User:ZackMartin/sandbox


 * Copied from here. This is my sandbox, please ignore.

Ace McWicked

 * 1) Agrees that his reasons for atheism are both emotional and rational. However, his understanding of the emotional aspects is very different from my own. In particular, while I find the prospect of non-existence, of everlasting nothingness, to be unredeemedly negative, he sees it as a positive: The fact the death is the end gives me purpose, gives me reason and gives me the emotional strength to know that every action I make could be the last...so make it count. And that fills me with joy, motivation and meaning. My response: Well, that's good actually that you share that. You see, why are some people theists and others atheists? Because one side is smart and the other side dumb? Because one side is rational and the other side irrational? No, because different people have different emotional makeups.

Thunderkatz

 * 1) Says that the reason it took him so long to become an atheist was because of the emotion holding him back. He spent a long time in "ultraliberal Judaism" and deism because he felt a need for God to exist. Finally, he says, reason was victorious over emotion, and he became an atheist. My response: You say you reached your conclusion through the use of reason, but which reason? Is there one system of reason, or many? Which system of reason is right? Maybe, if you used a different system of rationality, you would have reached a different conclusion? How do you know your chosen system of rationality is the right one?
 * 2) In reply, he rejects my idea that the had to choose a particular form of reason to justify his non-belief in God; he says that there was nothing rational in favour of it whatsoever. My response: When you decided that faith was not valid evidence, you picked a "basis of reason". You lack evidence for your position that faith is not evidence.
 * 3) He responds that I lack evidence that claiming that faith is not evidence needs evidence. He sees my argument for belief in God as being ultimately dependent on a claim that truth is subjective. (An aside, written after the fact: I don't agree with him that "truth is subjective", that is not actually my argument — I believe that truth is objective; my question is really, how can we know we have the actual truth rather than a falsehood? I attack the idea that either of us have evidence for our beliefs, not because I ultimately believe that truth is subjective, but because I think many people have built their house of thought on shoddy foundations, and maybe if I expose how shoddy those foundations are, I can convince them of the need to look for something firmer. That is why I propose, for the sake of the argument, that my beliefs are as groundless as theirs, even as I ultimately believe that my beliefs possess a ground which theirs lacks.) My response: Ah, so we both lack evidence for our beliefs, and each of us chooses to believe whatever we want to? Maybe stop hiding behind this mirage of alleged objectivity, which when investigated carefully is revealed to be empty.
 * 4) He then rejects my "subjective truth argument". He proceeds on the understanding, that what I am arguing, is that he should take someone else's faith as evidence, but he has no way of knowing if their proclaimed faith is really their actual faith, if they really believe what they say they do, especially if truth is subjective (as he seems to think I am claiming). With respect to his own faith, he points out that he does not and did not have any, so he could not possibly use that as evidence. He then goes on to consider the number of contradictory faiths: a billion Muslims and a billion Roman Catholics. He points out he cannot believe in both faiths, since they are contradictory; but he has no more reason to believe in one than the other, so the only logical solution is to accept neither.
 * 5) My response: I am not talking about using someone else's faith as evidence, I am talking about using your own. So, the fact that so many people believe in Catholicism, and so many people believe in Islam, is not relevant.
 * 6) If you read my essay, you will see I am not advocating that you have any old faith, but a particular kind of faith - what I call "highest faith". Highest faith does not have as its object the truth of a particular religious doctrine, or a particular religion. It only has as its object, "Good shall always triumph in the end". So all faith does is establish that one premise. From that premise, we deduce through ordinary reason (not faith) various doctrines, such as the existence of God or an afterlife. But we don't believe those doctrines directly by faith, only this basic principle. Our reasoning we base on that principle could well be mistaken, but the truth of that principle itself is certain.
 * Yes, if you have no faith, you can't use it as evidence — but you could always choose to get yourself some. You have a choice between having faith and not having faith, and thus far you have chosen to not have faith. But you could always change, if you chose to.

Objective ethics

 * 1) Thunderkatz then criticises what he sees as my inconsistency, in on the one hand arguing his truths are subjective, on the other hand using the concept of "good" (which he sees as inherently subjective). Thus the conversation began to address the issue specifically of objective ethics. My response: I believe ethics is objective. You don't? You think "murder is wrong" has no objective truth to it, but is just an expression of dislike for murder, ultimately no different from "I don't like bananas"?
 * 2) Thunderkatz raises a few points. Firstly, what you think of as right or wrong depends on your perspective. For example, the baker whose bread is stolen, vs. the poor man who stole the bread to feed his starving children. Secondly, he argues that there can be difficult ethical dilemmas, to which the solution is not obvious (his particular example is a continuation of the same baker vs. poor man story; whether or not it is the best possible example of the point, the point is well understood.) Thirdly, he points to the existence of radically different schools of thought regarding ethics, with no clear idea of how to choose who is right and who is wrong, e.g. Randian Objectivism vs. Utilitarianism. Fourthly, how do I know that my idea of good is anywhere near being right? Fifthly, he raises the rather unusual scenario, that the more good you do on earth, the more evil you get in the afterlife, and thus that doing good on earth results in eternal torment.
 * 3) My response: Yes, it is true that people disagree about matters of ethics, and our ethical opinions can be clouded by self-interest. That doesn't mean there is no objective truth to it; people also disagree about factual matters, and their opinions about them can be clouded by self-interest, yet we don't conclude that therefore factual matters are purely subjective (unless maybe one is a postmodernist), so to be consistent we should not conclude on that basis that ethics is subjective either.
 * 4) A matter having objective reality doesn't necessarily imply we know all the answers about it. We don't know all the answers about physics either, yet that is no argument that physics is subjective. So, the fact that you can point to difficult issues/dilemmas like the one you pointed to, doesn't mean that ethics lacks objective reality. (Would someone argue, that because no one knows the correct way to combine general relativity with quantum theory, that therefore physics lacks objective reality?) Likewise, the fact that people have different opinions about ethics (e.g. Utilitarianism vs Ayn Randism) does not imply that there is no objective reality to it, anymore than the fact that people have different opinions about theoretical physics implies that there is no objective reality to physics.
 * 5) I don't believe in eternal torment, I am a universalist (hell, if it exists, is only of limited duration; everyone goes to heaven in the end). So, your invocation of eternal torment is irrelevant to my position. (Actually, having re-read what he wrote, I realise now I somewhat misunderstood what he was actually saying - he doesn't seem to be referring to a classical "sinners go to hell forever" model, but rather some contrarian "good people go to hell, bad people go to heaven" model - although I'm not sure what his exact point was.)
 * 6) ListenerX then introduces what he sees as a historical account of objective morality, in terms of the relationship between Hellenistic philosophy and Christianity. In his view, Helenistic philosophers welcomed Christianity, because it provided them with an opportunity to force their morality unto the "unenlightened" masses. (I'd have to question whether that is really a historically accurate account, as opposed to a bit of modern mythmaking; however, in my discussion with ListenerX, I accepted his historical position for the sake of the argument.) He argues that the absence of objective morality is not a "nightmare scenario", so long as one does not believe in "total depravity" or dualism à la Manicheanism, given that most people have a conscience to guide them.
 * 7) I respond: You seem to me to be confusing two separate issues: (1) is morality objective? (2) if it is, then whose account of it is correct? If morality is not objective, then any morality is as good as any other. But, if morality is objective, that does not imply that any particular moral view is in fact the right one, just that they all have the potential to be more correct than the rest, but which of them if any actually is, that is a completely separate question. If someone tries to impose moral views on you that you disagree with, you have two choices (1) deny that morality is objective, (2) agree that morality is objective, but deny that they have the correct view of it. Is not in fact (2) the better choice? With (2), you actually get to claim those people you disagree with are wrong; with (1), all you can ultimately say is they have different preferences from you.
 * 8) I don't believe in total depravity; on the contrary, I see the vast areas of agreement on morality between people. For example, just about everyone agrees that, as a general rule, killing people is wrong, although of course there are exceptions to that rule. Now, people will argue about what exactly those exceptions are, about which putative exceptions are valid and which are not; but let's not let the disagreement about the exceptions blind us to the near universal agreement on the rule itself, and the near universal agreement on judging many particular cases. Consider for example the acts of Ted Bundy or Jeffrey Dahmer - just about everyone will agree their acts were wrong, even people who disagree about the morality of other instances of killing (such as war or euthanasia or the death penalty). Likewise, almost everyone agrees, that as a general rule, taking other people's stuff (theft) is wrong, although again there is argument about possible exceptions (e.g. poor people stealing to survive, taxation, wealth redistribution, etc.) But, consider the case of the rich person, who steals from the poor, because it's fun - just about everyone will agree that is immoral.
 * 9) What you call "conscience", I see as substantial agreement existing on objective morality. It is the same with factual matters - there is enormous disagreement about some factual matters (e.g. is global warming real? etc.), but let us not let those disagreements cloud us from the even greater agreement about the basics (e.g. the Earth, the Sun, the Moon exists; rain exists; trees exist; dogs and cats exist; 1+1=2; cows produce milk; most birds can fly; etc.) Just as these many agreements, in spite of those disagreements, is a sign that factual matters are ultimately objective, so are the many agreements about ethics, in spite of many disagreements, a sign that ethical matters are ultimately objective.
 * 10) ListenerX disagrees with my position that the better choice, when faced when someone else trying to impose their moral views on you, is to agree that morality is objective, but deny that they have the correct view of it; rather, he sees that arguing that morality is subjective as the better option. As justification, he argues that acceptance of objective morality, and the position that others have the wrong objective morality, is the attitude that leads to holy wars. (He also says that "telling lies is just a waste of time", although I am not sure what he means by that - he links "telling lies" to Pascal's wager, but I don't quite get the point - I believe that Pascal's wager is a non-starter, and I don't see what I am doing here as having much to do with it.)
 * 11) In response to my rejection of total depravity, he argues that my "extended paraphrasing of Thomas Aquinas" shows that I draw some of my points from Christianity.
 * 12) He rejects my argument that the many agreements about ethics, in spite of many disagreements, a sign that ethical matters are ultimately objective. He seems that instead as merely a consequence that all human beings have similar brains and inhabit the same planet.
 * 13) My response: that sort of attitude is what leads to holy wars - not necessarily. I can disagree with you about ethics, and even believe that we are disagreeing about some objective reality, as opposed to merely expressing differing likes and dislikes, without going to war with you over it. If there is objective ethics, then I have to admit that it is possible that I am wrong about it and you are right. If there is no objective ethics, then there is no such possibility, since there is no reality that you and I could be said to be right or wrong about. We can disagree about factual matters without going to war over it, we can disagree about ethics without going to war over it too. Now, it's not impossible that an ethical disagreement could lead to war (one of the causes of World War II was a series of disagreements about ethics between the Axis and the Allies); but whether it would in fact depends very much on the parties' viewpoints on the severity of the disagreement, on the ethics of warfare, and on practical considerations. And there can be no doubt, that many of the "holy wars" of history, had very little to do with actual disagreements about ethical matters, and were very much about political, economic or ethnic conflicts, thinly vieled in a religious cloak.
 * 14) I don't deny being influenced to some extent by Christianity in general, or Aquinas in particular. I have studied many religions and philosophies, and I will take what I think is true and useful from each of them. That said, total depravity isn't really Aquinas' viewpoint, it is more Calvin's. Have you noticed my extended paraphrases of Nietzsche?
 * 15) There are great similarities between factual matters and ethical matters, which could be taken as a sign that if one is objective the other must be also, as I indeed do. On the contrary, you insist those similarities are essentially coincidental, that they have other explanations, and fact and value fundamentally differ in objectivity despite any surface similarities. I suppose we each believe what we choose to believe; I am not sure how either of us could have any actual evidence with which to prove the other wrong.

Tielec01 and can we choose our beliefs?

 * 1) Tielec01 raises the question of how he would choose to have faith; more particularly, could he choose to believe that the moon is made of green cheese?
 * 2) My response: there are two extreme views here, and I am somewhere in the middle. One extreme claims that we can never choose our own beliefs, that we have absolutely no choice in the matter. The other extreme claims that we have absolute choice in our beliefs, that we can choose to believe absolutely whatever we want. I believe neither position; I think both are wrong. Yet you seem to be equating my position (we have some power over our beliefs) with the extreme position that we have absolute/unbridled power over them.
 * 3) There is a difference between claims that are obviously false, patently ridiculous, or plain ludicrous; and claims where both sides can make a prima facie plausible case, and neither side has strong evidence in its favour. "The moon is made of green cheese" is an example of the first situation; "ethics is objective" or "belief on the basis of faith can in some cases be approriate" is an example of the second. You can't choose whether to believe the first, but you can choose whether to believe the second.
 * 4) Also, you can only change your beliefs if there is some benefit for you in changing them. This is just obvious - if you are a rational actor, you will only decide to do something if there is some positive benefit in doing so (whether to yourself personally, or to other people you care about, or to some larger goal you value). So, if you are someone like Ace McWicked admits being, who (he as claims) is emotionally satisfied with the idea of death as non-existence, and emotionally dissatisfied with the idea of an afterlife, then there is no value for you in choosing to believe in some belief system which implies an afterlife. Whereas, if you have the psychology that sees positive value in an afterlife, and sees non-existence as one of the greatest tragedies, then there is value for you in choosing to believe in a belief system which implies an afterlife, and you may in fact choose to so believe. This comes back to my initial point - the real gap between theists and atheists is not one of rationality, it is one of differing emotional makeups. Just because it is not in your interest to choose to change course, does not mean that you lack the power to so change if you decided that it was in your interest to do so.
 * 5) Tielec01 provides what he hopes is, and I would agree is, a reasonable restatement of my position: in situations where both sides of an argument have a prima facie case of being true then it is possible to choose which side to believe in. He points to my examples of clearly ludicrous, and prima facie plausible statements: the moon is made of green cheese and belief on the basis of faith can in some cases be appropriate. He correctly states my view, that the first is impossible to believe in, but about the second we have a choice whether to believe in it or not. However, he does not agree with my claim that this statement is prima facie plausible; it is not prima facie plausible to him. Since it is not prima facie plausible to him, he cannot choose to believe in it.
 * 6) He then seems to raise a sort of meta-issue: How can I choose to believe that the benefits of believing this statement are real? In response to my statement that Just because it is not in your interest to choose to change course, does not mean that you lack the power to so change if you decided that it was in your interest to do so., he asks How would I choose to ‘decide that it is in my best interest to do so’? and labels that as begging the question.
 * 7) My response: you can disagree with me that "belief on the basis of faith can in some cases be appropriate" is prima facie possible. You can claim that is prima facie ludicrous. But, let me put the question more generally - are there claims which for you both sides have a plausible case? Or are you a person where the whole world is black and white, and all claims are either obviously true or obviously false? If there are claims where, in your judgement, both sides have a plausible case, are you not free then to choose whether to accept one side, or the other, or neither?
 * 8) How might you "decide that it is in my best interest to do so"? Well, if you examine why you believe what you believe, is it possible that you might find that for some of your beliefs, the primary causal reasons why you hold them are emotional? And, if that is possible, might it be possible that your emotions might change? And, if they changed, is it not possible that you could change your beliefs to suit? Or might you experience a conflict between your established beliefs and your new emotions? Don't you have some degree of choice, in whether you stick to your established beliefs in spite of your new emotions, or whether you let your beliefs yield to your new emotional state?
 * And, I would likewise argue we have some ability to control our own emotions. Not an absolute ability, but not none whatsoever either. And, if some of our beliefs are a product of our emotions, if we can choose to change our emotions, would we not in the process change the beliefs they generate?

AD

 * 1) AD claims he is convinced, although it is rather clear it is an attempt to humour me, and show up what he sees as a flaw in my argument (essentially, that in his understanding of what I am saying, he cam use my arguments as a justification to believe whatever he feels like): The turning point for me was when I realized I could just have faith in whatever I wanted
 * 2) My response, humouring him back a bit: Welcome aboard, fellow traveller, the great ship Faith! But, I feel I must disagree with you when you say I could just have faith in whatever I wanted. In my view, there are two extremes: at one extreme, we have the view that faith is totally illegitimate, i.e. justifies nothing. At the other extreme, we have the view that faith is totally without limitations, i.e. it is a blank cheque that justifies everything and anything. My own view tries to be the golden mean between those two extremes - the use of faith is legitimate, in some circumstances, but not just in any circumstance whatsoever. I have some criteria for the use of faith being legitimate (1) it must be in service of what is objectively good (which means, in practice, what you genuinely believe to be objectively good); (2) it must not contradict strong contrary evidence, if you are aware of any; (3) the absence of strong contrary evidence must be highly likely to be a permanent affair, rather than likely to be some temporary limitation of our knowledge; (4) faith is best used to defend high-level principles (like the good always triumphs in the end), rather than to support specific religious doctrines. Within those bounds, I support faith; beyond those bounds, I oppose it.
 * 3) Proving that he is trying to pull my leg, he responds to the above with: Nope, I have faith that you are wrong. Also bees. I have faith in bees. Also seat cushions.

Tetronian

 * 1) One of the premises of my whole argument, is essentially that, when we have an absence of evidence either way, we are free to believe whatever we want. I have previously argued for this viewpoint in more detail on RW, and Tetronian expresses strong disagreement with it. He also cites Eliezer Yudkowsky's arguments on the same issue. My response is that I am not convinced by his or Yudkowsky's position, and I am happy to revisit or restart my earlier debate on that issue, but up to now Tetronian has not taken me up on that offer.

Nebuchadnezzar

 * 1) Nebuchadnezzar says he is disappointed with my essay because it does not contain any "interesting philosophical issue[s]". He sees it as just the classic theist projection: My belief is based on faith so yours must be too! He admits that no one's beliefs are completely free from emotion, and says that he has heard some terrible emotion-based arguments for atheism (his example: I used to believe in god, then my brother died. I don't see how a loving god could allow this to happen. Therefore, god doesn't exist.)
 * 2) He reports that he used to believe in "some vague of deism", an "ill-defined watchmaker god", because he found the notion that the universe was just an "accident" to be incredulous (which he now sees as merely an argument from incredulity). Then he became an atheist.
 * 3) He says that on his journey to atheism, he spent much more time reading apologetics than atheist tracts. He focused just on the arguments for a god, and skipped past the arguments for a particular religion (be that Christianity, Islam or Hinduism). He also read Karen Armstrong and similar sorts of works - he sees her as fundamentally an equivocator. He did not read much atheistic or agnostic works, only some essays by H. L. Mencken and Bertrand Russell's seminal Why I Am Not A Christian — this was in the days prior to New Atheism, he points out.
 * 4) He concludes that he read more on the pro-god side because I wanted to see if anyone had actually come up with a convincing argument, but ultimately what I found was that the fundamentals of the debate haven't really moved forward that much since last century, at least (pointing out how contemporary works repeat discussion of Pascal's Wager and Paley's Watchmaker ad nauseam)
 * 5) He refers to the "old chestnuts" of the uncertainty tactic ("we can't be sure of anything") and other ways of knowing ("everything's subjective"), whic he sees as being repeated ad nasueam (I take him to mean, both in apologetic literature generally, and in my own essay more specifically).
 * 6) He suggests my essay would be better titled "How to Overcome Achristianity". RW defines Achristianity as a form of atheism focused on trying to disprove Christianity/Bible, and paying little attention to the claims of non-Christian religions.

ListenerX

 * Maratrean does a bit of a flip-flop on the evidence question; in the "Why disbelieve?" section he suggests that there is evidence in favor of God's existence, only to issue a categorical denial of that in "Justifying faith."
 * But it is not necessary to use psychological projection to establish that most atheists take their position on faith, specifically a belief in strong rationalism. 05:35, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
 * @ListenerX, I know what you are referring to. But I don't see it is a flip-flop, because I believe that faith is a form of evidence. That may seem a strange position to some, but if we understand the etymology of the word evidence (evidence, evident), which is ultimately about being a means to see the truth of something, then I would say that faith is evidence. Dictionary definitions can be found to support that usage. Indeed, even the venerable King James Bible can be quoted to support the usage that faith is a form of evidence - Hebrews 11:1 faith is... the evidence of things not seen.
 * Is atheism a faith-based position? To me, not exactly. To me, faith is a conscious choice to believe something which is not repugnant to reason because we ethically ought to do so. I think atheists may ultimately lack rational justification for their beliefs, but I don't see them as having faith by that definition. I do think atheists believe what they do for emotional reasons, and then rationalise to justify their emotionally-based choices. As a theist I do the same thing; I just think I am more honest about doing it.
 * @Nebs, I think I actually have something, at least somewhat original, to contribute to the debate. I reject the classic arguments as pointless. I am quite open about basing my case on faith, and on the deep relationship between ethics and rationality. Neither is entirely original (the first mirrors very much Robert M. Adams, the second the work of another philosopher whose name escapes me at the moment), but it is very much a different emphasis from the traditional one. 06:09, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
 * When you have to quote-mine a dictionary to argue your point, most likely you have a dodgy argument. "Evidence" is generally used today — as you use it yourself in the "Justifying faith" section — to refer to objective or outward signs, of which faith is neither.
 * I do think atheists believe what they do for emotional reasons, and then rationalise... Trying to plumb atheists' motivations for their beliefs is bordering on an ad hominem; better to focus on faults in the rationalization. When I was an atheist, I did not let emotion creep into my metaphysical judgments too much (and I could barely stand listening to other atheists chatter about how they dropped Christianity based on ill-thought-out moral differences). When I became a pagan I quit trying to rationalize that way altogether. 07:38, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
 * "Evidence" is generally used today... to refer to objective or outward signs, of which faith is neither - if your claim about the present-day usage of the word "evidence" is correct, then there can be no doubt that is a change from the past, compared to how it was used say by the translators of the KJV. Now, if the meaning has changed somewhat, we have to ask why? Could it actually be a loaded change, a reflection of a devaluing of faith in our culture? And if it is a loaded change, why should someone who disagrees with the ideological underpinings of that new usage assent to it?
 * It's not an ad hominem to ask the emotional reasons behind atheism. I have been open about the emotional reasons behind both my atheism and my theism. I ask myself - what is the greatest motivator of human beliefs, reason or emotion? - and I think the answer "emotion" displays a truer understanding of human nature than the answer "reason". And, in terms of understanding those emotions, the main thing I have to go on is my own personal experience, so my starting position is that the emotional reasons why other people are atheists must be similar to the emotional reasons why I was an atheist, and the emotional reasons why other people are theists must be similar to the emotional reasons why I am an atheist. Now, it is quite possible I am wrong there, which is why I welcome people who believe their emotions are different to give an account of them - but, in terms of a starting point, I don't really have any other choice than myself.
 * When people tell me that their beliefs are based on reason rather than emotion, I have two choices - maybe, unlike me, they really are some perfect unemotional reasoning machine, where reason generally trumps emotion in the belief-formation process; or, maybe they aren't unlike me after all, but simply have an emotional need to believe that they are? I don't claim to know; but, to me, the second possibility seems more plausible than the first.
 * As to your own experience, I have to ask a question - you think your atheism was much less based on emotion than that of some other atheists you knew; that may well be true, but is it possible that while less emotional than some others, your atheism was still fundamentally a response to your emotional needs given the life situation you were in? And, since then you have become a pagan - do you think your becoming pagan was primarily about reason or emotion? 08:02, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

AMassiveGay
"My less than rigorous response"

For the record, I have never claimed to be a rational person, and I have always been very much ruled by my emotions.

I was raised in fairly secular family. My Father is catholic, my Mother is CofE. As a family, we have never prayed together, God was never discussed and the bible was never consulted. I went to a CofE church and sunday school until I was about 4. I remember very little of it except for some vague recollection of being a shephard in a nativity play. School was equally secular. I stopped going when my brother refused to go, and I thought if hes not going, then neither am I. My younger brother didn't go at all, and my mother stopped going after that. There was some obligation on the school to provide some religious education via the soinging of hymns but I don't remember them being especially zeealous about it and RE was a dicidedly half hearted affair. God, christianity and how it related to me was ever explained. I did not know what a christian was until I was about 9 or 10 and it still meant nothing to me. Faith was not instilled me. I was not an atheist and I was not a theist. These things meant nothing to me. I did not reject a religion that I had some disagreement with its views or rituals, it was never presented in such a way to either accept or reject.

I became more postitivly atheist in my teens. I had learned there was such a concept as a God. I learned what christianity was. I learned that the vague stories that had half heartedly been presented to me in my earlier years were meant to be profound truths or facts. They remained to me vague stories. I learned of other religions and they seemed to strange but just as vague as christianity I was barely inducted into. I learned what an atheist was. The one constant in all this was the idea that a god was out there watching over us, making things run right. All my friends were the same. God, christianity, or any religion was just not part of their life. If pushed they would say yes there is a god, but with no thought of feeling in that (at least, they didn't vocalise anything about it). People with strong religious belief were few and far between, and considered somewhat freakish. I can't say for certain at which point I became I said to myself I was an atheist, but at some point in my teens, this whole idea of God, of some kind of creator, of some divine plain, was just aburd to me. I had no (still haven't) any great understanding of evolution - it was just presented as fact. All the wars and bigotry in their name, destroyed any interest in organised religion for me. And everytime I see children in the news murdered and abused, or people killed and maimed in accidents, people starving to death in far of lands, and just the general awfulness that goes on in the world destroyed the notion of a God watching over us or with some great plan.

As I grew older (sadly probably not any wiser), I acquired many issues. And I still have many issues. My sexuality was a major problem for me in my formative years, the religious stance on this further distanced me from organised religion. Maratreanism mentioned looking at the finality of death, the meaningless of existence, the bleakness of life. Well, I looked at this also. Only my atheism wasn't weakened, it was strengthened. I can't say I have embraced this bleakness like Ace has said he has in an absurdist fashion, but rather I looked at the emptiness and collapsed into nihlism. It has been said by people I know that I am an angry person (i would say just passionate). God is no longer a concept that has no meaning to me but is a sick joke. The problem of evil has probably been done to death by greater thinkers than me, but it is a problem that cannot be resolved. How can a god allow cancers, and HIV and a myraid of vile and painful dieseases to exist. How can a god allow children to preyed upon, raped and murdered? How can god allow peoples homes and lives be destroyed by natural and unnatural disasters? Is this part of some divine plan? Do I have enough evidence to say their is no god? I cannot say. All I can say if a god can allow, or simply has no power over these things, then god is no god at all. AMassiveGay (talk) 05:57, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
 * Some of the issues you raise (e.g. sexuality) are really issues with particular religions, than with the idea of God in the abstract. I believe in God, but I think God is 100% OK with gay relationships. Likewise, yes religions have caused all sorts of war and other evil, but I think those are flaws of particular religions or groups or believers, rather than problems with the idea of God in itself.
 * Beyond that, it seems to me that your main objection to the idea of God, is the problem of evil. I don't want to belittle how serious a problem that is. I think, in a sense, it is not even a problem specifically about God - how can this world contain such great evil? How can it be possible? And yet, despite that, it is. How can we make sense of a world with such great evil in it? How can a universe containing such evil ultimately have meaning? Or must we conclude it is all a meaningless, valueless, fluke? This leads us to a position of nihilism; which implies the non-existence of God, but goes much further than merely denying God's existence. I have wondered about the same things; there have been times when that sort of nihilism has attracted me. Some authors (such as Clarence Darrow or Bertrand Russell or Algernon Swinburne) have the ability to turn this nihilism into almost a sort of poetic tragedy, which at some level I can understand the appeal of; I don't agree with it any more, but can't disagree that it can be moving.
 * For myself, I look at my own personal situation for an answer to the problem of evil. I am the eldest surving child of my parents, but not the eldest child. I have older siblings, who all died in infancy. I can't imagine what that experience must have been like for my parents. But, I realise, it is only because of their deaths, that I am alive. If they had not died, would I have been born? It seems very unlikely; even if perchance there was a baby born with the same DNA as me, the circumstances of its upbringing, in all sorts of minor yet significant details, would have inevitably been so different, that the same person would not have resulted. Or, suppose my older siblings had never been born, and I was the first; again, it seems very likely, that in various ways, things would have happened differently, and a rather different person would exist in my place. So, it seems to me, quite likely, that I only live because my older siblings died; them and I are incompatible, universes in which they exist, I do not; universes in which I exist, they do not; yet, I also think I am dependent on them - I need their deaths for my birth. They are the sacrifice with which I was purchased.
 * But, when I think about it, this is not just true for me, it is true for everyone, just maybe my personal situation makes it more immediately obvious. When people die before their time, it is a great tragedy; and yet, removing people from the mating pool is very likely to change who ends up with who, and hence which set of children are actually born. Consider a momentous event like the second World War, where millions of people died from war, from genocide, and from famine and disease; and millions more were displaced. Consider the generation born during and immediately after WW2 - in a world in which WW2 never happened, many people who were born in our world would never have been born, many other people never born in our world would be born in that world instead. Many people, who found one partner in our world, would have ended up with someone else, who in our world was killed; many people who met in our world, as a result of population displacements, would not have met in that world; many people who met in that world, never come together in ours, since population displacements, and just all sorts of slightly different everyday circumstances (like where you work, who your friends were, etc.) are different. And then consider not just that generation, but the generations they have produced.
 * Now, the question is, if God exists, and God loves us, how does God love us? As just generic persons, or as particular individuals. Does God love me, just because I am, but doesn't particularly care whether I was or not? Or does God love me, for being me, and thus will arrange the world in such a way, so as to ensure my existence? If we give the first answer, then God's action in creating a world filled with immense evils seems inexplicable, as the greatest evil ever committed. Whereas, if God loves us as particular individuals, then God had no choice but to create all these evils, since they are necessary that we exist.
 * It is only because of the countless immense evils of history - war, murder, rape, disease, torture, famine, injustice, tyranny, disease - that we exist. In a perfect world, a world without these many evils, we are not. And when we, the children of these evils, condemn God for creating these evils, we are really condemning our own existence. Every joy, every good, every pleasure, every moment of happiness, that we have ever known, we have only known because of these evils, for without them, we would be not to know them. I for one refuse to participate in such self-hatred. 06:42, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

Nx
And, I think there can be no doubt, that all things being equal, believing that good finally conquers over evil, is ethically better than believing that the good is doomed. If there is a God, an afterlife, etc., then the murdered child will live again, there will be justice delayed, but not justice denied. If there is no God, no afterlife, then the murdered child has ceased to exist, forever. It is clear to me, which belief is ethically superior. Bullshit. There's nothing ethically good about wishful thinking. If anything, believing that there is no god and no afterlife and no final justice will motivate you to actually catch the murderer as opposed to letting him go and be judged by god. -- Nx  / talk 06:52, 7 August 2011 (UTC)
 * There's nothing ethically good about wishful thinking - but wishful thinking is a loaded term. If we consider the schema It would be good if X was true, therefore X is true, I agree that in many cases its use will be contrary to both reason and ethics, but I don't agree that we can generalise from that to the position that it is wrong in every possible case. Whether it is wrong depends on what X is. If X="fresh air is a better cure for cancer for chemotherapy", then the application of that schema is both rationally and ethically wrong. On the other hand, if X="there exists a life after death", I don't see the problem. You try to generalise from some specific cases to produce a general rule; I disagree with that generalisation.
 * If anything, believing that there is no god and no afterlife and no final justice will motivate you to actually catch the murderer as opposed to letting him go and be judged by god. But, the reality is, no matter how hard you try, it is entirely possible that the wrongdoer will never be found. And even if you find them, can you really get justice? No matter what you do to them (lock them up for the rest of their life, kill them, slowly and painful torture them to death), you can't get true justice, because you can't bring the murdered child back to life. And, one must be wary of the very real possibility, that in excessive eagerness for justice in this world, one might commit a miscarriage of justice, and convict and punish the innocent. I think this is a real problem with our society - because people don't believe in justice beyond this world, they are overly eager to find justice in this one, to the point that their desire for justice actually becomes a cause of further injustice. Is it not better, to hope for the perfect justice of another world, than rely on inherently flawed earthly substitutes for it? I am not saying we should not lock murderers up; but we should see that as doing what is necessary for the protection of others, rather than as some impossible attempt to right wrongs which it is not in the power of this world to right. And, if we make a mistake, I think it is better if we can say "we honestly thought you were a danger to others, we are sorry now that we realise our belief was mistaken" than "we honestly thought that you were evil scum that deserved to be hurt as much as possible, we are sorry now that we realise our belief was mistaken". The first seems to me a much more innocent a mistake than the second. 07:28, 7 August 2011 (UTC)