User:ZFekete

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Yours truly

QUOTE example[edit]

This basic model has therefore become the ‘E. coli of social

psychology’, and has been extensively applied in theoretical biology, economics, and

sociology during the past thirty years.
—Christina Fang et al. (2002)[1]


prisoner's dilemma - references

[2]

R. Axelrod (1980a)

"Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma." Journal of conflict resolution 24.1 (1980): 3-25.

R. Axelrod (1980b)

"More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma." Journal of conflict resolution 24.3 (1980): 379-403.

This study reports and analyzes the results of the second round of the computer tournament for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The object is to gain a deeper understanding of how to perform well in such a setting. The 62 entrants were able to draw lessons from the results of the first round and were able to design their entries to take these lessons into account.

SEE [3]

By re-analyzing data from the first tournament and some more recent data, we provide new results suggesting that the efficacy of tit-for-tat is contingent on the design of the tournament, the criterion used to determine success, and the particular values chosen for the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix. We argue that this places in doubt the generality of the results and the policy implications drawn from them.
2 × 2 PD payoff matrix that was used in the tournament had the “conventional values” [3] [4]

Using standard labeling of payoffs (T for sole defection, R for joint cooperation, P for joint defection, and S for sole cooperation), the values in this payoff matrix are (T, R, P, S) = (5, 3, 1, 0).

Real reference style

here[5]

more[edit]

https://web.archive.org/web/20011127045943/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~axe/research/Evolving.pdf

https://web.archive.org/web/20030810194803/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~axe/research/PD_with_Noise.pdf

begin example[edit]

'ref' [6]


>Scientific_method<

David Hume philosophically undermined the scientific method with his problem of induction[7] and his deconstruction of causation.[8] 

end example[edit]

Notes[edit]

References[edit]

  1. "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt." Group Decision and Negotiation 11.6 (2002): 449-467.
  2. Open access journal articleWilliam H. Press, and Freeman J. Dyson "Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109.26 (2012): 10409-10413.
  3. Open access journal articleAmnon Rapoport, et al. (2015) "Is tit-for-tat the answer? On the conclusions drawn from Axelrod's tournaments." PloS one 10.7 (2015): e0134128.
  4. Open access journal articlePress, William H., and Freeman J. Dyson. "Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109.26 (2012): 10409-10413.
  5. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma."
  6. Ethno-medicinal study of plants used for treatment of human ailments, with residents of the surrounding region of forest fragments of Paraná, Brazil by M. Bolson et al. J. Ethnopharmacol. 2015 Feb 23;161:1-10. doi: 10.1016.
  7. The Problem of Induction: Hume, Induction, and Justification, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  8. Open access journal articleDavid Hume: Causation, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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