# Talk:Pascal's wager

This Religion related article has been awarded BRONZE status for quality. It's getting there, but could do with improvement.

I'm laying 5:2 odds that any wager you place with Pascal will go to his next drinking/drugging spree. ~~ CЯacke® 17:26, 9 July 2007 (CDT)

Recently, the Catholic church chose to abolish Limbo. Limbo was the supposed place where the souls of unbaptised babies and good people who never heard of God went to. In the new cosmology, such being will go directly to heaven and, presumably, collect $200 if they pass Go. My question is this, "Did the Pope just argue, quite eloquently, for the utter abolition of the Christian church?" Think about it, if everyone who has never heard of God or Jesus gets into heaven on a pass, shouldn't the church be more concerned with the salvation of the greatest number of souls rather than its own monopoly on faith? Wouldn't they serve God better by removing all knowledge of the church and its teachings from human memory? Good question, except it did not abolish Limbo. --AKjeldsenGodspeed! 15:34, 7 August 2007 (CDT) "And what if we picked the wrong religion? Every week, we're just making God madder and madder!" - Homer Simpson, Homer the Heretic Garble 21:21, 23 August 2007 (CDT) ## Contents ##  Pascal's Wager Isnt the argument against it slightly contradictory? If you "choose one out of infinite possible varieties," and the "chance of worshiping him and not a nonexistent entity instead is one out of infinity," the chance cannot also be zero. Rangeley 10:36, 31 August 2007 (CDT) Maths isn't my strong point so I'm not sure. No doubt the more numerate amongst us will comment. But I've got a different objection to this one. Are there really an infinite number of gods to chose from? I'd be hard pressed to name 50. Even if we include the entire history of mankind and supposed that every single individual created a new concept of god there still wouldn't be an infinite number of them.--Bob_M (talk) 10:49, 31 August 2007 (CDT) The infinite possibilities would also include those not yet thought of. Rangeley 11:14, 31 August 2007 (CDT) Well, if we include imaginary entities that have not yet been imagined then I suppose you are right - though I can't help feeling there may be just a touch of special pleading in there somewhere. :-) --Bob_M (talk) 12:11, 31 August 2007 (CDT) I guess its best not to belive in god because i dont like a god that will condemn me to hell if i don't believe in him. That sounds more like Satan. Elassint Throw things at me 15:36, 31 October 2007 (EDT) The one out of infinity thing resolves to zero under some mathematical conventions that are used so certain problems can be solved. While it is a useful convention, it can also be proven untrue in some constructs. Knowing what construct one is operating under is important to whether or not one uses the convention. (Example of "proving" it - the limit as x approaches inifinity of 1/x is zero, but that's only one way to analyze or solve for 1/infinity). In this construct, I don't think it is valid to use the convention, so "one out of infinity" just resolves to "really bad odds", not "zero". human 14:32, 12 February 2008 (EST) ##  Odd sentence This sentence seems to keep coming back: (please accept this example for argument sake since the Christian God is the same as the Islamic God)? It doesn't seem to add a lot to the article. Could the bunches of numbers who want it please turn up here to talk about it? Thanks.--Bobbing up 16:43, 12 January 2008 (EST) Sounds like Dr. Doolittle, to be honest. --מְתֻרְגְּמָן שְׁלֹום Could be, but as the same person also carried out some spelling corrections on a post of Elassint's I think there is another possibility.--Bobbing up 16:59, 12 January 2008 (EST) I think User:71.62.227.44 is Dr. D, but i am not. --75.89.115.231 17:03, 12 January 2008 (EST) ##  Criticism section Having also read the Talk above, I'd say that the Criticism section should be modified. First of all, even if there were an infinite number of Gods, not every one has the same probability. I'd say that the most popular Gods would have a finite, albeit small, probability of existing. Let's say the Catholic God wins all with 0.2 % probability of existing. Under Pascal's Wager, I'd be compelled to believe in that God. Second, the infinite number of possible Gods should be grouped into taxonomic groups, representing more or less the same God. If the real God were Allah instead of the Catholic God mentioned above, there's a good chance I will see neither Christian angels nor Muslim virgins, but I'd be quite confident on a Protestant God understanding my heresy. Instead, the points in the Assumptions section are valid, and I wouldn't suggest to anybody to embrace a religion based on Pascal's Wager. Editor at CPBring TK back 09:19, 12 February 2008 (EST) I'm not sure how you arrive at the conclusion that not every god has the same possibility of existing. Could you elaborate? User:PalMD It's implicit in the wager, that it's up to you to suppose absolute or relative probabilities. Strictly, we can say nothing about these probabilities. But as well as it's possible that there are infinite equiprobable gods, it's also possible that one god is much more probable than another. Given that both cases are possible, the best solution is to apply the wager. For that, use history of religions, science, experience, feelings, to bet on a good horse God. For example, it could be argued that the probability of a god of being narcisistic with vanity is more than 50 %. In that case, it's a good guess that god gives some hints of its existence, and as such should be chosen from the revealed ones. Editor at CPBring TK back 10:17, 12 February 2008 (EST) The problem is that in this world, none of the gods actually shows up to show up to tell us anything. We have no objective data to work on.75.62.26.190 10:25, 12 February 2008 (EST) That's why it's called a wager. --AKjeldsenGodspeed! 10:33, 12 February 2008 (EST) If any god did show up the whole thing would become academic or do I mean trivial? Oh no, It's that already. SusanMiouw 10:36, 12 February 2008 (EST) It absolutely would, Susan! I mean, where is the challenge in believing in something that is obvious to everyone? Nowhere at all, of course; that would be entirely trivial. But to face and defeat a multitude of soul-wracking doubts on a daily basis in order to be able to believe in something for which there is no objective proof whatsoever - to so to speak float freely above the Kierkegaardian 70,000 fathoms of water with no reassurances whatsoever, and yet dare to have faith and be happy about it - now there's a challenge worthy of a human being. You should try it sometime. ;-) --AKjeldsenGodspeed! 10:59, 12 February 2008 (EST) undent Now there's a thing worthy of Alice: can one try to believe? Or try to have faith?SusanMiouw 11:13, 12 February 2008 (EST) Depends, but I don't see why not. It's certainly something that requires some kind of an active action or decision on the part of the would-be believer. Whether that's enough is another question, of course, but I guess one will never know unless one tries. --AKjeldsenGodspeed! 14:17, 12 February 2008 (EST) Dis iz teh funny section E @ CP! "Let's say the Catholic God wins all with 0.2 % probability of existing" - leaving 99.8% odds that one is still wrong! Anyway, after reading your first comment above, I became convinced that one should firmly believe in an unknown and perhaps infinite number of gods. I think then as long as one puts YHWH first, one should fair pretty well at the denouement. Of course, one is also screwed if there are gods one has not imagined yet that require specific spells naming them for salvation. Delicious! human 14:28, 12 February 2008 (EST) Well people play lotto et co. every week, knowing that they are at a disadvantage, with much less probability of winning prize N.1, which is, arguably?, worth less than a fully paid, all included, unlimited stay in Heaven. I admit though, that it is much more difficult to choose the right god than bying a lotto ticket. It's an art to choose a god, that is probable, offers a good Heaven (endlessly playing the same tune with a harp is not so tempting, is it?), and is similar enough to other gods, in case of picking the wrong one. Editor at CPBring TK back 14:49, 12 February 2008 (EST) Addendum: you may be right, an undefined god may be the best solution, depending on the actual god. Generic prayers now and then, some good actions, some less good actions, being careful not to offend any god - better omophobia than a crusade - and a place in heaven is guaranteed. Editor at CPBring TK back 14:52, 12 February 2008 (EST) I suspect it is "probable" that if any super-powerful entity exists that preserves our consciousness after death, they also don't really care about the details of our miserable lives here on earth, and thus we all go to "heaven". Which could be hell for some people ;) human 15:42, 12 February 2008 (EST) AKj and Susan - give Hell Is the Absence of God by Ted Chiang a read (won the Hugo and Nebula awards for Best Novelette in 2002). At one point, this story was published to the web for free on a micropayment site (now costs$1.25) though you can still find copies of it floating around to read. Its an odd story, and by no means do I suggest that this is proof of any deities existence, but rather read it as a story about the challenge in believing in something that is obvious to everyone. --Shagie 14:34, 12 February 2008 (EST)
Couldn't it be that the multiple gods are different perceptions of the same God? Just a thought — Unsigned, by: 68.197.173.216 / talk / contribs
Given that they are all equally improbable - why not? In fact, I've always maintained that the Flying Spaghetti Monster was simply an incarnation of the Invisible Purple Unicorn. However I've received threatening letters from both religions for suggesting this so I always post under a pseudonym. --Bobbing up 15:39, 30 October 2008 (EDT)

##  "Belief" vs. "System of belief"

All right. So the contentious phrase is: "[That belief is costless] is untrue, as any person who subscribes to a particular religion must attend its ceremonies and follow its rules, no matter how archaic or silly." Human further says: "It's not about "belief in God" as an abstract, it is about ascribing to a system of belief (which is what the Wager is about)"

I disagree on a number of levels. There is nothing in the Wager itself which leads to anything other than "living as if God exists" or however it is that Pascal puts it - or indeed, pretty much faith "as an abstract". Pascal himself certainly believed that such belief would necessarily lead to Catholic Christianity, because that was what he saw as the correct religion, but you can't deduce that from the wager itself. Here as always, it's important to distinguish between faith in itself and the institutional structures that surround it, such as ceremonies, dogma, canon law and so forth.

Indeed - and this may come as a surprise to some - even religious believers are occasionally able to make up their own minds about "archaic or silly" rules without necessarily being less religious for that. I find the level of generalization quite surprising (or perhaps not).

Finally, another point - I understand that the Wager apparently "relies on several logical fallacies". Keeping in mind that the Wager is not meant as a proof for the existence of God at all, but rather as a suggestion to what one should do in the absence of reliable evidence, perhaps the article at least should mention what these particular fallacies are? They have names, you know. --AKjeldsenCum dissensie 12:51, 5 January 2009 (EST)

I think a bigger point is being missed; the argument doesn't work on the premise that belief (or system of belief) is costless, but that it is finite. NightFlare 13:06, 5 January 2009 (EST)
Good point. Hadn't thought of that, actually. --AKjeldsenCum dissensie 17:17, 5 January 2009 (EST)
I would like to second a couple AKjeldsen's points. Pascal is not seeking to prove the existence of any god, what he is saying, is that as "a betting man" the odds are on the side of belief. Pascal was a Catholic in a Catholic country. Unlike "born-again" type religions, in Catholicism a mere belief that God exists does not get you into heaven. Belief is proved by acts. Therefore believing in God (for Pascal) means living as if God exists, and living as if God exists is more than just performing archaic rituals.
Now I don't want to get into an acts versus faith debate here. I have an opinion on whether acts alone, done in the absence of the knowledge of God, and therefore without rejecting God, is fine. I don't think that one can truly believe in God if one's actions don't reflect that belief. Further, I don't think that hypocritical performance without belief is going to get you anywhere. The crux of the problem was really corruption and its justification by the Church. If anything, belief to Pascal was more about how one lives, rather than belief in itself, than it is today in Catholicism.
Thus, to Pascal, belief in God is coterminous with actions done in furtherance of that belief. I too doubt that Pascal was accepting the performance of all the rites and rituals of the Catholic Church as necessary (the wager wasn't whether to act as if Catholicism was right), but even if he was, the most important part of belief for Catholicism/Christianity (and therefore the most important guide to one's actions) is to love God, and love your fellow humans. Most of the major religions provide the same moral guide to behavior. Further the view of many religions is that you are going to have to account for your actions at some point: during your lifetime, at your death, or in your next life, and that if you haven't behaved according to that moral guide, there will be negative consequences.
This could be risky if you pick the wrong religion, but only if living that belief would cause you to violate the major tenets of that religion or offend its god(s). But, lo and behold, except for certain rituals, most of the world's religions advocate the same types of actions; "be good" or "don't sin" may be too simplistic a formulation, but there is a lot of overlap: don't kill (unnecessarily), don't steal, perform your family and civic duties, have some regard for others, do charity, etc. -- basically, don't act as if the only thing that counts is looking out for number one in a material sense.
Was Hinduism known to Pascal? Certainly he was aware of some pantheistic religions which required specific actions directed to different gods, different sacrifices, etc. Thus Pascal was taking a risk that in the end he would not have performed actions required by these religions. For whatever reason he didn't think that changed the odds significantly or that the costs weren't high.
In religions that believe in reincarnation, the cost for bad behavior is having to make up for these in the next life and losing some ground in your quest to end the cycle of rebirth.
Also, remember that if you pick the wrong religion, in the worst case scenario, you're presumably no worse off than if you had chosen not to believe at all.
So, what have you lost if you were wrong and there was no god at all? You've lost the opportunity to "eat, drink and be merry" 24/7. You've lost a couple of hours every sabbath or every day when you've engaged in worship. You've performed some needless rituals. We can come up with a lot of opportunity costs but as Nightflare points out above, whatever the costs, they were finite. Death is forever. Ileanadu 12:49, 28 January 2009 (EST)

This argument from Ileanadu, in its various forms, has always interested me:

This could be risky if you pick the wrong religion, but only if living that belief would cause you to violate the major tenets of that religion or offend its god(s). But, lo and behold, except for certain rituals, most of the world's religions advocate the same types of actions; "be good" or "don't sin" may be too simplistic a formulation, but there is a lot of overlap: don't kill (unnecessarily), don't steal, perform your family and civic duties, have some regard for others, do charity, etc. -- basically, don't act as if the only thing that counts is looking out for number one in a material sense.

Isn't it just better to "be good" and do the various things listed without any thought towards religion? This is something that has always somewhat angered me about religious people. My thought is - would these people be horribly monstrous otherwise were it not for a religion that they subscribe to? --Edgerunner76Save me Tsisnaajini! 13:08, 28 January 2009 (EST)

##  Further (Hidden) Mathematical Assumptions

I'd like to point to http://atheism.wikia.com/wiki/Pascal's_Wager , which I partly wrote and from which I'm putting forward the following:

1) As mentioned above, the probabilties for believing in various Gods are critical here. As it stands, the formulation of the argument is insufficient as it doesn't mention these. This could be left as-is, and another "Assumption" added that says the argument assumes a finite probability for the Christian God's existence, and an infinitely small one for others.

2) Another assumption made is that a rational agent should maximize the average utility. I argue in the above that he should really follow the typical utility, which is not really affected by low-probability events.

3) The 'guillability problem' should be emphasized, too - the same argument could be used to sell snake oil, or any other 'conclusion', clearly indicating that it is not an argument that should convince a rational agent. — Unsigned, by: YR / talk / contribs

##  something to say

I just want to say that you will eventually find out that God exists or not when you die or maybe you'll never figure it out. Is it possible that there will be future proof of the existence of God besides holy religious books?

Just curious, anybody here a believer that doesn't know if God exist for sure or not? Cause I'm one and I'm really not sure if Go exists for or not.

Everyone has their own opinions....— Unsigned, by: Fairoozhaider / talk / contribs

I'm not a believer myself (agnostic, actually, but leaning towards atheism) so I'm technically undecided. I would argue that it is almost impossible to prove or disprove the existence of a God. It is, however, very easy to disprove the God described in the "holy books" of almost any religion. You may be interested in this.
Anyway, this probably isn't the best place for this discussion. You might want to try the Saloon.
Also, please sign your posts with 4 tildes (~~~~). Tetronian you're clueless 23:16, 14 October 2009 (UTC)
(EC) A future proof of God is theoretically possible (though I can't envision what kind of proof would be conclusive on this), but the point of this wager is about choosing the best course of action when we don't know for certain one way or the other. If you believe in God without certainty, then what are your reasons for doing so? Something like the ones here, or more complicated? WẽãšẽĩõĩďMethinks it is a Weasel 23:18, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

... and you'll realise that he's probably suggesting this with tongue-in-cheek. If you read his writings on religion you'll quickly realise that he is bemused by contemporary religious groups (which are basically at war over extremely arcane points of bible interpretation) 122.106.116.89 (talk) 05:11, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

This has less to with Pascal and more to do with his wager. Whether he suggested it with tongue-in-cheek or not, it is repeated as though it is serious by theists. - π 05:13, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

 A common misconception is that, as it currently stands (as an argument with the conclusion that people should believe in God), Pascal advocated this. Pascal originally submitted this to demonstrate, rather, that since theism is more desirable in relation to eschatological consequences, atheists must have some overriding willingness not to believe in God.[citation needed]

Besides some confuddled wording, this is likely true, I'm just not sure what to cite for it. Wikipedia's section on context explains it but cites an awkward paragraph. Pascal certainly doesn't seem to advocate it as a theological argument, only an argument about reason; perhaps with a little decision theory thrown in. pathetic 10:38, 7 January 2011 (UTC)

##  "isn't anything times 0, 0?"

Annony editor asks "isn't anything times zero = zero, even infinity? undefined crops up in division rather than multiplication. " Can someone answer this for him or her? --En attendant Godot 16:56, 3 August 2011 (UTC)

In *R, 0*ω=0. So, at least sometimes, zero times infinity does indeed equal zero. It all depends on what one means by "infinity". Zack Martin  10:03, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
Short answer: infinity times 0 is undefined and requires the knowledge of how these particular limits were obtained. For example, $\lim_{x\rightarrow\infty} x^2 \cdot e^{-x}$ and $\lim_{x\rightarrow\infty} \Gamma(x) \cdot e^{-x}$ are both $0 \cdot \infty$ type indeterminate forms, but the first limit is 0 while the second limit is ∞. Of course, since Pascal's Wager presents an infinity without specifying what limit achieves it, it's simply undefined. - LucidFox (talk) 10:29, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
But why define multiplication of infinities in terms of limits? Why not take ∞ as an infinite hyperreal, say ω? No invocation of limits required, and 0*ω=0. Zack Martin  10:33, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
If you're willing to invoke non-standard calculus rather than the mainstream, limit-based calculus, then sure. It's a matter of definition and preference. - LucidFox (talk) 11:14, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
"It's a matter of definition and preference" - so, the real answer to zero times infinity is "it depends on what definitions you choose", or in other words both zero and undefined are correct answers. So, those people who go around saying "zero times infinity is zero" is wrong, are actually wrong themselves, because they are ignorant of the variety of different mathematical systems (e.g. standard vs non-standard analysis). Zack Martin  11:21, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
Incorrect. Within hyperreal numbers, there are infinitely many infinite numbers, which give different results when multiplied by zero. Furthermore, for any given finite real number x, one can find such an infinite hyperreal number y that $y \cdot 0 = x$. - LucidFox (talk) 12:18, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
Yes, there are infinitely many infinite hyperreals. We can take any of them as ∞. But as to your claim that multiplication by zero doesn't always give zero, how about a cite? Give me an example. Solve the following: $y \cdot 0 = 1$. Furthermore, since 0*x=0 is true for the reals, it would follow per the transfer principle it is true for the hyperreals too. Zack Martin  21:19, 4 August 2011 (UTC)
Okay, sorry — upon re-reading the definitions, you're right, and multiplying any infinite hyperreal by the zero yields zero. However, in terms of limits, it corresponds to multiplying an unbounded growing function by the constant zero: the limit will be zero, but it is only one of many possible limits of products. For any infinite number, there is an infinitesimal number such that their product will yield any desired standard number. - LucidFox (talk) 03:21, 5 August 2011 (UTC)
I am not quite sure what you mean by the zero - is there meant to be more than one? Not in real numbers, nor in hyperreal numbers.
Personally, I think all this talk of limits is a distraction. The question is about multiplying two numbers together, zero and infinity. Now, the problem is, there is not one infinity, or type of infinity, but many; and for some of those infinities multiplication is not very useful anyway. But, if by infinity we mean an infinite hyperreal, or an infinite superreal, or an infinite surreal, then multiplication by zero makes sense, and in all those cases it is zero. The question was not posed in terms of the limits of functions, so why bring them in? No functions have been defined to take the limit of, you just see ∞ and assume the limit of a function is being taken.
For any infinite number, there is an infinitesimal number such that their product will yield any desired standard number - not any desired standard number, any desired standard number other than zero. There is no a*b, where a is infinite and b is infinitesimal, such that a*b=0. If a*b=0, then either a=0 or b=0 or both. (At least for the hyperreals - for some other number systems, like dual or split complex numbers, it isn't true.) Zack Martin  09:52, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

##  The new wager

Hmmm... -- Seth Peck (talk) 16:36, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

##  Deletion of the 'Limitations on Immortality' sub-category

Granted my writing style isn't the best but I don't quite see why this section was deleted out. My contention is threefold.

1.) Pascal's Wager assumes that your soul is immortal. As in, it can never ever be destroyed. If your soul could cease to exist then it's not really an infinite gain (or loss) metric.

2.) Pascal's Wager further assumes that the vector in which you experience your afterlife is the only portion of your existence that is or can be immortal; every other part of your self must eventually break down and immortality is otherwise impossible to achieve. Because if you never actually die then the metric breaks down.

3.) Believing one AND two at the same time, while not logically impossible, is so incredibly specific and self-serving that it's unbelievable. Notice that it's impossible to give assumptions or evidence that strengthens one sub-section without weakening the other except by invoking special pleading. The parody of this Morton's fork is summed up in A very specific level of tired.

Solved by adding "God is real and the soul cannot be destroyed" to one of the conditions in Pascal's Wager more explicitly. They're effectively the same thing anyway. You're simply trying to refute one unfalsifiable assertion with another. gnostic 19:07, 22 October 2012 (UTC)}
That's only partway there. It's not just "God is real and the soul cannot be destroyed" but also there is no other way to achieve immortality. Pre-afterlife immortality breaks Pascal's Wager just as surely as soul destruction. I think that if an unspoken premise requires three cases of special pleading (especially if two of the premises damn near contradict each other) then it deserves some extra pontification.
Also, call me crazy, but I was under the assumption that if your argument relies on two premises that are contradictory it doesn't even matter if some, all, or none of the premises are unfalsifiable. The argument as-stands is automatically wrong until you get rid of one of the premises or add another one that removes the contradiction. Which you can't really do with Pascal's Wager since the original stakeholder hasn't for centuries been, you know, alive. Dr. Swordopolis (talk) 02:54, 23 October 2012 (UTC)
This really doesn't affect Pascal's Wager. All it suggests is that you have two possible outcomes. a) The existence of Christian God and all premises associated with it are true and b) other. The collective odds of either are irrelevant because the risk management and game theory aspects of it. d hominem 10:58, 24 October 2012 (UTC)

##  Deletion of the criticism of reversal argument and Christian criticism of the argument

@Sam I am new to this wiki. I found a peace of Christian argumentation that seems not to go outside of common logic and gnoseology. And also, a common opinion that Pascal's wager is accepted by Christians is wrong. Please explain the deletion. — Unsigned, by: MaxFerby / talk / contribs

From what I read, I'm guessing Sam undid your edit because your writing is close to indecipherable. Theory of Practice "Seneca Falls and Selma and Stonewall" 01:25, 23 January 2013 (UTC)

I don't quite understand what you define as "close to indecipherable". Should I put it to sections to make it more visual? As to me, the argumentation is no more complex than that being used through the whole article. MaxFerby (talk) 01:40, 23 January 2013 (UTC)

##  superman quote

I added that a while ago, because IMHO it captures all of the absurdities of Pascal's Wager in one nice package. I did not originally attribute it to Pascal IIRC. Someone added that later. Can I add it back in without a source?

I'm adding it back. EnlightenmentLiberal (talk) 22:16, 26 February 2013 (UTC)

##  Not even wrong?

In Pascal's own writings, where he mentions the Wager, he acknowledges its flaws but says that when so much is at stake, it doesn't matter how unlikely the chance of God existing actually is; you should still accept the Wager. Does this even warrant refutation, or is it not even wrong? --Brendan Rizzo 2013-02-26 19:33 UTC

If we accept the premise that the payoff is infinitely valuable and the probability nonzero, then his claim seems plausible. Phiwum (talk) 20:46, 26 February 2013 (UTC)
The problem still is that there is no reason to assign higher probability to a god that rewards gullibility vs a god that punishes gullibility. That's where the wager completely breaks down. Too many inconsistent gods with inconsistent demands for rewards. EnlightenmentLiberal (talk) 22:16, 26 February 2013 (UTC)
Well, he also said that a god of a religion that has many followers is more likely to exist than a god that an atheist completely made up for the sake of argument, since there is at least the possibility that revelation is correct. I don't think any "serious" deities do what the criticism suggests: punish those who have blind faith and reward skepticism. Does that affect this in any way? No matter how much I think it over, it seems fishy to me.Brendan Rizzo 2013-02-27 17:31 UTC