Talk:Thought experiment

	This Philosophy related article has been assessed as SIGNIFICANTLY PROBLEMATIC in one or more ways. See RationalWiki:Article rating for more information.
This article requires attention for the following reason(s): Entirely unsourced. Please source

Newcomb's Problem

Is it just me, or is Newcomb's Problem not really a paradox at all? It seems to me in order to make it a paradox, you have to make the assumption that the "intelligence" is actually not able to take into account your future state, which isn't stated in the problem. Presumably, if the "intelligence" is able to account your knowledge of its decision making process, it should still have an accurate prediction. Then, if you know the accuracy P of the intelligence, and the money in box A and box B, you can mathematically make a best decision. Somebody please prove me wrong, because I feel safer knowing that I'm the only one on stupid pills rather than everybody else taking them. --ShadowofLords (talk) 02:27, 12 March 2013 (UTC)

Replace "paradox" with "dilemma"? Scream!! (talk) 02:54, 12 March 2013 (UTC)

I guess. But even then, it's a solvable "dilemma". If the "intelligence" is able to predict with an accuracy of P (including taking into account how you will think in this future state), then by taking B you should expect a return of P*B. If you take both, you should expect a result of (1-P)*B+A. It seems less like a "dilemma" or "paradox" and more like a "this only is a problem if you are vague about the knowledge and accuracy of the intelligence"... --ShadowofLords (talk) 14:56, 12 March 2013 (UTC)

Whether it's a paradox or not is disputed, but it is from a Game Theory perspective as two equally valid strategies to solve it produce conflicting results, which apparently shouldn't happen. ^gnostic 11:53, 13 March 2013 (UTC)

Note that the problem isn't asking you to assess the intelligence of the predictor. You assume that it is perfect. Thus is the nature of thought-experiments. ^bomination 11:57, 13 March 2013 (UTC)

Ship of Theseus

Read somewhere that there’s a temple in Japan (Kyoto?) which the locals regard as being the same building as existed umpteen centuries ago in spite of its having been rebuilt after being burned to the ground three times in the last hundred-odd years alone. Mr Larrington (talk) 23:47, 9 October 2022 (UTC)

If it were a conscious being, I would argue for continuity of consciousness to make it the same being, but the building is an inanimate object. It serves the same functions as the old building, so for all intents and purposes it may very well be the same building. The White House was burnt to the ground but no one talks about an "original White House," they only talk about the White House. Vee (talk) 13:39, 10 October 2022 (UTC)

In certain branches of philosophy, there is a distinction between essential vs accidental qualities. An essential quality is fundamental to what something is, while accidental qualities are beside the point. To essentially be Theseus’ ship, an object must 1) be a ship, and 2) belong to Theseus. So long as those two qualities are met, any object could accurately be said to be Theseus’ ship. What material the ship is made of, what type of ship it is, how big it is, etc. are all accidental qualities. They can change, but the object essentially remains Theseus’ ship. The same with the temple and the White House- they’re essentially buildings that serves the same purpose, even if the material has been changed. Allgoodusernamesweretaken (talk) 19:30, 12 October 2022 (UTC)