Talk:Scientific method

I like the charts. Based on them, I would agree with Ann Coulter that many liberal political ideas are matters of faith. --Uncle Ed bug me 08:53, 27 October 2007 (EDT)

Kuhn
Yes, Kuhn never get enough.--Bobbing for apples 10:23, 27 October 2007 (EDT)

Chart
Great chart! Couldn't it be displayed large enough to read?  Rational Ed perception 12:03, 5 May 2008 (EDT)
 * Agreed, the chart is good. I had no problem reading it. What resolution were you using? Or has that problem already been fixed? OneForLogic 19:42, 7 July 2008 (EDT)

Cover (please do not archive)
Wouldn't it be nice if we were older if we made this article good enough to be a cover story? 00:16, 26 April 2010 (UTC)
 * You're right. Then we wouldn't have to wait so long. Mei (talk) 00:17, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

Subjective opinion, not fact
"The scientific method is the single most successful epistemological system for deriving knowledge"

The "most successful"? That's an entirely subjective statement and one I happen to disagree with.

Yes, the scientific method is very successful for physics. But for mathematicians, it is entirely an inappropriate method. They choose axioms and derive knowledge through logical deduction. Mathematicians do not do experiments to test the validity of their theories. The same is true in the Austrian School of economics, where knowledge is derived from a set of a priori and empirical truths - such as the fact that humans use purposeful action to remove felt uneasiness, or the fact that people value leisure.

I guess logicians, mathematicians, and economists are pseudoscientific cranks since they do not use the scientific method. 1+1=2 is unfalsifiable, mystical mumbo-jumbo. &mdash; Unsigned, by: Doubledork / talk / contribs
 * Yup, pretty much. 02:26, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * In math, you can prove whether something is true or not. Back when I was in school, it was called "show your work." 1+1=2 is falsifiable, because you can prove that, if I have 1 apple and someone gives me an apple, I have 2 apples, and not 3. You can prove that a2+b2=c2, because if you work out the mathematical functions and, say, build a exact model of the pythagorean theorem, that is the case and there is no other alternative. SO, to say that math is not falsifiable is to have a misunderstanding of what is meant by the term "falsifiable." Conservative Punk (talk) 06:20, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Economics is as good as the scientific method?--BobSpring is sprung! 12:43, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * derived from a set of a priori and empirical truths - Aaaarghhhh!!! No wonder economists are driving the world into poverty. We scientists dropped a priori and empirical truths back in the renaissance. Wake up guys, all your assumptions need to be tested. Jack Hughes (talk) 13:29, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Do you reject a priori truths, such as 1+1=2? If you reject a priori truths arising from the logical structure of the human mind, then you must reject the significance of human knowledge. Ideas and theories are simply natural phenomena occuring in the brain. Ideas produced by the brain cannot be true or false any more than gall produced by the liver can be true gall or false gall.Doubledork (talk) 01:48, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * OK, at least your first comment was fairly coherent. Now you're comparing ideas popping out of the brain to organic secretions?  I think you lost me there.  02:07, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm trying to say (badly) that the human mind is the ultimate judge of truth and falsity. Without at least some a priori knowledge, one is lost adrift in a world of ideas which, being mere physical phenomena produced by the brain, possess no inherent truth or falsity on their own.&mdash; Unsigned, by: Doubledork / talk / contribs
 * (unindent) I think, when you use the term "theory," you make a common mistake about what a theory actually is. 02:01, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, I should have said theorem in some cases. &mdash; Unsigned, by: Doubledork / talk / contribs
 * Please remember to sign your comments. Thank you. If you think the Austrian School is a priori "truth" you're fricking nuts, but I knew that already. No math is a priori true, all math is basically "If A, B, and C, then all this other stuff", with A, B, and C being generally interesting axioms.  See non-Euclidean geometry...  03:55, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * "If you think the Austrian School is a priori "truth" you're fricking nuts" - It's not entirely a priori truth. For example, if one rejects the axiom that people value leisure, than some of its theorems would be rendered invalid. Or, if there is an error found in the deductive reasoning involved, then that would also render theorems invalid. I don't see why using axioms and deductive logic in the field of economics is fricking nuts, any more than using a certain set of mathematical axioms (e.g. Euclidean postulates) and derived theorems in the field of physics is fricking nuts.Doubledork (talk) 06:09, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Because mathematics deals with Platonic ideals and the effects of these axioms won't hurt anyone. However if you go around trying to put in place economic policies based on inductive reasoning and it turns out your axioms are wrong, you may have just killed a few million people before you find out. 06:24, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * So you're saying nuclear physics is not a valid scientific field to study in, just because a few hundred thousand people might be incinerated in a fusion experiment (again)?Doubledork (talk) 18:50, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Doubledork, Occam's razor really really suggests this conceptual problem is in your head rather than in the scientific method - David Gerard (talk) 07:05, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Wow, both at Pi and David. Smart peoples as opposed to you silly Austrian School, which lacks brains.  Really, it's just dogma.  07:23, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * DATS JUST ARUGENMT FORM AUTHORITAH YUO FALLACE - David Gerard (talk) 07:35, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I think the original issue was whether science is "the most successful" because maths doesn't use The Method- which is sort of true, but then again, maths is a tool of science, rather than a rival of science, so it doesn't apply anyway. But, that said, mathematics alone hasn't sent rockets to the moon, treated cancer, wiped out diseases, created the internet or delved into the origins of the universe and the structure of matter. I think by any metric for sucess, the statement is hardly subjective. 13:07, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * You are being too narrow-minded! Just think what the Austrian School of economics has done for us!--BobSpring is sprung! 13:34, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * The original issue was whether the scientific method is the "most successful" at deriving KNOWLEDGE, not whether science is better than math at curing cancer. If you think it's not a mere opinion that it's the "most successful" method, then let's hear your proof. Of course it's more impressive if you use the scientific method to prove it and not any other methods like logical argumentation.


 * "I think by any metric for sucess, the statement is hardly subjective."


 * How about this metric? If a psychic like John Edwards quantitatively makes more money than a physicist, then it is an unambiguous demonstration of how speaking to the deceased can be a more successful method of producing valuable knowledge than the scientific method is.Doubledork (talk) 18:47, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * So what better system for deriving knowledge about the world are you proposing? The Austrian School of economics?--BobSpring is sprung! 18:50, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I propose no single method: the scientific method and logical deduction (e.g. used in mathematics) are both great. In the field of economics, it is my opinion that logical deduction is more effective. Alas, the scientific method is powerless to measure and quantify the natural phenomena of people's motives, wants, and feelings. There are no constant relations or quantities in the field of human action. It is meaningless to say that person A is 1.32 times as valuable a friend as person B is.Doubledork (talk) 19:01, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * What we say is that it's the best method. We don't say that it's the only method. I would suggest that if you want to challenge the statement then you would need to propose a better method.--BobSpring is sprung! 19:10, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It is not the best in every circumstance: one does not use the scientific method to integrate a polynomial. For a person whose favorite thing in the world is doing graph theory (say, Erdos), then the scientific method may overall be the worst method. It is entirely subjective.


 * By the way, I was bit too harsh on the scientific method - it is valuable even in mathematics. The Riemann Hypothesis is often taken to be true for practical purposes (e.g. many proofs are contingent on it) because it has not been falsified despite trillions of zeroes have been located. As another example, there is little doubt that some mathematicians do lots of numerical experimentation, make a conjecture, and try to falsify it with more experiments before going to the bother of proving it outright - a good example is Euler's polynomial expansion of his Euler function (1-x)(1-xx)(1-x^3)...=1-x-x^2+x^5+x^7-... There is a specific example where Euler finds 9 data satisfying a certain conjecture but the 10th falsifies it http://www.maa.org/editorial/euler/How%20Euler%20Did%20It%2022%20False%20induction.pdfDoubledork (talk) 19:35, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Your opposition of economics and science is a strong indication that you are using a special personal definition of "science" that other people do not. Economists most certainly know what science is, and economics most certainly aspires to being scientific. It's difficult to perform really interesting experiments, but then the same is true of astronomy. Unless your personal working definition of "science" excludes astronomy too. As for mathematics, that is of course an art rather than a science. (Ask any mathematician.) It is, however, useful to science and to engineering, so gets rather more funding than the Old Norse poetry department. And your assertion concerning John Edward shows that his method is more likely to make money, which is true - but you then asserted from nowhere that making money equaled knowledge of anything other than making money, slipping it in without explaining where you got it from - David Gerard (talk) 19:34, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * "you are using a special personal definition of "science" that other people do not."
 * What about this Nobel prize winning Austrian economist and friend of Popper? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Hayek

"In his philosophy of science, which has much in common with that of his good friend Karl Popper, Hayek was highly critical of what he termed scientism: a false understanding of the methods of science that has been mistakenly forced upon the social sciences, but that is contrary to the practices of genuine science... Hayek points out that much of science involves the explanation of complex multi-variable and non-linear phenomena, and that the social science of economics and undesigned order compares favourably with such complex sciences as Darwinian biology."Doubledork (talk) 19:47, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Make your point in your own words rather than a vague argument to authority and a text dump. If you claim to have a point, you actually have to make it - David Gerard (talk) 19:44, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I suppose we can go back to basics and define "knowledge". Knowledge, from the OED is:

"(i) expertise, and skills acquired by a person through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject; (ii) what is known in a particular field or in total; facts and information; or (iii) awareness or familiarity gained by experience of a fact or situation."
 * I can't see how logical deduction from nothing (essentially tantamount to "pulling it out of your arse") can help with any of those. To gain knowledge, by any accepted definition, you have to look at the world and derive understanding of it. And this is what science is, it starts with the world and derives its knowledge from it. Knowledge certainly doesn't come from maths or mere deduction - in fact they often tend to be wrong as most Greek "science" tended to be like this and they had some truly crazy ideas. 19:50, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, knowledge in the field of mathematics isn't real knowledge. Gauss was a blithering idiot and had no expertise, skills, or understanding. Also, strawberry is objectively better than chocolate.Doubledork (talk) 19:56, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm just going to go talk to a brick wall for a moment. 19:58, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Wait a second. "A priori truths", "Psychics are more valuable than physicists because they make more money", "A is A".  I sense a pattern here. OBJECTIVIST!  BURN THE WITCH!  -- 20:20, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * "A priori truths" AKA axioms. "Psychics are more valuable than physicists" - I was basically making a joke. I don't believe in supernatural phenomena at all. I was just showing how, if one subjectively values money, then psychic methods can be more valuable than scientific method. But I really believe that saying the scientific method is better than some other method (say, mathematical deduction) of deriving knowledge is like saying strawberry is better than chocolate. "OBJECTIVIST!" - Are you referring to Ayn Rand's philosophy? Unfortunately, I know little about that subject.Doubledork (talk) 20:29, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * You appear to be pulling random statements out of your arse now. Just for one last try at getting you to say whatever it is you're trying to say in a vaguely coherent manner:
 * Above, you placed economics in opposition to the scientific method. Your Hayek quote appears to contradict this, he appears to support my point. Please explain what your point about raising economics actually was.
 * What is it you're thinking of that works better than the scientific method for gaining knowledge?
 * Do you actually understand what we're all trying to say here?
 * That'll do for a start - David Gerard (talk) 20:34, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * "Please explain what your point about raising economics actually was." - Apart from the scientific method, there are other methods for obtaining knowledge, such as logical deduction. Such methods are primarily used in some fields of knowledge like mathematics and Austrian economics (of which Hayek and his teacher Mises were chief figures).


 * "What is it you're thinking of that works better than the scientific method for gaining knowledge?" - For obtaining the knowledge of "what is the integral of a polynomial like x^3+x^2", logical deduction works better than the scientific method.


 * "Do you actually understand what we're all trying to say here?" - Not really. It's a confusing mixture of ad hominem remarks, math knowledge isn't real knowledge, the scientific method must be objectively better because it produces rockets, etc.Doubledork (talk) 20:47, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * OK then. You don't think economics is in science because it uses deduction. Do you think astronomy is in science? Why/why not? - David Gerard (talk) 20:50, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * If you define "science" specifically as using the scientific method, then I agree mathematics and Austrian economics are not sciences. Other schools of economics may be sciences per your definition - although I trust in the knowledge obtained from non-scientific mathematics and Austrian economics more than anything from those schools (markets are incredibly complex, and economic experiment is incredibly difficult). Astronomy is obviously a science according to your definition - since one makes falsifiable conjectures and checks them through experiment.


 * BTW, I wish to add a point: the "thought experiment" method - which I consider to be closer to logical deduction than the scientific method - was used by Einstein to successfully produce knowledge.Doubledork (talk) 21:04, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * You're back to implying personal, non-normative meanings of terms so as to try to make your argument come out. So I think I'll leave you about there - David Gerard (talk) 21:18, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * For my edification, please clarify which term was non-normative.Doubledork (talk) 21:22, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Was it the term "science" that bothers you? From www.dictionary.com:
 * –noun
 * 1. a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws: the mathematical sciences. Doubledork (talk) 21:35, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Although I don't usually abide by your restricted definition, I have no problem doing so for the sake of a productive discussion.Doubledork (talk) 21:35, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * You're telling me something clearly from your own head that makes no sense in terms of anything anyone else here has said as being my definition. Er, what? Honestly, it's like the cartoon. I'll just type some word salad now. Saying, (skull !) was, hive, comb and quoite, (this was a gugglet of cash, loss of Lewes, bad clap? Oo! Ah! Augs and Take off Bissavolo, missbrand her patterjackmartins about all the bucker's field, lying chap, floodsupplier of Isid, Totumcalmum, saith: I not dubiously pure, visibly divergent, as Day the whole side of a brace of Milltown etcetera by picky-pocky ten o'connell, and they might just how olld of Buckley who was joined by his holdfour stomachs (Dare! O why?): the fearstung boaconstrictor and dear thank yous! when to tell the heartvein throbbing between colours with such sneezing cold hands - David Gerard (talk) 21:38, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * "You're telling me something clearly from your own head that makes no sense in terms of anything anyone else here has said as being my definition."


 * Then please speak more clearly. You said "OK then. You don't think economics is in science because it uses deduction.". But I don't agree with that statement. I think economics, mathematics, and astronomy are all a part of science (the common usage of the word).Doubledork (talk) 21:48, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't want to quibble over definitions, so please tell me what science is and let's proceed with the discussion. But in my defense, mathematics is known as the Queen of Sciences and economics is often called the dismal science. They are both sciences in the common use of the word.Doubledork (talk) 22:46, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

Mathematics works to derive self-contained truths within the axioms it sets up. It essentially creates a little world with a known set of rules, and derives consequences of those rules. The consequences, derivations, proofs, etc are all dependent on the axioms that are used to start with. It is not a method of deriving knowledge outside of the little imaginary world of its axioms, though it so happens that we can setup a series of axioms such that the rules correlate well with our observed empirical reality.

We can derive "theories" that make predictions, and we can test those theories empirical, and once a given theory has been backed by a large enough amount of empirical data we can use those theories to make predictions, or as "short cuts" for deriving empirical results. That is how F=MA works, we can use it to derive an estimate of an empirical value, because there is such a wealth of empirical evidence to back up that it is accurate.

So today we can use classical physic's equations to solve for certain values under certain circumstances, but when they were first derived they had to be empirically tested first. tmtoulouse 23:23, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Very apt description. I can't find anything to disagree with. Yes, F=ma depended on rigorous verification with the scientific method before it could be used confidently with the deductive method. But before it was F=ma, it was F=dp/dt, a statement which cannot be fully appreciated without depending on the deductive methods employed to construct calculus. Both epistemological methods are invaluable for acquiring knowledge. One is not objectively better than the other.Doubledork (talk) 23:30, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * The center piece of my thesis work is a mathematical model of a cognitive system. I set up a series of rules, constructed stripped down representations of environments, and showed how my model learns and adjusts behavior. Within its self contained world of its actions are derivable, predictable and consistent. All with little to no need for empirical simulations (though many of the environment models have random elements that make simulations useful) so the basic behavior of the model is completely dependent on the initial mathematics. The whole underlying thing is a construction of random ideas in my head, collected from other peoples ideas, from random insights at 3 am while making funny shapes on the blackboard, drunken eureka moments, and carefully thought out derived trial and error processes. None of it matters though unless I can "anchor" it to some sort of biological reality. I have to take empirical evidence from animal behavior, drug studies, lesion studies, cell recordings, etc. and find as many analogs as possible showing that my model works similarly to how the biological system might work. Only once that empirical evidence is in place does any of this matter.
 * There are stages to science, the first is "where do ideas come from" and the second is "how do we know which ideas are less wrong than others." I don't think there are many people out there that would argue that the former is derived solely through empirical observation. The initial idea, hypothesis or inkling can come from anywhere the point though is that if we want to figure out which ideas are less wrong the singly most successful approach is the scientific method. 00:38, 7 July 2010

The discussion with Truth seeker continues
Here's something I know: if science helps us know things, then science helps us know things. Notice that there is no way to falsify this thesis, for it's not the sort of thesis that could be false. (That's another thing I know--that the thesis in question cannot be false.) Therefore, this thing that I know is not known by me via the scientific method. How do I know it then? Well, clearly by "just thinking" about it (which I also know by just thinking). This method of "just thinking" about something seems fairly successful (when I just think about it :)). Has it been established that the scientific method is a better method than the method of "just thinking"? How can we know?

Also: I noticed that rationalwiki is chock full of logical errors and bad arguments. I wonder if it would be more accurate to call this website "irrationalwiki"? (My academic training--which includes a Ph.D.--is in logical arguments.) 21:25, 14 October 2010
 * Chock-full 20:32, 14 October 2010 (UTC)
 * The post above is also chock full of logical errors and bad arguments. A hypothesis that takes the form "X helps us know things" could be false & is falsifiable.  If you think that "science helps us know things" is "not the sort of thesis that could be false", this is due to your already knowing what science is the fact that it helps us know things, not to any flaw in the hypothesis.  If you acquire knowledge by "just thinking", without verifying your findings with the scientific method, how can you verify that that knowledge is correct?   22:12, 14 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Well I did have a silly typo (spelling "chock" as "chalk"...) But where was my logical error? The hypothesis I presented was of the form, "if X, then X." To think it was the form, "X helps us know things" is irrational thinking (which I assume any rational observer, including yourself, can plainly see).
 * Knowing a tautology is "true" is not particularly useful knowledge once one has learned to spell the word. It's just a way of showing an empty argument. Your argument is empty, and I seriously doubt your credentialism. 03:09, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * The scientific method can't be used in the abstract - that's kind of the point of experiment. Logic is in a completely different sphere than science. There's no point in saying one is "better," because that's a meaningless comparison. 03:20, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Chalk the Unsigner asks: "Has it been established that the scientific method is a better method than the method of "just thinking"?"
 * I may be being a bit dim and missing his point here - but would we have silicon chips, the internet and atomic energy if we had done no more than "just thinking"? Surely we have to a bit of, you know, experimental testing of hypotheses and then the refining of these hypotheses based on results etc.   In other words the scientific method. I don't see how "just thinking" gets us to the moon.--BobSpring is sprung! 07:06, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * BoN, note that the article doesn't claim that the scientific method is the only way to attain knowledge. In fact, it does point out that the axiomatic foundations of science have to be taken as granted and cannot be falsified or empirically tested themselves. And yes, the focus on usefulness doesn't make it very helpful to supply tautologies and truisms as examples for the point you're trying to make. Röstigraben (talk) 07:59, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * No, we probably wouldn't. "Just thinking" is philosophy, which is things like "I postulate that there is self and a higher self and an outside would contained within an ism..." and bollocks and so on. You can't prove it true in real life just by thinking about it; it's very easy to rationalise any explanation as true. Conspiracy theorists would be a prime example as they can come up with any number of excuses reasons as to why they're right and everything conspires to their view. But equally, another individual can do the same and rationalise to a completely different conclusion - and the objective reality can't accommodate both. So you include the testing. And in every case where empiricism has been combined with rationalism, we get a boost in technology. It was the same in the Islamic Golden Age and in the Industrial Revolution. "Just thinking" you can probably come up with some great ideas (the vote, equality, law, morality and so on...), but you then need to refine them by testing them out against reality if you want technology and things that can be applied to reality. 08:22, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Lots of good thoughts here. In light of them, I wonder if it would be worth modifying the statement in the main text about the scientific method to say, "...for deriving useful knowledge" (or something along those lines). That might be a more accurate statement, and it might allow us to say that our method of knowing the axioms of science is as reliable as "the" scientific method itself. (Though, I do worry deeply about the premise that there's no (non-empty) set of very useful knowable necessary truths--truths as useful to know as many scientific, falsifiable ones.) I'm only here to help the cause of science by helping us to better understand its foundations. I'm not an enemy. Indeed, combining empiricism with rationalism seems good to me. :)
 * The intro presently says: The scientific method an epistemological system for deriving and developing knowledge.  You would have us change that to "developing useful knowledge".  This rather suggests that you feel that that there are other systems, apart from science, which are appropriate for developing "useless" - or at least non-useful - knowledge.  I have a couple of problems with this.  Is all scientific knowledge "useful"? And what are these other systems which develop useless knowledge? (I can imagine a few but I'm wondering what's on your mind.)
 * Nevertheless your change of heart is most welcome. If you could just learn how to sign posts ...--BobSpring is sprung! 15:20, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * To be clear, it's not that I think changing the statement to "useful knowledge" makes it a good statement. It's just that I see it as an improvement, or at least that it makes sense of some of the replies to my original argument. My original point was just that there's all sorts of things we know that aren't falsifiable. Indeed, no necessary truths are falsifiable, and we know many necessary truths. (Here's two examples: (i) if I'm tall, then I'm tall; (ii) if I'm short, then I'm short.) A number of the replies seemed to suggest that these don't count because the aren't "useful." Ok, but that implies a restricted scope; so if they are right that my statement is useless and so doesn't count as a counter-example to the statement about the scientific method, then that implies that the scope they have in mind is restricted to useful statements. I was only trying to help draw that out. My goal here is rationality, and rationality entails consistency. (I don't believe I changed my heart.)Truth seeker (talk) 15:39, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * "Useful" is, unfortunately, a little too subjective for this sort of thing. As Bob asks, is all science useful? I'd say yes, indeed, as you can never predict where research will lead and the entire body of knowledge we have acts as a reference for later. About 80% of the work done in my research group in the last decade could easily be passed off as "useless" at first glance, but once it has proved to be invaluable knowledge and experience when applied to the other 20%. On the other hand, Daily Mail readers dropping comments like "but why does science waste their money on that, it's COMMON SENSE!!" would clearly disagree, and think most science is ultimately useless. 15:55, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I meant "useful" not in the sense of having a direct application, but as a more general description of a statement that conveys any actual information. For example, "If I'm tall, then I can pick apples from higher branches" is useful, "If I'm tall then I'm tall" is not. Röstigraben (talk) 16:21, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * In which case we have another issue with the definition of "useful", making the word even less... erm, useful, in clarifying the point about what the scientific method allows you to obtain. If we go by that definition of useful (where "If I'm tall then I'm tall" is not 'useful') then what you really want to say is information. Information, by the definition in information theory, is always useful in this sense. "I'm tall" provides information, "...because I'm tall" adds no new information - one way is seeing whether you're surprised by it, and you're not surprised by that second clause because it's already been revealed, it's not information.  16:26, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * He's not even saying that he's tall, just that if he were, then he would be. Which is a statement that, while true, is utterly useless for any purpose other than supplying an example of an obvious tautology. OK, it's knowledge, but it was a poor example to put in contrast to scientifically derived knowledge. I wasn't proposing it as a general criterion for defining science (while all scientific statements take this form, nonscientific ones can do so as well), just to criticize that particular example. Röstigraben (talk) 16:53, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Good clarification, Röstigraben. Maybe then the implied revision would be "...informative knowledge." The point is that if there's a reason my example doesn't "count", then there's an implicit scope in the statement about the scientific method. It's hard to see just how to fix it (just what that scope really is), though. For, aren't some necessary truths informative? Notice that if we think that all knowledge is, by definition, informative and that no necessary truths are informative, then we will have to deny that anyone knows any necessary truths (including wiki's axioms about the nature of science itself). If, on the other hand, some knowledge isn't informative (or is trivial) and isn't falsifiable, then the statement about the scientific method doesn't apply to knowledge simpliciter.Truth seeker (talk) 17:06, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * The intro statement about the scientific method seems to have been much improved since I read it a few days ago. Excellent! I only have one tiny suggestion: change "The scientific method an epistemological system for deriving and developing knowledge." to "The scientific method is an epistemological system for deriving and developing knowledge."Truth seeker (talk) 18:10, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I edited the header to reflect your new user name and your having learned to sign your posts. Thanks and welcome! 03:18, 16 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Mmmm. We now say:It is considered the best method for making useful and practical additions to human knowledge. I suppose this is true but it still seems to suppose the existence on non-useful knowledge.  And there are many fields of investigation which have no practical advantage at the moment - though that is not to say that they might have practical utility in the future.
 * But neither "usefulness" nor "practicality" are the hallmarks of scientific knowledge. The hallmark is testability. We do talk about this in the next sentence but I'm not sure that we should have "usefulness" and "practicality" first.--BobSpring is sprung! 08:00, 16 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Sounds watered down and stupid to me, make it like it used to be. Our dear X > X = true friend is a bit of a concern troll.  08:57, 16 October 2010 (UTC)

Cases where the scientific method is not best
1. Suppose you want to obtain the knowledge of how long it takes for a lead ball to fall to the ground when droppped from a height of 10 feet. Should you use the "most succesful" epistemological method, the scientific method, to obtain the knowledge? E.g. make conjectures like 1 second or 3 seconds, and do experiments to falsify your conjectures?

Or is it better to use existing knowledge, like F=ma, and to employ the epistemological method of deduction to obtain the sought knowledge?

Does using the latter method make you a pseudoscientific crackpot?

2. Suppose a person enters a grocery store and leaves with less money then they had before, but they exit with various products in hand. As this happens hundreds of times every day, this should be an experimenter's paradise.

Now, is it possible to devise an experiment to falsify the conjecture "Each person exchanging money for goods did so because they subjectively valued the obtained goods more than they valued the money"?

BTW, do you think the conjecture is true or false? Doubledork (talk) 23:17, 6 July 2010 (UTC)


 * You are Notedscholar and I claim my 0.5p - David Gerard (talk) 23:22, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Are you saying I'm another user? Sorry, but I only found this site a few days ago. In any case, can you please address the issues at hand instead of making hominem remarks and linking to a weird website (one that talks about oil spills and abortions)?Doubledork (talk) 23:25, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Score 1 for David Gerard. -- 23:39, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * We do this all the time in psychology. There are several ways to do it. The first is to just ask people. In an anonymous survey situation people have a tendency to tell the truth. We can also device choice experiments, where people are given the option of selecting "kinds" of rewards (we can even do this with nematodes, or chemotaxis bacteria) and can explore under what conditions peoples choices might even change. Sated versus hungry, etc. Experimental economics does a great job with that, and can discover many things arm chair axiom driven austrian economist would never think of. tmtoulouse 23:26, 6 July 2010 (UTC)
 * This seems reasonable for easily reproducible microeconomic experiments. It sounds like you are assuming the people won't lie and that people actually understand the question (they way I phrased it, some would not). If the people felt cheated after leaving the register, they may not remember how they felt just before the transaction. Another problem is people may act differently in an expiremental situation as opposed to real life. I'm not saying it's not scientific or useful knowledge, it just sounds difficult to obtain! BTW I have not seen much experimental confirmation or refutation on Austrian economic axioms (that have been around for 50+ years). Any ideas why? Though it is now considered heterodoxy, it was once mainstream (it's fluctuated over the years). I would be very interested in any experimental refutation.Doubledork (talk) 00:10, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Just as an aside, this thing where people call out users as sock puppets is really starting to grind my gears. It's not funny, it's stupid and often counter-productive. Either keep your heads and do this sort of thing properly or go and troll 4Chan for an hour or two. 00:19, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I wasn't calling him a sockpuppet, I was comparing the quality of the arguments. It's clear the problem is that Doubledork doesn't know what the words he's saying mean, doesn't understand the subject in the first place (c.f. how to use the scientific method in psychology, above) and considers this to be a problem with the rest of the world rather than himself. The difference is that Notedscholar is a Poe - David Gerard (talk) 00:28, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * "Doubledork doesn't know what the words he's saying mean" - Any examples? Instead of posting ad hominem remarks, why not try to clear up misunderstandings and move the discussion forward?Doubledork (talk) 00:33, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It's not an ad hominem, it's an accurate description of your own words above: you started out pontificating about how this was all wrong and it turns out you literally don't know how it's applied in practice. This suggests it's going to be rather a lot of work to get you up to speed. I'll leave it to others - David Gerard (talk) 00:38, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * "Doubledork doesn't know what the words he's saying mean" - That is definitely an ad hominem remark, as it refers to a person. It is also dubious as you refuse to provide evidence. As for you, I don't think you've contributed anything constructive to the discussion yet.Doubledork (talk) 01:18, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Actually, a strict ad hom is when the attack is both personal and irrelevant. Like "x is an idiot because they have ginger hair" - saying "x is clueless as to the topic" isn't a fallacious ad hom, particularly as some clarification has been given. 03:25, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Throwing ad hominem around is a big pet peeve of mine. You rarely see a real one. Misplaced accusations of fallacious arguments are the hallmark of illogic, and make for a lackluster red herring. 207.67.17.45 (talk) 21:08, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Hmmm... no one seemed to figure out that in example #1, it is the epistemological method of deduction which is the best method to use to see what time it will take for a lead ball dropped from 10 feet to hit the ground. The scientific method will work, but is clumsy and unnecessary in this case. A high school physics student can solve this problem more easily with paper and pencil through deduction than one manipulating lead balls in a laboratory.

And in #2, the conjecture is a true consequence of the a priori knowledge that human action is purposeful action aimed at removing felt uneasiness. In arguing against this axiom, one only strengthens it by demonstrating purposeful action (viz. the construction of logical argumentation) aimed at removing one's uneasiness with the axiom. And because the scientific method has no yardstick to directly measure, quantify, or compare subjective values, it is in fact powerless to demonstrate or refute the truth of the conjecture. There is no conceivable way to compare the subjective valuation of two people or even of the same person at different timesDoubledork (talk) 08:26, 7 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I addressed number one above, essentially you are using a model of the world and the model is setup such that the actions within that model can be deduced. You are not using deduction in the "real world" but only in the stripped down model that was constructed. How do you then make the leap that your model (in which future states can be deduced) correlates well with the "real world." Well you use the scientific method.
 * As for your second point, your whole conjecture about "eliminating unease" isn't deriving knowledge it is merely stating a hypothesis. Suppose I introduce the contrary hypothesis that the actions are performed because of mind control via an alien race with super technology. Both conjectures are on equal footing a priori, how do we decide which idea is "less wrong"? Once again the scientific method. There is a lot of work in cognitive and experimental psychology, as well as neuroscience that attempts to empirically address subjective states and values. Some of it is very impressive. tmtoulouse 21:28, 7 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Popper accepted the use of operational assumptions and common sense in science. Not every piece of knowledge has to be, or even can be, verified by the scientific method. Your professed belief that no valid knowledge (such as how long a lead ball takes to fall) can be produced except through the scientific method is self-contradictory. For, your belief is itself an unscientific, and unfalsifiable conjecture: it is a mere metaphysical dogma. Doubledork (talk) 06:26, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Sorry, Doubledork, your name-dropping is not going to win your case here. Trent pretty much owned you above.  If I want to see how long a ball takes to drop I'll use a fricking stopwatch.  06:34, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Will you assume the stopwatch is a reliable device for measuring time? That would make you a pseudoscientific crackpot. So, will you check your stopwatch with the scientific method? And against what will you check it exactly?


 * You can probably foresee where this is headed. It simply proves my point about the need for operational assumptions and common sense. Thanks for giving me another opportunity to back up my arguments with evidence.


 * It is a bit disappointing that people at "rationalwiki" would believe in a self-contradictory and manifestly false metaphysical dogma.Doubledork (talk) 07:07, 8 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Your coming off as pretty arrogant but I will give you the benefit of the doubt that your just grand standing in a semi-hostile environment. Popper addressed "operational assumptions" and "common sense" in two important ways. The first thing you have to do is separate idea generation from idea testing. Idea generation is not restricted to empirical observation, idea can come from anywhere, sometimes from inductive reasoning based on observation, some times deductive reasoning, and sometimes a random eureka moment in the middle of the night. But ideas are just ideas. We are focused for now on ideas that make claims about some element of empirical reality, different ideas can be completely contradictory with each other, so how do we tell them apart? That's where the scientific method becomes the superior method for discerning knowledge.


 * In a lot of ways Popper was a response to logical positivist of the Vienna Circle. Of particular interest in this discussion was Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wrapped up in all this is the philosophical proposisition that somehow both idea generation and the epistemological frame work for science could all be derived from empirical observation. This turns out to have a lot of issues. It can be boiled down I think to two major points, what I addressed several times above that idea generation is not always based on observation, and that the scientific method requires certain a priori assumptions of epistemology and metaphysics in order to even get out of the starting gate.


 * It is the problem of solipsism. The brain in a vat or Last Thursdayism. If you are trapped in some sort of Descartian nightmare of being certain of your own "existence" and rejecting everything else then there is nothing for science to do. But whats the point of this? If you want to argue your a brain in a vat and we are all a downloaded hallucination then there is no way "out" of this trap. I personally, would make an argument that the way out of solipsism is pragmatism, but that's another discussion all together.


 * In order to demonstrate that the scientific method is the single best source for knowledge two major axiom that have to be set. The first is that "some ideas are more wrong than others," and the second is that "our sensory experience correlate with some sort of external reality." If you want to deny either of those starting assumptions than we are way, way out in philosophical left field, and I would need some beer before I would feel like addressing it.


 * But if you agree to those assumptions the scientific methods falls out pretty quickly as the path to knowledge. For an idea to be "less wrong" there has to be a fundamental "truth" or "structure" to reality, a right answer. This doesn't mean will we ever know the right answer but some ideas are closer than others. So how do we take all our randomly generated ideas and rank them in terms of their degree of wrongness? This is the second assumption, it says that our sensory experience of reality reflects at some level this external fundamental structure. So how do we use our sensory experiences to test ideas? The scientific method.


 * In order to argue that other ideas are just as good, you have to demonstrate that they are tapping into something that, just like our sensory experiences, correlate with the external structure of reality. If our sensory experience is what is used to differentiate between ideas, the scientific methods is the superior path to knowledge. I guess what I would ask is what other than our sensory experiences can sub in for differentiating between proposed ideas about the nature of reality?


 * You seem really focused on this idea that our internal mental models have some sort of fundamental truth to them that goes beyond how well they might correlate to your sensory experiences. Mental models, whether mathematical, or about the nature of subjective human experience, are great tools because they allow us to shrink down the infinite properties of the universe that we experience through our senses into a series of manageable rules, that often allow for deductive reasoning to make predictions within the models. But again, I come to the point where I don't see how these mental models can be tested for their correspondence to reality with out using the scientific method to compare their predictions with sensory observations. tmtoulouse 07:37, 8 July 2010 (UTC)


 * What you say makes a lot of sense. It is more informative than the wiki page :)Doubledork (talk) 16:20, 8 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Trent, please add your long quotes to suitable spots in the article - it needs extending - David Gerard (talk) 19:28, 8 July 2010 (UTC)


 * BTW, there is a contradiction at this site that troubles me. It relates to global warming. There, based on reliable knowledge already obtained via the scientific method (e.g. physics), one uses the epistemological method of deduction (e.g. complex computer simulations), to make predictions like "the world be 2C hotter 50 years from now". And that is considered "scientific consensus". Yet the conjecture is not valid per the scientific method: it is not falsifiable now nor during many people's lifetime. This is case where I think the epistemological method of deduction is abused and stretched out to reach very far-fetched, shaky, "more wrong" conclusions. It puzzles me that strong adherents to the scientific method would accept the conjecture, as even I who admire the epistemological method of deduction do not accept it. Do you not also see the cognitive dissonance here?Doubledork (talk) 20:34, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
 * A great deal of the work I do revolves around models and simulations. I would be happy to talk about this but think it should be broken out from this talk page as it is a bit of a different topic. I will make a forums post maybe for it...tmtoulouse 20:45, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Sorry, I didn't find a quote like "the world be 2C hotter 50 years from now" on this site. So I retract my statement.Doubledork (talk) 20:50, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
 * If you want to talk more about models and science I have posted a summary of 10 years of though on the matter here. tmtoulouse 21:38, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Pardon me I arrived late
In question 1 it seems the scientific method has been misused. My understanding is that the scientific method is used to formulate and test explanations for why certain things happen. If someone wants to know how long a ball will take to drop 10 feet on earth they can just look up a physics book and get the equation. Excuse me if this has been covered Hamster (talk) 03:48, 15 October 2010 (UTC)
 * A book containing information that was obtained by the method... Utilizing and building upon existing information is implicitly included in the method, which is where that entire example falls on its arse. 08:10, 15 October 2010 (UTC)

Wrong about Arabic science
The text in section How to do science reads like this:
 * Arabic science went into a steady decline as the Islamic world became dominated by orthodox and fundamentalist theology.

Nope, näggum, not, nyet and negative! '''It ... did ... not !!''' The short story is about this:
 * Short story: invading Mongols destroyed Bagdad in 1258, the center of Arabic Science. Then science fell into a decline.

The long story is about this:
 * Long story: some religious branches are positive towards science and reason, some are not. The Abbasid Califat was founded around a clan opposing the earlier Umayyad Califat, which erected a despotic empire. The Umayyads persecuted the mu'talizids that vindicated "reason" as a way to know God. Hence the victorious Abbasids supported the mu'talizids. The Abbasid Califat was centered in Baghdad. When it was crushed by Mongols, the Abbasids and the mu'talizids suffered a vast defeat. Hence science fell back.

It's not that religion "naturally opposes" science, some branches do, some branches do actually support science. Religion is not such an important point for science, one more important point for science is whether there is some economical power that is willing and able to support scientists and science financially. The whig-history of "the evils of religion" is pretty much obsolete in the history of science. It is a 19th century allegation, not a modern one. Rursus dixit (yada³!) 11:29, 1 September 2011 (UTC)
 * Please fix it! [[Image:Pink mowse.png|25px]]En attendant Godot 13:57, 1 September 2011 (UTC)