Talk:Logical positivism

The Antithesis
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Argument that logical positivism is self-defeating
This page contains some responses to the claim that logical positivism is self-defeating, however I think they are not thought out very well.
 * Logical positivism is criticized for "proving too much", making it self-defeating. Positivism asserts that any statement that cannot be empirically tested is meaningless. However, logical positivism is a philosophy, and cannot be itself empirically tested. By its own criterion, therefore, logical positivism is meaningless. This sort of language chopping is accepted as cleverness by some - philosophers resent their work being of practical use almost as much as mathematicians do.

"This sort of language chopping is accepted as cleverness by some". Well, its not language-chopping, its philosophy (unless all philosophy is language-chopping). If you want to play the game of philosophy, you have to do what philosophers do. You can't try to adopt their theories when they suit your position, and then dismiss criticisms of the same idea as "language-chopping". That's having your cake and eating it too.


 * Considering that logical positivism is a philosophy essentially "reverse engineered" to explain the success of the scientific method in explaining many aspects of the world, its statements are actually testable - in the way that they may or may not be considered guiding principles for science.

No, that doesn't work. The success of science does not prove the correctness of logical positivism. Many scientists have had all sorts of non-scientific beliefs which logical positivism would reject as meaningless, and there is no evidence their success in science has suffered for it. A good example -- belief in the objective truth or falsehood of ethical propositions -- something I am sure that many (but not all) scientists believe, but which in itself has no impact positive or negative on their scientific ability, yet logical positivists rejected this idea. Arguably, some specific ethical beliefs might impede scientific progress, such as opposition to some form of experiments (animal experimentation, embryo experimentation, etc.). But there is nothing about holding ethical beliefs to be objective which inherently interferes with scientific progress. Anyway, we should keep clear in our minds the distinction between metaethics and ethics, and their independence from each other -- specific ethical theories may interfere with science; but metaethical theories (like the objective truth of ethics) can't impede science, since metaethics and ethics are independent. Likewise, many scientists have held religious views. Now, some specific religious views may interfere with scientific progress in some areas. But, there are many religious views which do not interfere with science at all. So, if logical positivism seeks to reject religion, can it really claim it is helping science in doing so? Just because logical positivism drew its influence from some of the fundamental principles of the scientific method, does not mean it can claim the success of the scientific method as its own success.


 * A softened version of logical positivism might hold that "ideas without a real-world basis or real world application are useless."

Which is so vague, that it isn't a philosophical theory any more. Logical positivism may well be wrong, but at least it is precisely defined enough that it can be demonstrated to be wrong. That claim is so vague and fluffy, it can't be proven or disproven at all. (It's unfalsifiable!)

Actually, in academic philosophy, basically no one believes in logicial positivism anymore. It seems to be mainly outside of academia that people want to keep it alive. There are many people in academia that still have sympathy with the goals of the logical positivist project, and think that (in it's day), it was a fruitful line of investigation; but its problems -- being self-defeating; having multiple competing formulations with no clear way of choosing which is the right one, etc., are too insurmountable. I think, a contributor (or contributors) to this page have decided to adopt logical positivism as their own philosophy, on the basis of its attractiveness to them, but don't want to conside the later developments which have killed it off.

That is not to say that there may not be some theory, which shares the aims of logical positivism (a philosophy to support science and oppose metaphysics/religion/theology/etc), yet somehow escapes the problems which logical positivism had. But it isn't classical logical positivism, its going to be something new. And it needs to be clear about how it differs from classical logical positivism, and how it avoids the issues which logical positivism suffers from. --Maratrean (talk) 02:58, 27 February 2011 (UTC)
 * It's true that the axiomatic foundation of positivism is itself not a statement that can be verified or falsified. That doesn't mean this whole school is self-contradictory and critically flawed, though - modern postpositivists simply accept that it's not an all-encompassing doctrine that can be seamlessly integrated with a philosophy of mind. They accept that the first tenet has to be taken "on faith", but can be tentatively corroborated by the success of the venture. I don't get your point about scientists holding unfalsifiable beliefs while still conducting successful scientific work - all that shows is that scientists, like all humans, are capable of simultaneously holding two or more inconsistent beliefs. They can only be successful scientists because they don't let their other beliefs interfere with their work, though. What kind of ethical ideas they subscribe to is completely unrelated with this. Positivism, or indeed any philosophy of science, does not venture into ethics, and whether or not a certain action would contribute to the success of science is not a factor in determining its permissibility. Finally, positivism was not thought up in order to reject religion, that's merely collateral damage (or IMHO, profit) of scientific or simply evidence-based reasoning. Religions often make pretty grandiose claims about the real world, and rather often, they will conflict with established scientific knowledge. In such cases, we need a method to determine which explanation is more likely to be the correct one, and that's obviously the point where the positivist emphasis on evidence is crucial.


 * Apart from that, I agree that there are some religious conceptions that are so abstract and vague in nature that they will never come into conflict with scientific knowledge, like most forms of deism and some Eastern philosophy-religions. They're not the problem, but at the same time, the idea of gods or cosmic principles that are completely indifferent towards humans isn't very appealing to many people. Unfortunately, it's the truly dangerous religions are also among the most popular. Röstigraben (talk) 09:08, 27 February 2011 (UTC)

It depends on how precisely you define logical positivism. The definitions in the philosophical literature I am familiar with get quite precise -- for example, every cognitively meaningful statement is either an analytic a priori statement, or a synthetic a posteriori statement possessing an effective verification procedure. When we talk about logical positivism with such precision (and, being founded by professional philosophers, that is kind of precision with which it was originally stated), it is clear it is self-defeating. Now, if you want to talk about a more vague wishy-washy logical positivism, that isn't precisely defined -- well, admittedly that isn't self-defeating, because it is too vague to be self-defeating. But really, if something kinda like logical positivism but not really, is what you are after, why not call it something else? (Your term postpositivism is a good one.)

My point about scientists holding unfalsfiable beliefs, is we shouldn't call the success of science a success of positivism. One can be a perfectly productive scientist while adopting views widely different from positivism; the scientific method, while not compatible with every worldview, is compatible in practice with a wide variety. And, its not about scientists being "capable of simultaneously holding two or more inconsistent beliefs". There is no inconsistency required in, for instance, holding to the scientific method while believing in deism. The scientific method only applies when doing science; deism is not part of science, so the scientific method is irrelevant to it. Another example would be mathematical Platonism. One scientist may be a Platonist in the philosophy of mathematics (a position logical postivists disdained), another a formalist (a position of which they would have more approved) -- but, since the philosophy of mathematics has nothing to do with the scientific method, their views in this area have nothing to do with their efficacy as scientists.

I would question your claim that positivism was not thought up to reject religion. That was not the only motivation for it, but I think it very much was an objective of members of the Vienna Circle, and of Comte before them, to come up with a theory that would in part serve to reject religion. Religions do at times conflict with scientific claims, but there is nothing about religion which necessarily does this. It is completely possible to come up with a religion which does not conflict with science, and is unlikely to ever do so in the future.

You are wrong when you say positivism does not venture into ethics. Many logical positivists adopted the metaethical theory of emotivism, which they felt was a natural consequence of their logical positivism. It is hard to be a logical positivist without subscribing to non-cognitivist metaethics. Yet, such a metaethical theory really does nothing to advance the cause of science (its irrelevant). My point was, again, its wrong to try to use the success of science as an argument for the truth of logical positivism, since in many areas logical positivism has nothing to do with science, its an irrelevancy. --Maratrean (talk) 09:27, 27 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Postpositivism isn't my term, that's an established label within the evolution of the philosophy of science. It is a necesarily unprecise umbrella term, though. It's usually used to denote the developments since strict positivism was the dominant paradigm, and I'd subsume pragmatism and scientific realism under it, which have replaced it. The point of the endeavour is simply to provide a philosophical explanation for the success of science, not to develop a general system of metaphysics. The scientific method came first, and then people began to wonder about how this is actually possible - the point the article makes about it being "reverse-enginnered" is a good one, I think. It seems like you're attacking a strawman when you accuse positivists of adhering to tenets which they've actually abandoned some time ago, advancing an all-encompassing metaphysical and ethical doctrine, and last but not least targetting religion as a specific objective. That's just not the case, it actually is a pretty wishy-washy, pragmatist attempt to supply one rather limited explanation.
 * Once more about the compatibility of science and religion, again, I agree that some of them are compatible, and it is certainly possible to come up with another such religion. The question is, why do it? Why go to great lenghts to construct some deist-based new religion (or reformulation of an existing one) that is not at odds with established scientific knowledge and is designed in a way that ensures it never will be, no matter what we find out about the world? Why come up with something that will by definition not add anything to our understanding of and explanations for how the world works, while introducing unnecessary new assumptions? And let's face it, the religions that have been the most successful in capturing human imagination were nothing like that. There's not much appeal in a god who will not interfere with the world, won't listen to your prayers and won't grant you an afterlife. Röstigraben (talk) 10:08, 27 February 2011 (UTC)

I'm not attacking a strawman when I say logical positvitists adhere to certain meta-ethical theories. Its true that they did. Contemporary postpositivists might not, but contemporary postpostivists are not logical positivists. It's not attacking a strawman to attack ideas that logical positivists used to believe -- these aren't outdated ideas of a current group, they are the actual historical ideas of a group which largely doesn't exist any more. Do contemporary postpositivists subscribe to non-cognitivist metaethics? I would guess many still do. Some might just avoid the topic entirely. But how can a positivist/logical positivist/postpositivist possibly justify subscription to a cognitivist metaethics? (well, maybe naïve subjectivism - but who actually believes that?)

You can't just silo off the philosophy of science from the rest of philosophy. Logical positivism was not just a position in the philosophy of science -- it was a position in philosophy, so it had implications in other areas of philosophy also, such as metaethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of religion, etc. You might see this as just being about philosophy of science, but that is not how the Vienna Circle, etc., saw themselves.

I don't think its a strawman to say logical positivists wanted some ammunition to reject religion. I think thats true as a statement of human motivations. That doesn't necessarily they were right or wrong -- the correctness of someone's belief is not dependent upon their reasons for adopting. Neither is it true that rejecting religion was their sole, or even primary motivation. But I find it hard to believe it was not a motivation, even if only one among many, and even not the most important one.

I don't think there is any necessary conflict between believing in an afterlife and science. Some theories of an afterlife may conflict with science; but there is nothing about an afterlife which is necessarily contradictory to science. --Maratrean (talk) 10:29, 27 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Years late, but I do notice a non-sequitur here: "I don't think there is any necessary conflict between believing in an afterlife and science. ...there is nothing about an afterlife which is necessarily contradictory to science." It starts about believing such a thing actually exists, but it is non-sequitur to try to support that by saying it is merely not "necessarily contradictory to science".  Brianpansky (talk) 09:58, 3 September 2014 (UTC)

I don't think I buy the argument that "The most famous principle of logical positivism is that any statement that is not inherently verifiable is meaningless and can be safely ignored. Since this statement is itself inherently unverifiable, logical positivism tells us that logical positivism can be safely ignored". I don't see how the statement is unverifiable, inherently or otherwise. Whether something can be "safely ignored" seems quite testable. Brianpansky (talk) 10:05, 3 September 2014 (UTC)

BoN edit
Can someone who has studied/is studying philosophy take a look? Тy  Please do not click on this  20:05, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * I've rolled it back: don't care how accurate it is, such a large alteration should be talk paged first. Pippa (talk) 20:09, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * You don't expect us to have actual knowledge of this stuff?!?!? ADK ...I'll untie your ripple! 20:11, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * Nah, only you to ADK. Тy  [[User talk:Ty| Yes?

]]
 * Did you actually look at the edits. a large number of them did nothing but make what was already there, read better.  I'm dubious of the idea that "you should talk on the talk page first", since that is not how most of us do anything.  I've had things i've written be whole scale dumped and edited, and i've done the same.  Is the only real issue here, that the poster isn't logged in?  cause that i guess i could understand.  but again, i would favor looking over the edits and not just saying "you need to talk on the talk page first".  --[[Image:Pink mowse.png|25px]]En attendant Godot  20:29, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * I think it's that the edit was large and the subject matter was unfamiliar. It's just diligence to rollback and check rather than to just let something that you're unsure about stand. If it was a well-known logged-in user then it's likely people would be more trusting of it if they weren't sure of the subject matter themselves. ADK ...I'll litigate your cellulite! 20:31, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * And if you're unsure of the subject matter, you don't have the skill to really assess whether it's right or reads better. ADK ...I'll reiterate your dyslexia! 20:32, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * See, if I don't get it, I ask. Тy  [[User talk:Ty| communications wire

]] 20:35, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * It needs formatting but the material is good. I think the rollback was a bit paranoid, and shouldn't be our default reaction to contributions. 72.38.27.39 (talk) 20:36, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * There are some really excellent changes, and it is so much less wordy and (godot-like) in its style now. I'd look carefully at each paragraph and see "what's what". Which things make sense as juts better writing, which you need to look up or verify?  dear annony editor, you could help by making less changes at once... but you probably aren't even reading the talk page.

--En attendant Godot 20:39, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * The edit is fine, it's factually correct and makes the article more focused. Röstigraben (talk) 20:41, 8 July 2011 (UTC)
 * And upon googling it, I just found the first Conservapedia article I actually agree with. Wow. Still a copypaste, though. Röstigraben (talk) 20:44, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

"Theology" section
Why remove the theology section? The relationship between logical positivism and religious language (e.g. are religious claims verifiable?) is a real topic in the philosophy of religion. It isn't irrelevant. 08:38, 9 July 2011 (UTC)
 * If you feel the need to assert specific theological points against an already-abandoned philosophical position, you're always free to write another essay. The section was a serious distraction from the topic of the article, and way too narrow - the positivists' criticism was not that it is impossible to make testable claims from a theological position, but that such positions will always rest on untestable assumptions, and the vast majority of their statements will come in the same form. It bugs me that CP actually has a better article on a topic that is relevant to RW's mission and the philosophy of science, hence the rewrite. Röstigraben (talk) 08:47, 9 July 2011 (UTC)
 * Well, the section I wrote basically corresponds to the points about religion in the section of CP's article "Theology and ethics", but goes further by discussing some religious responses to the challenge of LP. One approach obviously is to deny LP's criterion of meaningfulness; another, which is what it was addressing, is approaches which accept LP's criterion of meaningfulness, but then argues that much (although not all) of religious language is meaningful by that criterion (e.g. afterlife claims can be verified by dying; God claims can be verified by meeting God in the afterlife; etc.) Most of this isn't my own work (although I admit the notion of a "post-death scientific community" is my own idea); there are references in the literature which say the same points I'm making (they do exist, although I don't have the cites handy right now, although if I remember they are mostly papers from the 1950s or thereabouts) 08:57, 9 July 2011 (UTC)
 * As I said, all of that can be much better accomodated in an essay. Mainspace articles aren't the place to conduct debates or raise narrow, highly specific objections to the principles it's supposed to describe. I'd advise against bringing this up on Conservapedia, though - that would only call attention to what is literally the only good article I've ever seen there. So far, it seems to have escaped detection by CP's crack team of sysop-vandals, and I fear for the article if Ken notices it. Röstigraben (talk) 09:06, 9 July 2011 (UTC)

Flowstone continua pace positivist fissures
The positivists wanted the analytic/synthetic distinction to separate the cognitively meaningful—analytic and synthetic—from the cognitively meaningless—neither analytic nor synthetic; the analytic/synthetic distinction was thus a criterion of cognitive meaningfulness (alongside verificationism).

This entailed that a sharp line could be drawn, with scientific language on one side and metaphysical language on the other side:
 * scientific language | metaphysical language.

However, no such line can be drawn (principally due to the insuperable difficulties positivism faced, which I shan't go into here); scientific language and metaphysical language exist on a continuum, distinguished only by gradation:
 * scientific languageǁǁ‖ǁmetaphysical language (where each '‖' signifies the gradation that is characteristic of a continuous quantity).

Metaphysical language is excluded from science because it fails to have the required degree of: objectivity, clarity, precision, etc. All metaphysical language, however, has some degree of objectivity, clarity, and precision—but no metaphysical language tends towards the limit set by science viz. maximum: objectivity, clarity, and precision (amongst other canons). Similar remarks apply to Popper's "demarcation problem" and to, more generally, the distinction between science and nonscience (though, off the top of my head, I'm struggling to see how to argue this extended-point concisely).

Finally, I do not wish to criticise positivism, so as to exculpate metaphysics and its protean brethren; rather, instead I wish to highlight that positivist perfervour for sharp distinctions may actually impede the progress of science; our broadest scientific laws may escape evidence altogether, one thinks here of string theory—"they may fall out of fashion,...they are never refuted by direct observation, they are the old soldiers who never die but only fade away"—Natsuhiko Yoshida wrote (pp. 207-8).

Addendum: It is worth noting that in discussing distinctions, or demarcations for that matter, we are discussing language. Language is simply a set of phonemes, a set of sounds. Thus, by substitution, to say that 'there is a sharp distinction between one sentence and another', can be substituted for\there is a sharp distinction between one string of phonemes and another string of phonemes\this seems less plausible and ought to raise a few eyebrows. To impose on language sharp distinctions, is to segregate sounds. Leucippus Salva veritate 22:14, 24 July 2021 (UTC)