Forum:An ontological argument

The proof[edit]

In ontology, one is working from the ground-floor up in order to both establish properly basic ideas and in the process define them. The most basic threads possible are being tied together. If you aren't very familiar with ontology, see here for an excellent introduction.

Now, it's time to light up a pipe, start the record player, and get to work:

My argument has three stages. The first stage establishes the principles of reasoning behind the rest of the argument. The second stage simply defines God by necessary inference from the principles. The third stage summarizes the argument in eight statements, which make explicitly clear the logic behind the whole argument.

A) Being is. That is, something exists. This is the principle of existence. It is undeniable since the one who denies it must exist in order to deny it. Hence, while the source of first principles is a basic intuition about being, the test for their truth is undeniability. That is, they cannot be denied without affirming them (either directly or indirectly) in the very denial itself.

B) Being is being. This is the principle of identity. Being is identical to being. A thing is identical to itself. Again, this is literally undeniable since it cannot be denied unless it is implied, for one must assume things to be identical to themselves even to deny that they are.

C) Being is not non-being. This is the principle of non-contradiction. Opposites cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. This too is undeniable since the claim that opposites can both be true assumes that the opposite of this claim 'C' cannot be true.

D) Either being or non-being. This is the principle of excluded middle. There is nothing between being and non-being. Hence, something must either be or not be. It can't both be and not be. This too is undeniable since the denial of it is a contradiction.

E) Non-being cannot produce being. This is the principle of causality. Nothing cannot cause anything since nothing does not exist, and what does not exist cannot not cause anything. Only something can produce something. Deniable of this principle also entails a contradiction.

F) Being causes being similar to itself. This is the principle of analogy. An effect resembles it's efficient cause. Like produces like. Being shares being, for this is all that it has to share. Being cannot give what it has not got. But what it gives (i.e., being) it must have had to give.

From these six principles:

A) A being can be either necessary or contingent but not both. This is based on the principle of excluded middle.

B) A necessary being cannot produce another necessary being. The opposite of this is reducible to a contradiction because (a) a necessary being by it's nature cannot come or cease to be, and (b) the being that is caused by a necessary being comes to be.

C) A contingent being cannot cause another contingent being. This is because a contingent being is one that could possibly not be, and if it caused another being, then non-being would be producing being.

D) A necessary being is a being of pure actuality, with no potentiality. This is so since a necessary being has no potentiality to not exist. If a necessary being exists, then it must exist necessarily, with no possibility not to exist.

E) A being of pure actuality cannot produce another being with pure actuality. The being that is produced by a being of pure actuality must have both actuality and potentiality, for this created being has the potentiality not to be, which pure actuality does not have.

F) Every being caused by a being of pure actuality must be both like and unlike its cause. It must be like its cause in its actuality, and it must be unlike its cause in potentiality. And what is both like and unlike its cause is similar (or analogous) to it.

G) I am a contingent being. This is so because I undeniably exist, and I am neither a necessary being nor an impossible being. I am not an impossible being since I do exist. And I am not a necessary being because I change or come to be, which a necessary being cannot do. Hence, I am a contingent being. But only a necessary being can cause a contingent being.

H) Therefore, a necessary being exists that causes me to exist.

I) This necessary being is a being of pure actuality and has certain necessary attributes:

It cannot change (i.e., immutable) since it has no potential for change.
It cannot be temporal (i.e., eternal) since that involves change.
It cannot be material (i.e., immaterial) since that involves change.
It cannot be finite (i.e., infinite) since it has no potentiality to limit it.
It cannot be divisible (i.e., simple) since it has no potential to be divided.
It must be an uncaused being since it is a necessary being, and a necessary being cannot be caused to come to be. So, it can't be caused. Nor can it be self-caused, since that would entail a contradiction.
It must only be one being since there can't be two or more infinite beings or two or more beings of pure actuality; there is no way they could differ in their being, for they are both the same kind of being. And beings cannot differ in the very respect in which they are the same.
It must be infinitely knowing (i.e., omniscient) since I am a knowing being that it caused to exist, and a cause cannot give what it does not have to give.
It must be all-powerful (i.e., omnipotent) since it is infinite, and it has the power to cause a finite being to exist.

Now, to summarize the whole argument in eight statements:

Some things undeniably exist.
But my nonexistence is possible, for I am not a necessary being but one that changes or comes to be.
Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, and all-knowing.
This infinitely all-powerful, all-knowing being is what is meant by a theistic God.
Therefore, a theistic God exists.

Propianotuner (talk) 14:17, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

The discussion[edit]

This reminds me of Gödel's ontological proof, what with what appears to be modal logic (I've only skimmed your text). It would appear your reasoning ultimately falls back on axioms? Reverend Black Percy (talk) 14:27, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

It's a rework of Kalaam that tries to break an infinite regress problem. There's three arguments by assertion right off the bat (1, 4, 7) that makes the assumption it's your chosen deity. It works a shitload better to replace any reference to a deity with universe because it's the one thing where the cause isn't known but it undeniably exists. It's always interesting to see people have a conclusion and try to warp reality to fit it. -EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 14:28, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

That's also the problem of most axiom systems generally; that some or most axioms are ultimately reducible to being regular dime-a-dozen stated premises, which were defensively marked as "read-only" by the argument maker. Hardly compelling. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 14:31, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Having read the argument slightly closer, only halfway through, it's producing several bluescreens of death. It is also a typical case of confounding philosophical logic with symbolic logic. Producing an argument of symbolic logic - i.e. pertaining to the internal ruleset of manipulating symbols as they relate to each other - has no bearing on philosophical logic, i.e. the description of the outside world. So conflating in things like what type of being you yourself are appears to be highly unprincipled. Also, it seems apparent that wildly discrepant ideas have been formalized here in an attempt to produce a desired result. For example, "A)" appears to be a version of the cogito, while "B)" to "D)" are variants on Leibniz' laws. These concepts are not inherently relatable. And so on. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 14:40, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Man, this would be a great proof is if I didn't have serious objections to almost every premise and deduction. #7, #1, and #2 are the only ones that makes any sense. Infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, and all-knowing is a good definition of a theistic god. It's just completely an unnecessary requirement as stipulated by #6, and causes can be complex and indirect. There's no reason to suggest that infinite regress isn't possible as suggested by #4 and #5, it's out of nowhere. #3 is poorly substantiated. That life can emerge from non-life in simple chemical processes is strongly suggested by current science. In some ways you're making a very creationist argument, and we have piles of things debunking that ideology here. It's all really flaky. this was supposed to say user:ikanreed 14:51, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Ahem... The last eight statements are not the tl;dr version of the argument. Arguments this tightly structured can hardly be skimmed over and appraised with statements like "it's always interested to see people have a conclusion and try to warp reality to fit it". Now, as for this seemingly a priori dismissal out of hand, purporting that the argument is based on axioms: it demonstrates either ignorance or "ignoreance" of the distinction between first principles and axioms. A first principle is predicated on an observation that is considered properly basic, while an axiom is merely a logical operator term which sets the universe of discourse and allows for corollaries, postulates, and theorems to be structured on top of it. Ontology is not algebra or geometry, i.e. it is not the study of logical operator terms and their use. Before you conflate the two again, I highly suggest you take the pleasure of reading the Stanford article I referenced at the beginning. As for Mr. "really flaky" here, you too appear to be confusing metaphysics and physics for the actual subject: ontology. Propianotuner (talk) 14:55, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

All I'm hearing in that condescending mess is "I want you to use a lot more a priori ideas that are kinda bullshit" ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 15:02, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

What's really flaky is trying to prove something you a priori state exists before anything else. You can make anything come out as true if you state it's true on the first point. Like:

Some things undeniably exist.
The Earth is hot inside.
Large cave networks have been found.
Dragons breathe fire and live in caves.
Dragons exist and live underground to power Earths central engine.

-EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 15:08, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

(I hope you don't mind me adjusting your formatting), yeah, that. I agree: my own approach is that the fewest a priori assumptions it takes to start taking a postiori inferences seriously the better your reasoning is. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 15:44, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Nope, no worries :-) I just wonder how it's a proof when the proof starts that some things exist and that thing is god. Okay, that's an assertion not a proof. It works for everything if you replace theistic god with any fictional character like pixie, a giant invisible dog, a goat, or Stevie Nicks and it will work. -EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 16:03, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Nah, the one bone I'll toss them is that they actually bothered to define "god" in a way that kinda closely matches the cultural center of that term in western societies. It's just they arbitrarily demand omnipotence, omniscience, whatever else as a precondition to there being a being. Which is really really silly. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 17:46, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

"Necessary"[edit]

A necessary being is a being of pure actuality, with no potentiality. This is so since a necessary being has no potentiality to not exist. If a necessary being exists, then it must exist necessarily, with no possibility not to exist.

Great, sure. Later, you try to make this actually matter:

I am a contingent being. This is so because I undeniably exist, and I am neither a necessary being nor an impossible being. I am not an impossible being since I do exist. And I am not a necessary being because I change or come to be, which a necessary being cannot do. Hence, I am a contingent being. But only a necessary being can cause a contingent being.

And:

It cannot change (i.e., immutable) since it has no potential for change.

It cannot be temporal (i.e., eternal) since that involves change.

It cannot be material (i.e., immaterial) since that involves change.

It cannot be finite (i.e., infinite) since it has no potentiality to limit it.

It cannot be divisible (i.e., simple) since it has no potential to be divided.

It must be an uncaused being since it is a necessary being, and a necessary being cannot be caused to come to be. So, it can't be caused. Nor can it be self-caused, since that would entail a contradiction.

It must only be one being since there can't be two or more infinite beings or two or more beings of pure actuality; there is no way they could differ in their being, for they are both the same kind of being. And beings cannot differ in the very respect in which they are the same.

It must be infinitely knowing (i.e., omniscient) since I am a knowing being that it caused to exist, and a cause cannot give what it does not have to give.

It must be all-powerful (i.e., omnipotent) since it is infinite, and it has the power to cause a finite being to exist.

Literally none of these are proven to be necessary for a necessary being.

1-3 assert that a necessary being cannot change. First, this is unsupported, and falls. Second, this is hilariously inconsistent -- for how can you claim that something does an action (and apparently with omnipotent power) without changing? How can any entity being do anything without changing? To claim this is to claim something that has never been observed.

4 is odd. First, what the hell does "infinite" mean here? Does a necessary being exist in space, or time, or abstract numbers? Otherwise, how can you claim that it takes up "all" of it? Second, you state that a finite/divisible has potentiality, yet there is no given reason why this is true. Let's say that Sid the Necessary Rock is a necessary being. In every possible universe, Sid is there. Why must Sid not take up space or time or "number", in order to be necessary?

6 and 7 are fine.

8 and 9 have the same problems as 4. First, this is unsupported, and fails. Second, why must a necessary being even have knowledge or power? Let's say that Sid the Necessary Rock is (still) a necessary being. In every possible universe, Sid is there. Why must Sid have the ability to know things, in order to be necessary? Why must Sid have the ability to act, in order to be necessary?

In short, this section tacks on qualities to "necessary", without support. As is usual for these proofs, they will prove a necessary being (by assuming other flawed things) and then assume that the specific God of the religion is what results.

In fact, if you stripped away every one of these flawed propositions away, you would arrive at a necessary being which very closely parallels the Universe, or at least the cause of the universe.

FU22YC47P07470 (talk/stalk) 16:00, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Contingent producing contingent[edit]

Again, an unsupported idea.

A contingent being cannot cause another contingent being. This is because a contingent being is one that could possibly not be, and if it caused another being, then non-being would be producing being.

Why? Merely because the contingent being "is one that could possibly not be", does not mean that it actually is not being at the time of the creation of the other contingent being. If the contingent being is in the state of "being" (rather than non-being), then NO, it is not non-being, and thus it is not non-being producing being. Mʀ. Wʜɪsᴋᴇʀs, Esϙᴜɪʀᴇ (talk/stalk) 15:59, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Seriously - nobody will believe in Gods because of this.[edit]

Nobody really believes in the existence of Gods because of "proofs" like this. They are just used by people who have already decided Gods exist in an attempt to persuade themselves they were right all along.--Bob ^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 16:50, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Reads to me like "If you can't beat 'em with science, baffle 'em with bullshit" Pippa (talk) 16:53, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

@Bob: I don't think that's necessarily true, but is probably true in 99% of cases. Very few converts are won with logical syllogisms. Mʀ. Wʜɪsᴋᴇʀs, Esϙᴜɪʀᴇ (talk/stalk) 17:09, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

OK, who knows, there may be a small number. But in that case do you feel that such people would become atheists when the argument is shown to be false? I kind of doubt it - but again, who knows how these hypothetical people might hypothetically react?--Bob ^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 17:18, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

@FCP You mean, that's true for 99% of people even in cases that would involve a coherent proof. This case does not, and as such, the percentile lies closer to 100%, considering the paradoxes and equivocative and vague conceptual definitions contained in it - never mind, again, the complete lack of evidence for God in the natural world. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 17:39, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Solipsistic drivel[edit]

It's worth nothing that the very attempt to construct a "proof" for an unobservable, unfalsifiable, unverifiable entity is done entirely because no evidence can be found in support of its existence in the natural world, and indeed, even with the construction of such proof (which has failed miserably above, and in all other cases) it gives us no new explanatory power of the natural world, which is still one where prayers are not answered, children die needlessly and the dying sun will in time consume this entire planet. "Proofs of God" are to logic and theology what perpetual motion machines are to physics and engineering. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 17:24, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

That's always part of the problem. If there was real evidence people wouldn't need to resort to pretzel logic and word salads. It's not like Jonas Salk figured out penicillin's power and asked people if they were good to use rhetorical tricks to prove himself right. He provided evidence. -EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 18:06, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Salk? Fleming! But your point stands. People are only doing this because their pet invisible wizard has left no physical evidence of his work or even his existence, so logic games are the only route left. Flannan Isle (talk) 20:38, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

And, I mean, it's one thing to admit to be amateurishly toying with logic. It's another to literally pretend to have any type of coherent - let alone authoritative - "proof" of the existence of ~~Santa~~ God. Wow, much nonsense, such illogical. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 21:09, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Heh, whoops...well this brings a very good point, though unintentional, as well. I am a relatively well educated professional with the worlds archives at my fingertips electronically and I made a mistake with two well known researchers. The Bible was written after Jesus's life by people who never met him that in relation to this time would be woefully uneducated for a 10 year old, recopied, and manipulated over 1,700 years since the stories were collected that's so un-fricken-fallable to some people they look to distort reality with logic games to justify their faith. An "infallible" document that if anyone was actually faithful enough to follow to the letter would likely make them a monster in the eyes of everyone as well as earn them a place on death row. -EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 21:28, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

Yeah, but divine inspiration is real because I'm a being. ikanreed ^{You probably didn't deserve that} 21:55, 21 April 2016 (UTC)

It's not the inspiration that I have a problem with, it's the divine fact checking and divine version control I question. -EmeraldCityWanderer (talk) 20:11, 22 April 2016 (UTC)

And I thought the forums were dead?[edit]

Great to see you guys still tearing apart apologetics. Any chance of making an article for this latest argument? Lord Aeonian (talk) 23:42, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

Rightfully are the simple so called. We should make an article on this embarassing mess of an argument, though I tremble for the length of the article it would produce (considering the many, many caveats). Reverend Black Percy (talk) 00:16, 24 April 2016 (UTC)

Perhaps we could simply expand our existing article on the ontological argument? I think this should be somewhere on mainspace, since many theists no doubt find things like this impressive. Lord Aeonian (talk) 00:35, 24 April 2016 (UTC)

"many theists no doubt find things like this impressive." I hate to repeat myself, but I again quote the Hitch; Rightfully are the simple so called. Reverend Black Percy (talk) 01:02, 24 April 2016 (UTC)

@Aeonian, this isn't really an ontological argument. It's just a rather standard Thomist version of the cosmological argument. Recently I've been reading Edward Feser's Aquinas, and so I can clearly see the Thomistic elements in this argument, such as the act-potency doctrine, the notion of pure act (actus purus), the principle of proportionate causality, etc. It's obvious that Propianotuner has been reading some Thomistic philosphy (maybe even Feser), but the fact that they've mislabelled a cosmological argument as an ontological one is a sign they haven't quite got it. (((Zack Martin)))^™ 08:08, 27 April 2016 (UTC)