Talk:W.V.O. Quine

Indispensability argument for Platonism and Scientific Realism
Would it be of any use to somehow add a link to category mistake in the objections to conceptual/abstract objects because they 'don't exist in space and time and don't partake in cause and effect' (also because they are usually taken to be causally inert anyway, I think it could be considered a category error to treat abstract objects as if they need a physical location). To which an issue from formal theories of languages could be relevant: what interpretation of 'existence'? (By which I at least just mean it's a bit strict to assume 'existence' in a spatiotemporal and causal way, this argument doesn't necessarily exempt claims of supernatural entities and extravagant metaphysics by the way, because these often claim physical existence and interaction with processes of cause and effect etc. (while being either utmost unfalsifiable or having no significant evidence in their favour), unlike things like numbers). The point about metaphysics is relevant to Quine's opposition to modal logic, at least I think, if I'm not mistaken, with arguments for and against some kind of 'actual' existence of possible worlds (there exist objections to and criticisms of rigid designators too, but at least modal logic is pretty well accepted as object/field of study, as interesting and useful, regardless of further views). Perhaps that doesn't immediately belong here on a page for Quine though and it might just unnecessarily complicate the point, and I have to say I'm mainly aware of discussions and claimed problems concerning these things, but I'm not entirely read up well enough myself to say much more, in depth, than this at the moment. Perhaps Leucippus could also still add to this, they're more familiar with Quine specifically than I am I think. I hope this is a somewhat useful note and that I haven't just spammed a few associations that might just be irrelevant. ConverginglyRational (talk) 19:26, 19 November 2022 (UTC)
 * I don't know if category mistake is appropriate because those factors are often used to define what abstract objects even are to begin with. Nominalists argue that accepting the existence of such entities would have to entail something like Plato's world of forms, or some sort of supranatural existence for abstract entities somehow outside our natural universe. That's often why mathematical realism is conflated with Platonism.  If you were to reject this claim you would have to then provide a definition of abstract objects independent of space, time, casual relations, etc. Nominalists are not suggesting that abstract objects need a physical location, but that they necessarily lack one and that is what makes them relevantly different from concrete objects (in addition to existing outside time, and not partaking causal relations).  They are saying that such properties (being in space and time, etc) are not applicable to abstract objects. - Only Sort of Dumb (talk) 20:12, 19 November 2022 (UTC).
 * No, sorry, I was mistaken, that's right, 'category mistake' would only be applicable if the objects were dealt with in ways that seem to need to assume inapplicable properties, simply making the position or argument incoherent, and I don't think that's usually the issue, it's rather disagreement about what has which properties and what kind of things can exist in the first place. I was mixing different points, it was a confused suggestion. It just generally bothers me that the precise meaning of 'ontology' and 'existence' in such philosophical debates often only becomes clear when proponents of different positions state what kinds of things they would consider to (be able to) 'exist' or not, making it seemingly largely a semantic argument, as they all just define it for themselves, but I am aware it's a bit more complicated than that and that real arguments back and forth can be made. I was being a bit messy with the arguments and concepts. Thanks for your response any way. ConverginglyRational (talk) 21:23, 19 November 2022 (UTC)