- Despite the site founder loving this, what is this crap? ħuman 05:56, 3 August 2011 (UTC)
There was a rather brilliant qwantz.com comic awhile back that mocked the arrogance of this philosophy and said it was much more likely that you were someone else's mental simulation than the universe revolved around you. Wish I could find it again. --Dr. Swordopolis (talk) 06:13, 29 November 2011 (UTC)
There appears to be a confusion between detectable differences and actual differences. If consciousness has a material basis there are certainly material differences between conscious and unconscious beings regardless of whether or not scientists can detect these differences.
Would anyone care to proffer a difference between "detectable" and "actual" differences here? If something has an actual effect then we can detect that effect. If the effect cannot be detected, i.e., experienced, directly or indirectly, it is not consequential, meaningful nor is it "actual". The ultimate gold standard test for an effect is the effect itself; so therefore "no detection" = "no effect" = "not existing". Or "no detectable difference between people and p-zombies" means that there is no difference between people and p-zombies. It's not that the difference is on a higher plane of existence, or outside of reality, or only visible to God, the difference is simply Not There. pathetic 01:51, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
No big deal
Quite a few politicians #appear# to be p-zombies, or possibly robots: totally expressionless faces and backstories that have limited contact with reality. 126.96.36.199 (talk) 18:44, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
Does not require dualism
It's possible to conceive of a machine built to pass an arbitrarily extended Turing test, to the point that one could interact with it for an extended period of time without realizing that it is simply playing back canned behaviors and responses. This doesn't require there be a soul or spirit separate from the body, consciousness could still be created by some computational process that is merely excluded from this machine.
I personally don't find this argument convincing, but it is a viable one that doesn't require dualism. Examples of such p-zombies in literature include the members of Julian Jaynes' bicameral civilizations, Peter Watt's vampires, and Karl Schroeder's various explorations of non-human-like minds in Ventus, Permanence, and the Candesce trilogy. -- Resuna (talk) 14:09, 5 February 2015 (UTC)
An odd point
In the article, it says "A p-zombie may be in every way equivalent to a human being, but only be simulating the exact way a human would react instead of actually feeling emotion". But, isn't that a known mental issue? Not sociopathy, which is different, but I have read about people that have little-to-no emotion, and have some personal experience with one as well. My ex, a paranoid schizophrenic, hated taking her meds for numerous reasons, but one she cited was the fact that her already dullened emotions (flat affect, a thing with schizophrenia) pretty much became non-existent. Just Googling, I find people that describe themselves as having no emotions or barely any and having to fake it to fit in, and it seems more common than just a few people. So, is it just me, or does point seem both ableist (or, if you hate the word, just oppressive towards those with certain mental illnesses, literally saying they're not human) and, because saying people aren't human because of their mental illness is just wrong on so many levels, outright wrong? I'm not sure if there should be a section there explaining all these issues with that idea, but from how I see it, there's a lot of issues with it. --PosthumanHeresy (talk) 03:20, 25 July 2015 (UTC)
- The original sentence was badly phrased. Only lacking in emotions isn't enough to count as a p-zombie; the lack has to be more categorical; e.g. a complete lack of conscious experience. 188.8.131.52 (talk) 04:16, 25 July 2015 (UTC)