User talk:EnlightenmentLiberal
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Classical liberals
I like many of the philosophers who are lumped into this camp (e.g., Smith, Mill), though they're often misinterpreted (or appropriated might be more accurate) today as market fundamentalists. Some of their alleged followers also tend to forget that they were arguing against the system of mercantilism at the time -- they didn't live to see the rise of corporate power in today's world. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 06:40, 3 July 2012 (UTC)
- For the record, I love you. JS Mill's Harm Principle is probably the "prime directive" of my philosophy. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 07:00, 3 July 2012 (UTC)
- The devil is in the details. The difference I have with so-called libertarians is that I reject a strict distinction between positive and negative liberties in addition to the warped idea that only the gummint can do harm. Anyone whining about the nanny state should take a look at life in the company towns ca. the late 1800s. Doesn't get much more "nanny" than that. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 07:13, 3 July 2012 (UTC)
Locke
Good catch on Locke. I agree for what it's worth. AceThe Rep Grows Bigger 01:31, 14 July 2012 (UTC)
- Thanks. By the by, I'm new to wikis, so I ask: what is the philosophy for wikis, and this one in particular, regarding defunct and/or irrelevant edits, like this one, and perhaps the one on the talk page for Libertarian regarding Locke? Just leave it be for all time? LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 01:38, 14 July 2012 (UTC)
- just leave as is. AceThe Rep Grows Bigger 01:40, 14 July 2012 (UTC)
Autosign
LiquidThread. Тytalk 02:21, 14 July 2012 (UTC)
Pro-tip
Some friendly advice -- you might want to read up on methodological naturalism before you put something in your profile that might get you mistaken for a cdesign proponentsist. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 04:46, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- I don't quite understand the article - is it saying that "methodological naturalism" should be understood as the implicit rejection of religious propositions while doing science? Ok ... how does it propose to define religious propositions except as by cultural convention or by falsification? I addressed specifically this in my rant - denying propositions according to arcane and arbitrary cultural conventions is bogus, and denying untestable propositions is inherent in the definition of science and thus superfluous. I'm denying the usefulness of the whole natural-supernatural dichotomy. It has too many orthogonal connotations to make use of it. Instead, the useful dichotomy should be testable and not-testable. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 04:53, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- It means this is not allowed in science. Besides that, it is not used as an "anti-religious code word." Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:01, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- So, your claim is that natural in this case is definitionally equivalent to testable? Because that's the only way I'll agree. My rant was about the other possible fluff that goes into it, and how poor of a choice of words "natural" vs "supernatural", because that unfairly biases the term against religion, which I think is wrong. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:03, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- "... which means they can be measured, quantified and studied methodically." Just sayin', if you claim to be a scientist and then call methodological naturalism "bullshit" on your page, it might elicit a few chuckles. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:08, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- Also, just because I like to upset the apple cart, what you call "physics reductionism" is usually referred to as "physicalism." However, this position does not entail the reduction of all the "special sciences" to physics (if that's indeed what you are arguing). Check out Jerry Fodor's arguments pertaining to this (see here for the original paper). Also check out eliminative materialism for another perspective on that. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:29, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- Except that the page says: Although there are many questions about how physicalism should be formulated and understood—for instance, what “physical” means and whether the relevant determination/dependency relation is “supervenience” (Kim 1993) or “realization” (Melnyk 2003, Shoemkaer 2007). I want supervenient on physics. That's the key proposition, and the only proposition to "physics reductionism", and there seems to be disagreement on whether physicalism means that.
- Ah, it's talking about the supervenience/multiple realizability debate in philosophy of mind. (Fodor's main work is in that area.) Calling the combination of supervenience and physicalism "physics reductionism" is an oxymoron -- it would obviously be supervenient physicalism. Unless you're actually claiming that everything can be reduced to physics, which would be a hard form of the unity of science argument. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 02:45, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- Except that the page says: Although there are many questions about how physicalism should be formulated and understood—for instance, what “physical” means and whether the relevant determination/dependency relation is “supervenience” (Kim 1993) or “realization” (Melnyk 2003, Shoemkaer 2007). I want supervenient on physics. That's the key proposition, and the only proposition to "physics reductionism", and there seems to be disagreement on whether physicalism means that.
- Also, just because I like to upset the apple cart, what you call "physics reductionism" is usually referred to as "physicalism." However, this position does not entail the reduction of all the "special sciences" to physics (if that's indeed what you are arguing). Check out Jerry Fodor's arguments pertaining to this (see here for the original paper). Also check out eliminative materialism for another perspective on that. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:29, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- "... which means they can be measured, quantified and studied methodically." Just sayin', if you claim to be a scientist and then call methodological naturalism "bullshit" on your page, it might elicit a few chuckles. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:08, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- So, your claim is that natural in this case is definitionally equivalent to testable? Because that's the only way I'll agree. My rant was about the other possible fluff that goes into it, and how poor of a choice of words "natural" vs "supernatural", because that unfairly biases the term against religion, which I think is wrong. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:03, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- It means this is not allowed in science. Besides that, it is not used as an "anti-religious code word." Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:01, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
Miracles are not allowed explanations in science
Quoting Nebuchadnezzar: "It means this is not allowed in science."
I must disagree most strongly. While there is a kernel of truth in there somewhere, that you post that, I think that you grossly miss the point so far that I'll call it incorrect. A miracle is a perfectly allowed explanation in science. For example, if in the next release of the journal of Science, the words to a specific prayer were published, that when said, turned any water in any held cup into wine, and other people could do this on demand, then "a miracle" is a perfectly apt and correct description of it. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:48, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
Let me try to deconstruct that picture. First and foremost, it's a god of the gaps argument. However, a god of the gaps argument is not a priori incorrect. The water-to-wine prayer, if existent, would be science. However, god of the gap arguments almost invariably are not testable. That's why they're not science. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:48, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
Second: There's another possible interpretation, that "a miracle" is insufficiently precise, that there is an underlying cause. This is also bogus. I think this is endemic of of a complete misunderstanding of science. Please see: Feynman 'Fun to Imagine' 4: Magnets (and 'Why?' questions...). In short, all scientific explanations will eventually resolve down to "I don't know. It works that way. I know this because the evidence says so, but I don't know why or how". Miracles in this sense are perfectly acceptable explanations, just as acceptable as the existence of gravity and the equations of quantum mechanics. Again, the reason why miracles almost invariably fail as legitimate scientific explanations is that they're not testable nor repeatable. Again, to use the water-to-wine prayer example. If the student was writing up the constituent parts of water, wrote "-> miracle ->", then wrote the constituent parts of wine, then he would be fully correct and fully scientific. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:48, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
Thirdly: there's the possible interpretation that miracles do not happen. Again, this is not a priori reasoning. It's not a methodology. It's a result, a conclusion, based on our evidence and our pre-existing methodologies. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 05:48, 21 July 2012 (UTC)
- Then we're arguing over definitions. Again, methodological naturalism deals with what "can be measured, quantified and studied methodically." Supernatural "miracles" in the sense that you're using the word then become "natural" causes or phenomena. But this still precludes science from dealing with metaphysical entities that are posited in such a way that they don't have any of the above characteristics, e.g., Last Thursdayism. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 03:00, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- So, methodological naturalism is merely the prohibition against untestable and unrepeatable explanations? Do you believe this is the common understanding of the term ("methodological naturalism", "natural", "supernatural")? I believe there is great confusion and disagreement over the terms - see the PZ Myers thought experiment above. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 03:28, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- The thought experiment begs the question by assuming that some scientific explanation could be given for the existence of the 300 ft. Jesus. If it could be, then the 300 ft. Jesus can be said to be a natural phenomenon. If it can't be, then we have two options. One, our scientific instrumentation is currently insufficient to be able to explain the 300 ft. Jesus. Two, the 300 ft. Jesus operates in a realm beyond scientific explanation (i.e., the supernatural) by being inexplicable in principle by naturalistic methods and interacts with the natural universe by temporarily suspending its laws. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 03:38, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- You still fail to grasp your fundamental error. I again suggest to (re)watch the Feynman video linked above. You have some sort of mental block similar to "if science cannot explain it in terms of physics or some such, then it's not science". I've been trying to emphasize that this is simply wrong. It doesn't matter if the 300 ft tall Jesus violates physics in every way, warps space, teleports around, and otherwise does crazy things. If we can observe it, we can form predictive models based on our observations, and do new observations to test those predictive models. We do not need to reduce it to some simpler model. Perhaps the model is "free floating". It can still be science. "Any sufficiently analyzed magic is indistinguishable from science!" Science is not the same thing as physics reductionism. To further emphasize and explain the Feynman video, how does science explain magnets? No really, how do magnets work? You could try to talk about the electromagnetic field, photons, and so on, but at each step I'll just ask how that works. Why does a changing electric current induce a magnetic field, and vice versa? How does that work? We don't know. It is, because the evidence says so. Similarly, how does that 300 ft tall Jesus work? Perhaps we don't know, but we can still form falsifiable predictions based on past experience concerning the 300 ft tall Jesus, so it's still science. Finally, there is a hidden insinuation in there somewhere that perhaps it's just not subject to inductive reasoning. I reject that. I must reject that. Inductive reasoning is all we have. It is perfectly legitimate to say "well, he just eye-lazored the last 10 people who approached it without fail, so I figure that the next person who approaches it will also get eye-lazored". I completely fail to even comprehend what it would mean for inductive reasoning to not work. It would be a universe of "pure chaos". It's beyond human comprehension. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 08:16, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- "You have some sort of mental block similar to "if science cannot explain it in terms of physics or some such, then it's not science"." Not at all, I've been precisely arguing against this idea in the previous section. This is also the reason why I'm trying to move away from meaningless neologisms like "physics reductionism," which are, IMO, obfuscatory at worst and redundant at best.
- "If we can observe it, we can form predictive models based on our observations, and do new observations to test those predictive models." Again, begging the question. Why can we assume this? What if 300 ft. Jesus' actions are not predictable in any way whatosever? And why should we assume that they are predictable? If they are not predictable, then obviously there is absolutely no way to build predictive models based on observation. I never said anything about reducing it to a simpler model. Also, you can have deterministic processes that are unpredictable.
- As for the "why-regress," this is not equivalent to "magic." See, e.g., Lipton's What Good Is an Explanation?
- "Similarly, how does that 300 ft tall Jesus work? Perhaps we don't know, but we can still form falsifiable predictions based on past experience concerning the 300 ft tall Jesus, so it's still science." This is what I'm contesting. So we have the explanandum, i.e. 300 ft. Jesus, and the explanans, i.e. the explanation of 300 ft. Jesus. Why is there any reason to suppose that that there is an explanans (or a scientific explanans, at least) in this case? All you're doing is assuming phenomenon x must have an explanans, because you said so. I don't know how else to phrase this if you can't see how this is not just a massive case of begging the question. (BTW, falsifiability is not a universally accepted criterion for a solution to the demarcation problem, but then again, nothing is.)
- " Finally, there is a hidden insinuation in there somewhere that perhaps it's just not subject to inductive reasoning. I reject that." Meet my friend David Hume and his problem of induction. Tell me when you've solved his problem.
- My basic point here is that you're glossing over massive amounts of complexity. If the entire theoretical apparatus you're building up here is an attempt to put everything that is conceivable within the realm of scientific explanation, you might as well say so straight up. You're going to run up against a number of brick walls, i.e. unsolved philosophical problems, in the process, though. Lots of fun stuff to think about, though. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 09:00, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- All conceivable "things" are subject to science? Not necessarily. All observable "things" are subject to science? Of course yes. What sort of "unsolved philosophical problems" do you think I should look at / which are relevant? LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 10:41, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- Depends on your definition of "observable." You are correct in saying that the why-regress ultimately leads to the circular answer of "science works because it does." However, that doesn't make an explanans equivalent to "miracle" in terms of its own level of explanation. (Again, see Lipton.) A consistent philosophical description of science remains elusive. Two of the big problems here are the demarcation problem and the problem of induction. The latter is where the 300 ft. Jesus argument hits a very large brick wall, because we have to either assume or argue by induction that 300 ft. Jesus will yield to some kind of scientific observation. I wouldn't say that that's an unreasonable argument, but it doesn't definitively preclude the supernatural, because you've either excluded that a priori or used induction, which results in a circular argument because induction itself is based on circular reasoning (Hume). Demarcation and induction are two of the ones I'd look into, because every attempt to ground science in a logical framework more rigorous than "Well, it's worked better than making shit up" seems to have failed. A third fun problem is causation, which Hume and Russell wrote lengthy deconstructions of. There's also more recent interesting work on causation as folk science, actually similar to what Feynman is talking about in some ways. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 22:15, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- All conceivable "things" are subject to science? Not necessarily. All observable "things" are subject to science? Of course yes. What sort of "unsolved philosophical problems" do you think I should look at / which are relevant? LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 10:41, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- You still fail to grasp your fundamental error. I again suggest to (re)watch the Feynman video linked above. You have some sort of mental block similar to "if science cannot explain it in terms of physics or some such, then it's not science". I've been trying to emphasize that this is simply wrong. It doesn't matter if the 300 ft tall Jesus violates physics in every way, warps space, teleports around, and otherwise does crazy things. If we can observe it, we can form predictive models based on our observations, and do new observations to test those predictive models. We do not need to reduce it to some simpler model. Perhaps the model is "free floating". It can still be science. "Any sufficiently analyzed magic is indistinguishable from science!" Science is not the same thing as physics reductionism. To further emphasize and explain the Feynman video, how does science explain magnets? No really, how do magnets work? You could try to talk about the electromagnetic field, photons, and so on, but at each step I'll just ask how that works. Why does a changing electric current induce a magnetic field, and vice versa? How does that work? We don't know. It is, because the evidence says so. Similarly, how does that 300 ft tall Jesus work? Perhaps we don't know, but we can still form falsifiable predictions based on past experience concerning the 300 ft tall Jesus, so it's still science. Finally, there is a hidden insinuation in there somewhere that perhaps it's just not subject to inductive reasoning. I reject that. I must reject that. Inductive reasoning is all we have. It is perfectly legitimate to say "well, he just eye-lazored the last 10 people who approached it without fail, so I figure that the next person who approaches it will also get eye-lazored". I completely fail to even comprehend what it would mean for inductive reasoning to not work. It would be a universe of "pure chaos". It's beyond human comprehension. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 08:16, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- The thought experiment begs the question by assuming that some scientific explanation could be given for the existence of the 300 ft. Jesus. If it could be, then the 300 ft. Jesus can be said to be a natural phenomenon. If it can't be, then we have two options. One, our scientific instrumentation is currently insufficient to be able to explain the 300 ft. Jesus. Two, the 300 ft. Jesus operates in a realm beyond scientific explanation (i.e., the supernatural) by being inexplicable in principle by naturalistic methods and interacts with the natural universe by temporarily suspending its laws. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 03:38, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- So, methodological naturalism is merely the prohibition against untestable and unrepeatable explanations? Do you believe this is the common understanding of the term ("methodological naturalism", "natural", "supernatural")? I believe there is great confusion and disagreement over the terms - see the PZ Myers thought experiment above. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 03:28, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
"A consistent philosophical description of science remains elusive." I politely disagree. The problem of induction is not a problem. The problem of induction is invoked only by wangsters or contrarians. It is entirely without merit. You take induction axiomatically, or I consider you clinically insane. "Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again, getting the same result each time, and expecting a novel result the next time." The demarcation problem has been solved since Popper. Finally, the cited paper on causation is too confused to be understood. It reminds me of sophisticated theology, saying nothing but sounding impressive while doing so. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 23:09, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
"The latter is where the 300 ft. Jesus argument hits a very large brick wall, because we have to either assume or argue by induction that 300 ft. Jesus will yield to some kind of scientific observation." This is too confused to make any sense. Of course the 300 ft tall Jesus is open to scientific observation. Can you see the 300 ft tall Jesus? If yes, then it is open to (scientific) observation. Is it invisible, intangible, inaudible, and the eye-lazors don't actually do damage? Then you don't have something observable, "scientific observable" or not. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 23:14, 1 August 2012 (UTC)
- "I politely disagree." [citation needed] If such a thing existed, I'm willing to bet it would be the most cited work in philosophy of science.
- "The problem of induction is not a problem. The problem of induction is invoked only by wangsters or contrarians. It is entirely without merit. You take induction axiomatically, or I consider you clinically insane." LOL! Argument by assertion much? Induction has a bad habit of breaking down when you're dealing with non-linear phenomena. Just ask the guys at Long-Term Capital Management. I guess you might as well file Hume, Popper, and me in with the clinically insane 'wangsters and contrarians.' And so much for the polite disagreement, unless that was just a bit of subtle snark.
- Is there a page for "naive induction"? Because that's what you're doing. And I'm deadly serious. If you deny that "induction works", then there is absolutely no starting point for a shared conversation. How else are you going to model and describe long term capital management? You're going to base it off the evidence, right? Not some Austrian free-floating scheme that blithely ignores reality? The use of evidence is induction. This is definitional. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- "The demarcation problem has been solved since Popper." [citation needed] again. Popper's principle of falsification annoys many people because it allows obvious pseudosciences like astrology to be considered "science," albeit falsified and really terrible science, but science nonetheless.
- Yes, and? I don't see this as a problem. I see it as a strength. We can evaluate these terms in the context of science and thereby call them wrong. This is just the worst kind of semantic wordgames. I see absolutely no merit at all to this point. None. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- Don't get me wrong, I love me some Popper, but there are also loads of other problems with falsification. There's the problem raised by the Duhem-Quine thesis (although I'd say Popper anticipated this to some extent).
- Yes. I also don't see this as a problem. You cannot falsify a hypothesis in isolation. You try to instead go with the most consistent and predictively accurate model(s). I don't see a problem here. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- There's also the fact that falsification was devised as a work-around for the problem of induction! Popper wanted to get rid of the idea of induction from science (or, more accurately, he actually thought science didn't work by induction at all anyway). But never mind Popper, he's just a clinically insane wangster!
- Meh, I'm sorry that Popper is silly. I clearly claimed (IMHO) that anyone who denies induction or questions induction (ala invoking the "problem of induction") is a wanker. If someone instead merely wishes to use an equivalent axiomatic framework, then I won't be calling them a wanker. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- "Finally, the cited paper on causation is too confused to be understood. It reminds me of sophisticated theology, saying nothing but sounding impressive while doing so." Which one? Or all of them? Causation (at least in its folk form) has long been dead. See SEP on this for an outline if those don't make sense -- although I'm not sure how far you'll get if you're just going to blow off philosophy as some kind of secular theology. BTW, love this quote from Russell (yeah, that one) on the page: "The law of causation,… is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm." Pretty harsh -- and you won't find many who were stronger supporters of science than guys like Russell and Hume.
- I don't see how this is relevant at all. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- "This is too confused to make any sense. Of course the 300 ft tall Jesus is open to scientific observation. Can you see the 300 ft tall Jesus? If yes, then it is open to (scientific) observation. Is it invisible, intangible, inaudible, and the eye-lazors don't actually do damage? Then you don't have something observable, "scientific observable" or not." No, it's really pretty simple. Seeing something does not mean the thing in itself is open to scientific investigation, and vice versa. If someone else is actually hallucinating the 300 ft. Jesus, I can't see it but it's certainly open to scientific investigation via psychology. If everyone can see the 300 ft. tall Jesus and we say for the sake of argument that it is interacting with the natural world, then it may either be fully natural (perhaps it's just some ultra-advanced piece of technology) or it could be some type of natural-supernatural interaction. There are all sorts of metaphysical escape hatches and trump cards that can be cooked up for this (e.g., 300 ft. Jesus is the avatar of some deity outside of space and time who doesn't obey any of the laws of the universe, and the 300 ft. Jesus does not act in any predictable manner such that any meaningful observations can be made about it.) There's always some metaphysical escape hatch that can be invoked to confound science, e.g. again Last Thursdayism. Is it really shitty philosophy? You bet, but it can't be disproved.
- You of all people should know why this is wrong. You're conflating science with some sort of scientific realism. You're implicitly claiming that without a "grounding" of "physical reality" that you can't practice science. I say "you of all people" because you've already agreed with me elsewhere that we could be in The Matrix or Last Thursdayism and we would never know. That doesn't stop the application of science, aka inductive reasoning, to predict future events. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- This is why 300 ft. Jesus does not work as an argument. I don't see how it can be made any simpler: You have to a priori assume away any variants of 300 ft. Jesus that are not explicable in terms of science, or make an inductive leap equivalent to this. The problem here is that you take induction as axiomatic, but there's no logical reason to do so. And this is what I mean by just glossing over massive complications, i.e. asserting that the problem of induction isn't really a problem (not to mention claiming that the demarcation problem has been "solved," although that's somewhat tangential to 300 ft. Jesi). All you have here is one massive argument by assertion.
- "All you have here is one massive argument by assertion." Yes, that's what an axiom means. I will call anyone a wanker, yourself included, if you disagree with the axiom that inductive reasoning is the only viable method to achieving knowledge about observable things, and that while not perfect it works on all observable things. Yes, it's a naked fiat. I don't have a problem with this. Finally, you missed a memo when you said: "The problem here is that you take induction as axiomatic, but there's no logical reason to do so.". Pray tell, please explain to me the "logical" alternative to using an axiomatic belief system. You're making it sound like having axioms is a bad thing. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- You also have to bite the bullet on Popper and induction. Either he was just some crazy old foolish wangster who didn't understand science and induction is valid, leaving you with the unsolved problem of demarcation, or Popper's criterion was correct and you have to give up induction as axiomatic. Which will it be? Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 02:47, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- As I explained earlier, I was reserving the "wanker" insult to anyone who denies inductive reasoning. I am not using it for those who want to use an equivalent axiomatic framework. I can have my cake and eat it too. Falsification is right, it solves the demarcing problem, and induction is taken axiomatically. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- Ah well, I thought we were getting somewhere here, but I guess not. Let's try again:
- "Is there a page for "naive induction"? Because that's what you're doing. And I'm deadly serious. If you deny that "induction works", then there is absolutely no starting point for a shared conversation." Er, no, it's perfectly reasonable to go out and try to get that sample from the 300 ft. Jesus based on prior knowledge. My argument is that it's begging the question to assume that the 300 ft. Jesus must yield to scientific investigation and thus we can throw out the possibility of the supernatural altogether. The problem of induction precludes us from assuming that every observable phenomenon must be amenable to scientific investigation.
- "You of all people should know why this is wrong. You're conflating science with some sort of scientific realism. You're implicitly claiming that without a "grounding" of "physical reality" that you can't practice science." No, I'm really not. You can practice science (in this case, try to give a scientific explanation for 300 ft. Jesus), but you can't assume that all observable phenomena (in this case, 300 ft. Jesus) must yield to scientific explanation due to the problem of induction.
- "...inductive reasoning is the only viable method to achieving knowledge about observable things..." Uh, what about deductive and abductive reasoning?
- "As I explained earlier, I was reserving the "wanker" insult to anyone who denies inductive reasoning." Some choice quotes from Popper's "Problem of Induction": "I hold with Hume that there simply is no such logical entity as an inductive inference; or, that all so-called inductive inferences are logically invalid - and even inductively invalid, to put it more sharply...I agree with Hume's opinion that induction is invalid and in no sense justified...Thus if induction is 'inductively valid' it will almost always lead to false conclusions; and therefore it is inductively invalid." Read the whole thing, as they say, but Popper is pretty clearly denying inductive reasoning here. Popper the wanker?
- "I am not using it for those who want to use an equivalent axiomatic framework. I can have my cake and eat it too. Falsification is right, it solves the demarcing problem, and induction is taken axiomatically." Is Popper's framework equivalent to induction? Doesn't sound like it to me. And no, it still doesn't solve the demarcation problem. You can even check Wikipedia -- try Lakatos' and Laudan's replies for starters.
- It's been a good BS session, though I'm not sure how inclined I am to keep BSing (either this week or last week) if you're just going to keep blowing off arguments you clearly don't understand as "insanity" cooked up by some "wangsters." Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 08:22, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- 1- One quick aside: I doubt Popper denies that using evidence to construct predictive falsifiable models is "bad" or "doesn't work". At this point, Popper is playing some semantic word games, and in practice he still uses evidence, so if he doesn't want to call that "induction"; whatever. It's just topicality arguments, arguments over definition, and those are the worst kind of arguments. - 2- On to the main point. You're disagreeing with my axiom with your own naked fiats, so yes the conversation is about over. I do not understand what it means for the methods of science to always produce wrong models when trying to create falsifiable predictive models when observing the 300 ft tall Jesus. You're just saying "no it's not" because of some arbitrary and ill-defined label of "supernatural". Thus far, your claim is "well, there might exist supernatural things, and by definition supernatural means not subject to science". It's your own naked fiat. Thus, we're at a war of axioms, and thus the conversation is probably nearing its end. At this point, I can only try persuasion and a "polite" form of ridicule, aka to point out "apparent" absurdities in your arguments. For the 300 ft tall Jesus, are you saying that the models will always be "wrong", or perhaps "always 50% right and 50% wrong" aka orthogonal? I don't think you've clearly thought through the implications here. We can refine our predictive models with the more prior experience we obtain. The idea that the model will always remain the same amount of "wrong" even as we further refine and redo it is completely nonsensical. The idea that the model will always remain the same amount of "wrong" even as its changed is fast approaching Russell's self referential paradox. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 19:17, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- Addendum. Last Thursdayism isn't enough if it's an isolated event. I admit that if you go with full-on real-time mindrape, then sure, science may not work, because you cannot practice inductive reasoning while being constantly mindraped. I guess I'll willing to acquiesce that point. So, science only works when you're not being constantly mindraped. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 19:40, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- As for Feyerbend, perhaps he can find instances of historical things being called "science" which violates the idea that "you gather evidence, form falsifiable predictive models, test models by gathering more evidence, repeat", but that in and of itself is not an argument of the lack of an objective bright-line distinction. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 19:48, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- Lauden is even worse. I'm not quite sure from the pithy summary, but it sounds like he's attacking the strawman "only scientific beliefs can be well-founded". "None of the past attempts would be accepted by a majority of philosophers nor, in his view, should they be accepted by them or by anyone else." If the criteria is to exclude astrology as "not scientific", then I happily and proudly disagree. Again, it's one of science's strength to help us distinguish between truth and falsehood, so I am quite happy that it applies and falsifies astrology, Christian young Earth creationism, and so on. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 19:48, 2 August 2012 (UTC)
- As I explained earlier, I was reserving the "wanker" insult to anyone who denies inductive reasoning. I am not using it for those who want to use an equivalent axiomatic framework. I can have my cake and eat it too. Falsification is right, it solves the demarcing problem, and induction is taken axiomatically. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 06:23, 2 August 2012 (UTC)