This troper suggests an analogy: comparing a "theory" with a scientific theory is much like comparing a jacket to a straitjacket; just because the names sound similar, it doesn't mean that their meanings have anything to do with each other.— Unsigned, by: Kitsune Inari / talk / contribs 12:17, 19 January 2010 (UTC)
NAZISM and socialism: The NAZI party was truly socialist. Not every socialist is a NAZI, but NAZIS acted under socialist ideals and applied them to the letter.— Unsigned, by: 126.96.36.199 / talk / contribs 20:51, 27 November 2013 (UTC)
- Your point is what, exactly? Also, "Nazi" doesn't need to be ALL-CAPS.--ZooGuard (talk) 21:13, 27 November 2013 (UTC)
- I think his point was the following: The statement on the page is wrong. And he is right. The Nazis had 4-year-plans (Vierjahresplan) and extended the welfar state (of course not for jews, gypsies and other humans considered as "non-arien"). A national automobile company (named Volkswagen) was created by the nazi state and the goverment isued orders enforcing the 4-year-plans against private owners of companys. For example the nazi goverment orderd the production of so called Volksempfänger and set it prize by goverment regulation...
Faith in science vs faith in God
I think this example assumes something absurd; namely that faith is a coherent concept without consideration of past performance. If you admit that that there are people who actually believe in God, then you have to admit that these people have perceived and evaluated some evidence to the effect; even if you have not perceived it, or do not think it actually exist. Separating the idea of perception of evidence from the concept of faith leaves you with the idea of agreement... but agreement with what? An abstract assertion? Well if you entertain the idea of agreement, then you imply that there is a judgement to be made, which eliminates assertions--they are true by definition. Faith requires judgement of some sort of perception. It cannot be blind.188.8.131.52 (talk) 10:56, 2 January 2014 (UTC)
- (EC)I don't think so. Blind faith exists afaik. For example, if an idea is repeated to you enough times, you are likely going to be susceptible to believing it (without some sort of critical examination, which not everybody is inclined to do), even though there is nothing to substantiate it apart from hearsay. People are not as critical of hearsay as you may be assuming. Nullahnung (talk) 10:59, 2 January 2014 (UTC)
- If I believe in something because I have a revelation which is only visible to me then you could say that I have faith in it. For instance, I could believe that I am the reincarnation of Napoleon because his spirit visited me in a dream and told me so. Obviously I could not share my experience with anybody else and others might feel that my beliefs were indistinguishable from insanity if I began to act as though they were true and insist on ruling France.
- But my faith would certainty be based on what I felt was the evidence of Napoleon's visit.
- In fact though we have just identified another example of "equivocation". What I regard as "evidence" of my Napoleonship is entirely internal and cannot be shared with or tested by or refuted by others. A sceptic would only regard as acceptable "evidence" something which could be shared with others - tested by them and, at least potentially, refuted.--Bob"I think you'll find it's more complicated than that." 16:01, 2 January 2014 (UTC)
Some content from EvoWiki. http://evolutionwiki.org/wiki/Distinction_without_a_difference http://evolutionwiki.org/wiki/Equivocation Sir ℱ℧ℤℤϒℂᗩℑᑭƠℑᗩℑƠ (talk/stalk) 20:56, 26 July 2015 (UTC)
A common, lame argument I frequently see online in discussions of LGBT issues is when a person tries to pretend that the term "homophobia" merely, and strictly, means "fear of homosexuality / homosexuals" (rather than its actual dictionary definition). They then claim that, since they are not afraid of gays, clearly they can't be homophobic! Essentially they seem to be arguing that the root stems of a word should define its meaning rather than its actual usage - which seems an almost hilariously disingenuous abuse of lexicography. Would this constitute an example of an equivocation fallacy? If not, how exactly should it be categorized?