Foundationalism

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In epistemology, foundationalism is the philosophical viewpoint that knowledge is derived from basic, secure premises. In order to learn anything, foundationalists say we first need to establish basic beliefs we can rely on, and any further knowledge has to rely on those basic beliefs. In other words:

(a) there are some “basic” or “foundational” beliefs that have a positive epistemic status — e.g., they count as justified or as knowledge — without depending on any other beliefs for this status, and

(b) any other beliefs with a positive epistemic status must depend, ultimately, on foundational beliefs for this status.[1]

You might think of it like building a house: in order to build a house, you have to start by building on a steady and secure foundation, and after you have erected posts on that foundation, you can build walls and a roof, and then put in windows and furniture. In this metaphor, the house of knowledge is being built step by step by relying on that steady and secure foundation.

History[edit]

The origin of foundationalism is usually pinned on René Descartes, who, in Meditations, sought to eliminate all unjustified belief and start with only what he could know for certain and rationally justify, a tactic foreshadowed by Discourse on the Method. By beginning with only what he could know for certain (that he was thinking and that he existed – cogito ergo sum), Descartes interrogated his perceptions and thoughts. He built this up toward an ontological argument for God and what is now known as Cartesian dualism, which separates mind and matter,[2] a progenitor of non-materialist neuroscience.

Since then, foundationalism has been popular for philosophers of many different disciplines. This theory of knowledge clearly has a lot of ramifications for logic, science, mathematics, and psychology. It provides a terminus to the problem of infinite regress and supports logical arguments like in a syllogism. Unfortunately, it can also be abused, as in the form of presuppositionalism.

Anti-foundationalism[edit]

Foundationalism was very popular for a long time, but opposition grew, and the main competing viewpoint is that of coherentism, which argues that knowledge is justified by fitting in with other points of knowledge. Instead of a house metaphor, we might use the metaphor of Neurath's boat: if one were sailing a boat and needed to repair it, one can't start with any foundation. Instead, one replaces the parts that don't work as it becomes clear they need replacing. Instead of building up from basic axioms, one works on creating a coherent view of the world that doesn't contradict itself.[3]

Some idealists, like Hegel, are seen as coherentists. Analytic philosophers may also oppose foundationalism; for example, some readings of Wittgenstein, and W.V.O. Quine. Post-modernists are often in opposition to foundationalism, such as Jacques Derrida, because they argue that there is no belief, no matter how rigorously proven, that can be fully justified on its own.

See also[edit]

External links[edit]

References[edit]

  1. Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification by Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton (Aug 5, 2022) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. Descartes, René. Meditations, 1641. On Project Gutenberg.
  3. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification by Erik Olsson (Mar 9, 2021) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.