Talk:Argument from marginal cases/Archive1

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Cherry picking?

Isn't this just a case of cherry picking? In so many words the argument takes exceptional cases among humans and use it to plead for general rights for (other) animals, not to mention that it uses a sort of "sliding scale of generalisation" from exceptional human cases to exceptional animal cases to all animals. ScepticWombat (talk) 06:43, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

This seems like an odd objection. The argument doesn't argue that all animals have rights, it only wants people to consider that some animals (exceptional animal cases, as you say) may have/deserve moral status. Just the suggestion that there might be non-human entities with a moral status is still quite controversial (even blasphemous!) to a sizable part of society, ya know. Objecting to this as "cherrypicking" because the argument primarily concerns itself with exceptional cases implies that exceptional cases have no moral value. Is that what you're suggesting?

If you want to object to the argument, its main weakness lies in that it assumes marginal-case humans inherently deserve the rights we acknowledge them to have, as opposed to that our society merely doesn't disacknowledge their moral status out of respect/precaution/civility. Indeed, many societies throughout human history have disavowed certain marginal-case humans of having any rights. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 11:03, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

Just because some marginal cases can be dug up that can be compared to higher primates, doesn't mean that rules written, not for marginal cases, but with the general population in mind, can or should be extended to, say, higher primates, or an even more limited category of exceptionally bright higher primates.

Societies do restrict rights for "exceptional" human cases, e.g. through legal guardianship, but these are clearly inserted as exceptions to a general rule, whereas this argument seems to turn this approach upside down by using such exceptions to argue for general rights for (some) animals. The general rules for humans are based upon general assumptions applying to "normal" (e.g. non-impaired etc.) individuals (as in the demand for signatories to declare that they are "of sound mind") to which exemptions are then added. This is the rationale behind the sort of "“potential for rationality” that is being objected to in the article. Sure, you can find marginal cases where this doesn't apply, but the difficulty of setting the exact boundary is why rules concerning the abrogation of rights tend to err on the side of caution (at least in the modern, Western world). Using such extraordinary circumstances as a basis for general rules for (some) animals is simply missing the point.

Take for instance the marginal case which allows next-of-kin to turn off life support for patients in a hopeless vegetative state. This illustrates a weakness in the argument from marginal cases: It seems to rely on a sort of "Goldilocks-category" of marginal cases by including only those human beings impaired enough to be allotted rights "just in case" while ignoring examples where even the fundamental right to life (of adult individuals, I'm not talking anti-abortion nonsense here) is abrogated.

As an aside, and this is not something I'm absolutely certain of, so please set the record straight if I'm mistaken, I seem to recall that in cases such as animal testing, the "threshold" for justifying testing on higher primates (i.e. "exceptional" animals) is higher than for other clinical animal trials, meaning that we already are making exceptions for the category of animals this argument refers to. ScepticWombat (talk) 12:06, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

Similar as with coma patients (or fetuses before they reach viability for that matter), though, the fundamentalness of the right to life and that it's being denied to them doesn't have to mean they can't still have some other rights. Like the right not to be raped by caregivers for example? And you're right, we already do have rules and laws attributing a limited amount of rights to some animals, particularly those seen as evolutionarily close to us. But this is of course no surprise, since this argument and the rest of the animal rights movement have been around for much longer than this article's existence. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 15:37, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

The general rule is to not cause unnecessary, unjustified, gratuitous suffering, not that animals deserve every right of a "full-fledged" human being. Correlate rights, such as the right to not be unnecessarily or gratuitously harmed, and correlate duties, such as the duty to not cause unnecessary harm, follow from this general rule. Furthermore, rationality is not necessary to suffer, to have one's interests violated, or to be harmed. That rationality confers some extraordinarily protected status to human beings no more mentally adept than certain animals, but not to such animals, is exactly the inconsistency and injustice the AMC seeks to resolve. Citing "human-level" rationality, moreover, is arbitrary. Namely, if you study cognitive biases and logical fallacies, you will realize just how flawed human cognition truly is; we are not the intellectual titans and moral exemplars we often imagine ourselves to be, and we are much closer to animals than we often wish to acknowledge. Finally, this general rule is an accepted, well-established, and almost certainly valid moral principle--it is wrong to cause gratuitous suffering. The conclusions, the rights and duties we derive from it, are furthermore impartial, in accordance with the demands of justice. By selecting suffering as the universal, morally relevant criterion, there is no "sliding scale of generalization"; suffering occurs along a continuous spectrum, from zero to uncertain theoretical limits.--Animalian (talk) 19:24, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Rights are not absolute. Nor are duties. There are gradations; some duties are stronger than others, and certain rights more worthy of defending. By selecting suffering as the criterion, there is virtually no Goldilocks-zone--anything which suffers is afforded moral considerability. The strength of duties and rights claims are proportional to the suffering offset or caused, largely independently of further mental faculties; though these, too, may be accounted for if not also eventually quantized. Hence, we have a moral spectrum with no absolutes, save the situation of an inanimate object which can neither suffer, have interests, nor be benefited or harmed.--Animalian (talk) 20:00, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Mission?

How is this article relevant to our mission? |₹Λ¥$€₦₦ ^{You were so busy karate fighting that you let Jesus escape.} 12:13, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

Documenting the full range of crank ideas. Problem is it's written from a crank PoV. Wẽãšẽĩõĩď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 12:25, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

Fair enough.

Although to be honest, this is actually one of the sanest arguments I've heard. I don't want to imply the animal rights movement is full of 2edgy idiots (although some of its loudest proponents are), but I've seen some that cross the line into bitter, toxic misanthropy. |₹Λ¥$€₦₦ ^{Flipping out the buttered fuck crumpets} 16:03, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

It's apparently an idea that some consider as very rational while others dismiss it as a crank idea. 141.134.75.236 (talk) 15:24, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

The argument from marginal cases descends from the fundamental principle of moral reasoning--that, barring a morally relevant difference, two cases must be treated alike. As such, the fundamental principle of moral reasoning demands, at the minimum, consistency, a basic demand of knowledge, and without which knowledge may not even be possible--what would happen if we were to be inconsistent and allow A and not A to be both simultaneously true? The fundamental principle of moral reasoning also demands validity. Namely, is some X morally relevant in arbitrating between two cases? Furthermore, to what extent is this X morally relevant? The morally relevant common denominator appears to be the capacity to suffer, which divides sentient beings with interests, such as dogs, from insentient beings without interests, such as rocks. Though various capacities, such as language or projection into the future, can influence suffering, our possession of language of higher ability to project into the future does not appear to justify the lives abject misery we inflict upon factory farmed animals, such as cows, chickens, and pigs. Even if higher intelligence and larger vocabularies were to accord higher moral status, the conclusion should not follow that we may exploit, torture, and murder lesser beings with impunity, as we do in factory farms--their suffering should still figure in our moral calculations. Furthermore, if we accept intellectual excellence as a sufficient condition to treat the less intellectually endowed with impunity, then an extraterrestrial race intellectually superior to man would be fully justified in treating us as we treat cows, chickens, and pigs. To embrace intelligence as decisive in moral matters would therefore force us to concede to this repugnant possibility. In essence, to deny the logic behind the AMC, you would have to

locate a morally relevant difference which supposedly justifies the rape, torture, and murder of billions of animals but not similarly situated human beings,

demonstrate that this difference is, in fact, morally relevant, and

demonstrate that this morally relevant difference, in fact, justifies our treatment of animals but not similarly situated human beings--Animalian (talk) 17:28, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Looks missional to me. Needs better writing though - David Gerard (talk) 15:45, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

This article is relevant to the mission of rationalwiki in that we examine and criticize an argument quite central to a cause often tied to crankery. It therefore satisfies the first two enumerations of rationalwiki's mission--1) analyze and refute pseudoscience (or, more generally, that an article be truth-seeking, skeptical, scientific, and informed by reason) and 2) document the full range of "crank" ideas (of which the AMC is supposedly a facet). Furthermore, this article not only satisfies the requirement that it be truth-seeking and surrounded by controversy, but our humanity. Namely, are we our best selves when we kill and inflict suffering on billions of animals each year for no good reason other than they taste good and are stupider than us? More importantly, is the suffering and slaughter of billions without consequence? More strictly, are intelligence, the capacity for language, and other supposedly human traits morally relevant distinctions which justify radically differential treatment between humans and animals, such that we emphatically protect infants, the retarded, and the otherwise disabled, yet force animals to live and die in horrendous conditions in factory farms and at slaughterhouses? The AMC tries to answer or at least launch investigation into these and related questions.--Animalian (talk) 16:26, 31 May 2015 (UTC)

Move to essayspace?

Written by a single editor, questionable quality, missing sources...--ZooGuard (talk) 16:40, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

Those three things are all remediable. Wěǎšěǐǒǐď^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 16:43, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

A problem (and perhaps the real reason why you're proposing moving it to essayspace) is possibly that it's too overtly slanted towards a pro-animal-rights-POV. If that's the case, what should the POV of the article be regarding this argument? 141.134.75.236 (talk) 17:18, 30 May 2015 (UTC)

I've rewritten it (though it still needs citations to some examples of this argument). My PoV is analysing & refuting the flaws in this argument's assumptions & implications. Щєазєюіδ^{Methinks it is a Weasel} 22:30, 30 May 2015 (UTC)