Essay talk:On Free-Will and Materialism

My very first essay on RationalWiki... I hope it is up to our high standards. Please feel free to comment on it, because I'd love some feedback that could help me improve and expand on it and my future works. Reverend Lucifer (talk) 02:26, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Or you can just argue for compatibilism and have your free will and eat your determinism too. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:14, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

After reviewing that, I think that's actually very similar to the assertion I was trying to make, though I take the stance that free-will is not "separate from but compatible with" determinism, and rather that what would be considered free-will is identical to the decision making process of a deterministic brain. My contention is that it's a similarly emergent property, like consciousness/self-awareness; what we consider free-will is simply the result of a neurological process that mimics free-will by making decisions using the same filters that the free-willed brain would use. If you presume that, through free-will, you have the ability to evaluate your choices and make a decision based on your moral and ethical beliefs, as well as the constraints placed on you by society of which you are aware, and that through a materialistic/deterministic view, those are the same factors that influence the physical construct of the brain which reaches those decisions for you, there is no difference between a person with free-will and one without, because the factors for consideration are identical. A deterministic brain is not compelled to action contrary to the "beliefs" held by the person any more than a free-willed person is compelled to action contrary to their beliefs. Still, I like that concept you present, because it gives a basis that I can use as a mid-way point from complete free-will to complete determinism, and allows me to show that there is a school of thought that does not consider them mutually exclusive. Factors like that make the next further leap to the conclusion I reached more palatable in general by showing that, even if free-will exists separately from determinism, it is not incompatible with determinism. It's then easy to step just a little further and claim that what we perceive as free-will is, in reality, just an effect of determinism.

The main issue I have with compatiblism is that it doesn't explain where free-will comes from, and since I have an issue accepting dualism, I need to reconcile the two concepts. I think that the common misconception that people have regarding materialism, as it relates to free-will, is an overly simplistic view of the process, where chemicals force a course of action regardless of what is right or wrong; instead, the factors that "determine" the outcome of the decision making process are many, varied, not always consciously known by the "decider", and include the concepts of "right" and "wrong" as well as "risk" vs. "reward". I like to compare the materialistic decision process to baseball. For each pitch, there are a significant number of factors that impact how the play will unfold: the grip of the pitcher, his wind-up, and throw all impact the initial trajectory of the ball; the spin of the ball and any possible crosswinds will further affect that trajectory; the batters timing, speed, and angle of the swing of the bat, as well as the material the bat is made of, all contribute further to how exactly the bat impacts the ball; and even slight variations of these factors will change how the play unfolds. All these factors are deterministic, but beacuse of the variety of factors, and the fact that not all of the factors can be known to 100% certainty, they contribute to what ultimately appears to be an almost indeterminable result. My biggest point, though, is that if the deterministic decision making process is made with the included factor that the "decider" is responsible to bear the consequences of the "decision" (which is an understood standard throughout society, and thereby would be a concept encoded in the physical make-up of the deterministic brain), and those consequences can be known before hand, there is no reason to not hold the "decider" responsible; deterministically, the consequences are a direct effect of the action, and should follow logically in a materialistic world, i.e. if the penalty for murder is imprisonment, then, deterministically, imprisonment must follow murder (provided it is done by someone with the mental faculties to understand the societal standard of "personal responsibility", allowing for leniency towards the mentally deficient or insane).

More importantly, though, is my logical progression through the premises correct? This was my very first attempt to reach a conclusion through a completely logical progression of premises while making as few presumptions as possible. I did my best to ensure that the only premises that I did not base on previous ones were the premises most likely to be taken as granted by both Christians and atheists (that's why it takes so many to reach the conclusion). I think the only one that may be disputable is that "Humans are primates" given the Christian apologists' desire to consider humans as separate from animals. Then again, I suppose that if an apologist insists on viewing humans as separate from animals, then it would be significantly more difficult to reach a consensus with the apologist. Reverend Lucifer (talk) 18:49, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

I agree that the stakes of the free will debate are lower than is generally thought. (Even if free will were false, would it make sense to let a crazed axe-murderer go free because we could not hold him "morally responsible"? Obviously not -- if his actions were determined, why let him just kill more people?) However, there are some elements of the argument that are questionable, controversial, or false:

• Materialism implies determinism. Not so, see SEP for examples of indeterminism in physics.
• Natural law determines physical events. Controversial. Some question whether exceptionless laws exist. (Again, see SEP.)
• Initial brain state is determined by genetics. Not sure what is meant by "initial." In any case, the brain is not fixed by genetics due to things like neuroplasticity.
• Animals are "selfish." I'm guessing you mean this in a metaphorical Dawkins-esque sense (i.e., "selfish" genes result in reciprocal altruism).
• The brain is predisposed towards unity rather than chaos. Not if you take a Minsky-an "Society of Mind" or Dennett-ian "multiple drafts model" view of consciousness.

Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 20:09, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Okay, well I will admit that much of the website that you provided is over my head, but I have a few issues that I take with the information based on what I do understand. None of the examples that I read seem to violate determinism as I understand it. The best argument I read in there against determinism, however, rests in quantum mechanics and virtual particles, given the Heisenburg (sp?) Uncertainty Principle. However, that presumes a few things as well, which are that there is no natural law (rather than simply an unknown natural law) that governs the appearance of virtual particles, which are essentially random from out perspective, and that the uncertainty principle implies that particles actually physically exist in multiple states at once, and the final state is only determined once they are interacted with, rather than what I understand is the implication that the state of the particle cannot be known until it is interacted with, but that it has a singular actual state. Unless those events are truly random, they pose no issues to determinism from what I can tell. Even then, it only truly effects determinism on the quantum level, but since the laws of physics hold true at the atomic level then determinism would be true at a clasical level, much like Newtonian physics. I may be misinterpreting those, however, as I'm not a physics major. The arguments in there from "infinite velocity" and black holes seems to fall on their faces, though, because nothing that can be conceived of as able to travel faster than light is understood to violate causality or determinism (to the best of my knowledge), and the views here on black holes seem rather suspect; simply because we cannot predict what may come out of a black hole doesn't mean that it is not deterministic--only that we do not have the information to determine what it will be. Regarding the assertion presented that there are no true, exceptionless laws of nature, that gives me the impression that the only reason that electrons don't spontaneously increase to 3 times their current mass is because they don't want to, so I can't really conceptualize a universe in which there are no fixed laws of nature; not to say that it is untrue because I cannot conceive of it, but that it renders science moot and therefore makes no sense to me. As for the other two you mentioned, when I refer to the "initial state of the brain" I am referring to what would be the initial physical makeup of the brain prior to any physical interactions (including in utero effects) that would change the state of the brain. I fully accept and understand neuroplasticity (I am a psychology major), and in fact it is essential to my conclusion (via premise 8). Rather, genetics would (generally) predispose the brain to develop in a way beneficial to survival, but as the brain develops, it is the neuroplasticity that determines its current state (with regard to the changes made by environmental factors), which in turns determines the decision making process. And finally, you are correct that I am using a Dawkins-esque view of "selfish" in the sense that any action that ensures the survival and transmission of the animal's genetic code ultimately benefits them, though that action may involve a more superficial cost (giving excess food to a friend who is starving to foster a relationship where a similar act my be reciprocated in the future).

Tl;dr is that the philosophical arguments presented don't really sway me against determinism, and I'd much prefer to see physicists' opinions on those factors. I'll do some more research, though. As an interesting aside, as I finished typing those last few sentences and was reviewing them for clarity, I had a strong sense of deja vu. Thanks for all the food for thought, though, and I'll make some modifications to clarify the "initial state" and "selfish" remarks.

I just also got the one about Minsky, and after a cursory look, I think that confusion from that is that I oversimplified the concept. What I meant there was that since cohesion and cooperation confers a survival benefit, and the brain is presdisposed to making decisions that confer survival benefits, in the absence of other effects on the brain (environmental factors, harmful genetic mutations, etc.) that would incline decisions contrary to "survivability" (i.e. suicide). I'll include a few more premises to clarify that further, and hopefully it will make the argument more sound. Reverend Lucifer (talk) 00:10, 23 February 2013 (UTC)

I looked it over again and make some tweaks, but my question is: do you feel that premise 25 (The brain is predisposed towards unity rather than chaos) does not logically follow from 23 (Humans are predisposed towards activities that enhance cohesion and cooperation) and 24 (Disruptive acts that are contrary to cohesion and cooperation may reduce survivability) as I assert, or do you feel the flaw is with a previous premise? I'm still learning the nuance of deductive logic, so while I understand that you are giving me alternate view points, but I'm trying to figure out where the flaw is arising, because to me it seems that all the premises follow as I have given them (excepting the few modifications I made). Reverend Lucifer (talk) 00:25, 23 February 2013 (UTC)

1. I agree that QM's indeterminacy does not necessarily hold at more macro levels, but the page gives examples where determinism might be violated on the Newtonian level (e.g., the frictionless dome). What I want to emphasize, though, is not that determinism is false, but that materialism does not necessarily force us to accept determinism, and like with QM, there may be deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of laws and theories.
2. As for the section on laws of nature, it is raising a chicken-and-egg scenario. Do the laws of nature "dictate" physical events or are they merely descriptions of regularities within nature? Positing the former puts you in the position of having to develop some kind of ontology for these laws. Additionally, this is not mentioned in the article, but I would also throw Hume's problem of induction into the mix. While it is a reasonable one, we must still make an inductive leap to believe that the laws of nature will hold in the future.
3. As far as deductive argumentation goes, you can set up an airtight system that crashes headfirst into the gritty wall of reality. (See Austrian economics for a prime example.) The argument about group cohesion is not wrong, per se, but just framed poorly -- "unity" and "initial state" are confusing. The argument itself goes back to Kropotkin's Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, though. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 02:52, 26 February 2013 (UTC)

I can see how reality may be conspiring against me. When I say "unity," I am referring to the "cohesion and cooperation" from previous premises. Maybe it would be more appropriate if I maintained my terms throughout, rather than trying to shorthand it. I modified my "initial state" premise to specify that it is the physical state of the brain prior to any environmental factors. What I mean by that is the physical structure of the brain determined by genetic code (barring damaging genetic mutation), before anything prior or post-birth affect that structure. I suppose I could eliminate that factor completely, because even without a genetic disposition towards cooperation, there are still the environmental factors such as societies impetus for everyone to "get along" which effect the development of the brain, and thereby effect the decision making process. I feel that the genetic factor makes it more likely to be implemented in the values system that evaluates decisions, but is in no way necessary for my conclusion, given that my final assertion is that even in a deterministic system, penalties for "undesirable" actions can reduce the instance of those actions by creating a factor for the brain to include when the decision making process occurs.

For the Newtonian examples that they provided, as I said, I'm not a physics major, and so I have only a marginally functional understanding of the complexities, but they all seemed like rather theoretical scenarios, unlikely to occur naturally (if not downright impossible). The frictionless dome, for example; I can hardly see how such a structure could exist. I am not personally aware of any substance that is literally frictionless. I accept that there are substances that have such little friction as to be virtually frictionless, but there is still some small force there. Before I can accept that an example such as that provides a real contest to determinism, I would need to see that it was physically possible.

That all goes back to the natural laws. I don't claim to know whether the laws of nature are fixed or transitive. What I do know is, regardless, as we conduct science, we test our understanding of these "laws" for validity, and attempt to revise them where we find them incorrect or inaccurate. To the best of our knowledge, these laws are fixed, at least on a spacially and temporally local level; that is, we have not detercted the laws changing at any point. That is not to say that they have, but we have no evidence that they have before, and for science to work, we must proceed with belief based on the evidence we have. We can consider how the universe may be different if the natural laws changed, but that is purely speculative until we have some evidence that they even can change. I forget where I read it, and I'm pretty sure that I'm paraphrasing, but there was a great quote I read a while back: "Physics is the science of 'What Is;' Philosophy is the science of 'What If.'" I don't mean that to be dispariging towards either field (though I think it was something I read while considering a major in philosophy).

All the same, thanks for all the great feedback. I always love having my understanding of the universe challenged, giving me the opportunity to take in more information; evaluate it based on the information I already have, as well as the quality and context it is provided; and finally reevaluating my beliefs about the universe. Some people hate to have their beliefs challenged, while I crave it. This has been really fun. Reverend Lucifer (talk) 18:43, 26 February 2013 (UTC)

Slightly iffy

"Surely," the Christian posits, "you agree that people must be held accountable for their actions; and if a person does not have free-will, then how can they be held accountable for things beyond their control? However, if you believe in a completely materialistic world, then you cannot believe in free-will, because the decisions a person makes are the result of chemicals and neurons, and their interactions are determined by the laws of nature, and are therefore beyond the control of the person. Indeed, without God, there cannot be free-will; and without free-will, it follows, there can be no moral responsibility; and without moral responsibility, it again follows, anarchy and chaos would reign."

I don't think I've heard a Christian argue this before. At least, not directly. There's a heap of issues to do with determinism and so on going on there that isn't necessarily just God-based, and certainly not purely Christian-based. ^postate 01:22, 23 February 2013 (UTC)

It's a paraphrase of different variations I've read by Christians on trying to use free-will to disprove materialism. I tried to boil it down to a simple assertion that espouses most of the common claims I hear, without having to get into all of the variations. I suppose it could be considered somewhat "straw-man-y", but I think it accurately reflects the opinion the hold where 1) free-will defeats the concept of materialism, and 2) since there is something science can't explain, that is proof that God is responsible. Perhaps it would be less objectionable if I further narrow the target to "Christian apologists", rather than the overly-broad brush of "Christians". I wasn't trying to imply that all Christians were guilty of trying to press this claim, just that it is one I've heard Christians make before. ^{— Unsigned, by: Reverend Lucifer / talk / contribs}

Seriously? I hear this argument made by theists of all stripes -- even atheists if you remove the bit about god. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 02:54, 26 February 2013 (UTC)