Debate:Why do good?

Many atheists cite secular humanism as the basis for their morality; but I have never heard a compelling secular reason for why anyone should be moral or do good. "You should do good." "Why?" "Because it's good to do good." That's a circular argument, and it has no rational basis. Or, worse: "You should do good." "Why?" "Because it's beneficial to human society." But why should we care about benefiting human society? "Because it's good." Another circular argument.

In fact, if we choose to define "good" merely as "something that is beneficial to the rest of human society", would it not be pertinent to kill off people in aged-care facilities? After all, most of them are—for all intents and purposes—wasting human society's time and resources, and it's not as if every one of them is still benefiting human society. I do not know a person who would fail to call that murder. But why is that? And, more to the point, why is murder wrong?

I have heard an argument that runs along these lines. In the past, it says, those humans who worked out a kind of mutual agreement centred around respect for each other and each other's property tended to live longer than those who constantly attacked each other out of greed; and so, the argument goes, natural selection has given us human societies that are based on mutual respect and trust. Now, I don't agree with that argument, but I'm not here to debunk it. Rather, I want to ask a very simple question: If you were in a position of power, and there was no possibility of people enacting revenge against you, why would you not murder and rape and pillage at will?

Some may ask, "What is this, you only do good because God's watching you?" No; but that is an irrelevant question. I am not concerned with religion in the context of this debate. I am interested only in how those who don't believe in an objective standard of good justify (a) why they themselves do "good" and (b) why they insist that others do "good". Thomas Larsen (talk) 02:51, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Possibly paranoia that it could come back to you. I could go on, but I make negative input on a person's mind sound like new age crap.--Thanatos (talk) 03:17, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Karma, perhaps, or superstition? But that presupposes the existence of the supernatural, and hence it is not a secular rationale. Thomas Larsen (talk) 03:22, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Why not? ТyAn, yet ? 03:39, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Secularism, by definition, is separate from religion. Any argument for doing good that depends on religious considerations is, therefore, not secular. Or were you asking "Why not?" in response to another question? Thomas Larsen (talk) 03:48, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Why not do "good" ТyAn, yet ? 03:51, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * To which I shall retort, "Why not do evil?" I think you will agree with me when I say that "good" things are a subset of all the things we could do; why should we limit ourselves to that subset? I mean, it would be convenient if I could rob the bank. Thomas Larsen (talk) 03:59, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Very well. Have fun. Also, in evolutionary terms altruism also makes it more likely for the species to survive. Only a few people (cough Ayn Rand cough) consider altruism to be bad. Most "good" acts such as community service, teaching, OSS programming, helping others, etc. are altruistic.ТyUser_talk:Tyrannis 04:04, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * (I will. Actually, I've been trying to program a robot to do the job for me, on the grounds that I can claim it was acting under its own free will... unfortunately, I haven't had very much success yet. It keeps crashing into things.) See, why should I—why should you—care about what is good for the rest of the species? Let's assume, for a moment, that altruism arose as a product of evolution by natural selection. That tells me how I became altruistic, maybe. But it does not tell me why I should be altruistic. Should I be altruistic because it's good? Um, yeah. Thomas Larsen (talk) 04:10, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * A bank robbing robot?! Hmmm. You will need to get through the vault door and the guards... machine vision was a problem back when I worked across from the bot lab. Oh, anyway, back on topic. I would have to say that humans make their own morality, whichever feels best to them. If you feel like robbing a bank with a robot, have fun. Unfortunately, not everyone will feel that way. And they will likely try to enact legislation getting rid of the poor robots. And I like robots. ТyUser_talk:Tyrannis 04:17, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

But, if humans concoct their own morality, why should we imprison murderers? Rapists? Bank robbers? What if they thought, on the spur of the moment, that it was perfectly right and good to murder, to rape, to rob? I mean, it's easy to say that human beings make their own morality until someone steals your car or mugs you in the street. Thomas Larsen (talk) 04:30, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Let me draw another analogy here about the flaws inherent in the argument that humans make their own morality. Suppose someone close to you—your significant other, your child, your parents—were murdered by a notorious serial killer; and, when he was eventually tracked down and taken to court, you begged the judge to have him imprisoned for life. And the judge merely sighed, sipped at a cup of coffee, and said, "Well, you know, I'm feeling in a good mood today. And this guy was feeling really frustrated at the time; I think that murder is okay if you're feeling really frustrated. You know, I'm going to let him go free. But you! You who forced me to get out of my warm bed this morning and come to this court—it is you who will be imprisoned for life!" With that, you are handcuffed and led off to a cell. I think you would be outraged, and rightly so. Why? Why is it not okay for a judge to make their own morality and apply it to others? Thomas Larsen (talk) 04:40, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * There is no objective morality, because morality is a construct of society. Yes, humans concoct their own morality, but it is immensely more complicated than you make it out to be, and it is constantly evolving along with society. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to actually think of an example of objective morality that has been constant throughout human history. A moral absolute is extraordinarily rare. In my opinion, they do not exist. 05:19, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * On what basis can you claim that morality is, and always has been, constantly evolving with society? I'm not saying that it hasn't, simply that we do not have even the slightest scrap of evidence on which to base that assumption. Some might point out, for example, that slavery was widely accepted a couple of centuries ago in the Western world, but that has nothing to do with basic morality and everything to do with application. Certainly, there have been minor moral controversies in the past—birth control comes to mind—but they are trivial whirlpools in a far greater current. Killing has always been a moral matter in humanity, but birth control only became a moral matter comparatively recently, for the simple reason that birth control only became practical comparatively recently.


 * And, at any rate, why should I obey society's morals if I can disobey them without consequences? What right do you have to enforce them? Thomas Larsen (talk) 05:56, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * On what basis can you assert that objective morality exists? It's almost like the theism debate. No evidence. 06:00, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Ah, but I'm not asserting that objective morality exists—although I think it does, and maybe my bias is showing. Rather, I'm waiting to hear some good secular reasons for why people like you and I should limit ourselves to doing "good" things. I'm not even very concerned about the definition of "good". Let's suppose that our view of good and evil is merely a product of natural selection. Let's suppose that morality has evolved over time, though I don't know of any scientific evidence to suggest that it has. Now, given a particular situation in which there is a "right" thing to do and a "wrong" thing to do, why should I not do the wrong thing if it benefits me personally? Thomas Larsen (talk) 06:13, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Wait - are you asking the question "why should I obey society's morals?", or "where do morals come from such that they hold authority over our actions?" 06:32, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I'm asking "Why do good?" "Why should I obey any kind of morals?" is directly related to that question. Where morals come from might or might not have anything to do with the answer. Thomas Larsen (talk) 06:36, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * So you're repeatedly asking a loaded & meaningless question. You say you're not asserting that objective morality exists, but your question (why "do good"?) presupposes that it does.   07:49, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * How so? The question presupposes that some form of good exists. Whether good is objective or subjective is left undefined. Whether good is local to a particular culture or global to humanity is left undefined. But if we assume that good goes beyond simply what a particular individual wants to do (otherwise, say, rape would be perfectly "good"), then we are left with a problem: why should we do "good"? For instance, why is it not okay to abuse or mistreat someone if you feel like it? Thomas Larsen (talk) 08:02, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Hold on a moment
I think we're falling into a classic trap: when confronted with a hard question, we can't resist the urge to answer it and marshal the arguments for and against. But I think the question itself is a bit confused, mostly because there are so many concepts it depends on that we don't really have clear pictures of. First, as mentioned above, we have problems with the difference between explanation and justification. If we find an explanation for a particular behavior or stance or morality, is that the same as its justification? Also, what does it even mean for an act to be just or unjust? Secondly, are these concepts of "just" and "good" and "evil" actually inherent properties of the universe, or are they just properties of our mental models of the universe? And how would we make this determination? Could we do it logically or empirically? (That is, is there some underlying moral structure to the universe, or is it just an inaccuracy in our belief systems? And how do we know?) I suspect that we may not be able to answer Thomas Larsen's question until we can answer these. 04:52, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I think we need to recognize that there are two underlying components to our morality: a, social and cultural conditioning, and b, the evolution of morality, i.e., its biological basis. There are no "first principles," per se, as we are consciously or unconsciously working within the framework of those two things. Without that, these discussions tend to devolve into philoso-babble. (IOW, I agree.) Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 06:07, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Personally, I think the distinction between the explanation and the justification is a very important one. But I'm not particularly interested in explaining our sense of morality. How we got to where we are is rather irrelevant; why should we care? But the trouble with justification is that it requires a standard to justify against, whether that standard is objective or subjective; and, if that standard is subjective, it also requires justification. Eventually we either have to arrive at an objective standard or accept that we impose unjustifiable limits on ourselves and on other people. Thomas Larsen (talk) 06:47, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * "How we got here" is definitely not irrelevant to your question. We're not free to choose our morals in any way we please, we're conditioned by our evolutionary inheritance. That doesn't mean that every single moral rule we abide has been hardwired into our brains, but the way in which we construct our moral codices has. This still leaves room for social construction, but guarantees that we'll come to conclusions that are similar enough to allow for peaceful coexistence. Why do good? Because we feel an impulse to do it, and vice versa, an aversion to do evil. You might as well ask "Why breathe?". We just do it because we feel a strong urge to, the rationalizing comes later. Or ask yourself, is the only reason why you're not committing murder and theft fear of being caught or worries about society going downhill? Or is it because you simply don't want to kill or rob your fellow human beings? And how is it possible that people from across very different cultures and ages have mostly agreed on these fundamental principles if there's no underlying biological explanation? Especially when the societal advantages of having such built-in compassionate responses are obvious and it's hard to see how a society lacking them could have survived. If you're really interested in the topic, I recommend Marc D. Hauser's Moral Minds - he concerns himself with finding the systems and principles that produce our moral codes, or as he calls it, our "moral grammar". Röstigraben (talk) 07:19, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I think "Why should we do good?" (which is the question I'm interested in, hence "Why do good?") and "Why do we do good?" are two very different questions. I think we can agree that human beings are not "good" all the time, but we have this idea that it's best to do "good"—even if we say that "good" is merely what people make it. "Why do we do good?" is an interesting question that can be answered in a variety of different ways, but I don't think it's particularly relevant to the issue of why we should do "good". We do not call someone immoral for refusing to breathe, although we may call him a fool; but we do call someone immoral for refusing to save a fellow human being in dire need, if he was able and would not have placed himself in any significant danger by doing so. I think there is a great danger in defining "good" as "what we feel an impulse to do", although perhaps that is not what you intended. If that were true, practically all criminals would be vindicated.


 * I'll try to pick up a copy of Moral Minds; it sounds interesting. Thomas Larsen (talk) 07:38, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * The question of what we should do is also one that isn't answered as a result of some long, deliberative process, but rather after a quick, reflexive judgement. We reflect on them, we discuss them with others, and try to come up with some rules, but they're always designed to accomodate our spontaneous emotional responses. There was a website somewhere that confronted you with a series of moral dilemmas that increased in complexity, and though few had any problems picking the right, or "good", way of acting, it became increasingly hard to justify. And regarding your second point, "good" is simply what the vast majority of people, not all, have an impulse to do. That's how we define the specifics, by broad majority consensus - unanimity is impossible. In our vast societies, there'll always be a few whose moral compass is either lacking or flawed. A serial killer only becomes one because he does not have the usual impulse to help and protect others, but rather wants to hurt them. Unlike normal people, they can't be trusted to act on their impulses, so we lock them away. That doesn't change the fact that most altruistic acts are born from impulses. Röstigraben (talk) 07:57, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Oh, I agree with you that not all moral situations are clear-cut. In my opinion, sometimes there is a "right" answer, but it is not intuitive; and sometimes there are two answers that are equally "right". Such situations are interesting but comparatively infrequent.


 * Now, if I understood your argument correctly, you're saying that we—acting on our own impulses—have the right to lock away those people who have different impulses from ours, simply because we are in the majority. But who is to say that we have that right? We might as well have pulled it out from thin air! It sounds like the ultimate bully tactic: let us imprison those who are different from us, because we are bigger than they are. If past experience has shown us anything, it is that the majority can be "wrong". Thomas Larsen (talk) 08:23, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * We don't imprison them because they're different, but because they're dangerous. It's collective self-defense, and if we don't have a right to that, then we don't have any, as we'd waive our right to life. People who simply lack the altruistic impulse and don't react to help others in need are also different, but harmless, so we may chastise them, but we wouldn't lock them away for it. Of course the majority will always define what is good and moral, but when we take a look at the broader picture, it becomes a little circular: only societies in which altruists are in the majority could survive anyway, if there's a majority of psychopaths, it would devolve into chaos and unravel. So, by definition, any society that has managed to persist must have a majority-accepted foundation of moral principles that are "good", i.e. conducive to societal well-being. Röstigraben (talk) 08:33, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * So car thieves are dangerous to society (what sections of society)? That's why we lock them up? Reformed murderers are dangerous to society? That's why we imprison them for life? You're right, we do restrict people because they're dangerous, but we also punish people for doing wrong.


 * I don't think you're correct in saying that only altruistic societies have any hope of survival. For example, some animals are known to kill others of their own kind to eliminate competition for food—a "greedy", but very practical, act. See, for example, wp:Eagle: "Many species lay two eggs, but the older, larger chick frequently kills its younger sibling once it has hatched." In any case, even if you were right, it wouldn't explain why you and I should do good or should be altruistic; it would only explain why we have those tendencies. Thomas Larsen (talk) 08:55, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Sometimes there's a chance a criminal can be reformed, sometimes not. And crimes like petty theft aren't serious enough to warrant more than short-term imprisonment. When I wrote that, I had psychopaths in mind, not criminals in general. And there's an obvious difference between eagles and humans: we're not solitary predators, but extremely social animals. The former can make it on their own and don't need tons of rules governing their complex interactions, but we stand or fall together. Every society can take some extent of rule violations, but if there's even just a substantial minority of people who don't stick to them, things can unravel very fast. Our social fabric is mostly built on expectations how others will behave, and these expectations will rapidly change for the worse when we see others doing evil and getting away with it. That's why it's so important to at least give people the impression that cheaters are few, and they're usually caught. And regarding the point about what we "should do", I already said above that I think it's mostly a post-hoc rationalization for a reflexive emotional response. Focusing on the latter is more valuable to explain human behaviour, IMHO. Röstigraben (talk) 16:44, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I don't understand the question "why should we be good"? It's already been explained to you why are are "good", the advantages that brings to both individuals and society, and the pleasure it brings most of us. Our society's laws and behaviours have developed from us and these re-affirm our tendency to be altruistic. If you're looking for a gap that the only reason we should be good is because if we're not we will spend an eternity in Hell, then you're implicitly admitting that you would be "evil" if you didn't have that threat hanging over you.
 * I think you need to study societies which are largely secular. Or at least don't have your quaint obsession with eternal damnation as a punishment. Do they have less of a tendency to be "good" than societies based on strong Abrahamic religions (for example)? If not, then Occam's Razor would suggest that the simplest answer is the most plausible, i.e. that we want to be "good" (for the aforementioned reasons) and it is this general desire that has created the societies we live in where "good" is indeed good. Ajkgordon (talk) 17:23, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I'm primarily interested in secular explanations here, but since you implied a religious perspective I'll give you mine. Christianity makes it pretty clear that no amount of "doing good" can get you out of Hell, or into Heaven for that matter. In fact, to do good merely to avoid punishment is not good, in my opinion, because one's motives are fundamentally wrong. If you say, "I'd like to rob that bank, but I'm scared I'll go to jail if I do," you have already revealed that your inclination is to rob the bank. You have, morally speaking, robbed the bank. This is because if circumstances had been "ideal" for you—if there had been no risk of imprisonment—you would have gone ahead and done wrong. And if I do good simply to avoid punishment, I am being a base hypocrite: I am indicating that, if the circumstances were ideal—if there was no risk of punishment—I would do wrong. Surely that is not good? Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Well banks with no vaults or walls will be robbed. An unfortified bank would be like a territory with some natives who could be conquered. Unless someone is reading this from an Arctic field station, we are all likely benefiting from something that was taken from someone else. Is that bad? ~ Lumenos (talk) 07:10, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * And that's exactly why I have the Mencken quote that "All men are frauds" in my profile. Obviously, to say that what we should do is based entirely in biological or cultural norms is a classic "is-ought" fallacy. However, you can't just magic away human nature. I respectfully challenge all the the people that ask "Can't we all just along, maaaaaaaaan?" to take the locks off their doors and keep their money on their doorsteps in a basket labeled "Please don't steal." This is why, IMO, we have to realize the constraints of human nature and at the same time, do our best not to be dicks. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 07:31, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

I don't know
I don't know is my answer to this one. I do however think that there seems to be some sort of positive moral evolution taking place. We no longer feed people to lions, hold public executions or support slavery for example. (OK, some parts of the world may have different ideas and sometimes we slip back.) Why? What possible reason could there be for such improvement? I don't know.

It's interesting though that religious people and athiests typically share the the moral codes of the day - and that both try to retrofit their improved moral codes into their philosophies. Those of a religious bent claim that whatever holy book they hold dear "really" says that we should give equal right to homosexuals or ban slavery or whatever OK, so some of them may take a bit longer to catch up ; humanists claim that humanism brings them to the same conclusions. But, as I said, I suspect that it's just a human social development which people then interpret in terms of their existing beliefs.--BobSpring is sprung! 11:25, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I agree with this. I'll also add that it may be an evolutionary instinct to help the species, not a rational decision. Society tells us what is good, instinct drives us to obey it FairyCupcake (talk) 12:01, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * @Bob: I do agree that there is a tremendous tendency to retrofit the words of others we admire or dislike into our own philosophies and beliefs. On a vaguely related note, have you read Chesterton's The Everlasting Man? I don't agree with everything he wrote, and I know you would agree with far less of it, but I think you'd probably still find it an interesting read.


 * @FairyCupcake: Don't you find it interesting that Good can, somehow, stand on its own—unsupported, irrational, something that humans feel instinctively compelled towards and yet can never reach—and yet God, as a definition of good, cannot? If human beings do have free will, the idea that we should do good merely because we have been "wired" to do good is an insult to our intelligence. Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * No I'm afraid that I haven't read it. Looking at the WP description I don't think that I'm going to spend time on it.
 * But my point is not just about the retrofitting - it's the strange fact that athiests and theists come to the same moral conclusions. The moral conclusions of their age. However much they may claim that rationality or their religion drives them to these conclusions it is obvious that this can't be the case - if it were their conclusions would be wildly different.--BobSpring is sprung! 11:06, 19 February 2011 (UTC)


 * Wikipedia's description sucks. I think it's a pretty decent book, although Eurocentrism and various prejudices that were widespread in 1925 do tarnish it. If you want to give it a read you can find it on Gutenberg; if not, well, fair enough.


 * I agree that it can't be rationality or religion which drives human beings to particular moral conclusions. In fact, things seem all the more strange when one looks, not at the morality of atheists and theists, but at the morality of tribes which have been isolated from the rest of civilisation for thousands of years. And a remarkable pattern shows: on matters which are relevant to all cultures, even those which have been isolated for a great deal of time, every human society supports and upholds identical or very similar moral principles. Well, at least, I don't know of any exceptions. Thomas Larsen (talk) 12:08, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I was reading something recently on fairness. I think the experiment was with dogs. If one dog was rewarded and the other wasn't the non-rewarded animal stopped responding.  If neither were rewarded there was no problem.  I think this expectation of fair treatment drives a lot and it seems to pre-date human society.--BobSpring is sprung! 12:20, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Games Theory
It has been shown that in a world where the game is iterative Prisoners Dilemma then generaous tit-for-tat is a winning strategy. When translated to a moral code this works out as "Do unto others as they do unto you but give them the benefit of the doubt occasionally."

OK, so there are number of massive assumptions and over simplifications starting with the posit that interactions can be mapped to a series of Prisoner's Dillemas but it would suggest that co-operating - being good - is a winning formula and, as such, evolutionarily sound. Jack Hughes (talk) 13:11, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * That's quite possibly true, and in any case I don't know enough game theory to refute or prove your point. But I think you may be confusing the fact that humans do good with the question "Why should humans do good?" Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

I can back up Jack's claim. I read about this quite recently in 'The Singing Neanderthals' by Steven Mithen. A number of experts in mathematics, international relations, economics etc. developed machines which used different approaches to the prisoner's dilemma and were squared against one another. One of the machines was called TIT for TAT and did exactly what you'd expect. It was taken advantage of by more intelligent machines in one to one situations. However, when all of these machines had to compete with one another it came out on top. I actually think it does go some way to answering the question. If being consistently 'good' to other people is going to benefit you, I think it presents a damn good reason to be 'good'. Nevertheless, I admit this does not give any reason for being good to people who are not good for you (if TIT for TAT is indeed the best strategy in a large group. --Danfly (talk) 20:01, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

A cynic writes
The question is very badly framed because it fails to define what is meant by "good" and even defining it as "something that is beneficial to the rest of human society" lacks adequate boundary conditions and doe not distinguish between "moral" and "ethical". First of all the universe is neither "good" nor "evil", it just "is". Good and evil are moral concepts which arise from the fact that we are (in general) social animals. For me, the primary assumption is that biologically we have an evolutionary imperative to promote the continued existence of our genes - the so-called "selfish gene" - but we also have an instinct for self-preservation and the balance between these two is the dichotomy. Social animals like bees and ants have a strong sense of society and will sacrifice themselves to defend and ensure the existence of the colony. Humans evolved from small familial groups (like we see with higher primates) where a hunter/gatherer existence was the norm into large urbanised groups. Different behaviours are required in these two settings because the sense of community in each are on different scales. Humans have evolved a strong sense of group identity - encompassing family, gender, locale, nationality, sexual orientation, physical appearance, culture, religion, social class, wealth, occupation, sports teams and even name (people will often sympathetically identify with someone who has the same first name as themselves) - so how far we go in identifying our group affects what we perceive as being "good" or "evil". So (to invoke Godwin), Hitler may be considered "evil" on one scale but did he think that he was doing evil or was he doing something which he thought was for the good of Germany or the Aryan race?

I have certainly noticed differences in attitudes to what is right to wrong between large and small communities. Small, rural communities tend to be much more certain in their perception of what is "wrong", "evil" or "alien" than in cities where a greater diversity requires greater tolerance.

Getting back to "doing good", we need to define what the good is, because I can discern different things which might be considered good but which are enacted for different reasons. First of all we have the quid pro quo or golden rule (do unto others as you wish to be done to you); we all enter the world as helpless infants unable to care for ourselves for many years and if we are lucky have a lengthy life before some sort of infirmity sets in and we once more require some assistance. Even if when going about our daily lives if we see someone stumble and lend a helping hand it promotes an atmosphere where we might expect the same assistance if we should also trip. There are obvious evolutionary benefits to this. Because of the long period of care which juvenile humans require, a society based on mutual respect for all is beneficial to the greater good and survival of the community/species. Even when people become too weak to contribute to the physical side of supporting a group they have value in childcare where they can release a more physically able person and also are a repository of wisdom and knowledge. Some periodic natural phenomena have a long cycle time and the wisdom of the elderly can prevent societies from having to relearn the same thing over and over again. But at the same time a social bargain is struck and in return for supporting an older person in their final years we also know that we will receive the same support; an aged animal may die or be killed when they are no longer strong enough to fend for themselves but our reliance on brain power means that older humans still have value past their physical sell-by date.

Secondly, the power of the collective, as elucidated by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, means that people can accomplish more when they work together as a team. When one person or group starts to dominate and are seen to be enjoying a preferential lifestyle then resentment sets in and they become vulnerable. I think it is important to understand that great wealth always comes at the expense of other people. If you adopt an entirely self-sufficient lifestyle then you will never become wealthy because you could not accomplish enough by yourself. Even if you were sitting on top of a gold mine it would only be of value if you could barter it for something from someone else. In a civilised/urbanised society we depend upon others and the more we remove ourselves from them, especially if we have acquired wealth at their expense, then the more that people will come to resent the disparity. You may become very rich but if you have to ensconce yourself in a fortress in order to defend those riches from those who have barely enough to live on you can hardly expect to have an enjoyable life having to watch you back all the time. So it is to the advantage of those with more to distribute some of their wealth to assist those with less. A recent book, The Spirit Level suggested that a more equal society was a happier society, and a happier society is probably a safer society for all. So it behoves the ultra-rich to pay their fair share of taxes or construct model villages as Victorian philanthropists did as to preserve their elevated position. I believe that this is a cornerstone of a successful, western, capitalist, social democracy. In Europe where we tend to live closer together then this a more accepted idea, in the USA where most people live much further apart it is easier to separate yourself from the rabble in your own island fortress.

My third point as to why it is advisable to do good from a secular humanistic point is that we are aware of our own mortality. Any wealth that accrues cannot be taken with us and while we might like to bequeath it to our offspring it is often the case that inherited wealth does not command the greatest good to society. Warren Buffet has made a lot of money, albeit from investing rather than inventing, but has decided to give his wealth to charity. From purely selfish reasons - like Nobel, Carnegie, Getty, Gates, etc. - this ensures a degree of immortality after one's death. You can't take it with you, so do something by which you may be remembered. Perhaps not the finest reason but a vain human one.

My fourth point about altruism is the pleasure principle. If we adopt a purely selfish lifestyle then there is only so far we can go before the highs become banal and we demand increasingly self-destructive highs. We may get pleasure from drink, drugs, sex or sky-diving but at some point it is meaningless unless we can share it, even if that does involve a degree of condescension or vanity. For most people, making somebody else happy is enjoyable in itself. It gives one a sense of power that you can control someone else's emotions and engenders gratitude in return, it also makes people like us and one of our fundamental human failings is the need to be liked. (Admittedly there are are sociopaths who do not appreciate this but I think that these are in the minority.) Even if we are "good" in an anonymous context there is a feeling of self-satisfaction moral smugness, one has done something good because one can.

Finally I must address the goodness of the poor. I know that 🇰🇪 harps on about religious people people giving more to charity but this does not address the issue of distribution. If we are to believe the statistics there are more "people of faith" in the USA than there are atheists or humanists, what if most of these (excluding Bill Gates & Warren Buffet) Christian donors were actually high earners? To really know how generous (or good) someone is then you need to know what percentage of their disposable income is given to charity and I think that in this regard the poor are generally more giving. This is because they have possibly suffered (or come close to suffering) in the past and therefore feel a comradeship with others in need. They know darn well that they could be in the same boat if something goes wrong so give as a form of unspoken mutual-assurance policy, they may need a reciprocal favour in the future.

After dealing with why people may do good I would like to turn to "why not do evil?". What is true "evil"? Murder, rape and pillage seem to be the generally accepted items but even these have degrees. In regards to murder then first we have self-defence, where if we are attacked and are truly fearful for our lives then it may be proportional as last resort to kill our attacker, who might be acting out of malice or some temporary psychotic disturbance (in which case we impose the requirement of proportionality as who knows when we might be similarly afflicted). Second we have manslaughter - murder by negligence - not something that was done with malicious intent but nevertheless resulted in the loss of someone else's life. We must accept responsibility for our own actions as we would be aggrieved if another person or entity killed someone that we loved either though some negligence, parsimony, or dereliction and demand justice. (Here I must take issue with those French people who who having lost a loved one who crashed into one of Napoleon's trees while driving under the influence of alcohol insisted that the tree be cut down as if it was somehow to blame.)  Thirdly we have the killing of another human just because we don't like them, think that we have been slighted by them (or the group to which we think they belong)  or somehow they got in our way of attaining some minor goal. Most societies regard this as unacceptable as the effect is disproportional to the benefit one might accrue but often becomes acceptable when escalated to the level of international war (in the role of a protagonist rather than in self defence). However, we must turn the tables and think "what if it was us that had offended someone else" or were seen as standing in the way of someone's material gain. Would we accept it? No, the golden rule requires that we are proportionate in response. Some cultures demand that shaming of the family or clan requires a death (but then forget that there might be a reciprocal requirement which leads to escalation) but most legal codes recognise that this should not be the remit of laymen as the greater stability of society is their prime concern. Rape also has degrees; Julian Assange is charged with rape in Sweden because he did not use a condom while engaging in consensual sex, in some jurisdictions a married woman has automatically consented to sex with her husband whenever he likes, statutory rape is sexual intercourse with a person below an arbitrary legal age of consent - in the UK it used to be 12, now it's 16 - who's to say where the precise line should be drawn? We may have a legal definition of rape but it is much more difficult to ascribe a moral one because it often boils down to psychological coercion, issues of power or even temporary self-intoxication (if two people are both drunk who is to blame if sex occurs?). Pillaging (theft with violence during wartime) or the taking of things from others that do not belong to us is also seen as evil but again has degrees. Some have access to natural resources denied to others either by privilege or accidents of history. If a man and his family (or nation) are starving because they have no access to land yet a rich man (or country) has an orchard or field of food is it evil for the starving man to take it? Some might claim that it is evil for the better off to withhold it, especially if they do not need it beyond their own subsistence.

Some people consider any infraction of the Ten Commandments as evil but four of them are purely about religious observance; the rest are about respecting your parents, not stealing, killing or lying, and respecting the property of others (including their spouse). The latter six are "good" because they ensure the smooth running of a society by protecting everyone in equal measure.

So I see that I've rambled on at length but my point is that doing "good" can be an essential part of enlightened self-interest, good for one group may not be good for another, evil for some may be good for others, and doing nothing may be good or evil depending on the circumstances. 14:30, 15 February 2011 (UTC)


 * You've articulated some really interesting points; I'm in the process of writing a response. Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)


 * What Lily said times a million. If anything, I've come to see morality as part self-serving rationalization and part unattainable idealism. We should apply rationality to our morality (this is RationalWiki, right?), but at the same time, I feel that some intuitive feeling of right and wrong must come into play. I simply can find no justification for people to be stomped on for some vague abstract principle like "the dictatorship of the proletariat" or "the free market." As I wrote above, an acknowledgement of our limitations needs to come into play but it can't dominate our thinking entirely. We have to balance skepticism of intuitive morality with intuitive morality itself. The evils of both are readily apparent and they often lead to xenophobia, justifications for greed and selfishness, etc. So many look for a perfect system of morality and ethics. Admirable, and I sympathize with this, but it's impossible to achieve. All we can do, I feel, is find that Churchill-esque "least worst" solution while we continuously try to define and move toward that ideal perfect system. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 08:24, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

The simple answer is...
...of course that the majority of us roughly agree on what "good" is, that we like it, that we want it to happen much more often than "evil", and so we collectively make society's rules (laws, conventions, etc.) to promote it. There isn't a gap here for God to fall into. It's pretty basic. Ajkgordon (talk) 13:26, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * I enjoy simple answers to this sort of thing. You can rationalise it all you like and bring in plenty of philosophical and moral discussion, but it's not that complex. You could easily ask "why be gay?" "why get into spanking?" "why vote Labour?" "why play D&D?" "why have two legs?" and merely respond in the immortal words of that great musical artist Billie Piper... "because we want to!" I mean, that's all reality is telling us, that it's instinct and its desire and it's just a wanting to be good for the sake of being good. 12:53, 18 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Exactly. Ajkgordon (talk) 13:10, 18 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I think that ultimately "Because we want to!" is way too simplistic as a justification for why we should do good. I don't think you'll deny that we've all done things that we knew were "wrong" in one way or another—not "wrong" because they were poorly thought out or badly done, but because they were not "good" (however you choose to define "good"). Why did we do wrong? Because we wanted to. Why do we do wrong? Because we want to. Why shouldn't we do wrong? ... Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Then you didn't understand the point. 12:29, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * In fairness, I should expand on that a little. The point is that, ultimately, we don't need to justify ourselves at all. There is no way I can conclusively prove that anyone else is actually alive and not a figment of my imagination, therefore it cannot be objectively and conclusively proven that killing one of these little imaginary sprites is in any way wrong. So we really have nothing more complex than "because we want to". We make the assumption that there are others out there just like ourselves, that they think and feel the same way and so we see it as just a plainly good thing to not be a dick. It's simple, and there is no need to make complex justifications for being good. But I suppose more deeply, being "good" in the sense we're all talking about is about not doing things. Like not murdering, not stealing, not vandalising and so on. You never have to justify not doing something. Vegetarians don't have to justify that they don't eat meet, I don't have to justify not following the Premier League, an atheist doesn't have to justify not believing in God. Therefore we don't really have to justify being good. Because we want to. 12:36, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Can you "objectively prove" you are the offspring of two of these "imaginary sprites"? Would it not seem very likely that you got your sentience from them? It seems that in order for you to be the only conscious entity, this would have to be a simulated reality or a "dream". For that matter, you can't prove anything "objective" exists. You can't "objectively prove" the Earth is older than 6 thousand years or six days. You must have some faith there could be something beyond yourself, in order to investigate or believe in the likely "reality" that we "perceive".
 * The memory I have of dreams tells me they are not as consistent as the real world. If you are an organism dreaming, how would you survive being asleep all the time? Are you a god dreaming? What evidence is there that a god could exist or that it would dream if it did?
 * The world we observe suggests that we have ancestors going all the way through the tree of life. Although we can hardly imagine how there could be a physical correlate of sentience, we know it exists because we experience it and the evidence of evolution strongly suggests that sentience has evolved with life. ~ Lumenos (talk) 19:07, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Enlightened Self-Interest
The ethic of reciprocity is an ancient and common idea, and it's a good one: do good for others so they will do good for you. It's true and it works in a logically consistent, ethics-based, entirely practical way. It also has the benefit of being breathtakingly simple, and allows for all kinds of interpretations such as "Jesus made human society so that this would work" right on over to the more cynical "we can make a social contract to step up from our bestial nature to this".-- 13:59, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
 * See Lily, above. She is much more thorough and intelligent.-- 16:19, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Ambiguity and my value system
"Many atheists cite secular humanism as the basis for their morality; but I have never heard a compelling secular reason for why anyone should be moral or do good. "You should do good." "Why?" "Because it's good to do good." That's a circular argument, and it has no rational basis. Or, worse: "You should do good." "Why?" "Because it's beneficial to human society." But why should we care about benefiting human society? "Because it's good." Another circular argument."
 * Perhaps this goes in circles because you ask an ambiguous question. What is good? One way to define "goodness" is utilitarian, another definition is divine command theory. Why should a person do good? "Good" is what a person "should" do (by definition). If you don't define "good" or "should" your question can't be answered. If you are asking how someone else would define those, then don't expect the answer to satisfy your question.


 * I've found answers that satisfy "that question" for me. Basically I start by defining benefit. My values look like this: There are three essential benefits. We benefit from having what we choose, what pleases us, or an increase in awareness. Of course these may conflict and this is relative to time and person. To me, choice is most important, followed by pleasure, followed by awareness. These are "objective" in a sense. I didn't make these up. I could argue that these are universal values. From there I would say that to choose something that is detrimental to everybody (including oneself) is absolutely bad/"evil". When life is so convenient that we can find solutions that are in everyone's best interest this is absolute goodness. However life may not always be so convenient. When it comes to conflicting interests, I am more like a relativist. But we can still discuss what is the utilitarian way, for example. That is also sorta "objectively measurable" once you have discovered what the essential benefits are. Is this a form of "objective morality" or even a form of "morality"? ~ Lumenos (talk) 07:45, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Euthanasia
"In fact, if we choose to define "good" merely as "something that is beneficial to the rest of human society", would it not be pertinent to kill off people in aged-care facilities? After all, most of them are—for all intents and purposes—wasting human society's time and resources, and it's not as if every one of them is still benefiting human society. I do not know a person who would fail to call that murder. But why is that? And, more to the point, why is murder wrong? "
 * That is a rather bad example. If we enact mandatory euthanasia then we are likely to become victim to it, if we live long enough. I don't see a problem with physician assisted suicide with as much informed consent as possible. Suicide sometimes seems to be the only cure for hell. This issue seems to be more about whether we should want to pay tax or donate to help those with incurable disabilities that make them unable (or unwilling) to meet their own survival needs. This wouldn't necessarily be "morally" obligatory according to my values, but it would be compassionate (assuming the resources could not be used more efficiently to utilitarian ends) and compassion is a form of "good". ~ Lumenos (talk) 06:58, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Almighty murder, rape, and pillaging
"If you were in a position of power, and there was no possibility of people enacting revenge against you, why would you not murder and rape and pillage at will?"
 * "Murder" and rape don't tickle my fancy. Why would I need to murder anyone if they are completely powerless to oppose me? I want to be worshiped. How will I be worshiped if the people don't love me? I'd maybe do a little of what some might call "robbery", in the interest of redistributing wealth to more rightful owners. ~ Lumenos (talk) 06:58, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Secular vs theistic morality, origins of violence
"Let's assume, for a moment, that altruism arose as a product of evolution by natural selection. That tells me how I became altruistic, maybe. But it does not tell me why I should be altruistic. "


 * I basically agree with that. But you seem to be conflating "goodness" and "selfless altruism". I say "selfless altruism" because "altruism" can be done for "selfish" reasons. For example, if people have evolved to enjoy doing "selfless" acts, these aren't "altruistic" in the sense you mean. We have a selfish reason to do those things because we enjoy them. If the "pleasurable altruism" leads to some future detriment for ourselves, then we may have a selfish reason to change our ways. So we agree there. ~ Lumenos (talk) 06:58, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

"Some may ask, "What is this, you only do good because God's watching you?" No; but that is an irrelevant question. I am not concerned with religion in the context of this debate. I am interested only in how those who don't believe in an objective standard of good justify (a) why they themselves do "good" and (b) why they insist that others do "good"."
 * I don't insist that others act altruistically. I think here again that question comes up because you seem to be suggesting that theism has a "justification" for "altruistic objective morality". If you can tell me how theism could pull this off, I could probably use this reasoning to show how it can't depend on theism. Conversely if there is not a "secular" argument for "altruistic objective morality" I don't think there could be a theistic one either.
 * How does the existence of a god change anything? There are two differences that come to mind:
 * The first is that only god can perfectly punish or reward. But this doesn't justify altruism, it makes altruism unnecessary (for the believer anyway). This would mean that altruism is only possible for those who lack faith. There is only a matter of doing what may be pleasing in the short term vs the eternal state.
 * The second argument is that atheism implies physicalism and physicalism implies nihilism. Without going into detail I would say that atheism may imply determinism (or no free will) but not necessarily physicalism.
 * To answer your question, in theory, if a person makes arguments based on "altruism", then I might make an argument based on an "altruistic" moral system such as utilitarianism. But in practice it is rarely possible to distinguish deeds of truly selfless altruism from deeds that may benefit the doer in some way, so I would usually look for a way to show that it is in our mutual interest.
 * In theory, sociopaths have no reason to have empathy or they may enjoy or otherwise benefit from being malicious. In theory, there is no reason for them to be "good" (without a god to fear). But in my "research" (mostly from watching documentaries or communicating through the Internet) sadists and tyrants often have strong sense of their own sort of morality. I shouldn't imply "they" are a minority either. People are often willing to look at prices before they ask how products were produced. Normal "westerners" often seem to support state terrorism or wars of aggression. Perhaps I shouldn't label most people as sociopathic when everyone tends to be "altruistic" or "benevolent" in one way or another. At least some scientists believe that the tendency toward maliciousness is rooted in early trauma resulting from abuse OR neglect. So I think human nature tends to be benevolent so far as the person is mentally "healthy". By "healthy" I mean being adapted to a world that will reciprocate the benevolence. In an environment where one has to resort to "evil" in order to survive or thrive, this too is a "healthy" adaptation. "When in Rome..." ~ Lumenos (talk) 06:58, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Secular morality
Traditional concepts of secular morality (particularly those from the Age of Enlightenment) have appealed to natural law for their source. To quote Benjamin Franklin:

Nevertheless, the late learned Author of The Religion of Nature, (which I send you herewith) has given us a Rule or Scheme, whereby to discover which of our Actions ought to be esteem'd and denominated good, and which evil: It is in short this, "Every Action which is done according to Truth, is good; and every Action contrary to Truth, is evil: To act according to Truth is to use and esteem every Thing as what it is, &c. Thus if A steals a Horse from B, and rides away upon him, he uses him not as what he is in Truth, viz. the Property of another, but as his own, which is contrary to Truth, and therefore evil".

That example has been put in a more succinct form by G.K. Chesterton:

Thieves respect property. They merely wish the property to become their property that they may more perfectly respect it.

07:12, 17 February 2011 (UTC)


 * There's no more evidence for natural law than there is for God & the concept makes even less sense. Just another way of claiming that one concept of morality should be regarded as universal.   07:40, 17 February 2011 (UTC)
 * We don't necessarily need to agree on "universal morality" so long as we can agree that we have a mutual interest in something along the lines of utilitarianism. Then we can write moral codes or laws. ~ Lumenos (talk) 07:57, 17 February 2011 (UTC)
 * There's no more evidence for natural law than there is for God... Uh, right; similarly we can conclude that pigs can fly and people do not fall down and die when they jump off a cliff.
 * Much of natural-law morality is simply an enumeration of the known or probable consequences of certain courses of action; other parts include spinning out a consistent application of the principles making up one's conscience.
 * This can all be relative to time, place, and social context, but there seem to be a number of principles that are common to all sorts of people. 05:06, 18 February 2011 (UTC)
 * There seem to be a number of principles that are common to all sorts of people because there are experiences which are common to all sorts of people too, like pleasure & suffering & the things which can cause these, & a need for some level of social stability. Hence similar ideas about right & wrong.  Seeing these similarities between different cultures' ideas of morality as evidence of something external & objective is not a sound conclusion.   08:17, 18 February 2011 (UTC)
 * You could say a person is objectively "wrong" if they are acting on the belief they will be successful, when in fact they have miscalculated the risk of a negative consequence (of a crime, war, or other conflict). This may be the idea behind certain forms of "objectivism", "ethical egoism", or "natural law". But is "morality" nothing more than correctly predicting consequences? Usually it is. Many would say something is "morally wrong" even when the "evil" doer knows they are unlikely to suffer a negative consequence. This definition of morality is altruistic (or it includes both acting in "self-interest" or denying "self-interest", for the greater good). Ethical egoism sounds like "morality" because it makes prescriptive statements; it says you should act rationally. However a more "traditional" definition of "morality" says that morality is more than merely acting "rationally" and therefore ethical egoism is not even wrong, it is not "morality". So we first must disambiguate "morality". Is "morality" anything prescriptive or is it (sometimes) altruistic? To speak more clearly we could call the first definition prescriptive morality, and call the second, altruistic morality. ~ Lumenos (talk) 00:25, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Pleasure, suffering, and social stability do have causes and consequences that are external and objective. 05:09, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * But the question is, how do these facts indicate how people should act? ~ Lumenos (talk) 07:38, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Free will
Many responses have focused on answering the question "Why do humans do good?" as opposed to "Why should humans do good?" Now, there are various possible explanations for the former, but I am not particularly interested in that question right now. We can say that doing good is something we have built into ourselves, something like the beating of a heart, and call it a fundamental and incontrovertible part of us; and claim that those who do wrong suffer from some sort of disease or affliction, much like a person might have heart problems. But I think there are two refutations to this view.

The first is that I do not know of a human being who has lived to a reasonable age and not done something that he or she, and almost every other person, would call "wrong" in one way or another. If this pattern holds for all people, then every one of us is afflicted to some degree by this disease of wrongdoing—although something cannot be called a disease unless there is some man or woman who is free from it, in which case we might throw up our hands and say that we are free of disease and that the "perfect person" under scrutiny actually suffers from the disease of perfection.

The second is that we can choose to do good or evil, but we cannot consciously choose fully how fast or how slow our heart should beat or our lungs should breathe. Well, I suppose that some person somewhere might have figured out how to stop their heart or suspend their breathing by merely thinking about it, but in any case the privilege of suspending such fundamental natural processes has not been given to the rest of us. And yet we quite consciously choose to make decisions about moral matters on a daily basis, and we act upon those decisions.

If human beings have free will, it makes no sense to claim that humans should do good merely because they do do good or because they are "wired" to do good. But if there is no free will, and humans are mere robots completely subject to the laws of nature that we know and understand, it makes as much sense to punish a person for punching us in the face as it does to punish a rock for falling on our toe. Thomas Larsen (talk) 01:52, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * The only reason most people even ask the question "Why do good?" is because they have had their consciences blinkered by the imposition of perverted moral codes, creating a disconnect between what is said to be "good" and what their consciences tell them.
 * But if there is no free will, and humans are mere robots completely subject... Nihilistic dreck, if you ask me; systems have rules to them, whether people accept that fact or not. It makes as much sense that a punch to the face should be likewise repaid as it does that an object should fall to the earth when it is dropped. 05:07, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * When someone doesn't retaliate, your "theory" is discredited. How could physics dictate that people act in ways they don't? Real natural laws are always obeyed. ~ Lumenos (talk) 09:50, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Let's not forget that determinism isn't necessarily incompatible with the idea of free will. This position is called compatibilism and is generally supported by materialist/reductionist philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (see here) and Eliezer Yudkowsky (see here.) Though I don't know enough to vouch for compatibilism's validity, it certainly seems likely. 19:38, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Thomas writes, "If there is no free will, and humans are mere robots completely subject to the laws of nature that we know and understand". I don't believe I "understand the laws of nature" because I have no answer for mind-body problem (my own description of a mind-body problem). It appears that I am more than a "robot" because I have sentience not "free-will". Based on good science and logic we can often predict what things will do and make medicines, devices, etc, but I can't predict if some form of artificial intelligence would be sentient. I am the ghost in the machine. Just because I am robotic doesn't mean I'm always a robot mkay? ;-) Only when I'm misunderstanding. On the other hand, how could I be "free" if I am not determined to do as I will? Conundrums. ~ Lumenos (talk) 19:50, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Thomas, I think you need to re-read the "simple" answers above. You might not like them but I think you need to consider them a little more carefully. Your post above seems to indicate, as is seemingly often the case with people who believe in an absolute moral authority, that you forget that "doing good" is not an absolute. These behaviours are like any other instinct or behaviour. They are by degrees.
 * Think of a basic animal instinct or need. Take, I dunno, eating as an example. We have to eat to survive. But look at how many ways we eat. How much we eat. How badly we eat. How sometimes we don't eat at all and starve to death. Or eat poison and die.
 * Now swap that behaviour with this "doing good". Admittedly it is a much more complicated and ambiguously defined behaviour but the principle remains. There are an infinite number of ways we can behave and, even though an evolutionary advantage probably exists for "doing good", there are myriad ways we can get it wrong and still survive. Besides, there will definitely be plenty of occasions when "doing evil" will be an evolutionary advantage.
 * (I was about to write something about imagining if Hitler had won. But I caught myself just in time!)
 * The point is that all behaviours are much more complicated than some sort of absolute rules based game - do this and you win, don't do it and you lose. There are occasions when "doing wrong" is right for the individual and doesn't have such a negative impact on the population that it is a disadvantage to the species. There are other occasions when the exact same behaviour will have catastrophic results for the individual, the population or the species.
 * But for the most part, "doing good" is a naturally advantageous behaviour and this is why we do it.
 * It really is that simple. Ajkgordon (talk) 21:38, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Compatibilism
This is a reply to Τe†rоиіαn: I couldn't understand Yudkowsky but I watched Dennet's video:

Dennet spent most of the time "arguing" that future events that depend on our choices are not "inevitable" therefore we have "free will" and "moral responsibility".

At the beginning he said that due to determinism, consequentialism is more appropriate than "retributivism" for administering the criminal justice. Apparently this is not because determinism means we are less "morally responsible" but I don't see how else he can make that argument. Seems to be yet another example of the is-ought fallacy.

At the end someone asks about chimpanzees having "free will" and Dennet emphatically declares they do not. This is a quintessential example of what I like to call the Truthism. Dennet (via Hume et al) first divorces "free will" from its traditional definition as some sort of alternative to determinism (or mindless indeterminism). I don't see that he even attempted to address a proper formulation of the reason that determinism and free will are incompatible, but he sure does rip that straw man a new one! ;-) For the final trick, he simply raises the cognitive bar to a level that "animals" aren't invited to the freedom party. Cha ching!

What I would find more informative is to hear a couple of compatibilists acting as defense and prosecution lawyers, in a court. One is arguing that someone is "morally responsible", the other is using the insanity defense. Did the person do bad because they are bad or because they don't "know" what "good" is? Can compatibilists distinguish the two? That may be difficult to fathom but I will expand an old thought experiment to illustrate the problem more clearly.

Let's assume that Laplace's demon is actually involved in devilish activities. Determinism implies that a person's "choice" ultimately has causes that are outside the brain. Choices must be determined by genetics or environment. This means that all the demon needs to do is adjust some aspect of the environment or fiddle with the victim's zygote, and they can have the silly human doing whatever they want. Even without resorting to a theistic hypothetical, the reality is that the more that is known about genetics and animal behaviour, the more that humans are able to control other (less intelligent) humans/animals. Who will be "morally responsible" when people can predict and manipulate the lower classes with a high degree of precision and certainty? Or is this not the inevitable future? ~ Lumenos (talk) 08:42, 24 February 2011 (UTC)