Talk:Moral relativism

We seem to be defining cultural relativism here, which is only one form of moral relativism. MR itself is simply the concept that morality is relative to many factors (cultural norms, peer group, personal tendencies, circumstances, etc.) Wėąṣėḷőįď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 23:08, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

Still seems to be the case. Unless anybody else wants to, I'll break out a philosophy book later and try to rework it. ~ Kupochama^[1][2] 21:31, 2 August 2009 (UTC)

Criticism edits

Um . . . I know this isn't wikipedia, but shouldn't we discuss a bit before blindly reverting edits? Or, at least, include a summary comment about what you are thinking when you revert? Heck, even the redundant "that"'s were re-added. I know there was a bit of disagreement about the previous phrasing, so I tried rephrasing it. Before I re-add the text, though, does anybody want to post some thoughts? --Bertrc (talk) 04:14, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

On an aside, does the heavy metal bit make no sense, or is it just me? --Bertrc (talk) 04:14, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

This page is largely wrong anyway. Moral relativism consists of "descriptive relativism" and "normative relativism." The former simply holds that moral standards differ depending on time, place, history, culture, etc. which is rather undeniable, I'd think. The latter says that they should be that way. "Cultural relativism" has really just become an epithet for the latter extreme prescriptive relativist position. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 04:19, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

I had not known of those terms, but I agree with your point. However, I do not know how to phrase that in the article. Your "descriptive relativism" seems to be the idea that people's moral practices change with time and culture; I doubt you will find anybody who disagrees with such a view. I think this article is focusing on your "normative relativism" which seems to take a stand on the validity of all those moral practices (In its extreme form, the stand is that all those practices are valid for that particular person to have) If I have the definitions right, then my text is pointing out a contradiction in "normative relativism". ie. By saying all moral frameworks are valid, one invalidates any moral framework which contends that it, itself, is the only valid framework. Did my text in the article convey that adequately? --Bertrc (talk) 04:37, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

That's the standard refutation of normative relativism. I realized I made a mistake in the above paragraph and wrote the article accordingly, though. Descriptive relativism, usually in accordance with a position of philosophical naturalism, that it logically follows from this observation that there is no objective morality (cf. the soul; show me a soul and show me these objective morals). Thus, morality is "created" but not "discovered" as if it were some object out in the universe. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:48, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

. . . So . . . Can I re-add my text and remove the heavy metal bit? To re-iterate, somebody who says all moral frameworks are relative is proposing an absolute moral framework (one which invalidates moral frameworks that propose an external absolute framework) . . . and also, the heavy metal bit makes no sense. Nebuchadnezzar, we could prepend it with "If moral relativism is defined as ..." --Bertrc (talk) 05:09, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

. . . Well, okay, then. --Bertrc (talk) 17:14, 19 January 2012 (UTC)

"The former simply holds that moral standards differ depending on time, place, history, culture, etc. which is rather undeniable, I'd think." Yes and no. Yes some moral (and legal) rules change depending on human culture. However, I'm going to agree with Sam Harris that as a matter of facts nearly all people and all known human cultures have some underlying shared moral values. The Trolley Problem is IMHO a great example of even Amazonian tribes-peoples, about as far isolated as you can get from any other existing culture on the planet, answer similarly to this moral question. So, if we interpret descriptive moral relativism to mean there are no moral claims which are overwhelmingly prevalent in nearly all known human cultures, then it is demonstrably factually wrong. Related: Almost everyone agrees with Mill's Harm Principle. Sure, various cultures have restricted the class of people who are worthy of the protection offered, and sure various cultures disagree as to factual claims relating to harms (if that person sins then I'll be "contaminated" and go to hell too!), but most everyone agrees to the general proposition that you ought not harm someone without good cause. LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 02:54, 7 August 2012 (UTC)

Normative relativism

The text says that normative relativist deny the possibility of absolute morality. Without the possibility, then they are saying morality is relative. If they only deny the desirability of an absolute morality, then they are saying it should be relative. I think there is a subtle play and difference between moral practices and morality, itself. I think everybody would agree that moral practices are relative. The Absolute vs relative debate targets the validity of those practices; ie. is there are is there not an absolute morality that applies to all, regardless of whether people are practicing it. --Bertrc (talk) 04:50, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

Yeah, your edit phrases it better. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 05:36, 7 January 2012 (UTC)

Can I add in: "Alternatively, one could say that 'descriptive relativism' addresses the existance of actual moral practices, while 'normative relativism' addresses the validity of those practices" --Bertrc (talk) 05:20, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

I've never understood what it meant for relativity to be absolute, absent some variant of divine command theory. I think in such contexts "absolute" and "objective" are usually used interchangeably, and while I understand what it means for something to be "objective" in the context of science and shared physical reality (and for score keeping such as football vs gymnastics), I don't know what "objective" might mean for morality (again apart from some variant of divine command theory). If they do invoke some divine command theory, my usual retort is "I do <X> because I want to. You do what <X> says because you want to. I see absolutely no worthwhile distinction here." LiberalOfAnUnknownVariant (talk) 02:58, 7 August 2012 (UTC)

Needs to break out metaethical relativism

This article incorrectly conflates metaethical relativism with normative relativism, when they are two separate things (also separate from the third thing of descriptive relativism):

1. Descriptive relativism says that people disagree about what is right or wrong.
2. Metaethical relativism says that people disagree about what is right or wrong, and that nobody is more correct than anybody else about that.
3. Normative relativism says that people disagree about what is right or wrong, and that nobody is more correct than anybody else about that, so we should tolerate others' behavior even when we think it is wrong.

Metaethical relativism does not entail normative relativism, and so is not a form of it. A non-normative metaethical relativist can push his moral views on others without hypocrisy because by what standard could someone else hold that he ought not do such a thing? There may be some examination to be had of the irrationality of normative relativism on those grounds (propounding a universal moral code of tolerance while disclaiming all universal moral codes, and attempting to justify the former with the latter).

The Wikipedia article on moral relativism has some good discussion on this that you could perhaps draw from. --98.173.204.185 (talk) 04:01, 28 May 2013 (UTC)

Miscellaneous

Hey, check this out. (http://xkcd.com/103/) It seems like a good image to add to the page, don't you?^{— Unsigned, by: 173.72.162.61 / talk / contribs} 23:53, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

How about no? Wẽãšẽĩõĩď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 23:54, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

There are xkcd cartoons that make valid points applicable to the Mission. This one is just wordplay, and not very funny at all. So: No!--ZooGuard (talk) 10:35, 5 December 2013 (UTC)

There are fundamental errors here

I have read through this page, and have found fundamental flaws in the logic and misunderstanding of the relativist view:

The biggest issue is that you claim that the moral relativist claim that morality “should” be relative. But upon closer inspection, this cannot work as an argument, as they argue there is no “overall” morality in the world but that made by humans. So how do they come to the conclusion that morality “should” be relative? In short, it is saying “morality is relative, so you cannot tell somebody to do something” - this is illogical, because if morality is truly relative, then why should there be anything “wrong” with enforcing a relative system on another – after all – it is only “wrong” by one persons standards.

As a side note, if morality is completely relative, then it makes it impossible to condemn any religious practice, as by the relativist argument, they aren't actually doing anything “wrong” - indeed, it is impossible to do “wrong” as morality does not exist. So whilst you're right in saying that moral relativism gives no justification for oppressing things like gay marriage, it also gives no justification for opposition to the oppression of homosexuality.

This article falls into the trap of thinking that moral relativism is a reason for tolerance. But what is tolerance but a way of saying “it is morally right to allow others to be free”? If there is literally no morality, tolerance and oppression have the same moral value, which is that they have no moral value. ^{— Unsigned, by: Ehicsguy / talk / contribs}

The article sort of addresses this:

In its purest form, moral relativism is an example of a self-refuting idea; the principle that "all moral frameworks are relative" being, itself, an absolute moral framework. In practice, though, it tends to be "All moral frameworks except mine are relative" which is instead an example of special pleading. The above critique, however common, is rather weak as moral relativism should not be classified as a "moral framework" as it does not prescribe any moral values or principles. Moral relativism in it's purest form is the observation that all moral frameworks share a common trait - that they are not absolute. —Moral relativism

In the end, ideas about morality and morality itself are distinct. Moral relativity merely asserts that morality is a human construct and should be treated as such. And I think you'd be hard-pressed to demonstrate that's untrue without being some rather substantial propositions. Ikanreed (talk) 20:34, 14 January 2015 (UTC)

That is not a valid response. First, you say ideas "about" morality and morality itself are distinct; but how? If the ideas are about morality, then surely they are saying what it is. If they aren't, then they aren't talking about morality. The issue is that you are confusing normative moral relativism with descriptive moral relativism. It is true that there are many different moral systems and people disagree about morals (that's descriptive relativism), but that does not allow for the jump to normative relativism. Just because people disagree, that does not make it relative, it can mean that somebody is wrong.

Furthermore, you say that "Moral relativity merely asserts that morality is a human construct and should be treated as such" - but this is wrong. By which standards "should" morality be treated in any way. You cannot have a "should". If somebody wants to order everybody else about and tell others to do what they want, then by which standards do you say they are wrong to do so if morality is just a human construct? You cannot say that they shouldn't, because tolerance is a relative, according to moral relativism, so you have no way to say that they are wrong. This is not saying relativism is a self-defeating property, it is pointing out that if moral relativism is true, there is really no reason to do or not do anything; anything goes under relativism, including intolerance.