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Talk:Ontological argument

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Currently it's not clear – here is how it should be simpler[edit]

If you think of something greatest, then something greatest exists in your thoughts, so it exists in reality too (because it's greatest :))

fallacy: 'something in thoughts' is not something actual :)

Additional Flaw (Hypothetical version of the greatest element) to add?[edit]

I noticed another flaw in this "argument", should anyone want to incorporate it to the main article: the abrahamic god which people are trying to prove, the god they think is "the greatest thing since sliced bread", they define him as "the greatest element to exist." There is a problem here: YHWH should be, according to a more accurate definition: "One version of what could HYPOTHETICALLY be the Greatest element ever." Three reasons for this are: 1 - As mentioned in "Specificity", there are other great deities in other religions, they are regarded as "the greatest thing ever" according to their own religions; so those gods are just as valid versions of what MAY be the greatest thing ever. 2 - I imagined right now a FSM-like familiar, that will produce infinite amounts of Pasta to nourish everyone and end famine. This a pretty nice idea, right? Well, too bad it seems to be just that: a mental concept, that would be unable to exist in RL due to violating so many basic natural laws: Let's call the greatest thing to exist in the universe in RL "X". How exactly could "X", that is actually part of the universe, be beyond it? How can it bend its own universe's laws of physics like wet noodles? So "X" isn't simply be what could be the greatest thing imaginable, it is the greatest thing that CAN EXIST IN RL AND ACTUALLY EXISTS.(It is similar in some ways to the unicorn argument, but with an explanation of why what already exists and is "the greatest" may not be some illogical BS) 3 - "X", which actually exists, is "The greatest thing that there currently is." But who is to say one cannot make through some way something better than X, or that X won't become in the future something even better than its current state, or that "Y" (a different element) won't become better than "X"? It is very possible that "X", the greatest thing to currently exist, IS NOT the same as "Z", "The greatest thing THAT MAY AND COULD HYPOTHETICALLY / POSSIBLY EVER EXIST ". Imadmagician (talk) 17:45, 19 August 2015 (UTC)

One God problem[edit]

Moved this to talk page, because it's not really a problem, but i wanted to explain without just deleting your idea.

"If a god were to be as "great" as possible, than would it not be infinitely numerous as well. If existence is a virtue, than having two of oneself in existence is surely a greater virtue."

The counter is Leibniz Law. something that is "infinitely numerous" would be indistinguishable (in a closed system) from something that is singular, but all encompassing. Both would completely fill any "vacuum" with their being, so to speak on division (or "numerousness") is meaningless. That's basically The Identity of Indiscernibles rule. Also, it would be illogical to think of 2 identical, infinitely encompassing "things" co-existing. Petey Plane (talk) 18:59, 1 March 2016 (UTC)

Analogy to the Craig's[edit]

I am not sure I got what Craig says right. Here what craig says:

It is possible that a maximally great being (God) exists. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Let us make an analogy here. Imagine Stockfish has solved chess entirely. Then it is a "maximammally great being to play chess"

1. It is possible that aan engine that plays chess maximally greatly exists. 2. It exists, it stockfish

now, following his 3rd and 4th premise:

3. if stockfish exists, then it exists in every possible world.

then, does it mean Stockfish exists in every possible world? Craig's reasoning leads us into this conclusion.


We even do not need to solve chess, all we need to do is to some of us imagine an engine that has solved chess.

1. IT is possible that a maximally chess playing engine exists. 2. if it is possible to exist, then it exists in some possible world 3. if it exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. Therefor, it exists in actual world. 5. Therefore, it exists

conclusion: AN engine with a maximal quality of playing chess, which solved chess, exists in the world. not only in this world, but in Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Gliese 481b and any other planet as well.

wait, what kind of reasoning is that? Çhess is not solved yet and the public is not aware of any chess engine that plays perfect chess. But Craigs logic show otherwise. Let us name this "proved" engine Stockfish. I am quiet sure Stockfish (or any other perfect chess playing engine) does not exist in Jupiter or Saturn but Craig's logic will lead us to think Stockfish exists in Jupiter, Saturn, Gliesa 481b, in andromeda and anywhere you can think of.— Unsigned, by: ‎Sir artur / talk / contribs


Let me take it one step further
  1. It is possible that a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists.
  2. If it is possible that a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists, then a maximally great chess playing machine exist in some possible world
  3. If maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists in some possible world, then it exists it every possible world.
  4. IF a maximally great chess playing machine exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual word
  5. Therefore, a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists in the actual world.
  6. Therefore, a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists.
  7. Therefore, Godfish exists.
as far as I am aware of, as of November 2016, chess is not solved yet. But William Craig proves us not only chess is solved but there exists a perfect chess playing machine as well. How come can someone take this arguement seriously? --Sir artur (talk) 10:40, 21 November 2016 (UTC)
I think the first question we must ask is "what is the reason to accept "if maximally great being may exist, then it exists in somewhere?". This must be the first question. This arguement seems to be based on this assumption: if it is possible to exist, then it exists.
then we shall go on. what is the reason to assume "it exists in every possible world even if it existed somewhere." I think, scientifically, there is no law of nature that says "if something is maximally great somewhere, then it is everywhere." Let us say jaguar's running speed is the maximal speed a being can reach. now, are we to deduce jaguar exists in each and every possible world?
moreover, God's definition is based on subjective definition, it relies on subjective definition. What is the reason for me to accept that God is like how it is like defined? This definition does not rely on observation. --Sir artur (talk) 10:48, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

RationalWiki vs the Ontological Argument[edit]

BadPhilosophy thread, so far doesn't include any learns anything substantive. Hey, at least RatWiki is good for free karma. FuzzyCatPotato!™ (talk/stalk) 18:10, 11 June 2017 (UTC)