Essay talk:General refutations to common pro-choice arguments

I've heard an argument I'd be interested in your refutation of: Suppose a woman is already a mother, and her child has some critical illness that requires a transplant of some kind (like a kidney or bone marrow), and the woman is the only viable donor. Since the child has all the rights of a human being, is it moral to force her to give that donation, or does she have the right to refuse?

Now if the child is a fetus, which has the same rights as a person, is it moral to force the woman to continue carrying the child, against her wishes? My argument is that if the woman cannot be forced to help her child, she shouldn't be forced to carry a fetus. Super ^{Dude,What does mine say? Sweet!} 19:08, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

It makes me sad that Animalian never actually engaged me on the debates I set up to discuss different moral systems. He's never clarified his life=value stance, but he's been rather pigheaded in pushing it. I wanted to believe it was someone nurturing their first internally consistent moral framework, and I wanted to help them examine and grow it. I've lost that hope. These hypothetical equivalents you're raising are another good way of doing that. I wish you good discourse. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 19:43, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

Ikanreed, having generated fifty pages of refutations, I am tired of arguing abortion. I am just tired of it. And I apologize that I did not view your debate on biocentrism earlier--I am more so a sentiocentrist, and certainly would not entitle cancer the "right to life". I also appreciate your shit example of why uniqueness, taken in a particular sense, does not necessarily entail special treatment. I also wish to accomplish something more productive with my time. I, for years, have been urged to write a book, and I am in the process of compiling various essays of mine on contemporary moral issues, including abortion. This work takes priority to my "work" on rationalwiki, which has grown unmanageable without extreme investment which I can no longer sustain--just look at some of the responses to my other essays. I will be here to address major criticisms, but deconstructing claims and criticisms clause by clause has simply grown too time intensive. I am limited in what I can do, and very tired of our debate, especially since it never seems to progress anywhere. And my understanding has grown. I have honed my arguments, found the criticisms which are most essential I refute--the above criticism, embodied in a hypothetical, I find of moderate importance--and committed myself to learning more about ethics, from ethical nihilism to moral absolutism.--Animalian (talk) 16:03, 7 March 2015 (UTC)

It's kinda funny reading a person claim in a venue like this (an open, anonymous internet community) " I'm too busy and important to disscuss any of my claims with you" while simultaneously submitting pages and pages of claims. Either you want to disscuss these issues and that's why you brought them up in the first place, or you don't want to. In which case, why did you submit them? Super ^{Dude,Where's my car?} 16:35, 7 March 2015 (UTC)

I recognized my hypocrisy, and that is why I stated multiple times that I will be here to address major criticisms. I was just emphasizing that I will no longer reply to more piddling matters, such as defending myself against insults to my intelligence and other ad hominem attacks. I am therefore more efficient. (As Ikanreed can probably recall, I took such criticisms seriously in the past, being bugged with them on my talk page and elsewhere.) I also do not have the time to deconstruct every accusation, clause by clause. I tried that twice with Trick, and a couple times with Castaigne--the result, they hate me bitterly and haven't defended their position. In the face of my criticisms, even after I simplified them (but more so probably BECAUSE I simplified them), Castaigne threw a temper tantrum about me expecting him to satisfy his burden of proof. I haven't heard from him in weeks, until I found a vile comment on one of essays. (NOTE: I do not receive updates for comments on my essays. Trying to fix that.) Trick now just sweeps my criticisms under the rug, no matter how clear (and probably BECAUSE they are so clear) by sweeping them under the rug. Witness the collapsed sections of abortion page. I have written more than 50 pages satisfying my burden of proof, and I am tiring from it--it is one against so many. And much of the criticism is not even legitimate. Do you really expect me to continue handling illegitimate criticism? Would you expect the same thing of yourself? I am still here. Just look below--I responded to relevant criticism, which I took seriously. NO ONE ELSE is this thorough, and it in fact takes a long time to be this thorough. I need to invest myself elsewhere in life where I will be more productive. I cannot continue catering to every troll beneath the bridge. Thank you for understanding.--Animalian (talk) 18:22, 7 March 2015 (UTC)

As to the above hypothetical--while we might argue that the mother ought to supererogatorily donate her organ by the principle of beneficence, I advance that the mother is morally obligated to provide a non-essential organ to save her child's life as a matter of strict justice, ceteris paribus. As to the former, we might argue that, since the mother is the only one who can help, since the transplant (assuming she has two kidneys and is healthy) is relatively non-fatal, and since this action will save her child, she ought to do so. (If you believe that she ought to let the child die, who she could save at comparably little cost to herself, the burden of proof falls unto you.) We might argue against the sense of obligation entailed by motherhood, since it is her child whose fate she decides. But if the "care ethic", providing only for those nearest to you or those with whom you hold the strongest sentimental attachment, is limited as an ethical theory--if someone is unloved, does that entail they lose all rights, that they should remain without love or care? (likewise, can one do what is right, or achieve excellence, unless others are aware of these verities? Do a tree not make a sound wherefore it falls and no one is around to hear it?)--then we must recognize a similar prima facie duty to provide a kidney to others in a similar situation as her child. However, I reject this claim in letter, though not in spirit. While we all possess natural duties to one another--in the domain of justice, being respect for each other's rights and assistance wherefore rights are violated--we possess furthermore acquired duties, which arise out of agreements or responsibilities we accrue, such as parenthood. Therefore, if given the choice between saving a stranger and saving her child, ceteris paribus, the mother ought to save her child.

Your particular contention, however, resides with whether she possesses any moral obligation to provide for her child. I believe she does. Since she inherited, as an acquired duty, the responsibility to provide for her child's welfare, the same responsibility is invoked in the present situation. You might, however, contest this conclusion on the grounds that she rejects her role as mother, perhaps even rejected it before birth. But this does not absolve of responsibility. If I took my two year old brother to the park, and decided I no longer needed to watch him, and in fact, I had hated him all along, does my paternal responsibility to protect my brother's welfare suddenly disappear? Perhaps the child in your hypothetical was unwanted prior to birth, the mother rescinded her responsibility to provide for her child, and offered her child up to adoption. If adoption was within the best interests of the child--say, the mother would have aborted otherwise--then the mother has not only committed no wrong, but her acquired duty is virtually nil. She would assume only a natural duty to assist her child. However, since the mother is the only one who can possibly save her child, and, at that, at relatively little cost to herself, should she allow her child to die, or save him? Specifically, does she have the right to refuse assistance?

While a plausible basis for refusing assistance, the behavior of the mother should still respect the principle of beneficence. But we may argue further that the mother ought to donate a kidney to her child as a matter of strict justice. Since the mother can safely provide her spare kidney (assuming she has two and is in decent health) and she is the only possible donor, and the child will die without such assistance, the child will be clearly made worse-off than the mother. According to the "worse-off" principle, when deciding whether to override the rights of the many or the rights of the few, and wherefore the few would suffer greater harm than any member of the many, we ought to override the rights of the many. This principle, though relatively useless, unless modified, for example, to aggregate total harms, when dealing with large groups of people, such as the American populace, generally advises situations involving several people, and holds true for two people, in which case it reduces to "when deciding between overriding the rights of one over the rights of another, and wherefore one would suffer greater harm than if the alternative action were taken, we ought to choose the alternative action", following from the least-harm principle. Quite clearly, the child will suffer more greatly than his mother, who will likely carry on living. We ought therefore override her right to choose in favor of the integrity of her child.

Perhaps you might yet object, and declare that, at best, her action on behalf of her child is merely recommended by the principle of beneficence, not demanded as a matter of strict justice. Even permitting such an objection, however, reveals something rather disturbing about the mother's conduct. Why should we find allowing someone to die permissible, wherefore you could save that person at relatively little cost to yourself? Unlike battling poverty, wherein we can declare causal impotence, that our actions alone will make but the slightest dent in the problem, and will probably fail to raise from poverty at least one person whom we intend to help, we cannot so declare in the given hypothetical. The consequences are concrete and all too real--if the mother does not act, even at some cost to herself, her child dies. And unlike the poverty scenario, we cannot cite bystanders to do our bidding for us, to combat poverty while we wish we could. There is an entire nation to provide help to the needy, but only one person who can save her child's life. Her actions are not indirect. They are a matter of life and death, and she alone decides whether he child lives or dies. Her decision to let her child die is worse yet if the child expresses his desire to go on living, and asks his mother to save him. If the child is retarded or elsewise incapacitated, and death seems an untimely end (i.e., the child possesses prospects for a rewarding life in the future, provided we save him now), she also fails to respect the preferences of her child, even if he is incapable of articulating them. Do to the vested interests of the mother and child, we need a morally informed, external arbitrator to determine which course of action is better justified--the donation of a kidney, or the death of a child.

If the mother is causally potent, if she can save her child and she is the only one who possibly can, and if she can do so at relatively little cost to herself--what is a kidney to a human life?--why should not she save her child? Perhaps you will contest whether the cost proposed is so slight as I suggest. However, given quick research, donating a kidney is a relatively benign, non-fatal procedure, and the results are positive, though not ideal. According to kidney.org, one kidney can function as well as two. This is accomplished wherefore the kidney grows to assume the function of the missing kidney, nearly doubling in size. Those who live with a single kidney--some from birth, a condition known as renal agenesis--can enjoy an average lifespan. Moreover, 95% of kidneys still function a year after transplant, and the average lifespan of the transplanted kidney ranks at 15-20 years, according to Barnes Jewish. A young child should be given the chance to enjoy a longer lifespan--15-20 more years of life would mean so much to a 5-year-old, or virtually anyone, for that matter. The only good reason to withhold the kidney is if the chances of recovery are too slim and/or the child will suffer so greatly if we extend his or her lifespan that such suffering negates the value of that child's life to that child, in which case death would be preferable. But these, admittedly, are rare cases. According to webMD, moreover, kidney failure does not appear to entail multiple organ failure, and usually results from problems directly related to kidney malfunction and complications thereof. Death from kidney transplant is also rare. There appears, therefore, to be no empirical basis on which contest kidney donation to a child who could recover and enjoy a radically (15-20 years) longer, fuller life.

Finally, we may treat the present hypothetical in the manner of strict justice by examining what the casually potent mother may accomplish, or fail to do, insofar as we concern rights. Rights can be understood in two different ways--negative and affirmative. Negative rights state what we ought not to do, such as the right to life, which entails that we ought not to kill others. Affirmative rights declare what we ought to do--we ought to preserve the rights of the accused (Miranda rights, right to a quick and speedy trial, protection from cruel and unusual punishment, etc.). We may therefore hold someone accountable so much for what they do, and what they fail to do. To violate rights of either kind, moreover, you must break or fail to comply with them, disrespect their statutes. The mother arguably violates the rights of her child to such extent as that she would condemn him to death rather than proffer her kidney to relatively insignificant cost to herself. Since she is the only one who can save her child, she is uniquely obligated to help, for reasons already demonstrated. To ignore her unique responsibility is moreover of grave consequence--as we assume, the death of child who could recover to enjoy many more years of relatively pleasurable life. If such is not the case, the we would be justified, perhaps, in allowing the child to die now, rather suffer for the dim remainder of his life. Such situations, however, are rare, and we assume the more common case--isolated kidney failure, subject to drastic recovery provided a suitable kidney--the kidney the mother and only the mother possesses. By the worse-off principle, since the child would suffer the fate of death, that fundamental and irreversible loss, wherefore no preferences may be satisfied or any pleasure derived, and the mother would go on living healthfully, there is no reason, all considered, to force that child to die out of "respect" for the mother's right to choose. In this case, we may justifiably override her right to choose, since life is far greater than a single kidney, which she can do perfectly without (provided she had two to begin with). A similar line of reasoning follows concerning abortion, which I will substantiate further, and which I have referenced in my numerical argument against abortion.

To simplify--to refute my argument thus far, you must demonstrate why

a) the worse-off principle is invalid or does not apply

b) how the mother does not violate her child's right to life

c) why we may not override the mother's right to choose or

d) why the mother's right should take precedence to the life of her child

Here, we assume that the child will enjoy decent prospects of recovery and will go on to life roughly 15-20 more years of rewarding life, if not longer. Given the cited research, these are reasonable assumptions which reflect the norm. I have considered several extreme cases which lie outside this norm, such as extreme suffering which would negate the value of that child's life to that child, in which case euthanasia may be a better alternative. Each of these cases implies different treatment. Our goal is nevertheless to address the more typical or "average" case--we should not generalize from extreme examples what an ethical theory implies as a rule of thumb for less exceptional cases. Given these stipulations may you now proceed to refute a-d, adding whatever other counter-arguments or criticisms you find relevant.--Animalian (talk) 18:11, 7 March 2015 (UTC)

Whoa, ok. First of all, when debating people try not to say/write so much at once because it feels like gish gallop and it's discouraging. Try raising your arguments point by point.

Secondly, I feel you didn't really answer the core question. The core question is not whether it's moral for the mother to help, or immoral to not help. The question is if it's moral to force her to help. Remember that we are still talking about a procedure with a non-negligible rate of negative side-effects for the mother and even if the child lives as if he never had the medical problem, you are still forcing her to take a risk. I get the whole "people should act morally", The underlying, more general questions is: is it moral for a society to force them to do so, and in which situations? For most of the points you've raised, it's pretty irrelevant whether she is his mother or a total stranger, saving his life comes over her wishes because of the "worst off" principle. Super ^{Dude,Where's my car?} 07:11, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

In writing to the tune of a few pages, I answered your question with some nuance, particularly since I was exploring the hypothetical for the first time. In such length, I was able to cultivate some nuance, which I hope you appreciate. (Christopher Hitchens, after all, was the man without “a single, non-nuanced view”. Have you ever heard his response to the question of abortion? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8HhTKzmvas) Whereas the former ambled leisurely with several digressions, and answered more so the question whether the mother ought to help her child, certain conditions provided, the following will address whether we ought to force the mother to assist her child.

Preliminarily will I note that such digression was necessary, since your given hypothetical, however well-intended, is too vague to competently answer. Just as with the desert island hypothetical, where we must choose who to save or who should be dinner, we must have sufficient answers to questions such as are these people equally good? What are the benefits to the alternate courses of actions? Are there morally relevant differences between the two which should inform our decision about their fates? I attempted to answer such questions, and a variety of them, in the “excesses” of my response.

Let us therefore establish certain questions. As to whether the mother ought to give her child her kidney, we must know whether the child deserves the kidney—is he morally good? Is his mother morally bad?—what are the likely consequences of certain actions—how certain is it that the child will die without assistance? How will the decision to donate her kidney influence the mother’s health?—and whether the mother is morally obligated to help, before we can answer whether we ought to force her to save her child, and the conditions under which she are we are so obligated.

As to the first question, we may assume that each the mother and child are equally morally good. If, for example, the mother was a murderer or serial killer on death row, and her child an innocent five year old, she ought to donate her kidney, not only because the relative guilt and innocence between the two individuals, but also as a result of external considerations—since the mother has already engaged in unjustified homicide, so far we can tell, since she has already killed, she ought not, through negligence, rather than premediated murder, let another die because of her selfish actions.

As to the second question, we may assume an extremely high probability, ~99% or higher, that the child will die without the medical intervention he desperately needs, without the kidney that his mother may refuse to give. The mother, however, may donate a kidney at little risk to herself, with some minor complications, or possibly death. According to livingdonor101.com, the risk of death within a year of transplant from all causes, including motor vehicle accidents, rests at roughly 2.3%. On second thought, kidney donation could be extremely dangerous, and for reasons addressed below, reveals the disanalogy between the present hypothetical and pregnancy.

As to the third question, I have advanced reasons why the mother is morally obligated, if not bound, to save her child. Since the risk of death is relatively certain in the case of child, and 1 in 50 for the mother, she ought to accept to the risk of death to do what is morally right. But since death is a serious, albeit relatively unlikely, risk to the mother, she has serious grounds on which to object. Nevertheless, the picture remains clear—the mother, the only one who can possibly save her child, can either accept a serious, though unlikely, risk to herself, or forsake her child to death. While she maintains the right to refuse, it would seem somewhat evil to allow her child to die.

The case presented thus far, however, is, in some respects, disanalogous to that of pregnancy. Firstly, the death rate from complications in pregnancy hovers around .016%, or 1 in 6,250, given roughly four million live births in the US each year and the CDC statistic that, of these, only 650 women die each year. The risk of death is therefore negligible, though death is possible. Moreover, it is stands to reason, given roughly 700,000-1,200,000 abortions per year, depending on whether you count “medical” abortions, i.e., the morning after pill and other substances which target and destroy the fetus, that the number of abortions legitimately performed to protect maternal health is relatively slim. A 1-2% rate of ectopic pregnancy, a 1% rate of pregnancy by rape, and a 1.2% rate of fetuses aborted after the twentieth week of gestation, presumably to protect the mother’s health in the event of extreme, life-threatening complications, fails furthermore to account for such a high abortion rate. In other words, women overwhelmingly seek abortions for reasons other than legitimate, substantive threat to maternal health. After all, we accept 1 in 6,250 death rates or thereabouts quite frequently in our daily life, from walking on streets to driving cars and sitting in the office. The question therefore becomes, at what point is the risk of death negligible enough for a woman to no longer possess a legitimate claim to maternal health? Is not 1 in 6,250 low enough to appease you? Why would it be acceptable in virtually every other context, and suddenly unacceptable here? That it is avoidable via abortion is a null point—just stay inside and never traverse the sidewalk.

Having spotted the disanalogy between pregnancy and abortion and kidney donation and death, let me note a couple further disanalogous elements. First, you rightly note that I challenge the “care ethic” as a limited and therefore inadequate ethical theory when you concede that, according to my arguments, it should not matter whether the child is the mother’s or a complete stranger to the mother. However, this is beside the point since abortion is directly tied to the mother and her child. If I were to ignore this, we would be discussing a very different hypothetical, one which does not reflect pregnancy. If you wish for your hypothetical to be a legitimate criticism of the pro-life stance, it should reflect the circumstances of pregnancy as thoroughly as it can. The problem at hand when we consider abortion is what the mother ought to provide her unborn child, or what she may do to deprive her child, not some far-fangled obligation to a complete stranger. This matter is between mother and child, not mother and stranger. You would radically distort the conclusions we derive if you insist that we should instead consider the case of the mother to the complete stranger. Fortunately, this is largely irrelevant to the matter of abortion for the very reason that it does not adequately reflect the matter of abortion.

All said, now we may address your question—ought society to force the mother to bear her children. One way not to respond to this question is the presumption of absolutes, which may never be overridden, such as a right to life which validates the forced existence of the most miserable beings among us and perhaps even cancer. Any ethical judgment, or theory, for that matter, which proposes absolutism is fundamentally unsound, all considered. Therefore, cases naturally arise in which abortion would be a justified act, in which we may justifiably override the right to life of the fetus. An existence of extreme, life-negating pain, pain so great it negates the value of life to that being, wherefore the chances of any substantive recovery or improvement are obviously circumstances under which we may justifiably and rightly terminate the existence of so miserable being. Such conditions are extremely rare, however, which leads to the judgment that abortion is prima facie wrong—it is wrong to kill someone, or a group of cells which promises, roughly 60% of the time, to mature into an infant, without sufficient justification. In those cases in which it is wrong, in which we deny a child life for no good reason, his or her rights are violated to such extent. I find it cruel to maintain otherwise, since potential matters in virtually every other domain of life. It matters when a teacher informs you that your child has the potential to mature into a concert violinist, and does not follow that you should kill such child by lending the “benefit of the doubt” that such child will NOT mature into a concert violinist. There is simply no non-arbitrary point at which to draw the line for potentiality except after the sperm and egg have united. That this process might take a few days misses the point. To find the point at which potentiality doesn’t matter other than the “moment of conception” is to draw a line in the sand. Again, just as it is cruel to punish someone for what they might become by assuming that they will not so become is cruel. And life is so much more than just becoming an excellent violinist (in the vast majority of cases), for which the offense is even greater than, say, keeping the young girl from playing the violin, let alone killing her.

All said, we are generally justified in overriding the rights of the mother to preserve the unborn life. We are also justified, in such cases, in forcing her to carry her pregnancy to term. Life means so much more, for the vast majority of persons, rare cases excepted, than a particular mother’s disdain for carrying her pregnancy. Someone’s existence tends to matter so much more than someone else’s opinions or feelings surrounding that existence. Do not some people hate you? Do not some people find objection to your existence, for whatever reason? Why should their opinions be reason enough for your termination? Why should the opinions and feelings of the mother take precedence over the life of their unborn children? I have already demonstrated that the risk involved in pregnancy, at least in first world countries, such as the US, is so low as to be negligible, at the hundredths of a percent. Moreover, it is cruel to lend the unborn “the benefit of the doubt” and kill them since they may not have been born alive anyway. But a 60% wrongful death rate is unacceptable when better alternatives exist. A mother is consigned to her pregnancy for roughly nine months, after which, though often with great heartbreak, give their children up to adoption. The mental turmoil of the mother almost never outweighs the right to life. We should not always allow the mother’s right to choose take precedence to the right to life. The unborn child has no say in the matter, and part of the evil is that we kill the child before he or she can. Part of the evil of factory farming is that the animals don’t even know what they’re missing. I have said a lot, but I must emphasize once more that placing your comfort before the rights and lives of others is a threat to humanity, and the lack of any substantive reason to do so is particularly revealing. Imagine that in one timeline, your mother had an abortion, and that, in another, you were born alive, thanks to your mother’s abstinence from abortion. I am by no means religious, but assume the killed being exists in a sort of limbo of nothingness. You talk to this being—yourself but grown up in this strange purgatory—you, doctors, the folks at rationalwiki, and your mother tell this being that he was deprived of life because your mother decided she didn’t want you, that she felt she couldn’t provide, that she wouldn’t choose adoptive services over abortion. Are these justifications for condemning this being to this strange purgatory, devoid of the usual joys of life? Would he accept the right to choose over his right to life? Wouldn’t the situation be even worse if the being never existed at all? Hence, the evil lies in that we knowingly and deliberately kill fetuses who would presume a life on their own with anemic justifications that would not work in any other context, rare, extreme exceptions permitted.

For the short answer, in general, yes, we are justified in overriding the mother’s right to choose to save the unborn life. If you wish to challenge me on this, you must compose an objectionable system of ethics in which the right to choose comes before the right to life, 9 times out of 10, insofar as abortion is concerned. Good luck. I have never seen it done.--Animalian (talk) 18:03, 8 March 2015 (UTC)