User talk:Animalian

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Peace. AgingHippie (talk) 20:52, 8 February 2015 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] The case for animal rights

The following represents a preliminary account of the book presently in review, The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan. I shall contribute greatly to this article in the upcoming weeks to present a robust account of all the arguments therein, condensing 400 pages into a document of several. I will also determine whether there exists a more appropriate placement for the preceding, to remove this from the main body of this article. That article now commences:

Tom Regan, following the footsteps of Peter Singer, adds to the literature in defense of animal rights, promoting a more so deontological, rather than strictly utilitarian account.

[edit] Chapter 1: animal awareness

In the first chapter, Regan refutes the Cartesian view of animal consciousness, proceeding dialectically from complete denial of animal consciousness toward a basic acknowledgement of such consciousness, embodied in his "cumulative argument for animal consciousness".

[edit] 1.1 Descartes's denial

Descartes is infamous for regarding animals as "thoughless brutes", living machines incapable of thought, and therefore devoid of any and all consciousness. However, Descartes did acknowledge that animals were aware of some things, denying only the conscious capacity for thoughts about such awareness. Though a muddy account, Descartes does offer the following hierarchy of sense-perception, the basest, merely stimulus-response, the intermediate, CNS (central nervous system) processing, and the third, awareness of things beyond the self, i.e., beyond the immediate processing of external stimuli to thoughts about the stimuli themselves. But since Descartes denies that animals possess a mind, he inadvertently denigrates animals to the lowest order of sense-perception, that of stimulus-response.

[edit] Biocentrism

Biocentrism refers to the belief that life, not just human or sentient life, is intrinsically valuable.

Debate:Biocentrism--Animalian (talk) 02:06, 1 March 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Moral Subjectivism

Moral subjectivism holds that morality is subjective, contingent on personal or cultural beliefs, similarly to moral relativism. However, many moral subjectivists argue that, since morality is ultimately subjective, morality is in fact meaningless, leading to moral nihilism, the belief that morality does not exist and should be abandoned altogether. Major criticisms of moral subjectivism and nihilism, however, include the essentiality of morality to human society, thought, and meaning, objectionable conclusions (such as that an atrocity, no matter how vile, is and never can be wrong), and the simple fact that any value, even the value of pure rationality or objectivism, necessarily presupposes the existence of morality, since value is a meta-ethical property which underlies all ethical theories, regardless of whether these theories are well-articulated. Arguments for moral subjectivism generally derive from the imputed meaninglessness of morality, stemming from the belief that morality is ultimately subjective, and hence, "choosable".--Animalian (talk) 14:33, 13 February 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Moral reasoning

Moral reasoning refers to the logical and procedural modus operandi by which we may assess moral propositions, including specific claims and acts, as distinct from strict moral principles, such as Kant’s universalizability criterion. Similar to critical thinking skills, moral reasoning proceeds by the tenets of logic and derives from the such tenets. Moral reasoning and critical thinking skills may therefore be understood as “applied logic”, and are therefore central in the assessment of both moral and nonmoral claims.

[edit] Fundamental principle of moral reasoning

The fundamental principle of moral reasoning proceeds thusly:

In the absence of a morally relevant difference, two cases must be treated like.

As stated, the “consistency principle” may be condensed to read thusly:

Like cases must be treated alike.

The converse of the first formulation is also true. More generally, both formulations derive from the logical demand of consistency, the cornerstone of most logical systems. In propositional logic, for example, were a proposition and its negation both true, the truth-value of all claims would become indeterminate, and all such claims meaningless. In essence, consistency is a logical demand of utmost importance, without which meaninglessness becomes manifest.

Likewise must we respect the logical demand for consistency in moral matters. Failure to comply with such demand leads to moral arbitrariness, which allows for the dissimilar treatment of relevantly similar persons. For example, it is morally arbitrary to award one student a C for his work and another student an A for comparable work in the absence of any morally relevant difference between either student.

To clarify the impetus against moral arbitrariness, note that historically, as at the present, moral arbitrariness has given rise to the most despicable forms of discrimination, as in the case of slavery. Wherefore rights were ascribed to wealthy, white land-owners in pre-civil war America, they were denied or abrogated in the case of poor, non-white, non-landowning persons. Quite clearly, ceteris paribus, poverty, skin pigmentation, and land ownership are neither sufficient nor morally relevant characteristics upon which to found or deny rights.

[edit] Second principle of moral reasoning

The second principle of moral reasoning is procedural rather than logical, and asserts that if one appears to have violated the consistency principle, the burden of proof to demonstrate otherwise rests with him. Since moral reasoning employs critical thinking skills and derives from logic, protocol concerning the rules of formal debate and the burden of proof follow accordingly. Not surprisingly, moral argumentation directly reflects other modes of argumentation, except that the former involves moral as opposed to nonmoral claims.

[edit] Moral reasoning in argument

Taken together, the consistency principle and the second principle, the principle of “moral burden”, outline the fundamental principles of moral reasoning. While the consistency principle makes demand upon logical consistency, the moral burden principle makes demand upon satisfaction of the burden of proof. Proper compliance with these the principles of moral reasoning, alongside other critical thinking skills, immediately improves the strength of one’s moral arguments, and are useful for winning arguments by force of superior logical argumentation.--Animalian (talk) 01:44, 1 March 2015 (UTC)

[edit] The ideal moral judgment

Though a moral judgment may never be perfectly ideal, we may specify minimum requirements by which a moral judgment may approach such an ideal. We may reformulate these requirements as questions, against which we may weigh both our judgments and the judgments of others.

[edit] Conceptual clarity

Is the meaning of the proposition and its terms sufficiently clear and understood?

[edit] Information

How well does the proposition reflect relevant information? To what extent is it factually informed?

[edit] Rationality

How well does the proposition obey the rules of logic? Is it consistent? Are its implications reasonable?

[edit] Impartiality

To what extent is the proposition or its implication morally arbitrary? Are morally relevant differences cited? Are these differences actually valid?

[edit] Coolness

How emotionally excited was the author? How calm is the author’s writing?

[edit] Valid moral principles

Does the proposition rely on valid moral principles? Is the proposition supported by valid reasons?--Animalian (talk) 05:57, 1 March 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Criteria for evaluating moral principles

The following criteria, phrased as questions, may be used to evaluate moral principles.

[edit] Consistency

Does a moral principle ever imply that the very same act can be both right and wrong?

[edit] Adequacy of scope

Is the principle too specific to be generally useful? Can it be applied to a variety of cases?

[edit] Precision

Is a principle vague in what it requires, when it comes to right and wrong?

[edit] Conformity with our intuitions

Does a moral principle imply actions consistent with our considered beliefs?--Animalian (talk) 23:50, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Critique of moral theories

Moral theories may be criticized within and beyond the domain of ethics. Whereas internal criticism focuses on whether a moral theory satisfies basic structural requirements, external criticism focuses on the relative usefulness of a given theory.

[edit] Internal criticism

Does a theory avoid contradictions? Is it unambiguous? Can the theory be generalized?

[edit] External criticism

Does the theory address more problems than another? Does it address problems more effectively than others? How powerful is it in comparison to other theories?--Animalian (talk) 02:04, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

[edit] Selective irrationality

Selective irrationality refers to cases wherein an otherwise rational individual succumbs to irrational belief or practice. A selectively irrational scientist, for example, while skeptical, analytic, and empirical in most any other domain, might accept the premise of god on blind faith, reneging her former scientific merit and scruple. In general, selective irrationality refers to cases wherein a sufficient degree of choice surrounding a belief or practice exists and one willingly and knowingly chooses an irrational belief or practice over more rational alternatives. Since the deluded are often the least likely to recognize their delusion, fulfillment of the second criterion, while rarer, indicates a deliberate act of self-delusion, and therefore constitutes a more severe indictment than irrationality alone. As such, selective irrationality applies to the aforementioned scientist if she knowingly and deliberately embraces other ways of “knowing” while simultaneously professing and practicing the scientific creed elsewhere. The indictment of selective irrationality therefore applies to deliberate acts of compartmentalization, whereby one dissociates certain aspects of his or her life from others, perhaps to hypocritical (or “selectively irrational”) extent.

[edit] Criterion of choice

The criterion of choice presumes that one possesses sufficient autonomy to choose a belief or practice him or herself. If one, for example, one is held under threat of death to believe in the “one true god” or to profess geocentric theory, one’s autonomy to choose is compromised or impaired, to varying degrees of severity. The greater autonomy one may exercise, without incurring significant damage or a sufficient risk thereof, the greater the extent to which one is culpable for his or her beliefs. Though the language thus far is vague, everyday affairs in first world countries rarely involve circumstances under which one is not or should not be held accountable for his or her beliefs, since, in such countries, one is generally free to believe, and to choose to believe, as one wishes. Consequently, otherwise competent doctors who subscribe to anti-vaccination propaganda should be harshly judged, unless the insanity plea is legitimate or held under threat of serious harm, which externalizes that particular doctor’s locus of control.--Animalian (talk) 17:17, 18 March 2015 (UTC)

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