Bump: You know that obnoxious thing people do on the internet when they've said something and they feel they haven't been paid enough attention? I'm doing that.

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Bump: You know that obnoxious thing people do on the internet when they've said something and they feel they haven't been paid enough attention? I'm doing that.

Would you please continue the discussion we were having here? Unless, of course, you feel you've handed me my ass already and I'm just in denial or something.


It's just that I worry hostility towards religion won't really make the world a better place, you know? RationalWiki isn't yet much of a nexus but I really want to lighten the tone in some instances, so we can get along a bit.

thanks for paying my arguments attention in the first place

User:Brxbrx/sig03:04, 23 June 2011

Lets simplify things down a bit to two basic hypotheses:

  • H1: There is a god.
  • H0: There is no god.

From what I can piece together you are trying to say that these two hypotheses should be treated as fundamentally on equal footing because the absence of direct evidence does not disprove H1, and that because there is no observational evidence available we can not calculate relative probabilities of the hypotheses based on empirical observation. Therefore, these things are some how axiomatic in their own separate sets.

I pointed out that at best this approach can only be taken somewhat serious in a hardcore frequntist framework where calculating the probability of data given a hypothesis can not be used to calculate the relative probability of each of the hypotheses. In this framework an absence of evidence does not allow us to be a make claim about H1 or H0. But in a Bayesian framework it absolutely does. When we observe a universe that does not show any sign of what we would expect if there were a God then that makes the relative probability of H0 > than H1.

The only way out is to keep redefining God and the predictions of what a universe with a God would look like until you have made all possible observations of universe H1 equal to H0. So in other words there is a God but he has made the universe look and act exactly like a universe without a God. At that point I feel you have argued yourself into the oblivion of the gap.

However, you are making the more practical claim that some how specific religions that do make very specific claims about how God should effect the universe can not some how be addressed empirically. Anything that makes a claim about something observable can be analyzed empirically, and if no empirical observation can be made regarding a hypothesis then it is completely irrelevant.

Tmtoulouse (talk)06:12, 23 June 2011

I'm going to reply to this tomorrow after I've gotten some sleep. Then you'll see my reply and scratch your head and ask yourself if I'm really that stupid or if I'm trying to make parody.

User:Brxbrx/sig06:30, 23 June 2011

You know how a couple of days ago I said tomorrow? I was wrong.

I'm pretty sure you don't care when or even whether I answer your post, I just thought I'd notify you in case you believed me to have run off

User:Brxbrx/sig00:12, 25 June 2011
 

What I'm saying is that science is not a universal framework. There is no god hypothesis, only belief in god.

I believe RationalWiki should not characterize religion as inherently irrational because

  1. It's not a friendly attitude. We won't get far antagonizing people (though the question of whether obscuring the truth for the sake of diplomacy is right remains).
  2. Religion is not bound by such ideas as Bayesianism (is that a word? Or is only Bayesian a word?) or more specifically methodological naturalism and falsifiability. It's the difference between faith and knowledge.


I think I understand what you're saying. I'm very sorry if I'm repeating myself. I used to think I was a good debater, but later in life I figured out I was just so stubborn the people I was debating with simply gave up...

User:Brxbrx/sig18:14, 28 June 2011

Please read special pleading.

- π09:39, 29 June 2011

Could I ask you to explain the relevance?

User:Brxbrx/sig12:24, 29 June 2011

Your entire argument is an example of special pleading.

- π12:47, 29 June 2011
 
 

RationalWiki is not a place where we are friendly to false and misleading ides. We don't coddle people who refuse to give their kids vaccinations, why should we coddle people who belive in a god?

You have failed to demonstrate how beliefe in god does not fall under an emperical framework other than simply stating that it deost not. I have tried to explain how it repeated observations of no evidence can be viewed as evidence against something in a Bayesian framework.

Tmtoulouse (talk)21:17, 3 July 2011

My own opinion on this matter is that religion is and should be treated here as an irrational system of understanding the world but that is not to say those that are religious themselves are necessarily irrational themselves. So while slamming religion due to its under-lying tenants the believers may not be deserving of the same treatment. If you follow me.

Ace of Spades21:22, 3 July 2011

I agree with this, assuming that by "understanding the world" you mean "understanding the physical world." I agree with Trent on most things but not here. My personal view is that science and religion are basically orthogonal.

Doctor Dark (talk)04:47, 4 July 2011

Physical is not the key word, rather observable (not observable merely in the sense of vision but as broadly as that term can be defined). Science is about making sense of observations and applying those observations to the creation of model construction to add in comprehension of our observed reality. The only way that there could ever be an epistemological system orthogonal to science is if it some how adds in comprehending non-observable reality.

But this leads into the same issues I brought up below. Systems of knowledge that try and postulate hidden things operating in a universe that acts exactly as if there are no hidden things violates the principle of parsimony. I don't see how anyone would be okay with an epistemology that didn't embrace parsimony, you would get stuck in an infinitely increasing loop of made up gibberish with no mechanism to break out of it.

Tmtoulouse (talk)05:20, 4 July 2011

Well, my question then is this - how can you exclude Berkleyan idealism, when its observable predictions are identical to those of materialism? Furthermore, I'd suggest that the principle of parsimony favours idealism over materialism. The materialist universe contains a large amount of information, which can be divided into two parts: the information which, will at some point, be known or observed by some mind; and the part which no mind will ever know or observe. Arguably, the unknown information is much more than the known information. Materialism claims that this information exists, even though no mind will ever know it. For example, there is a planet in the Andromeda galaxy, and it is having a certain type of weather today, but it is quite possible no mind will ever know what that type of weather that is. Materialism claims this information exists, even though no mind will ever know it. Idealism does not claim that information exists, that only information that will ever be in some mind somewhere exists. According to materialism, unobserved things exist in particular states; even though no mind may ever know what that state is; according to idealism, things only exist in particular states if a mind knows they are in that particular state, and otherwise exist in a sort of state of mere potentiality, a superposition of all their possible states. Doesn't it then follow, that materialism is much more complex than idealism, because materialism posits the actual existence of all this unknown and unknowable reality? And hence, by the principle of parsimony, we should be idealists rather than materialists?

(((Zack Martin)))05:39, 4 July 2011
 
 
 

I think there's a big difference there. People that don't vaccinate their kids are putting their children in clear and obvious danger. People that bring their kids to Sunday school are doing no such thing.


As to you hypothesis/Bayesian stuff (forgive me for not understanding. Much of the science on this wiki is far beyond me), you keep insisting we apply this standard to things that are in my eyes irrelevant to it. When you last read Lord of the Rings, did you scoff at the depictions of ents since plants have no muscle? Did you claim it to be improbable that Sauron affix all his power to the one ring?

Religion is not irrational because it is not based on observations of the natural world and generally admits to being unfalsifiable. Creationism is irrational because they draw conclusions that can easily be disproved and ignore and deny the body of evidence against them.

Finally, for a more pragmatic argument, "coddling" would accomplish far more than insulting. New Atheists are only widening the fissure. Pissing people off rarely teaches them anything.


BTW, thanks Maratrean and ListenerX for stepping in to help me. And if it's at all relevant, I'm an atheist. Always have been, my parents are atheists, and my grandparents are atheists.

User:Brxbrx/sig17:54, 4 July 2011

What does your Lord of the Rings have to do with anything? No one is going around claiming that its real, and if they did, yes I would scoff at them.

Other than that your argument is amounting to "is not", "is so", "cause I said so", style statements. There is nothing to really reply to that.

Tmtoulouse (talk)18:12, 4 July 2011

Oh well. I never was very good at debates.


I'm sorry to have wasted your time.

User:Brxbrx/sig18:13, 4 July 2011
 

Consider that in Islam, your "Sunday School" may well indoctrinate children to become fanatic suicide bombers. Much of the children's television in the Islamic world is seriously unhinged. However, your argument would count this under religion, and therefore harmless and should be respected and tolerated. I do not buy for one moment that just because we arbitrarily put one form of belief under the banner of "religion" that we should protect it and shield it from free and rational inquiry, and mockery if it necessarily flows from that. Should we not also shoehorn any political beliefs - views on taxation, universal health care, abortion and so on - into that protective bubble?

Your attempt to create a distinction that is objective and all-encompassing is noble, but currently it's very half-baked and open to many holes. Currently all you have is "that's different" when faced with some beliefs falling on the wrong side protective scrutiny free zone you're trying make. This is just special pleading and I don't think you will ever get that far without first trying to figure out a full and encompassing definition of the word "religion" first. Once you've done that, the hard part is done.

Right now you seem to be working backwards; trying to say religion is free from rational/irrational labels and trying to justify that. Instead, try to figure out what properties a belief system should have in order to make it fully immune from rational scrutiny, and why that should be so, and then try to find out what fits it. This should avoid any special pleading problems that arise from endless back-and-forth example-counter-example exchanges. You may think that you have already done this, but I think you've been too circular, effectively saying that things exempt from rational scrutiny should be religious, religious are religious, so religions should be exempt from rational scrutiny.

ADK...I'll repair your tuxedo!18:29, 4 July 2011

Rational scrutiny requires objective standards of rationality by which to judge whatever is being scrutinised.

But people disagree on what the basic principles of rationality are. A lot of people will point to, e.g. the laws of logic, yet all of the traditional laws of logic have been questioned. (For example, intuitionistic logic denies the law of the excluded middle, paraconsistent logic denies the law of non-contradiction, etc.)

How do we decide what is the correct standard of rationality? That is like asking, what is the correct standard of morality. If people disagree, there is no obvious way to resolve the disagreement. Is there a test or experiment or observation we could perform to determine whose rationality is the right one?

It seems that a materialist worldview has no room for objective morality; but if not, how does it have room for objective rationality either?

And if rationality is not objective, isn't rationality just whatever each person says it is? In which case the whole concept of "rational scrutiny" is a waste of time.

What about Alvin Plantinga's "reformed epistemology", where he adopts basic doctrines of his religion as basic principles of rationality? What is to stop any religion from doing that? If there are no objective standards of rationality, then each religion can adopt its own ones. But if there are objective standards, how do we know that the right ones are secular rather than religious?

I myself have views on faith similar, but not identical to Plantinga. To me, faith is by definition rational, since for me faith is a basic principle of rationality. However, I do apply various qualifications (which I won't go into here) to that idea, which avoid some of the more obvious pitfalls of that approach (but maybe not all pitfalls.)

(((Zack Martin)))08:10, 5 July 2011

A semantic dispute over "rationality" isn't the issue. As I've said before, I have no emotional attachment to random strings of vowels and consonants so will happily pick a new word if I get to define it myself. So it's pretty irrelevant.

The question is; why would you want to specifically take religions off the menu when it comes to RW trashing them? Why one type of belief and not an other?

Why would you consider faith - that is, acceptance of an idea despite, and increasingly because of, the lack of evidence - a virtue and part of this "rationalism"?

This probably answers the question. Science tends to hold evidence as the highest authority. After all, how can you say something about the universe if you haven't actually looked at the universe? So faith - that is, having an idea without evidence - can be damaged by science. It would be akin to saying "Armondikov has ginger hair" without making any attempt to actually figure out if that statement is actually true. But not only that, but because faith can be damaged by observation, you will start making excuses about why you can't find that out and eventually pushing and pushing and pushing until you've defined it in such a way that you can't make the observation and then try to limit what others can do answer your question. This is exactly what is happening when you try to shield religion from science.

We used to think we could never fly, or go faster than 10 mph, or land on the moon. The thing is, no one can predict the future (I know this because I can't and am pretty convinced no one has mental faculties I don't posses) so once you start making hard-and-fast decisions about what can't be done, someone will throw egg on your face when they do it. So perhaps we will be able to prove there is no God one day, as I don't see that hypothesis as any different to disproving that he made the world 6000 years ago. All the excuses otherwise are just special pleading.

ADK...I'll forsake your lisp!08:39, 5 July 2011

You say you will pick a new word, but I think you miss the point. Rational is a loaded term, it is a value judgement. It comes with the near universal value baggage Rational=Good, Irrational=Bad. Suppose instead of rational/irrational, you substitute Armondikovian/non-Armondikovian. Then you've lost the value baggage, which is a big deal, so it isn't the same thing. "Should I want to be rational?" "Obviously yes". "Should I want to be Armondikovian?" "Why???"

Some faiths can be damaged by science. Others can't be. Suppose I believe by faith the claim "The mind, by its nature, can never cease to exist". Science can't possibly damage that claim. Despite all lack of scientific evidence for the continued existence of the mind after death, it can't disprove the claim "The minds of the dead have gone to another universe". Nor does it appear it ever could be. (Even if we could somehow prove the existence of parallel universes, and somehow access to them to prove the minds of the dead aren't there, how could science prove there aren't yet further universe unaccessible to us in which the minds of the dead are present.)

Certain unproven claims can potentially be refuted by science. Others can't be. This follows from the nature of science. The findings of science will change; its fundamental nature won't. If you put your faith in what science can disprove, science may one day conquer your faith. If you put your faith in what is beyond the inherent abilities of science, science will never conquer it.

(((Zack Martin)))09:17, 5 July 2011

How do you know what the limits of science are to make such a grandiose claim?

We used to have gods to make life happen. Now we know that isn't the case.

We used to have gods to make the sun rise. Now we know that isn't the case.

We used to have gods to heal the sick. Now we know that isn't the case.

We now have gods to create the universe...

See a pattern here? These beliefs are only beyond science that is possible now. You can only comprehend what actual observation of the universe can discover now. The world is like a giant ice sheet of ignorance. We constantly chip away at this with observation, reason, theory and prediction, learning new things as we progress. Meanwhile this vast icy sheet of ignorance is where God hides, and it's shrinking. Can it keep hiding forever? Yes, there'll always be that one last piece to chip away at. But by doing this you diminish your belief so much as to make it pathetic. Why call it God if it's so weak that it has to constantly run away from observation?

Now, back to the original point, what makes this different to other beliefs? Homeopathy originally was invented in the 17th century and appeared to work - though only because it was less harmful than the prevailing medicine of the time. Medicine since overtook it in effectiveness by stopping killing patients long enough to treat them properly. But the alternative medicine still exists, but now retreats back into the ice wall of ignorance, hiding itself from observation. The claim that active ingredients were infinitely diluted was blown apart and then replaced by less falsifiable means.

This is absolutely no different to a religion, which does the same thing but tries to invent things like metaphyiscal realms to hide in. The only option is to admit it's meaningless or shrink it down until it becomes pointless.

Consider the claim "When we die, we go to another universe, inaccessible from this one, except through death." How could science possibly disprove this claim? Isn't, the grandiose claim, the claim that science will one day be able to disprove this claim? You have absolutely no idea how science could even begin to disprove that claim. It is inherently untestable by science. To claim science will one day be able to disprove it is grandiose, putting an excessive and irrational faith in the power of science.

The fact that other supposedly similar beliefs have been disproven by science, is no evidence against this belief. Science can't disprove it. Science will never be able to disprove it. You have absolutely no evidence to the contrary, just analogies to radically different kinds of claims which science can disprove.

Homeopathy is disprovable by science because homeopathy claims "X is an effective remedy for Y". By a double blind trial, we can compare X to a placebo. If X really was an effective remedy for Y, we would expect to a statistically significant result that patients with Y given X have better outcomes than patients given a placebo. In the absence of such a result, we can conclude X is not an effective remedy after all. Thus, science can disprove homeopathy.

Science can't disprove the claim "When we die, we go to another universe, inaccessible from this one except by death". What kind of statistical test can we perform for this claim? There is none. So this is a radically different claim from "Homeopathic remedies are effective". Science can disprove claims that homeopathy works, it can't disprove this claim.

If science disproves homeopathy, and homeopathists refuse to accept the findings of science, then so much the worse for them; but that is irrelevant to the question of those who accept a claim which by definition science cannot disprove.

(((Zack Martin)))09:48, 5 July 2011
 

The question what science can and can't (dis)prove is interesting. I don't think science can prove anything if we are exact. Why? If we say "science proved that X exists" what we are actually say is "science has - by it's own standard - proven that - by it's own standards - X exists". We can continue that game all day long: "evidence" has it's defintion in science, "method" has one, and so on. Now it may happen that these definitions do not match everybodies definitions of these words and concepts. The normal go-to reaction of scientists (amateur or pro) for that case is "You are stupid for not accepting my definitions", which I always thought was a dick move. Of course we can define a proposed existence in ways which would be not provable for science - simply through the remark "…and behaves so that science can't prove it", and while that claim is valid in the normal world, in science (read branches that use the scientific method) it is invalid (why should be clear). Science and the scientific method are by some taken as the end-all-be-all of thought, but it's fundementals are a question of faith into a concept which can be quite favored looking at the empiric evidence. By scientific standards the scientific method is a valid method and in fact the best system. But that is the minimum requirement of all theories, methods and ideologies. It is presicely why so many scientists scratch your face out when somebody brings up a postmodern concept of steady uncertainty that one of it's fundementals even exists. One attacks the very basement of their nicely build house and they go ballistic, because if that ain't true anymore what is?

Now as I said before, I think that there are several types of rationility (personal, philosophic, scientific) which all have different areas of validity and my personal atheism was reached with the second one, but I'd like to see my atheistic non-believes proven by science, but I can go without it quite nicely.

uhm, t!10:28, 5 July 2011

A couple of things science cannot prove/disprove:

  1. Claims about other universes. Science can only deal with this universe, and maybe other universes somehow "accessible" from this one. If there are other universes with no or very limited accessibility from this one, science can't prove/disprove claims about those universes. The other universe I have proposed, one where all the dead go, but which can only be accessed by dying, is beyond the power of pre mortem science to evaluate.
  2. Suppose there is a perfect(i.e. error-free, never makes a mistake), omniscient, omnipotent, intelligent agent intervening in the universe. Suppose furthermore this agent does not wish for their intervention to be proveable scientifically. Then, science will not be able to detect the intervention of that agent. It may intervene heavily in times/places where there is little scientific ability; but as the ability of science to detect its intervention increases, it simultaneously decreases its intervention. As a result, science can never prove or disprove its intervention, since it only intervenes under circumstances when it knows science will not be able to detect it, and refuses to intervene otherwise.

The second claim is a bit like a Gödel sentence for science. It is a theory which makes the prediction "science cannot prove or disprove the truth of this theory". So it is self-referential (a theory referring to science and its abilities to prove/disprove itself), a bit like a Gödel sentence (I'm not claiming it is exactly like a Gödel sentence though.)

(((Zack Martin)))19:39, 5 July 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

You need to distinguish the mere abstract idea that there is a God, from the specific claims of particular religions like traditional Christianity.

For the traditional Christian God to exist, the universe must have particular features (e.g. miracles), and from the absence of those features, we can infer the non-existence of the Christian God.

For a deist God to exist, the universe need not have any particular features at all. Hence, there is no reason from the nature of the universe to infer the non-existence of the God of deism.

So, your argument that P(H0) > P(H1), may well work for the God of traditional Christianity, but doesn't work for the God of Deism.

And before you argue the God of Deism is somehow parasitic upon Christianity, it is very similar to the God of philosophers such as Plato or Aristotle, who both predate Christianity, and whose work shows no direct signs of Jewish influence either. They are obviously based on ancient Greek paganism, but if they turned from that to a more refined philosophical perception of the deity, modern science had nothing to do with it. It seems likely to me that Platonism/Aristotelianism was a natural development out of Greek paganism.

(((Zack Martin)))05:02, 4 July 2011

The only way to equalize P(H0) and P(H1) is if P(observed reality | H0) = P( observed reality | H1). This means that all observed reality acts as if it can be completely explained through naturalistic mechanisms. This is Spinoza's God. The problem is that the pragmatic and epistemological weight of H0 and H1 in this case are not equal. Since observed reality in this construct acts as if there is no God, an appeal to the existence of a God is expanding the complexity of the system without gaining any explanatory power. Therefore, the principle of parsimony kicks in and we still embrace H0 as the preferred hypothesis.

Tmtoulouse (talk)05:13, 4 July 2011

Well, then it all comes down to what is the correct version of the "principle of parsimony" or "Occam's razor", which I have been debating back and forth with Röstigraben recently. A couple of points open to dispute:

  1. Is "God does not exist" really simpler than "God exists"? Atheists make that claim, but I am not convinced
  2. The principle of parsimony says to avoid unnecessary complexity. The question is, what determines whether extra complexity is "necessary" or not. You say it is only necessary if it adds explanatory power. But, it is open to someone to argue that human thought performs other purposes than just explanation, and that a complication, which may be unnecessary for explanation, may yet be necessary for other purposes
(((Zack Martin)))05:20, 4 July 2011

Uh seems pretty axiomatic to me. Lets set this up using a linear system just for simplicity sake.

Mo = X0+X1+X2

R = O - Mo

We have some model of reality, Mo is the prediction of our observations given the elements of our model (X0...XN). If we then take our observed reality (O) we can calculate the "residuals" left over that are not accounted for by our model. The "complexity" of the model is then defined as the number of elements with in the set. To determine if an extra element is worth adding to the model we need to compare the residuals of those two models.

Mo1 = X0+X1 Mo2 = X0+X1+X2

R1 = O - Mo1 R2 = O - Mo2

In order for us to say that Mo2 is "better" than Mo1 R2 must be significantly less than R1. Now what "significantly" means is something we work out in statistics and doesn't need to be defined here. The reason we do not need to worry about it here is because what you guys are postulating is something like this:

Mo1(there is no god) = X0+X1...XN Mo2(there is a god) = X0+X1....XN+1

R1= O-Mo1 R2= O-Mo2

R1=R2

You have therefor added an element to the model XN+1, but kept the residuals equal. Therefore, an sane system of knowledge would reject Mo2 in favor of Mo1.

Tmtoulouse (talk)05:34, 4 July 2011

Well, most deist/theist worldviews include an afterlife, so they actually make additional predictions. Adding a deity to the model, and the assumption that we will observe the deity post mortem, produces additional predicted observations.

The problem with your metamodel, is that you are looking at things in a static/atemporal manner, rather than a dynamic manner, not taking into account that observations (and also predicted observations) vary over time.

We can talk about objective time, in the sense of something which is a property of the external universe, and which we share with other observers. And we can talk about subjective time, which is something relative to ourselves as individuals. (Roughly speaking, subjective time is relative to the frame of reference of our own consciousness; objective time is relative to some frame of reference external to our own consciousness.) Our individual personal observations are indexed with respect to subjective time - we have no observations prior to the beginning of subjective time, nor after its end, even if objective time extends beyond those bounds.

If death is extinction, then our subjective time is a finite duration, t0 >= t >= t1.

If there is an afterlife, then our subjective time extends beyond t1, at least up to some other time t2, where t1 < t2. (Whether it extends infinitely past t1, or eventually ends, is not relevant at this point).

The no God model predicts certain observations within the bounds of t0 >= t >= t1, and no observations whatsoever for t > t1.

The God+afterlife model predicts the same observations within the bounds of t0 >= t >= t1, and further observations (e.g. experiences of God) for t1 > t >= t2.

So, we've added one or more elements to our model. What we've done to the residuals, is hard to say, because you've defined the residuals in a time-invariant manner, when the residuals really need to be defined in a time-variant one.

(((Zack Martin)))06:06, 4 July 2011

The model I have proposed isn't static at all, the elements vary in time in conjunction with observation points. I did limit the dimensionality of the equations because non-linear statistical modeling is needlessly complex when the point can be shown in a linear context.

Your use of the after life is no different than any proposed model that makes a claim about a specific point in the future that has yet to occur. I could say that we actually all live in a giant lollipop, but that the lollipop is structured so that we will never know that we live in it until the giant finishes licking it to the center core. The giant will finish licking the lollipop and reach the center core on March 26th, 2014.

When does my giant lollipop model become superior to the anti-thesis that we don't live in a lollipop? Well when we reach the point that our observational evidence can show that we do. Until then the rational thing to do is to accept the more parsimonious model and wait further observation.

This is how science works, we change our models when new data is introduced that is better explained by another model. But until that time the rational individual will rely on the simplest model with the greatest explanatory power.

If you abandon this idea and say that any model that postulates some future event should be viewed as equally likely as any other, then you are stuck in your infinite loop of gibberish and giant lollipops.

Tmtoulouse (talk)06:24, 4 July 2011

Let me put it this way: The giant lolipop theory (GLT) claims that on 26th March 2014, we will make some observation which clearly supports its claims (e.g. we will see the giant's tongue through our telescopes.) More formally, at some time tg, where tg > tnow, we will have some observation og; but predicts no observations for times t < tg. And, GLT specifies tg as 26th March 2014.

Anti-GLT theory claims that on that same date, we will see no such observations (e.g. we look out our telescopes, and no giant tongue can be seen). More formally, at tg, we will have some observation o~g, which by its nature is incompatible with having observation og.

So, both theories predict different observations at tg, og and o~g. Why should we assume anti-GLT is more likely than GLT? Because, our existing knowledge + anti-GLT is simpler than our existing knowledge + GLT. Let O = {all ot for all t0 <= t <= tnow}. In other words, O is all the observations we have had so far. Anti-GLT is more likely, because C(O + o~g) < C(O + og), where C(x) is a measure of complexity. (I would say Kolmogorov complexity, or some computable approximation thereto.) Hence, parsimony leads us to prefer anti-GLT, since anti-GLT is a simpler theory than GLT.

Now, the God+afterlife theory (GA theory) says that post mortem, I will make certain observations. Unlike GLT, it doesn't predict a precise date for its observations, but that is fine. Consider the theory "My cat will die one day". That theory predicts certain observations in the future. It doesn't specify a precise date, but it can provide a function p(t) = probability we have had those observations by time t. Obviously, all animals, my cat included, have a finite lifespan, and the longer they live, the more likely they'll die now (to simplify things a bit). So, the fact that the afterlife theory doesn't precisely specify a time for my own death is fine, since that is analogous to the case when dealing with the death of my cat. It simply claims that, whenever my death occurs, then observations of a certain sort will follow, reasonably promptly thereafter, measured in subjective terms. Depending on one's theology, maybe one believes in soul sleep, and I will be unconscious post mortem for thousands or millions of billions of years before God returns me to consciousness; but, since the theory references subjective time, that duration doesn't count.

So, GA theory says I'll have certain observations oGod at time tpm, where tpm > tdeath > tnow.

What does no-God-no-afterlife theory (NGNA theory) predict at tpm? Well, interestingly, it doesn't predict any observation at all. It predicts, not an observation, but this strange entity called observing nothing, a null set of observations. This is why, GLT and anti-GLT are symmetric, in a way which GA and NGNA aren't. So, comparing the GLT/anti-GLT pair to the GA/NGNA pair isn't really valid.

Should parsimony prefer NGNA to GA theory? Using the same logic we used for the GLT/anti-GLT case, we have to compare C(O + GA) to C(O + NGNA). Now, NGNA is essentially a null set, so we are basically comparing C(O + GA) to C(O + null), and it seems reasonable to assume that C(O + null) = C(O). So, if C(O) < C(O + GA), then NGNA wins by parsimony.

Can adding an observation make the set of observations simpler? Indeed it can. Consider a program which generates all the digits of pi, call any program meeting this description P1. Consider instead a program which generates the first n digits of pi, where n is a large but finite arbitrary number (say one on the order of Graham's number); call this program P2. Now, is the shortest P1 program shorter than the shortest P2 program? Yes; a P1 program must just encode an algorithm to calculate pi; a P2 program must also encode some large number n, and the logic to stop the generation when that many digits have been output. The Kolmogorov complexity of a finite initial substring of pi will be greater than the Kolmogorov complexity of pi itself, when that initial substring is long enough.

Furthermore, let me present the following theory, call it universe extinction theory (UET). UET claims, that at some time tend, where tend >= tnow, the universe, and everyone and everything within it, will suddenly cease to exist, and thus time will end, and nothing will exist at all, ever thereafter. Of course, UET is not a single theory, but a family of theories, for differing values of tend. At one extreme, where tend is many billions or trillions of years in the future, UET may match various theories from cosmology of the end of the universe (e.g. the Big Crunch). On the other hand, if tend is next week, or next second, or this very instant, well now we are in reverse Last Thursdayism territory - Next Thursdayism rather than Last Thursdayism.

Won't the principle of parsimony prefer UET(tnext Thursday)? Isn't it simpler to assume the universe suddenly ceases to exist next Thursday, than it exists for billions, trillions of years to come. That is an immense extra volume of spacetime we are adding to the universe, an immense subsequent series of observations - surely, that immense addition is not perfectly compressible, and even if combined with O it compresses significantly, it seems likely that C(O + a tiny bit extra) << C(O + billions of years extra). But, if the principle of parsimony leads us to prefer the hypothesis that the universe will end next Thursday, doesn't it lead us to believe in preference to that, that right now is the last moment of the universe's existence? But, clearly that is preposterous; so something must be wrong with the principle of parsimony.

Furthermore, no-afterlife theory (NA theory) is very similar to UET(tmy death), except the U (the universe) is my personal universe rather than everybody's. If UET has problems, why won't NA have similar problems?

Now, maybe my presentation of the principle of parsimony is wrong; but if so, I challenge you to explain why, and provide an alternative.

(((Zack Martin)))07:56, 4 July 2011

The principle of parsimony doesn't care the least about the amount of time in which an observation takes place. It cares about the number of elements in a model.

The predicted end of the universe or the existence of the end is not a model itself but rather a prediction of a model. To compare two models in terms of parsimony (one predicting the end next thursday, one predicting the end in 15 billion years) we need to see the elements that make up those models that make that prediction. The prediction itself whether next thursday or 15 billion years is a single prediction, a single point of data. The relative time between now and that prediction is not a factor in the models complexity.

Also keep in mind parsimony includes the "all things being equal" more complex models are better than simplier models when the residuals of the complex model are some significant value less than the simpler model.

I don't really see much to reply to here. A lot of it has nothing to do with what we are talking about, and the rest seems to be a misstatement of how parsimony as applied to model building is actually used.

Tmtoulouse (talk)08:11, 4 July 2011

Define model, element in a model. Can you give a precise definition to these terms? I have some idea what you are talking about, but it would be clearer if you could define these terms more precisely.

Consider the following claim: "The universe will cease to exist on Friday 8th July 2011". How many "elements" are in that "model"? Considering the opposite claim: "The universe will continue to exist after Friday 8th July 2011". How many elements in the model of that claim? Is one of these statements more parsimonious than the other, or are they equal in complexity?

The relative time between now and that prediction is not a factor in the models complexity. So, its not the complexity of the universe that would exist were the model true, or the complexity of the observations we would expect to have were the model true, but the complexity of the model itself? This goes back to part of my point - we have multiple competing formulations of the principle of parsimony. Why choose to follow your formulation rather than some other one?

more complex models are better than simplier models when the residuals of the complex model are some significant value less than the simpler model. - comparing my two claims, i.e. the universe will suddenly end on this Friday, v.s. it will continue to exist after that date, how do their residuals differ?

(((Zack Martin)))08:35, 4 July 2011

A model is a set of causative or predictive rules/statements used to simulate some observed phenomenon.

An element of a model is a specific causative or predictive rule/statement with in the model's set.

A prediction is a specific predicted data point generated from the model to be compared with actual observation.

"The universe will cease to exist on Friday 8th July 2011" and "The universe will continue to exist after Friday 8th July 2011" are predictions not models.

A model would be something like: Since Gargurtle the giant turtle who exists outside of space and time and eats universes is coming for us next and will reach us on Friday 8th July 2011.

The elements of the model are: {All existing scientific theories}+the existence of Gargurtle

The prediction is: "The universe will cease to exist on Friday 8th July 2011"

The Gargurtle model adds an element to our model that adds zero explanatory power except for a single future prediction.

Until Friday 8th July 2011 the Gargurtle model has less epistemological value than the standard model.

Tmtoulouse (talk)18:19, 4 July 2011

Why should I adopt your "model theoretic" approach to the principle of parsimony? Why not another approach instead?

(((Zack Martin)))08:16, 5 July 2011

You don't have to do accept anything. The premise of this discussion is whether or not science as an epistemological framework has anything to say about the god hypothesis.

If you want to reject science and all that science tells us about reality that is your call. What you don't get to do is have your cake and eat it to, by claiming that you can accept science but reject what it would say about your made up god.

The approach to parsimony I have presented isn't "mine" its how science works. You can see it Bayesian model selection, or in something as basic as a statistical significance scale (hint why does the difference score increase for the same p-value as our degrees of freedom increase?).

Now this principle can be used for model-free approaches, but the same basic idea that predictive power has to scale up with degrees of freedom to maintain significance applies.

Tmtoulouse (talk)15:33, 5 July 2011

I have no problem with approaches which are genuinely part of science, as in required by and implied by science. But I can question whether the approach you've proposed is the only one which works with science. You claim science uses your interpretation of the principle of parsimony rather than some other - have evidence for that claim? You suggest that science only works with your interpretation of the principle of parsimony, and won't work with competing interpretations - have evidence for that claim?

I don't think science actually does use your principle of parsimony. Consider the theory of gravitation. Say we have Einstein's general relativity (hereafter GR), and we have some new theory, super-GR (maybe one of the GR alternatives listed by WP). Now, super-GR produces almost identical results to GR, except in very rare/extreme circumstances. Due to the rareity/extremity of those circumstances where super-GR behaves differently from GR, it is unlikely we will be able to distinguish super-GR from GR experimentally or observationally in the medium term. But, while Einstein's field equations are frequently lauded for their simplicity, super-GR's field equations are far more complicated. So, quite validly, physicists use the principle of parsimony to exclude super-GR: (1) GR and super-GR are experimentally/observationally indistinguishable at present; (2) GR is simpler than super-GR; (3) hence, prefer GR to super-GR. (Of course, maybe one day the experiments/observations needed to distinguish GR/super-GR will become feasible, and the results may actually favour super-GR. So, the rejection of super-GR by the principle of parsimony is provisional.)

Now, the reason I bring up this case, is that I think it demonstrates your account of the principle of parsimony - the "model element counting" approach you are using - doesn't match how scientists actually reason. GR and super-GR have the same elements in their model (spacetime, mass/energy, etc.). But super-GR's equations are much more complex than GR's. But I don't see how your model counting approach can measure the complexity of the equations, since all you do is count model elements. So, your definition of the principle of parsimony does not match the one actually used in science.

Moving on, let me produce two theories: theory 1: "The universe will instantaneously cease to exist this Friday". theory 2: "The universe will still exist this Saturday". Theory 2 is nothing more than the denial of theory 1. And what I've given is the whole of theory 1. There is no "Gargaturtle", no agent which ends the universe. The universe just ends for no particular reason. So these two theories have identical models. Hence, you can't use the principle of parsimony, as you describe it, to distinguish these two theories.

(((Zack Martin)))20:08, 5 July 2011
 
 

Ah, so that's what's happening on the 8th. I did wonder.

ADK...I'll xerox your virus!09:24, 5 July 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Good post!

As I have said many times before, if the God in question is not claimed to be a miracle worker, there will be no scientific observation that could differentiate from .

Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX05:14, 4 July 2011

Wouldn't that also mean that the faith of deist (non-miracle worker) can't be harmfull to society? Also would that mean that faith in anything non-supernatural can't be harmfull either? (That's what I get by accepting Mara's and ListenerX's premises and I fully agree with them.)

uhm, t!23:41, 4 July 2011

No; all that "premise" does is to remove science from the equation. It does not leave deistic/theistic beliefs immune to other criticisms, nor does it necessarily excuse faith in non-supernatural entities or ideas (e.g., political fanaticism)

Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX00:23, 5 July 2011

All by itself, I can't see how deism can harm society. However, suppose someone claimed: "The deist God will reward you with everlasting bliss if you do right, and punish you with everlasting torment if you do wrong. And doing right is to kill all members of <insert your favourite minority here>, and doing wrong is failing to exterminate that group." That viewpoint is compatible with deism, since it isn't claiming the deist God is intervening in any way - post mortem reward/punishment is not a form of intervention into this universe. But clearly, such a viewpoint would be very harmful to society.

So deism by itself can't hurt society, but deism + some other ideas can, if those other ideas are bad. I'd say the same thing about theism, actually; plain old theism, by itself, doesn't harm society in any obvious way. Theism + some other ideas can obviously harm society, but then the harm comes from those other ideas, not from theism per se.

(((Zack Martin)))08:22, 5 July 2011