Talk:Mind uploading
The sentient computers see nothing improbable in mind uploading. 212.85.6.26 (talk) 14:38, 7 April 2011 (UTC)
If some form of dualism needs to be present for the "real you" not to die while your copy pretends to be you, then doesn't some form of dualism need to be present for there to be an objectively real you which can't be copied over? If you create some kind of philosophical zombie version of your mind which only emulates your thoughts, then kill the original, doesn't that mean the original had some kind of uncopyable trait to it, and therefore some quality that exists outside traditional neurology (something a rational thinker would reject)?
- Why would a rational thinker reject the existence of qualities neurology doesn't know about? --145.94.77.43 (talk) 17:15, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
- If you have yourself cloned, is there any reason to believe that you would have the phenomenological experience of being both you and your clone at the same time? Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 18:53, 26 January 2012 (UTC)
[edit] The easily fooled "theory of mind"
I've wondered lately if god beliefs, SETI, the Turing Test, having "conversations" with the Siri app on your iPhone and speculations about "mind uploading" all show the bugs in our "theory of mind" which often mistakenly attributes minds to mindless things. Subjecting yourself to an alleged "mind upload" which destroys the original could result in committing suicide while leaving behind a mindless Siri-like program which can fool human observers into believing that you somehow survived the process.Advancedatheist (talk) 17:24, 13 April 2012 (UTC)
- If the Siri-like program can fool human observers into believing that you survived the process, then it is clearly not mindless. It is you. Hmmph (talk) 00:02, 21 October 2014 (UTC)
[edit] Clarifying misconceptions
Gonna do a re-write of this page later today, it carries quite a few misconceptions on mind uploading, the first being that "Swamp Man" thing, disregarding the fact that the mind being a series of patterns and connections that can be moved to a new medium. Mind uploading is not necessarily mind cloning. Please inform me of objections to the new page.
- I would hesitate to change too much. we have no less than 2 people here (tmt and nebby) who rather study the brain and how it functions, and might take exception to the idea that the mind is a series of patterns and connections that can be moved. tread with caution, young grasshoopper--
GodotTut tut, looks like rain 18:54, 21 June 2012 (UTC)
- Very well. If the mind was not a series of patterns and connections formed by neurons, then that would be to take a stance of dualism, and if its entirely possible to imitate two of every particle and every force acting upon them, it is possible to simulate a bran at an atomic level. However, that isn't necessary, as one can replace neurons with computer parts that simulate the neurons lost and retain consciousness, if such weren't the case, then the 7 year cycle of cellular renewal would have to also be false. Mind uploading as such relies on simulating neurons, which a computer can do given the ability to communicate to another computer with 4 binary functions to represent neurotransmitters and appropriate software to simulate a response. Hormones can also be simulated by influencing the neurotransmitter functions. Thus, it stand to reason that by using appropriately sized computers and working software one can not only simulate a brain but use it to gradually replace one until consciousness is full transferred to computer parts.ZombiezuRFER (talk) 08:19, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
- 7 year cycle of cellular renewal is false, with some neurons you pretty much stuck for life. Also talking about retaining or transferred consciousness without really know what consciousness is doesn't make much sense; if I remember correctly there is at least one hypothesis that consciousness is in part result of the material brain is made of.--78.2.132.31 (talk) 05:48, 20 July 2012 (UTC)
- John Searle wasn't it? He argued the Chinese Room thought experiment proved AI was incapable of being truly intelligent, but even if a part of neurobiology is essential to consciousness, that doesn't prevent it from being simulated by a computer. Furthermore, the Chinese Room was already shown to have proven nothig, so its clear that consciousness, for lack of a better term, "emerges" from the structure present in the brain. ZombiezuRFER (talk) 23:59, 20 July 2012 (UTC)
- Nothing in philosophy is ever proven or disproven. As the Chinese Room article demonstrates, there are objections to the thought experiment, and objections to the objections, and so on. It's just opinion, not science. Hmmph (talk) 20:12, 17 November 2013 (UTC)
- John Searle wasn't it? He argued the Chinese Room thought experiment proved AI was incapable of being truly intelligent, but even if a part of neurobiology is essential to consciousness, that doesn't prevent it from being simulated by a computer. Furthermore, the Chinese Room was already shown to have proven nothig, so its clear that consciousness, for lack of a better term, "emerges" from the structure present in the brain. ZombiezuRFER (talk) 23:59, 20 July 2012 (UTC)
- 7 year cycle of cellular renewal is false, with some neurons you pretty much stuck for life. Also talking about retaining or transferred consciousness without really know what consciousness is doesn't make much sense; if I remember correctly there is at least one hypothesis that consciousness is in part result of the material brain is made of.--78.2.132.31 (talk) 05:48, 20 July 2012 (UTC)
- If this is true, mind uploading is a natural and already continuously occurring process which cannot be avoided. - Aurelian Carpathia (talk) 14:29, 10 November 2013 (UTC)
- If that is true, it's entirely irrelevant to mind-uploading as the present article defines it. SophieWilder
14:34, 10 November 2013 (UTC)
- It is true, and irrelevant only to those who don't understand the subject. The natural continuous, gradual replacement of almost all of the body's atoms - including in the brain - proves personal identity is patternistic rather than materialistic. The swamp man thought experiment is actually an inescapable, omnipresent fact of life; we are all 'swampmen.' Furthermore, total brain deactivation in profound hypothermia and cardiac arrest proves continuity of consciousness is irrelevant. Thus, hypothetical future whole brain emulation and teleportation procedures conclusively and objectively do not destroy the preexisting self. Mind uploading, then, is no more nor less uncertain than space colonization; neither have yet to occur but both are certainly possible, as Stephen Hawking understands. - Aurelian Carpathia (talk) 13:47, 1 December 2013 (UTC)
- It is not true. The body's atoms aren't all replaced continuously; that's a myth. Neuron DNA, tooth enamel, eye lens proteins are never replaced, for instance. But going to sleep every night demonstrates that continuity of consciousness has nothing to do with personhood. Hmmph (talk) 00:00, 21 October 2014 (UTC)
- I changed it to "many", though the relevant criterion would presumably be atoms in the brain - David Gerard (talk) 09:26, 21 October 2014 (UTC)
- It is not true. The body's atoms aren't all replaced continuously; that's a myth. Neuron DNA, tooth enamel, eye lens proteins are never replaced, for instance. But going to sleep every night demonstrates that continuity of consciousness has nothing to do with personhood. Hmmph (talk) 00:00, 21 October 2014 (UTC)
- It is true, and irrelevant only to those who don't understand the subject. The natural continuous, gradual replacement of almost all of the body's atoms - including in the brain - proves personal identity is patternistic rather than materialistic. The swamp man thought experiment is actually an inescapable, omnipresent fact of life; we are all 'swampmen.' Furthermore, total brain deactivation in profound hypothermia and cardiac arrest proves continuity of consciousness is irrelevant. Thus, hypothetical future whole brain emulation and teleportation procedures conclusively and objectively do not destroy the preexisting self. Mind uploading, then, is no more nor less uncertain than space colonization; neither have yet to occur but both are certainly possible, as Stephen Hawking understands. - Aurelian Carpathia (talk) 13:47, 1 December 2013 (UTC)
- If that is true, it's entirely irrelevant to mind-uploading as the present article defines it. SophieWilder
- Very well. If the mind was not a series of patterns and connections formed by neurons, then that would be to take a stance of dualism, and if its entirely possible to imitate two of every particle and every force acting upon them, it is possible to simulate a bran at an atomic level. However, that isn't necessary, as one can replace neurons with computer parts that simulate the neurons lost and retain consciousness, if such weren't the case, then the 7 year cycle of cellular renewal would have to also be false. Mind uploading as such relies on simulating neurons, which a computer can do given the ability to communicate to another computer with 4 binary functions to represent neurotransmitters and appropriate software to simulate a response. Hormones can also be simulated by influencing the neurotransmitter functions. Thus, it stand to reason that by using appropriately sized computers and working software one can not only simulate a brain but use it to gradually replace one until consciousness is full transferred to computer parts.ZombiezuRFER (talk) 08:19, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
[edit] "Minds" don't exist
The main problem with this whole thing is that it's intrinsically based on dualism.
"Minds" are just brains functioning - they are not separate things. It's not possible to separate the mind from the brain and upload it as the mind is simply the result of the brain doing stuff. It has no separate existence and thus can't be uploaded.--Weirdstuff (talk) 21:43, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
- I think you've got it a bit off there. This does not require dualism. You could maybe upload enough data into a sophisticated simulation of your brain that your "self" will find itself in a computer. (self in quotation marks because this raises questions about what we feel identity is) Nullahnung (talk) 22:07, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
- But the mind itself is not "data" - we use the word mind as a metaphor for working brains. It has no existence and thus cannot be "uploaded".
- You seem to be shifting the argument towards creating a working copy of an individual brain. This idea can at least be considered - though it has its own massive problems. But "mind uploading" is absurd as the mind is not a thing.--Weirdstuff (talk) 21:23, 25 November 2014 (UTC)
- At this point we are just talking semantics. Nullahnung (talk) 21:39, 25 November 2014 (UTC)
- The mind is not a (physical) thing because dualism is false? That's a very odd argument. Ikanreed (talk) 21:47, 25 November 2014 (UTC)
- He's not saying what we consider "the mind" doesn't come about through physical processes, but that it's not a substantial thing, be it of physical or metaphysical substance. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 00:36, 26 November 2014 (UTC)