User talk:Birdman/CS
Yes, believe it or not, the guy who keeps deleting my contribution gets his own special section. Go figure? I have copied your statement below so I can find it.
Christopher: "It's a stone he can't lift, unless under certain circumstances (those being lifting all of plane B including the rock). He is unable to lift the stone in all circumstances, resulting in a compromise of his omnipotence, but it is also a stone that he can, under some circumstances, lift, meaning it isn't a stone he can't lift. Your rephrasing of one of the arguments changes it from "God is unable to lift the stone under all circumstances" to "God is unable to lift the stone full stop", altering the meaning. Christopher (talk) 15:56, 15 October 2017 (UTC)"
RESPONSE: The Paradox of the stone asks a very simple question: "Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it?" There are no other qualifiers added to it and it is very simplistic by design. The Stone Paradox would not have survived for as long as it did had it not been crafted with such simplicity. Within the S.P. we find three basic components:
(1) "Can God create" = This represents the challenge.
(2) "a stone" = This represents the object to be created.
(3) "so heavy that he cannot lift it?" = This represents the qualifier.
There are no additional "qualifiers" other than the one key qualifier (3) which is directly related to what type of stone God is required to create. This allows for our omnipotent being (aka: God) to use the full capacity of his omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent powers to respond to the challenge. Each individual component asks a question. If the answer is "yes" then the next component is added. So within the S.P. it would be as follows:
(1) Can God create? = Yes!
(2) Okay, well then can God create a rock? = Yes!
(3) Okay, can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? = ???
The moment you add another "qualifier" you start limiting God's omnipotence before he is able to even respond. Since the fullest scope of God's omnipotence is being restricted with any additional qualifiers, then this results in a tainted test of omnipotence.
Your argument is that I have God depicted as being able to lift the stone under certain circumstances, so therefore he is not omnipotent. So technically you have proposed adding the additional qualifier of (4) "under any circumstances" to the Stone paradox. So let's re-write the Stone Paradox as you would have it presented to us all: "Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift under any circumstances?" But since you have chosen to add qualifier (4) then you are required to accept that every condition required of God that is listed before the addition of qualifier (4) as being possible to do without suffering any loss of omnipotence. The reason why everything prior must be accepted is because the addition of qualifier (4) has been deemed as being "needed." If God was unable to successfully meet the requirements of everything prior to the addition of qualifier (4) then there would be no need to add qualifier (4). ...right?
Let's use Tom Brady as an example (just to piss off Anna). Let's say we asked the question, "Can Tom Brady throw a football over 70 yards?" Once again we have the three basic components:
(1) "Can Tom Brady Throw?" = This represents the challenge = Yes!
(2) "Can Tom Brady Throw a football?" = This represents the object to be thrownn = Yes!
(3) "Can Tom Brady Throw a football over 70 yards?" = This represents the qualifier. = ???
However if we add qualifier (4) "with a broken arm?" to the end of the question, then it now reads, "Can Tom Brady throw a football over 70 yards with a broken arm?" That means you are required to fully accept that Tom Brady is fully capable of throwing a football over 70 yards and the question now becomes whether he is able to do it with a broken arm. You "need" to add qualifier (4) because Tom Brady has already accomplished all prior tasks. ...So let's get back to your question, Chris:
"Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift under any circumstances?"
Unfortunately for you, we are required to accept that God has successfully completed all challenges prior to the addition of (4) "under any circumstances" so in essence, you have just admitted that God can do what you have been arguing all along that God is not able do. Now you "feel the need" to make it tougher for God. But in the process you are actually limiting God's omnipotence before God is even able to respond (just like when we break Tom Brady's arm before he's even able to throw the football). Every qualifier you add strips away God's omnipotence before God is even able to respond.
And think about the qualifier you have added for a moment: "under any circumstances." Do you even realize the nature of your qualifier? What that means is that even if God was able to use his omnipotence to figure out a way to answer the question and maintain his omnipotence, he's STILL not allowed to do that because that would be considered "a circumstance." That's right! God successfully accomplishing what your question asks him to do would technically be violating the rules of the question. That's tantamount to asking, "Can God answer my question without him being allowed to answer my question?"
...And I hope the hour I just spent answering YOUR question was worth it for you. However, it's certainly not worth it for me because you will simply continue to delete my link submission regardless. It seems my rationalWiki paradox is, "Can Birdman submit a link that Christopher will not delete?"--Birdman (talk) 03:29, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- Birdman - If you provide a link to an article that is considered on mission #and# appropriate, then of course Christopher will not delete it: if you keep on providing the same link to the same website that has been removed before, then you will get the same thing.
- As you are trying to annoy me - Talk:Orac and [1]. Anna Livia (talk) 18:14, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- You've completely misunderstood what I was saying when I posted that comment. I wasn't saying that because you "have God depicted as being able to lift the stone under certain circumstances" he is not omnipotent, I was saying that because he is unable to lift the stone under certain circumstances he isn't omnipotent. Christopher (talk) 18:33, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- I presume Christopher was not replying to me. Anna Livia (talk) 21:45, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- You've completely misunderstood what I was saying when I posted that comment. I wasn't saying that because you "have God depicted as being able to lift the stone under certain circumstances" he is not omnipotent, I was saying that because he is unable to lift the stone under certain circumstances he isn't omnipotent. Christopher (talk) 18:33, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- Actually it in not a misunderstanding at all, because you would still have to reword the Stone Paradox to fulfill whatever stipulations you feel are necessary. The S.P. doesn't specify any specific conditions, regulate the type of lifting that is to be done or anything else for that matter. It merely asks if God can create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it.
- So let's get back to Tom Brady again. But first, let's help out poor Anna who's probably googlin-up Mr. Brady right now: (Anna: Tom Brady is a NFL quarterback who has five Super Bowl rings and a pee-pee.). Let's say the question was, "Can Tom Brady throw a football over 70 yards?" and then he walks onto the field and does just that. Now Christopher comes along and says, "Well, Tom can only do this under certain circumstances." and then goes on to say, "Tom Brady couldn't throw a football over 70 yards in a 100 mph headwind." So if you re-write the Brady Paradox it would read, "Can Tom Brady throw a football over 70 yards while facing a 100 mph headwind?" Unfortunately you are still adding qualifiers even though your argument is that he can't "under certain circumstances." So please re-write the Stone Paradox so that it will address your concerns regarding "certain circumstances" and do so without the qualifier limiting God's omnipotence before he is ever allowed to respond. If you can't, then you have to accept that God has met the challenge.--Birdman (talk) 22:16, 17 October 2017 (UTC)
- Hmm, I think you've forgotten something. Oh yes, Tom Brady isn't omnipotent. An omnipotent being would be able to do anything in any circumstances. —Kazitor, pending 05:14, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- Birdman - what is your fascination in linking my name with 'pee-pee'? And patronising me invites pseudo-Freudian analysis.
- And in UK football holding the ball is against the rules. Anna Livia (talk) 11:51, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- Hmm, I think you've forgotten something. Oh yes, Tom Brady isn't omnipotent. An omnipotent being would be able to do anything in any circumstances. —Kazitor, pending 05:14, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- Kazitor, Pointing out Tom Brady is not omnipotent based on the point I was making is a straw man argument. I'm very disappointed in you, Kaz! Wow! I thought only Theists needed to stoop to that level?, but apparently not? Whatever the case, I know that when a straw man argument gets tossed out, that's tantamount to my opponent raising an intellectual white flag because they have no valid argument to make. The Tom Brady reference I used was in regard to adding a second qualifier onto a sentence requiring a task to be performed - which would apply to any being (including an omnipotent being). You then wrote: "An omnipotent being would be able to do anything in any circumstances." which is not correct nor does it address Christopher's point at all. Anything in any circumstances would include stripping away all of an omnipotent being's omnipotence prior to it ever being allowed to perform the task. Requiring God to create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it without using any omnipotence is... well, ... a circumstance.
- This would also include requiring the omnipotent being to perform a task while not allowing the omnipotent being to even provide an answer to the question. This would also include requiring an omnipotent being to perform a task in some other way than any possible way that the omnipotent can use that would fulfill the requirement of the task. This would also include requiring an omnipotent being to perform a task that doesn't allow the omnipotent being to perform the physical act required within the task. (i.e., "Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it without lifting it?") This would also include requiring an omnipotent being to perform a task when its omnipotence has been marginalized prior to it ever being allowed to perform the task. (i.e., "Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it without using any omnipresence?")
- More than anything else, you did not accurately represent what Christopher wrote at all. Christopher: "I was saying that because he is unable to lift the stone under certain circumstances he isn't omnipotent." ..."Certain circumstances" is NOT THE SAME as "any circumstances". So if we focus on the circumstance that Christopher is bitching about, then this include requiring an omnipotent being to perform a specific task without allowing it to use the method it would normally use to perform the task (i.e., "Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it and not use whatever method it would normally use to successfully complete this challenge?").
- So the challenge I offered to Christopher I also extend to you, Kazitor: Re-write the Stone paradox in a way that includes a qualifier for either "any circumstances" or "certain circumstances." Let everyone see what you two come up with.--Birdman (talk) 13:15, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- No matter how many times you argue your case you will not make it any more correct.
- God/the Deity/whatever term you prefer is omnipotent - we are not. Possibly God chooses to play with paradoxes or #chooses# to abide by the rules - we cannot tell: and possibly 'the universe within which God etc operates' is something we can barely imagine. Perhaps #God becomes the stone#.
- One thing that is probably true - God etc is amused by the presumption of those who come up with such ideas and then split hairs while discussing them. Anna Livia (talk) 16:17, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- So the challenge I offered to Christopher I also extend to you, Kazitor: Re-write the Stone paradox in a way that includes a qualifier for either "any circumstances" or "certain circumstances." Let everyone see what you two come up with.--Birdman (talk) 13:15, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- "Anything in any circumstances would include stripping away all of an omnipotent being's omnipotence prior to it ever being allowed to perform the task." Like it or not, you just admitted the omnipotence paradox is true. Consider that. But now I understand your position (good! This is crucial for a proper debate.); you think an omnipotent being can't do anything in any circumstances. I don't know about you, but that doesn't sound very omnipotent to me. So now, the debate can shift to the core of the matter: why shouldn't an omnipotent being be able to do anything in nay circumstances? —Kazitor, pending 20:52, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- Kazitor, I cannot believe you just wrote this: "Like it or not, you just admitted the omnipotence paradox is true." That's like challenging Usain Bolt to a race and tying his feet together before the race even starts. If you are seriously suggesting that stripping an omnipotent being of it's power prior to it being allowed to respond to a challenge represents a "true test of omnipotence" then I'm going to have to toss any future responses from you into the intellectually-challenged abyss of "Godly Gonads" where you can discuss the genitalia designation of deities with Anna. Maybe those are the kind of stones you two are best at figuring out?. Whatever the case, I do appreciate you unknowingly posting the opposite determination of Christopher's determination was. ...I appreciate your help on that one!--Birdman (talk) 22:56, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- Kazitor wrote: "why shouldn't an omnipotent being be able to do anything in any circumstances? ...I will presume that you meant "under any circumstances." And the answer is "No!" It's "No!" because stripping away the omnipotent being's power PRIOR to having it perform a task does not present a challenge to omnipotence, but rather a challenge ONLY to whatever is left after you strip away the powers of omnipotence. You are not testing omnipotence at all, but this still represents a "circumstance" that falls under the heading of "any circumstances." So again, simply re-write the stone paradox in a way that would cover "all circumstances". If you cannot do this, then just say so.--Birdman (talk) 01:18, 19 October 2017 (UTC)
Kazitor or Christipher: "I’m still looking for that re-writing of the Stone Paradox that addressed your “all, any or certain circumstances” arguments. Otherwise you’ve accomplished nothing more than St. Thomas Aquinas accomplished in arguing the merit of the Stone Paradox. Otherwise, produce a “smoking gun” error in the CGCP.--Birdman (talk) 16:49, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
- You haven't answered #my# questions, so why should they answer yours? And as for putting me out of the loop - the answer involves omnishambles and drying paint. Anna Livia (talk) 17:04, 18 October 2017 (UTC)