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User:ComradeMaethor/sandbox
| Tomorrow is a mystery, but yesterday is History |
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| Secrets of times gone by |
“”Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam (Furthermore, I consider that Carthage must be destroyed)
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| —Cato the Censor |
The Second Punic War was but one piece in a 118 year conflict between the two big boys of the Mediterranean, the Roman Republic and Carthage. Of the three Punic Wars, the second stands out as both the most interesting and most destructive, often being called one of the deadliest human conflicts. The war would feature massive battles between the two belligerents, often resulting in one side being completely and utterly wiped out. Both the Roman and Carthaginian homelands were pillaged, razed, and sufficiently burned. Honestly speaking, the Mediterranean and Asia Minor was the only world Rome and Carthage knew. Even though this wasn't a global conflict, if we look at the causes, results, and the nature of the war, it turns out to basically be the World War One of Antiquity.
Because this war happened in a time before European politics became fancy and gentlemanly, the causes of the Punic Wars and the Second Punic War are relatively basic: you have two large states, Rome and Carthage, and they want each other's land. The actual sparks that ignited conflict between the two states were often a bit more involved, but in the case of the Second Punic War, it was mainly concerned with Carthage outright conquering a pro-Roman city in Iberia, Saguntum (note: it was not a Roman city, it was just a city that liked the Romans more than the Carthaginians). Without hesitation, the Senate decided that fighting a seventeen year war where at least half a million Romans would die and around 400 towns be destroyed was an acceptable plan of action.
The end result of the war was a Roman victory (somehow). Carthage would be severely reprimanded by the Roman Senate for being too good at defeating their armies, having to bring all territorial disputes before the Senate, as well as having to receive Roman approval to go to war. The state of Carthage itself would remain basically independent but thoroughly under the boot of Roman superiority. This would last until the Third Punic War fifty years later when, Rome decided to just level the city of Carthage entirely and annex the rest of their land because Carthage defended itself against Rome's ally, Numidia.
Background[edit]
Much to one's surprise, the name of the Second Punic War means that this was not the first time Rome and Carthage went to war. The First Punic War was fought over Sicily, which was under Carthaginian control. There were a few pitched land battles, but the true meat of the war was at the seas, where a newly assembled Roman navy was able to defeat the Carthaginian navy (which was the largest and best navy in the western Mediterranean). Even though many historians like to consider the Second Punic War the larger and meatier conflict, there is still plenty of credit to be owed to its predecessor. The first war was the longest conflict ever fought in the history of Rome, spanning 23 years, as well as the greatest naval war of the ancient world.
As the First Punic War ended, there was still no clear answer to who was more dominant in the western Mediterranean. Rome only controlled the Italian peninsula, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica while Carthage controlled vast swaths of North Africa and Iberia. Both states were exceptionally wealthy, Carthage being known as a trade empire in its own right. At the same time, Carthage still possessed a very capable and large navy, even though they got bitch slapped by the Romans. The only area that one side had on lock was the army. The Roman army was bar none the greatest in the western Mediterranean and one can even argue that it was better than the Greek phalanx to the east. As demonstrated in the Pyrrhic Wars, Rome was one of the first enemies the Greeks have faced that was capable of breaking the impervious Macedonian pike phalanx. Granted, the manipular legions (as they were called before the Marian Reforms) had extreme weaknesses if they fought in the traditional order of battle hint hint, but either way it was an exemplary army.
The two powers continued to go about their days waiting for the other to attack. One treaty the two made during this interwar period was establishing the Ebro river in Iberia as the border between their spheres of influence. One city, Saguntum, was designated as the Switzerland of this border, meaning that they were neutral. However, at some point, Saguntum pulled the age old trick of breaking their neutrality by making a separate treaty with Rome, as if their leaders wanted to start a massive war between the two greatest powers in the western Mediterranean. Thankfully for those idiots, their diplomatic blunder would be discovered by a Carthaginian general in the peninsula, Hannibal. In 219 BC, the 26 year old operationally independent Hannibal besieged Saguntum. In a shocking revelation, Saguntum appealed to Rome for help against the Carthaginian menace (that they brought upon themselves). Again, thankfully for the inebriated leaders of the city, Rome would indeed answer the call to arms, but not all that quickly. After several months, Hannibal broke pushed his advantage and won the siege, the Roman Senate being told that he completely leveled the city. It was at this point that Rome saw no other course of action than to utterly destroy Carthage. The Antiquity historian Livy notes that the Senate was shattered by the news of Saguntum's destruction, and that "They knew they had never had to face a fiercer or more warlike foe... War was coming, and it would have to be fought in Italy, in defence of the walls of Rome, and against the world in arms." Now, was this an overreaction to Saguntum being destroyed? Maybe. To be perfectly honest, there is no way in hell that the Senate legitimately cared for Saguntum. They just played themselves like the victim of a horrendous crime and continued to use that as justification to commit similar atrocities to Carthage. Either way, the Second Punic War had begun.
The 17 Years of War[edit]
218-217 BC[edit]
A less common name used for the Second Punic War is the Hannibalic War, which is just an objectively cool name, but it isn't called that because it is only cool. Hannibal, that rowdy 26 year old that razed Saguntum, was an absolute mad lad. He was truly the greatest military mind of his time, and even though his feats don't seem so impressive compared to modern combat, for the time he lived in, his tactics and strategies were almost godlike. Some of you may already know the greatest thing Hannibal did, the infamous crossing of the Alps.
When war broke out, Hannibal was Carthage's best chance at striking Rome fast and effectively. He was stationed in Iberia (as he had just destroyed an entire city) and decided to continue being the aggressor by invading Italy. Hannibal wasn't the first person to invade Italy, but he was the first person to invade Italy through the Alps with a large army. The reason why he came to this plan was because of two primary reasons:
- Invading by sea would be quick but Rome has already demonstrated its ability to dominate the seas
- Crossing the Alps with over 40,000 men and 37 elephants into Italy will scare the ever living shit out of Rome
So, Hannibal marched out. He crossed the Ebro, went north into Gaul, and made it to the Rhône all while avoiding the Roman armies patrolling the coastline. Hannibal won a swift battle against some angry Celts and proceeded to begin his ascent into the Alps. Even though we should praise Hannibal's genius for attempting and succeeding such an extraordinary logistical feat, as he entered Italy he had lost about 14,000 men during the ordeal. The 26,000 who remained were weak and malnourished. Hannibal took what time he had before the Romans found out about him to scour the region for supplies, resting his men and rejuvenating them. It was only a matter of time before Hannibal met Roman resistance, and the first instance of this was at the Battle of Ticinus. Though a small battle in comparison to the rest of the war, Hannibal's victory coerced most of the Gallic tribes in northern Italy to join forces with him. Recruiting the Gauls, Hannibal was able to inflate his numbers up to around 43,000 men.
With news of Hannibal in the north, the Senate ordered the Consul, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, to halt his preparations of invading Africa and march north to face Hannibal. They would meet at the Battle of Trebia. Both armies were similar in size, around 43,000 men. Knowing that the Roman heavy infantry would absolutely annihilate his forces head on, Hannibal used his big brain to lure the head strong Romans into a trap and encircle them. This proved to be so amazingly effective, that only 10,000 Romans managed to escape the disastrous defeat. With the "oh shit" meter in Rome at max levels, the campaigning season ended and Hannibal wintered his troops in northern Italy.
The next campaigns began in the spring of 217 BC, with the Romans raising another sizable army under new Consuls: Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius. Their goal was to, essentially, defeat Hannibal by facing him head on. Even though the Romans knew that Hannibal could exploit the manipular legions, it was still Roman military culture and tradition to fight the enemy aggressively and head on. This will not be the last time Rome would feel obliged to do this. The two armies spent the beginning of their campaigns gathering men and supplies, with Hannibal being the first to make a distinct move. His goal was to lure the Romans into a trap where the manipular legion could be ambushed and destroyed, and because Rome just had to fight one more battle, they fell for it. Hannibal drew them near Lake Trasimene where his army was waiting in ambush. Unsurprisingly, the Romans were yet again defeated at the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Flaminius was killed in the heat of battle, and this time only 6,000 were able to escape. Hannibal had an open road to the city of Rome, but he decided to march south instead, in order to win the favor of the Greek and Italic populations there.
With the "oh shit" meter now broken, the Senate elected Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator, an emergency position where he had absolute control of the army and state. Fabius was one of two critically important Roman figures in the war, and between these two, their special unique trait was that they weren't stupid and could learn from mistakes. Fabius innovated a rather bold strategy, the Fabian Strategy to be exact. The idea was completely unheard of by the Roman people or the Senate. This revolutionary concept was to not fight any more pitched battles against Hannibal. What a shockingly frightening revelation that is. It was almost like Rome couldn't win any battles against Hannibal, so Fabius said "let's not fight him then". After doing what a five year old could've thought up, Fabius actively avoided any direct confrontation with Hannibal. This angered many people, including Hannibal. The former were pissed off because, as said before, Roman martial tradition is to march head on towards your enemy and kill them with brutal determination. The latter was pissed off because his best chances of winning the war was in pitched battles where he could feed off the Roman's inability to adapt. In order to draw Fabius out into battle, Hannibal began savagely pillaging the Italian landscape, a move that actually came to hurt him because when winter arrived he had little choice of where to lodge his troops. Despite the devastation being wrought on Italy, Fabius refused to engage Hannibal, which pissed the Senate and the army off even more than before. What made matters worse for Fabius was when he attempted to indirectly engage Hannibal's forces in a night attack at Ager Falernus. Hannibal was ironically able to avoid Fabius's forces and escape with little harm done to his army. As you could imagine, the fact that Fabius got played by his own strategy being used against him made him suffer a serious PR setback.
216-215 BC: Because Rome Hadn't Lost Enough Already[edit]
The year of 216 BC started with Fabius losing the Consulship to two guys: Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. Because the Fabian Strategy did not bring the Roman people a hasty end to the war (some serious World War One vibes right now), it was up to Paullus and Varro to bring the glorious victory to the great city! It would be a great battle! The largest battle! They would assemble the greatest army Rome has ever seen! They would assemble 86,000 ready and willing Roman legionaries able to fight back the Hannibalic menace! How could that Carthaginian possibly withstand the might of Rome! Well. . . he did.
Starting the year of with a bang, Varro and Paullus marched straight at Hannibal's encampment near Cannae. The idea Varro had in his head was to replicate the Battle of Trebia. Wait a minute, didn't they lose that battle? Yes dear reader, yes they did. But it would be different this time, I guess. Varro hearkened back to the fact that the Roman army was able to break the Carthaginian line at Trebia. They still lost the battle, but they at least broke the line. Apparently, this was enough for Varro and Paullus to make this their plan of action. So, the Romans marched towards Hannibal in an extremely dense and compact formation. You must realize that this army was 86,000 men in strength, and Hannibal's was only about 53,000. Despite this large numerical disparity, the Roman line was more or less equivalent to the Carthaginian line. Even though this sounds ridiculous, in the eyes of Varro, it did make sense because his goal was to break the Carthaginian line (provided Hannibal would not exploit the dense formation and maybe, oh I don't know, encircle it). The only problem with this grand plan was that Hannibal would exploit the dense formation and plan to encircle the Roman army. Hannibal would arrange his troops in a chevron with the tip facing the Romans. As they pushed forward, Hannibal would pull the small number of troops at the tip inwards to lure the Romans into a trap. Because Varro and Paullus wanted to prove a point that Roman martial brawn was better than the Fabian Strategy, 86,000 legionaries ended up pursuing maybe 10,000 Carthaginian soldiers. As the Romans marched on, blissfully unaware of their impending doom, the wings of Hannibal's chevron folded in around their flanks. Suddenly, the manipular legions, that were only effective when facing an enemy head on, found themselves in quite a pickle. Surrounded on three sides was bad, yes, but at least their rear was open. Oops, sorry Hannibal said as he destroyed the Roman cavalry with his own and proceeded to charge in and out of the Roman rear. It should be clear at this moment that Romans lost. . . hard. According to Livy, 67,500 of them were killed or captured. Hannibal's losses were a meager 5,700 (Polybius).
As you can imagine, the defeat at Cannae was earth shattering. The Romans assembled the largest army in their history and proceeded to lose 78% of it to a numerically inferior foe. Paullus, one of the Consuls, died in battle as well, with Varro escaping (though his pride and dignity very much died at Cannae). But before we delve into the immediate affects of Cannae on the war, this battle was so large it actually shifted who fought who. Seeing as this battle would usually be a decisive conclusion to any war, many once pro-Roman or neutral parties joined in on the side of Carthage. Much of southern Italy rebelled against Roman authority. Even a completely neutral power up until this point, Macedonia under Phillip V entered in a military alliance with Carthage against Rome, hence inciting the First Macedonian War a couple years later (those more historically inclined in this time period would know that this strategy did not go so well for them). While all this was happening, Hannibal found the time to send an offer of peace negotiation to the Senate, whereupon Roman prisoners would ransomed. The Romans unceremoniously rejected the offer. The war was not over for them yet.
As if the situation couldn't get any worse, the newly elected Consul of 215 BC was ambushed and killed along with 25,000 troops in the Battle of Silva Litana. This solidified Rome's northern possessions as effectively independent and also pro-Carthaginian. Yet not all was hope was lost for Rome. Hannibal attempted to capture the fortress of Nola, a geographically important city that would link together many of Hannibal's Italian allies. The Romans had taken the great pleasure in "peacefully removing" the pro-Carthaginian factions within the city, negating any chance of betrayal. Though Hannibal had great success in pitched battles, sieges didn't seem to be his cup of tea, as Marcus Claudius Marcellus was able to repel Hannibal's assaults on the city on three separate occasions, in 216, 215, then 214.
Some may be wondering how exactly Hannibal was able to sustain this lengthy campaign completely in enemy territory. While he relied mostly on local mercenaries, mainly Gallic in nature, there was one singular occasion where Hannibal received reinforcements from the homeland. Locri, a port city, defected to Carthage in the summer of 215, and through that, Carthage was able to send reinforcements for the first time to Hannibal. A second, rather sizable force, was supposed to land in Italy as well, but was redirected to Iberia after Hasdrubal lost at Dertosa.
Iberia[edit]
Even though Hannibal was kicking ass and taking names in Italy, Carthage was having less success in other theaters of the war, such as Iberia. The forces in Iberia were primarily commanded by Hasdrubal, a man with a name that may take you a couple times to get right. Hasdrubal was ordered to move into Italy and help Hannibal, an order he failed to follow because he claimed that Carthaginian control over the Iberian tribes was too weak to be left unchecked.