Talk:Ontological argument

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Currently it's not clear – here is how it should be simpler

If you think of something greatest, then something greatest exists in your thoughts, so it exists in reality too (because it's greatest :))

fallacy: 'something in thoughts' is not something actual :)

Analogy to the Craig's

I am not sure I got what Craig says right. Here what craig says:

It is possible that a maximally great being (God) exists. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Let us make an analogy here. Imagine Stockfish has solved chess entirely. Then it is a "maximammally great being to play chess"

1. It is possible that aan engine that plays chess maximally greatly exists. 2. It exists, it stockfish

now, following his 3rd and 4th premise:

3. if stockfish exists, then it exists in every possible world.

then, does it mean Stockfish exists in every possible world? Craig's reasoning leads us into this conclusion.

We even do not need to solve chess, all we need to do is to some of us imagine an engine that has solved chess.

1. IT is possible that a maximally chess playing engine exists. 2. if it is possible to exist, then it exists in some possible world 3. if it exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. Therefor, it exists in actual world. 5. Therefore, it exists

conclusion: AN engine with a maximal quality of playing chess, which solved chess, exists in the world. not only in this world, but in Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Gliese 481b and any other planet as well.

wait, what kind of reasoning is that? Çhess is not solved yet and the public is not aware of any chess engine that plays perfect chess. But Craigs logic show otherwise. Let us name this "proved" engine Stockfish. I am quiet sure Stockfish (or any other perfect chess playing engine) does not exist in Jupiter or Saturn but Craig's logic will lead us to think Stockfish exists in Jupiter, Saturn, Gliesa 481b, in andromeda and anywhere you can think of.^{— Unsigned, by: ‎Sir artur / talk / contribs}

Let me take it one step further

1. It is possible that a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists, then a maximally great chess playing machine exist in some possible world
3. If maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists in some possible world, then it exists it every possible world.
4. IF a maximally great chess playing machine exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual word
5. Therefore, a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists in the actual world.
6. Therefore, a maximally great chess playing machine (Godfish) exists.
7. Therefore, Godfish exists.

as far as I am aware of, as of November 2016, chess is not solved yet. But William Craig proves us not only chess is solved but there exists a perfect chess playing machine as well. How come can someone take this arguement seriously? --Sir artur (talk) 10:40, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

I think the first question we must ask is "what is the reason to accept "if maximally great being may exist, then it exists in somewhere?". This must be the first question. This arguement seems to be based on this assumption: if it is possible to exist, then it exists.

then we shall go on. what is the reason to assume "it exists in every possible world even if it existed somewhere." I think, scientifically, there is no law of nature that says "if something is maximally great somewhere, then it is everywhere." Let us say jaguar's running speed is the maximal speed a being can reach. now, are we to deduce jaguar exists in each and every possible world?

moreover, God's definition is based on subjective definition, it relies on subjective definition. What is the reason for me to accept that God is like how it is like defined? This definition does not rely on observation. --Sir artur (talk) 10:48, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

RationalWiki vs the Ontological Argument

BadPhilosophy thread, so far doesn't include any learns anything substantive. Hey, at least RatWiki is good for free karma. αδελφός ΓυζζγςατΡοτατο (talk/stalk) 18:10, 11 June 2017 (UTC)

This should be rewritten.

I'll do it at some point as long as you all don't mind. KoiDevelopment™ (thanks, Love!) 02:43, 21 November 2018 (UTC)

@Koidevelopment Is there a particular reason behind this decision? ☭Comrade GC☭^{Ministry of Praise} 14:52, 21 November 2018 (UTC)

Because the page is bad. Koi "I could really use an animator because I have so many ideas floating around in my head" development 20:41, 21 November 2018 (UTC)

@Koidevelopment How is it bad? Could you please elaborate beyond mere assertion? ☭Comrade GC☭^{Ministry of Praise} 17:51, 22 November 2018 (UTC)

Yeah, sure. #1 the ndash aside in the first sentence. It doesn't help explain the argument at all. The ontological argument stands aside from assertions of what particular god fills the role of MGB. The ontological argument just attempts to prove that a MGB exists and doesn't specify which religion got it right (if any got it right). #2 the second sentence is blatantly false. Russell himself even said it's easier to convince yourself that the argument isn't valid than explain why it isn't valid. #3 third sentence is wrong. There exist the cosmological and teleological arguments. It's important to note with the teleological argument that if even one example of design exists then the argument stands sound. It should also be noted that the ontological argument is hardly a last-ditch effort to keep God around. It's been around since Anselm. Hardly last-ditch. #4 Fourth sentence "This is a fallacy in itself" doesn't make any sense. #5 References to the burden of proof and the dragon in my garage are out of place. This argument is the proof and the dragon is an example of something being invoked with zero evidence. This argument doesn't assert God's existence without providing the logic and reasoning behind the assertion. #6 Pared-down version of the argument is absurd. It's a strawman. #7 Anselm's version is weirdly worded (if I rewrite this I'll just cite it straight out of the Proslogion). #8 The responders section is weak. Guanilo did write In Behalf of the Fool – a response that claimed Anselm's argument was too broad and would end up creating Platonic forms for everything. It's important to remember though that as an Augustinian, Anselm didn't necessarily see this as a bad thing (Augustine himself was a sort of Platonist). Kant and Frege's criticisms aren't explained at all. #9 "Great-ness" paragraph mistakes Guanilo's criticisms for Kant's. #10 "Great-ness" second paragraph is sloppy and misunderstands the argument. While Anselm does assume that there is a difference in our conception (let's name it A) and reality (let's name it B), Anselm's assumption of the difference is existence. A is different from B in that A exists in the imagination, but B exists in reality. That these are different is hardly a bad assumption of Anselm's. Besides, most of that second paragraph is a word-salad. Want more examples? Koifishdevelopment (swim) 20:55, 23 November 2018 (UTC)

@Koidevelopment You could have probably have stopped at #3 or #4. There is however one thing that I will disagree with you one, and that is that the "Dragon in my Garage" (DimG) example seems, from my experience, to be a bit more than illustrating the burden of proof. That is to say that an extended version of it explains how the dragon is supposed to be intangible, invisible, etc, as the questions as to the claim are tested, i.e. "Why can't I touch it?" "Why can't I see it?" etc. But that is a slight digression into the mechanics of the DimG argument, and not directly relevant to this discussion. Rewrite it, but please try to make the critism section as clear as possible, as the Ontological argument does have its share of problems. ☭Comrade GC☭^{Ministry of Praise} 21:11, 23 November 2018 (UTC)

Affirming the consequent

An additional error, which is especially apparent in the simplest reductions, is that there is an implicit affirmation of the consequent.

Take the sentence (from the current version of the article): "God is a maximally great being." This can be rephrased as "If a thing is God, then that thing is the maximally great being." While that may or may not be true, the argument usually rests in actuality on the converse: "If a thing is a maximally great being, then that thing is God." This is a formal fallacy: P → Q does not imply Q → P. Any properties that can be attributed to a "maximally great being" are thus irrelevant. ^{— Unsigned, by: 73.172.153.168 / talk}