important tensions between American rhetoric about the evils of empire and actual political practice. The doctrine of " | + | Another way in which the United States saw itself as fundamentally different from the European powers was in its eschewing of imperial ambitions. That said, there were important tensions between American rhetoric about the evils of empire and actual political practice. The doctrine of "[[manifest destiny]]" was a blatantly imperial program that involved exercising power over, or simply eliminating, other peoples. Also, the U.S. exercised sovereignty over a number of overseas territories, including [[Puerto Rico]], [[Hawaii]], [[Guam]], the [[Philippines]], and [[Cuba]]. Paradoxically, Americans' belief in its exceptional nature helped to inform the acquisition of such colonies, as Americans believed they were uniquely suited to ruling foreign peoples benignly. |
| − | Even when not under direct U.S. rule, many Latin America states felt the weight of US influence in the formation of their political institutions. | + | Even when not under direct U.S. rule, many Latin America states [[Blowback|felt the weight of US influence in the formation of their political institutions]]. |
| − | American exceptionalism also led the US to employ idealistic and democratic rhetoric, even when getting involved in brazen "sphere of interest" or geopolitical engagements, like the various coups in Latin America, or World War I. | + | American exceptionalism also led the US to employ idealistic and [[democratic]] rhetoric, even when getting involved in brazen "sphere of interest" or [[geopolitical]] engagements, like the various coups in Latin America, or [[World War I]]. |
| − | To this day, the US still tends to be idealistic in its justifications for interventions. In the 90s in particular, there were many interventions that had zero basis in national interest (including [[Somalia]] and [[Yugoslavia]]). Many scholars, like the entire realist school of international relations, have a hard time understanding this part of US foreign policy. Today, it rests on the assumption that the US military is naturally a force for good (think of the [[ | + | To this day, the US still tends to be idealistic in its justifications for interventions. In the 90s in particular, there were many interventions that had zero basis in national interest (including [[Somalia]] and [[Yugoslavia]]). Many scholars, like the entire realist school of international relations, have a hard time understanding this part of US foreign policy. Today, it rests on the assumption that the US military is naturally a force for good (think of the [[neoconservative]] hawks of the [[Bush]] administration) and that any country they get involved in would recognise this fact. However, <s>an Iraqi villager</s> a freedom-hating terrorist watching his mosque being destroyed by an American bomb may have a differing opinion on this. The over-confidence in "American values" has a larger impact considering that where the U.S. military goes, many other militaries follow. |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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==Footnotes== | ==Footnotes== | ||
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<references/> | <references/> | ||
[[Category:Denialism]][[Category:Imperialism]][[Category:International relations]][[Category:Pseudohistory]][[Category:United States]][[Category:Society]] | [[Category:Denialism]][[Category:Imperialism]][[Category:International relations]][[Category:Pseudohistory]][[Category:United States]][[Category:Society]] | ||
Revision as of 09:37, 2 August 2013
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American exceptionalism is a belief that the United States is unique, or exceptional, when compared with the historical development of other countries. It would be easy to pigeon-hole as nationalism, but it is more expansive and more concentrated than that. It is a popular ideal held by many American conservatives,[1] though the temptation is not entirely limited to the Right. Several liberal historians and politicians have embraced certain aspects of American exceptionalism, in particular in the "vital center" and "end of ideology" views popular among American liberals in the mid 20th century following World War II. American exceptionalism is also a core belief within neoconservatism.
One major characteristic of American exceptionalism from a historiographical viewpoint is its tendency to gloss over what it would consider "bad" history,[2] and emphasise and in many cases mythologize the founding struggles[3] and subsequent consolidation[4] of what is the modern United States.
American exceptionalism may view the United States through the lens of a special historical determinism for the United States, separate from broad historical trends in the rest of the world. It may, for a variety of reasons, view the U.S. as a nation that is immune (or should be immune) from things like terrorism and dictatorship — "It can't happen here". The U.S. in turn is supposed to assume an activist role around the world in promoting "freedom" or being a "shining example" to the world (the "City on a Hill"). This sort of presumptive moral superiority isn't always is virtually never welcomed by other nations, and is often almost always resented, particularly when the U.S. has a long history of engaging in gunboat diplomacy itself.
The belief by Americans in American exceptionalism is one of the reasons for worldwide resentment or dislike of the USA.[5]
Impact on American foreign policy
From colonial days, the English-speaking, European descended residents of what was to become the United States viewed their colonial societies and (more or less) shared culture as unique or at least virtuous. American uniqueness was a theme developed by Calvinist preachers in New England, and worked itself into the foreign policy of the newly independent republic. Rather than military alliances with the European powers as part of that continent's balance of power diplomacy, political elites in the new United States sought to trade with Europe and to establish regional hegemony over its own sphere of influence (Latin America).[6] The focus was not on the entangling alliances with which Europeans tormented themselves,[7] but on ensuring Europeans did not interfere with what was perceived as an American sphere of influence. This had dual effects, such as protecting Latin America from undue European interference, but also insured America kept itself out of the struggles to assert a 'balance of power' in Europe. It is often said that the US was sympathetic to Britain diplomatically, but played little part in the 'great game' of European diplomacy.
Another way in which the United States saw itself as fundamentally different from the European powers was in its eschewing of imperial ambitions. That said, there were important tensions between American rhetoric about the evils of empire and actual political practice. The doctrine of "manifest destiny" was a blatantly imperial program that involved exercising power over, or simply eliminating, other peoples. Also, the U.S. exercised sovereignty over a number of overseas territories, including Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and Cuba. Paradoxically, Americans' belief in its exceptional nature helped to inform the acquisition of such colonies, as Americans believed they were uniquely suited to ruling foreign peoples benignly.
Even when not under direct U.S. rule, many Latin America states felt the weight of US influence in the formation of their political institutions.
American exceptionalism also led the US to employ idealistic and democratic rhetoric, even when getting involved in brazen "sphere of interest" or geopolitical engagements, like the various coups in Latin America, or World War I.
To this day, the US still tends to be idealistic in its justifications for interventions. In the 90s in particular, there were many interventions that had zero basis in national interest (including Somalia and Yugoslavia). Many scholars, like the entire realist school of international relations, have a hard time understanding this part of US foreign policy. Today, it rests on the assumption that the US military is naturally a force for good (think of the neoconservative hawks of the Bush administration) and that any country they get involved in would recognise this fact. However, an Iraqi villager a freedom-hating terrorist watching his mosque being destroyed by an American bomb may have a differing opinion on this. The over-confidence in "American values" has a larger impact considering that where the U.S. military goes, many other militaries follow.
See also
- Manifest destiny
- Americentrism
- "Is America exceptional? Liberals, conservatives agree -- and disagree": Essay by UC San Diego political science professor David A. Lake
Footnotes
- ↑ Michael Bailey on American Exceptionalism
- ↑ Such as slavery, treatment of the Native American, segregation, the Jim Crow South...
- ↑ The Founding Fathers as demigods, the Constitution, Washington as the supreme example of commander-in-chief...
- ↑ The frontier, the Western tradition, the immigrant tradition, the capitalist tradition...
- ↑ Except, perhaps, for blowing up their stuff and interfering in their governments, yadda yadda.
- ↑ See the Monroe Doctrine.
- ↑ See George Washington's famous Farewell Address in 1796.