Talk:Hard problem of consciousness

Responding to the section "The question presumes that "we don't know yet" somehow has special implications when it's consciousness in question, even though it suffices for everything else we don't know yet. Philosophers with an inclination to dualism then start assuming the question can be asked leads to philosophical zombies, qualia as an irreducible basic of the universe, etc."

All this statement shows is a lack of understanding of philosophy of mind and the epistemic gap of trying to explain consciousness with empirical material. It's incredibly presumptive and biased at best. Let me say that it is not that "we do not know yet". It is that materialism is necessarily insufficient to explaining consciousness (as obviated by double aspect theory and Levine's explanatory gap). It is from this philosophical stance that the hard problem inevitably arises. This is because full empirical (objective) knowledge of the physical brain cannot give us full knowledge of consciousness and subjectivity, or why consciousness exist at all. Consciousness is simply too problematic for materialism (if you read the external link Facing up the Hard Problem of Consciousness this point it made quite clear).

This doesn't suggest dualism - this is a strawman (and its come to my attention that the editors here are clueless about alternative ontological stances). It should be noted that it is perfectly possible to have philosophy of science that does not incorporate a materialist or a dualist ontology (information monism, neutral monism or idealism should springs to mind).

~Æ 20:08, 20 September 2013 (UTC) AstralEtheric

If "materialism is necessarily insufficient to explain consciousness", that's dualism, or something enough like it I'm happy to use that word for it. You're still trying to sneak bollocks in by assumption. It fails the same way as the ontological argument: a philosopher claiming that "I can think something, therefore the universe outside my head is a certain way." This is one of those "hard problems" in philosophy whose hardness is entirely in the minds of the philosophers in question. - David Gerard (talk) 09:02, 21 September 2013 (UTC)

"If "materialism is necessarily insufficient to explain consciousness", that's dualism"

I specifically addressed this very point in my previous post. "It is entirely possible to have a philosophy of science which does not incorporate materialism or dualism". Read again?

"or something enough like it I'm happy to use that word for it"

I must ask, how much philosophy have you studied exactly? All this statement shows is a lack of understanding of philosophy if you are not even familiar with any other positions aside from materialism or dualism.

"You're still trying to sneak bollocks in by assumption"

Please demonstrate this claim. Where and how so exactly?

"a philosopher claiming that "I can think something, therefore the universe outside my head is a certain way"

This is yet another strawman. If you're referring to Descartes' "I think therefore I am", this is simply affirming the axiomatic foundation of "I exist", which, actually says nothing about the universe outside my head in of itself (note that this axiom is compatible with metaphysical Solipsism). The Cartesian ego makes no claims about the universe outside ones mind. I should also note that Descartes' secondary position of substance dualism is a red herring to this discussion.

Even granting this strawman, this analogy is completely irrelevant to actual hard problem in question.

"This is one of those "hard problems" in philosophy whose hardness is entirely in the minds of the philosophers in question"

This statement is entirely a cop out. This essentially translates to "I don't fully understand the hard problem or it's ontological implications, therefore it must not be a problem at all".

Considering these statements, and so that our time is not wasted, I must ask: Can you envision anything that will change your mind on this topic? If one of your arguments is shown to be faulty, will you stop using that argument (with everyone)? Are are you prepared to abide by the basic principle of reason (and philosophy) in discussing this topic?

~ Æ 16:39, 21 September 2013 (UTC)

I'm not really interested in playing pattycake with you, nor in letting you just add bollocks to the wiki as if it's not bollocks - David Gerard (talk) 19:53, 21 September 2013 (UTC)

AE is correct here -- there are even materialist/physicalist philosophers who accept the validity of the hard problem. Nebuchadnezzar (talk) 22:34, 21 September 2013 (UTC)

Better? This is well into the realms of "he said/she said" - David Gerard (talk) 10:14, 22 September 2013 (UTC)

David, you've made it clear that your knowledge on this subject is limited and misinformed. If you are not capable of properly addressing these counter arguments, or defending your claims regarding this issue, you are in no position to label my position 'bullocks', let alone in any position to add your commentary on this subject. Please refrain from doing so. Thanks. ~ Æ 23:06, 21 September 2013 (UTC) (talk)