Talk:Divine command theory

This article seems to wander all over the map... it goes from talking about its subject to a clumsy walk into arguments (and refutations) about the existence of God. What the hell is "Divine command theory" anyway, and who subscribes to it? I'm almost thinking deletion would be the kindest solution here... 07:19, 19 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Then again, maybe I just don't understand it. Or then again, I might be right in that it is written lumpily.  07:20, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Argument by assertion
I'm not sure if this is a valid line of reasoning. We are considering an axiom, here, for defining what is morally good and morally bad: What God declares good is good, what God declares bad is bad and what God does not chime in on is neither good nor bad. If we assume God has the ability to declare something morally good, then we can assume God has the ability to declare that He, Himself, is morally good. It is just a direct derivation of our initial assumption. In order to make this an argument by assertion, we would have to show that given the assertions above, there is a contradiction. Does anybody have a definition for defining something as morally good or morally bad that does not make an initial, axiomatic, assumption? --Bertrc (talk) 20:27, 19 January 2012 (UTC)
 * . . . Okay then. Removing.  -- Bertrc  (talk) 21:42, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

God and Abraham
God tells Abraham to sacrifice Isaac - and then tells Abraham not to sacrifice Isaac bur use a substitute animal.

Two mutually exclusive commands within a few lines of The Bible - therefore this theory is bunk.

Or am I misunderstanding the argument? Anna Livia (talk) 15:11, 5 October 2018 (UTC)
 * Being fooled by god's "it's just a prank yo" is necessarily morally good. ikanreed 🐐Bleat at me 17:58, 5 October 2018 (UTC)
 * For whom - and what if I switch to a Deity with a better sense of humour? Anna Livia (talk) 22:22, 5 October 2018 (UTC)