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Talk:Quantum consciousness/Archive2

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GrantC's issues...[edit]

Here is where we can discuss them, since they're taking up space everywhere else. This isn't a bad thing, but I just want to give him some more room... (talk) 20:15, 9 September 2013 (UTC)

I don't care whether consciousness is irreducible in the philosophical sense. I care about whether it's irreducible in the physics sense. Quantum mechanics is (as far as we can tell) physically irreducible, but one cannot equate scientific and philosophical irreducibility.
You have yet to provide me a reference that shows a physical model of quantum consciousness, and you have yet to show me proof that the computation in these microtubules is actually a quantum computation. I have asked you variations of both of these questions several times now, and you have yet to give me what I'm asking for. Not only are you deliberately ignoring a massive gap in information between theory and experimental results, but you're also blatantly ignoring most of the theory and asking me to take it on faith. - GrantC (talk) 22:47, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
Look, stop with the finger-pointing. I'm tired of it. I'll be talking to some people this week, but it just looks like you're grasping for straws. Your argument basically boils down to "Oh no, we don't know enough about quantum computation, therefore this is woo" (It's not, because what we DO know about quantum computation allows us to make these conclusions), "You're just saying that if it's a classical computer that has quantum bits, then it's a quantum computer" (I'm not saying this, for the final bloody time. I said that if microtubules are cellular computers that act via quantum mechanisms and have qubits, they are quantum computers BY DEFINITION), and "It's just classical with some quantum stuff" (which looks like a cop-out on the surface, but I'll look into it anyway). BTW, D-Wave is the equivalent of an analog computer right now. Of course it's going to be slower than most computers. It can still solve things differently than others. (talk) 23:41, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
It has to be unless one holds to substance dualism. In order for the mind/body problem to be soluble, the philosophic(1st person/mind) and scientific(3rd person/body) halves must match. Otherwise they are forever apart and thus dualism would be true. I understand that this is not usually how business would be conducted, but the Mind/Body problem raises epistemic issues that can not be solved by a purely empirical approach alone -even in principle. -Jfraatz
You're not understanding me here. If consciousness can be modelled by quantum mechanics, then there must exist such a mathematical/physical model. Throw your mind/body problem all you want, but you can't say "quantum mechanics does it" and then say "but we can't know how". If quantum mechanics is the reason this is the case, then there will be a quantum mechanical model (complete with math and physics) that describes it; end of story. - GrantC (talk) 23:33, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
And you're not understanding me. It's associated with the fundamental levels of spacetime and the collapse process. That's what the Orch-OR model DOES, if you actually read the earliest publications. (talk) 23:43, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
Here's the math: (talk) 23:44, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
"You'll notice that this article on the wiki makes good fun and ridicule of the portion of this stuff that is plainly woo, and it doesn't mention the rest. Why not? Because the rest is purely speculative, fringe science with limited evidence to back it at best. - GrantC (talk)"<------Yes, but that's why this article is essentially trash. The issue is not whether or not their are woo ideas out there, or whether or not these ideas are speculative. The issue is that speculative ideas even if false do not constitute woo. -Jfraatz
"then there will be a quantum mechanical model"<-----There already is. It's called the Orthodox Interpretation of QM (just Copenhagen made consistent through Wigner's friend). It's not a COMPLETE picture, but no one said it was. It just demonstrates that there is a link, and thus that this is where the answer (whatever it may be) lies. Though this should be obvious if one starts with (the primary evidence of) consciousness itself. -Jfraatz
Oh for Christ's sake. I'm done with this discussion. What I'm telling you is that your definition of "quantum computer" is wrong, and nobody who is taken seriously in the world of quantum information would agree with you. Nobody in quantum information gives two shits about the people you've cited. Your arguments are full of shit mostly made by fringe researchers and one legitimate mathematician who should know better. Your understanding of what science actually is is entirely non-existent, and it's a complete and utter waste of my time to continue this conversation. You may continue to post here all you want, and perhaps some other editor will eventually let your crap slide, but I'm done. If I see you adding this crap to the page itself, you can bet I'll be reverting it. As someone else has suggested to you already, go peddle your shit on Citizendium. - GrantC (talk) 23:53, 9 September 2013 (UTC)
P.S. See for a nice summary of all of the other reasons Orch-OR is crap, and is not a suitable quantum model for consciousness. - GrantC (talk) 00:03, 10 September 2013 (UTC)
Dammit. These people I'm citing know what they're doing. Stop asserting that they're not taken seriously. As far as I can tell, they are. Sahu et al. are taken seriously by Pokorny (he considers their findings revolutionary), Rosa and Faber are credible quantum information theorists as is Jack Tuszynski, and Hameroff is one of the people who has opened up a world of discussion via the Towards a Science of Consciousness conferences. I'm trying to take your arguments seriously, but they just look like a bunch of cop-outs right now. I'm sorry. And I have looked at those criticisms, by the way. I was responding to most of them IN OUR DISCUSSION. (talk) 00:07, 10 September 2013 (UTC)
"What I'm telling you is that your definition of "quantum computer" is wrong<---- I don't know what Nicolas has claiming about quantum computers regarding the D-Wave, but no researcher to my knowledge is claiming to KNOW what what the mind IS in terms of this. Just that this is where the answer lies, (per Wigner's friend) which is actually an entirely modest claim. "I know/don't know" is an entirely different claim than "I know where the answer lies." -Jfraatz

BoN edit 02:38, 18 January 2014 (UTC)[edit]

From UPdate no evidence? check

Bunch of ORCH-OR stuff, referencing Penrose and Hameroff. I reverted it. Discuss. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 02:38, 18 January 2014 (UTC)

There's nothing really new here, and I for one am still very much fatigued by the discussions that came up before. I don't believe it's anything really credible. - GrantC (talk) 02:40, 18 January 2014 (UTC)
GrantC, please listen. The standards you have set for Orch-OR are WAY too high. I don't see how they're scientific at all. Reimers and McKemmish brought up your objections and Hameroff's reply actually works: Asking for the level of precision you seem to be looking for at this point is ludicrous. Once the basic ideas get off the ground (i.e. whether microtubules can have topological quantum computation AT ALL), you can bring up more specific forms of quantum computation and how these correspond to certain cognitive processes. I hardly see these conversations as tiring, too. (talk) 14:24, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Also, Sprocket, you shouldn't have reverted it. They brought up several good points, and I'm sure BoN brought up several as well. I'd hate to go off on an ad-hom here, but your guys' biases are shining through more than your reasoning is, and I think that explains your reluctance to these ideas more than a concern for scientific integrity. I'm sorry. (talk) 14:24, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
One more thing: With consciousness, you NEED to understand philosophy. There's no "equivocation" on "philosophical irreducibility" and "physical reducibility". If you were using this argument in front of cognitive scientists or philosophers of mind, you'd be laughed out of the room. The point is that if consciousness is metaphysically irreducible, as the arguments we've given seem to show (don't bring up Dennett here or I'll give papers that debunk every argument he has), it follows that it interacts with the fundamental levels of physical reality, i.e. the irreducible parts of physical reality. If you want to avoid dualism (Who doesn't?), this means that you need physics that is, in itself, metaphysically irreducible. This is the point of the "new physics" approach Penrose and Hameroff have taken. (talk) 14:24, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
That last paragraph is utter tripe. It's trivially obvious that everything reduces to physics at some point, since physics is a description of the laws that make the universe (and everything in it) work. That has absolutely nothing to do with philosophy. If you tell a physicist that philosophy (beyond perhaps the philosophy of science) is required to understand some physical concept, you would laughed out of the room (and rightly so). If Hameroff's model makes it into the mainstream of scientific opinion, then it will be worth changing the article. Until then, no it isn't. You don't understand how science works, and it shows. The standards I'm setting for Hameroff's model are the same standards that scientists in general are setting. There are holes in many theories in which we do not have suitable explanations for them (in certain limiting cases). Hameroff's model has holes in it that have nothing to do with limiting cases whatsoever. Those types of holes are bad. - Grant (Talk) 17:14, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
[ec]Saying "it follows that it interacts with the fundamental levels of physical reality," without laying out the nature and scope of the putative interaction, is vague hand-waving of negligible utility. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 17:20, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Wow! You didn't comprehend a word I wrote, did you? I'm not saying physicists need to handle problems in physics with philosophy. I'm saying you need philosophy to tell you that something is a problem for physics *in the first place*, and that there are better ways to approach it than others. That's why philosophy of mind is a part of cognitive science, actually! Again, you would be the one who's laughed out of the room, but nice try on flipping that back on me. I'll give you that. By the way, I understand how science works enough to tell you that the holes are not as huge as you're making them out to be. First we need some way by which this mechanism can occur AT ALL, after which various opportunities for further development can occur. Hameroff has been tuning the model with his co-authors to reduce the holes while still retaining the key premises they began with. It's exploratory, but not in an unfalsifiable way. Please stop appealing to your own authority. (talk) 19:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
And no, you don't "change the article when it becomes more accepted". I could hand-wave away a bunch of hypotheses just like that. The least you can do is state that Hameroff has given direct replies to a great deal of the criticisms, even if you just send a link to them and don't flesh them out. Second, this is Rationalwiki. It's known for promoting woo of its own. Look at your completely unobjective historical Jesus page, which lumps apologists in with non-religious historians! You've got forgeries listed as real (the Serapis letter) and a complete lack of knowledge of first-century Roman, Greek, and Palestinian culture on there. Not only is this not a site for objectivity, it's definitely not being objective here. (talk) 19:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: That's hardly hand-waving. Once we agree on that principle, and that it's possible that such a thing can occur, THEN we can discuss the mechanism. Phenomenon first, explanatory model second. This is something that's regularly discussed in philosophy of science. (talk) 19:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
I'm being a jerk right now, yes, but I've come to realize this is the only way of dealing with certain people. (talk) 19:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Pointing at other RW articles is not helping your case here. If you were a competent philosopher, you would know that sort of rhetoric may be categorized as casuistry. See what I did there?
I didn't say the mechanisms of the alleged interaction need to be nailed down before proceeding. I said, in so many words, that the term "interaction," without further particulars, is too vague to be of use in considered discussion. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 20:14, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
And I've learned that the best way to deal with some people is to ignore them. I will continue to revert your edits to this article until the above conditions are met (i.e. that this becomes adopted as a reasonable position in mainstream science). You'll also note that those others who are here on RW who have a scientific background generally feel the same, given that this article exists in the first place. If you think this is some fringe argument based on my own authority, I'll point you to the sound rejection this has received on WP as well. And no, I don't need philosophy to tell me something is a problem for physics, thanks. Gravity is what it is regardless of what any philosopher thinks about it. - Grant (Talk) 20:18, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: OK. Yes, but the interaction is either a form of non-Cartesian dualism (if you're into the Copenhagen material), an information-monist one, or some kind of new physics (Orch-OR). There are various options by which the interaction can take place.
This isn't casuistry. That article speaks of a common trend I see in a lot of RW articles, which I could go on about for quite a while. As far as I've gathered, it's just another internet skeptic site whose greatest attribute is its debunking of intelligent design which any biologically-literate middle-schooler can do. (talk) 21:04, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Grant: I'm not the one making the edits! I don't care if you or others have a scientific background. You are not applying good reasoning here. And again, you do need philosophy to tell you whether or not consciousness can be solved by physics. Saying something about gravity and philosophy (why not make an example out of WLC's stupid neo-Lorentzian stuff while you're at it?) doesn't change this fact. Gravity is strictly in the scientific domain by definition (there's some philosophy for you). Mind, for the moment, needs to involve philosophy. Whatever your attitudes towards said subject (philosophy) are, this is a fact you need to deal with. (talk) 21:04, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
WP is a little better now that WingGundam (who put the OR theory under "pseudoscience" just because of its connection to Orch-OR, AND despite the fact that it's BEING TESTED) and Danko Georgiev (who has rival models of Q-mind contra Hameroff and Stapp) have relaxed a little. And just because something is controversial in areas that aren't as clear-cut as you portray it to be, that doesn't mean you need to ridicule them like this. All you need to say is "few scientists support Orch-OR completely", which is an honest statement that even Hameroff would be fine with. Again, refer to the Physics of Life Reviews material for a great rebuttal to the critics. (talk) 21:04, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

break point[edit]

Consciousness itself is a somewhat fuzzy issue, but we are happy to accept its existence. But as far as I understand we are not clear on how consciousness is generated.

Now, let's, for the sake of argument, assume that something quantum is happening in the brain. Even granting this - why would we assume that this consciousness thing is generated by this proposed quantum thing?--Coffee (talk) 21:19, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Perhaps BoN would be kind enough to tell us, in terms intelligible to a studious middle schooler, how he has ruled out emergence from biochemistry as the generator of consciousness. If "generator" is inapt, kindly supply a better term. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 22:05, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
OK. NOW we're having a better, more productive conversation. (talk) 22:30, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: I guess I would cite Chalmers's arguments in THE CONSCIOUS MIND and related papers regarding p-zombies, which deal with the supervenience thesis. Johanan has an identity-based argument that works around the coherence of having phenomenal experiences and their properties in an immaterial, solipsistic universe, something which the properties of matter don't entail for themselves. Thus, mind shares different properties from matter, and by Leibniz's law, mind is not matter. Note that these arguments are not the same as an epistemic "for-all-we-know" possibility, since such a possibility could be used to prove that Clark Kent is not Superman. Churchland takes this route in all the editions of MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS, as does Dennett, to some extent. Instead, this is a case of our being aware and having knowledge of all the relevant properties of a subjective conscious experience needed to make modal claims like these. That's just what the definition of "subjective experience" entails. All the content of a conscious experience is inside consciousness, so there's no need for further intensions. This is also a good identity argument, since we don't see anything identical to brain states when we introspect! I would also cite John Searle's and (the somewhat controversial) Roger Penrose's arguments against strong (and weak) AI. In short: computers operate on syntax while humans operate on semantics; computer-minds can't prove their own Halting computations while we can. If you want to discuss specifics of these arguments, we can, though I've probably taken up too much room here. (talk) 22:30, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
Coffee: To be clear, I'm fine with emergence at a certain level of complexity. I just think it happens on a deeper scale, due to the arguments presented above. The only area I can see that allows for an intimate relation with the first-person is QM (Copenhagen, irreducible ontology), and the only area that opens the door for this non-computationally-simulated material (if Penrose is correct) to play a significant role. (talk) 22:30, 9 February 2014 (UTC)
AFAIK right now you're just establishing that consciousness could be somewhat directly quantum-based. Even if it was somewhat directly quantum-based, the specific attempts at modelling this, by Hameroff, do not appear to be able to make it through peer review/gain scientific acceptance. Nullahnung (talk) 02:24, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for coming back but I'm still not getting it. Why (if it is happening) would the quantum thing cause the consciousness thing?--Coffee (talk) 09:25, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
Nullahnung: Actually, Hameroff's work has been peer-reviewed: There was a paper prior to this which was published in the spurious JOURNAL OF COSMOLOGY, the ideas of which this paper presents and further refines. I'm guessing it was mostly because of special request, as there are other very credible authors who published quantum mind papers there around the same time. It's not representative of their work, and if anything, it was just a special "peek" into their most recent ideas. As far as I can tell, Hameroff is fine with constructive criticism, but the main points of Orch-OR haven't been refuted just yet. (talk) 19:31, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
Coffee: Well, consciousness isn't quantum because both of those are really mysterious. They're connected because consciousness is irreducible to physical stuff. So if we have this ontically irreducible thing like consciousness that still interacts with the physical world (or we wouldn't be here to talk about it), it would have to interact with the physical via the most irreducible element with respect to the physical, i.e. the area of quantum-mechanical phenomena. If we're going to avoid dualism (Cartesian or not), we'll have to resort to a "new physics" by which consciousness is put into science, although it would require major overhauling of what you mean by "science" and "the physical", and might need some speculative informational theory of reality. I know all of this might just be gobbledygook to some people, but does that help? (talk) 19:31, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
But how do you know that consciousness is "irreducible to physical stuff"? The fact that we presently have no "physical stuff" explanation for its production doesn't mean that there isn't one. (And isn't quantum included in "physical stuff" anyway?) It all sounds a bit "God of the gaps" with "quantum" taking the place of "God".--Coffee (talk) 20:06, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
Coffee: I just argued why consciousness is irreducible to physical stuff above. A god-of-the-gaps argument is positing god or quantum with no explanation whatsoever. Here, I'm not doing that. I'm giving REASONS why it's at the level of QM. It's not "irreducible to physical stuff we currently know about". It's irreducible to physical stuff IN PRINCIPLE. No matter what "physical stuff" you show me, now, in the future, or whenever, it won't match up. Consciousness INTERACTS with the levels of QM phenomena but is not, itself, physical or quantum mechanical. As I also said, you could take the approach of Penrose (the new physics), as a way to avoid such god-of-the-gaps reasoning while still being honest about consciousness. Penrose and Hameroff are on your side, as odd as that sounds. However, their ideas require a strange redefinition of what we mean by "the physical". It's a type of information processing at the level of quantum gravity with microtubules acting as the intermediary. It's more informational than physical, if you ask me. (talk) 13:09, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
I've had a look and can't seem to find it. Could you direct me to the part where you demonstrate that "It (consciousness)is irreducible to physical stuff IN PRINCIPLE." Thanks.--Coffee (talk) 17:09, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
It's at the part where I say "I guess I would cite David Chalmers's THE CONSCIOUS MIND" right above. Hope that helps. (talk) 02:51, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Nicolas (I feel more like calling you by a human name than some bunch of numbers) you have not explained things in terms a studious middle schooler can understand. You have alluded to some off-site tap-dancing, and used some fancy terminology. I don't care what other scholars have to say about it. I'm not a student of the history of other people's arguments, and I do not yet have a sense that you are a serious student of cognitive science. In small words, and few of them, what's your take on it?
Consciousness is transient, and would seem to be a supervening layer upon cognition. Or maybe cognition supervenes upon consciousness. I don't know, but I might be persuaded to care. Here and now, can you persuade me that the alleged irreducibility of what we reify (correctly or not, that's another question) as consciousness has anything to do with the alleged irreducibility of some quantum analysis or other? Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 20:34, 10 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: I haven't been hand-waving. I've been trying to give you rather complex arguments in a simple-to-understand way. I can't simplify them any more than I already have. If you call all this "tap-dancing with some fancy terminology", I'm really sorry. I'm not a neuroscientist, yes, and I am only a student, but that doesn't stop me from having an informed opinion on this. Again, please don't accuse me of hand-waving while doing hand-waving of your own. (talk) 13:09, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
Once again: The properties of conscious experience are such that it is coherent that conscious experience can exist in an immaterial, idealistic universe, where qualia of different mind-levels replaces the physical like Lego building blocks. In other words, it can exist in the universe of Berkeley's god or other idealist ontologies. Matter doesn't have said properties. Therefore, consciousness is not material. (talk) 13:09, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
I mean, please take the time to read what I'm writing. I think any philosophically-literate middle-schooler will get this. (talk) 13:09, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
I've been reading your writing all along, but when you say things like "conscious experience can exist in an immaterial, idealistic universe" I start to lose interest. If consciousness emerges from the array of neurochemical interactions contained within an individual body, then "immaterial, idealistic universe" will not cut the mustard. Such fanciful notions may be useful as approximations to what really happens, but I'm a firm believer in studying what really happens, if you want to know what really happens. That's a hint of where my sense of philosophical hand-waving comes from. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 14:23, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
I will also point out that the kind of philosophical reduction argument the BoN is using "it interacts with quantum stuff, therefore it must be quantum" is not the way science is done. Sprocket's attitude is far closer to the truth, where we devise physical theories based on physical evidence. The premise that consciousness must be quantum requires this kind of reduction argument to succeed; there is a significant lack of actual evidence pointing to it. - Grant (Talk) 16:58, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
It's difficult to make sense of what the IP is saying, for sure. On the one hand consciousness is supposed to not be reducible to any sort of physics including QM, but on the other hand we apparently have to avoid dualism, so there must exist some kind of informational connection between physics (meaning QM) and consciousness. My only question is: Why? Nullahnung (talk) 23:55, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: *Facepalm* Listen. You are going about this backwards. We need to examine whether or not it IS emergent. You don't just ASSERT it's emergent. You need to argue for it. I'm giving you an argument AGAINST emergence. You can't counter an argument against emergence by just saying "emergence"! It's like going up to a creationist, explaining why creationism is false because of evolution, and then having them say, "But that doesn't work, because creationism is true". (talk) 23:21, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
Grant: Are you keen on misrepresenting me? I never made that argument. My argument was that consciousness interacts with the physical world at the level of QM, not that consciousness IS quantum stuff. That's all my arguments above were trying to present. However, Orch-OR goes a step further, and argues that proto-qualia are at these fundamental levels of physics based on further arguments from Alfred North Whitehead and Roger Penrose. Sprocket couldn't be farther from the truth. I have no idea why you're backing him up. There are experiments by people like Dean Radin that suggest this, but I know how much you love his work, so I won't go into that here. In any case, philosophical investigation is good for now, in order for us to understand whether or not something is scientific, and how it's scientific. (talk) 23:21, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
Both of you: Stop with this "I'm an objective scientist, therefore you're an idiot" talk. I hate it. You need to address arguments like these in the best way, which you're not. What we are trying to understand is whether or not consciousness IS emergent at the classical level you want, or a scientific question at all. I'm arguing that it's not, based on the data supplied to us in introspection and modal reasoning we can use to understand said data. You two are arguing based on the faith that "Since this science works for all this, it'll work for this. Why? Because it will." Congratulations. You've just made a materialism-of-the-gaps argument. (talk) 23:21, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
So I think I may be helpful in reconciling the views presented here. IP address guy, you should really post those criticisms of Dennet, because he is, in my opinion, one of the only philosophers who even seems to try to understand neuroscience. The others just propose thought experiments (China brain, Chinese room) which attempt to discredit materialism with simplistic notions of what consciousness is. You can find rebuttals to those thought experiments online, but just ask if you want my own, I don't feel like typing them out right now. The reason for the harsh treatment of ORCH-OR here is due to its parsimony (more accurately lack of). It adds a completely useless explanation (quantum mechanics) for consciousness. Not only does it never even explain why the problem of consciousness should be intractable for neuroscience, it doesn't explain why it should be a tractable problem for QM. Despite popular opinion, there really isn't much reason to think that consciousness can't be explained in non-classical ways. I can understand how it seems like you are being unfairly treated here by people who are trying too hard to act objective, but in reality philosophers tend to misrepresent scientific facts, leading to apparent disagreements between philosophy and science which don't really exist. As of yet, we have learned very little about how the millions of complex circuits in the brain interact and function; but we have learned that some circuits play a role in "watching" the other circuits and regulating their activity, immediately suggesting something strange and inherently metacognitive about brain function. Sorry if this last bit seems a bit ad hominem, but if you actually think neuroscience and quantum mechanics are highly related, then you don't understand the principles of either and the scales they are occurring on. — Unsigned, by: / talk / contribs 12 May 2014
+1. Not only is there little reason to believe the two are related, but Orch-OR is riddled with enough holes that philosophy isn't a sufficient stop-gap to justify it. - Grant (talk) 22:05, 12 May 2014 (UTC)
"Materialism of the gaps," seriously? I really doubt special pleading like this is going to fly here. --Marlow (talk) 23:35, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
(EC) Everything interacts with the physical world on the level of QM, because QM is the fundamental basis of every macroscopic object and interaction in the physical world. Perhaps you forget that "classical" mechanics is just a limiting case of quantum mechanics. Sure, the theory doesn't cover things as large as celestial bodies yet, but there is an active area of science working to close that gap. The premises Orch-OR takes are the things I was attacking before.
No, in fact, we need to do no such thing. I stated above that I would be happy to change my viewpoint if this moved into the scientific mainstream. Until then, my view stands. You're damn straight I'm saying "Since this science works for all this, it'll work for this". Do you know why? Because that's the point of falsifiability. The scientific theories we use today are considered correct until physical scientific evidence shows up to prove otherwise, at which point they are adjusted as necessary. This is not "faith"; it's science. - Grant (Talk) 23:38, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
Excuse me, but where did I assert that consciousness is emergent? I cast that as hypothetical, if you care to look again. As a matter of fact, the neuroscientists I've asked regard emergence as a better basis for consciousness than whatever else has been proposed so far. Their activity is producing results in the rehabilitation of damaged human beings. I haven't heard anything of how disputes about duality, Cartesian or otherwise, has accomplished anything like that. In my view, cognitive scientists are doing a batter job of cataloging the properties of conscious experience than any introspective philosopher could hope to do. Sorry you don't like Lakoff, but I'd urge you to re-examine the neurology of conceptual metaphors. There is a whole taxonomy of them at which to marvel. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 00:08, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Grant, again, stop with the "man-of-the-world" crap. Please, for goodness's sake, pay attention, because I don't think I'm coming through. First we need to see if it's a scientific issue at all. When we do, then it's a matter of finding out WHERE the scientific investigation should be done, and THEN developing a hypothesis in said domain, with predictions to falsify said hypothesis. But until you get that first thing off the ground (i.e. whether this is a scientific question and if so where should we be looking), you have nowhere to go. And until you do, it is a faith position to say it will apply here. Is. That. Clear? (talk) 01:30, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Sprocket: See my reply to Grant. Even if you didn't "endorse emergence" (that obviously matters!), you're still countering an argument against the idea that emergentism in a purely materialistic way produces minds by saying that it could. It's stupid. Neuroscientists have addressed the easy problems, and yes, there is stuff to marvel at. But they haven't addressed the problem of conscious experience. (talk) 01:30, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Marlow: How is that special pleading? I think you mean "ill-applied", not "special pleading". But it's not even that. Good try, though. (talk) 01:30, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
By the way: I don't HATE eliminative materialists. I like Douglas Hofstadter, though I disagree with him on a lot. I don't dislike Lakoff as much as I did, but I don't see how conceptual metaphors really gets to the meat of conscious experience. It's not that I don't think analogy just isn't important to cognitive processes. I just think it's overextended to places where it doesn't quite help. (talk) 01:50, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
I'm sorry, but I'm not the one here arguing that we should give more consideration to a crackpot theory. By your own argument, Hameroff and Penrose are approaching this problem backwards, trying to slap a half-assed scientific explanation on an arbitrary field of science with absolutely no physical basis for it. I will also mention that if you're going to say that there must be some interaction with matter on a quantum level, you are already within the domain of science. Whether you like it or not, there's no philosophical handwaving around quantum mechanics. If you're going to pop in here and try to justify us being "nice" to Orch-OR based on philosophy, then I'm going to continue to think you're ignorant. If you would like to make a purely philosophical argument about consciousness, then leave quantum mechanics (and science in general) out of it. - Grant (Talk) 01:54, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
It's not crackpottery, as I've been trying to tell you a thousand times (and have given you plenty of reason why). I hardly see how they could be approaching this backwards. They're saying "Consciousness has X, Y, and Z properties as taken from various philosophical analyses, so we should be looking at this "new physics" area, which is most likely OR, can be correlated with the brain, and has certain key predictions for its key premises that are falsifiable." To be clear, they put consciousness as this strange "moment of experience" at the level of space-time geometry, which, at least to Penrose, is Platonic. Hameroff takes this as immaterial. In fact, in some interviews, he says this is "reductionist, but not materialist". There's still immateriality and information monism, much like in Tononi's IIT, which I also like, but there's also correlations with quantum gravity and how this information is related to the brain. They also took considerations from Alfred North Whitehead. Again, I'm not doing "philosophical handwaving to save Orch-OR and bring in QM", you dumbass. I'm using philosophical considerations to argue that we should be looking at the level of QM in general, and yes, based on the implications of QM, you can do that. Then work can begin on a more specific, more scientific model. We can then address important details of the proposed model, like Orch-OR. Until you get what I'M saying here, I will continue to think of you as ignorant. (talk) 02:51, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Their premise is flawed. We do not build scientific theories based on philosophical analyses. We build scientific theories based on physical evidence. As someone who as already professed not to be a scientists of any kind, it's unsurprising that you continue thinking this is a good way of doing science. However, you would be wrong, and you're not going to find any traction on RW, Wikipedia, or in the broad scientific community. Good luck with your crusade, though I'm not sure what you honestly hope to accomplish with it. - Grant (Talk) 03:12, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
No, you idiot, that's not what I'm saying at all. Look, they're considering physical evidence, such as observations from Freeman and Vitiello regarding gamma synchrony, indications of the plausibility of OR, and the role of microtubules in addition to philosophical analyses. But you can't throw out philosophical analysis in an issue like this. And I never said philosophy, therefore hypothesis. I said, philosophical analysis, specific area of research, observations, and formulation of a hypothesis. Again, this is just the way you approach an issue like consciousness. I know you don't like it, but I ultimately don't care. It's how IIT and physicalism work as well: Philosophical modeling on whether or not this can be scientifically understood in a specific area, followed by comparison with physical observation and the formulation of a hypothesis. I'm not going to sit here trying to make this basic thing clear to you. What starts off as metaphysical, depending on how you approach it, can be analyzed from a physical perspective. It's all about where you decide to look. (talk) 03:41, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
And I don't care about Wikipedia, though I find it odd that you put it and RW along the scientific community as paragons of intellectual integrity. This conclusion (Q-mind) hasn't been "rejected by the scientific community". There's just huge disagreement. Learn to tell the difference. (talk) 03:44, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
You put "rejected by the scientific community" in quote marks, as relating to Q-mind, as if anyone has written that. I can't find the quote on this page, though. It seems nobody's actually saying that the scientific community rejects Q-mind. Strawman. Nullahnung (talk) 09:50, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Nullahnung: GrantC was just going on about how I wouldn't be taken seriously by the scientific community, with reference to Orch-OR as a crackpot theory. Even if he didn't exactly say that, it's a valid inference about intention. So no strawman. (talk) 12:22, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
Actually no, it is not a valid inference. There's a few crucial differences between "Orch-OR is rightfully not taken seriously by the scientific community" and "Q-mind has been rejected by the scientific community". Nullahnung (talk) 12:41, 12 February 2014 (UTC)
There doesn't seem to be much of a difference, if you operate by scientific consensus. But in any case, this is just one of my minor points. Why focus on just this? (talk) 20:27, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

Should This Be Filed Under "Philosophy"?[edit]

At this point, Q-mind is a valid philosophical position, as much as physicalism or dualism. In fact, it kind of *is* a physicalist position, and it was a particular brand of philosophy the founders of QM held to. This isn't to say there are NO scientific aspects to it, however. You could put under it: "Whether or not this sort of thing is a metaphysical question or can be scientifically understood is not currently known." (talk) 19:36, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Message from BoN...[edit]

OK. I think we're just talking past each other right now. I'll let you keep your pages if you want, because right now we're just butting heads. I'll go away now. (talk) 12:24, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

Childish introduction[edit]

Whoever wrote this article doesn't remotely understand science at all. Science is a sub-set of the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science is the foundation of science, which the childish introduction suggests the author has absolutely zero understanding. Try writing in a more rational and objective manner. Everything can be written in a scientific and logical way. You must study logic and philosophy of science to be able to do this properly.Your personal bias has no place in science. Revise all this and try again. — Unsigned, by: / talk / contribs 5 April 2014,‎ 23:17(UTC)

Well you're entirely wrong. But hey, whatever floats your boat I guess. - Grant (talk) 03:34, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Thank you for your highly specific and detailed feedback. I will action that immediately. Scarlet A.pngtheist 14:41, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Didn't you get the memo? Every scientist worth their salt needs to have close working relationship with a philosopher of science, to make sure the science is being done right. Without that, all credibility is lost. Sprocket J Cogswell (talk) 15:49, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Well damn; it seems that my entire life has been a lie! Here I thought I was doing science, and instead I've just been flailing around and accomplishing nothing. - Grant (talk) 15:51, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Article inadequately sets the stage for the Victor Stenger quote[edit]

So I've skimmed this:

And it seems to be putting down various notions of 'mind over matter' that people have come up with, and that is also apparent in the bit quoted in our article. The article makes no mention of any sort of 'mind of matter' concept whatsoever. The quote would make more sense if did integrate something like that in one of the preceding sections. Nullahnung (talk) 23:55, 6 June 2014 (UTC)

Yeah, I'm sure we have an article in which that quote fits, but I doubt this is it. - Grant (talk) 00:09, 7 June 2014 (UTC)
I'm commenting it out until the article addresses this gap. Nullahnung (talk) 08:56, 8 June 2014 (UTC)

RW record stained[edit]

RationalWiki almost perfect record is stained with this article - simply, this is not pseudoscience, at least as long as sci community consider it worthy of constructive criticism and debate. Certainly it's not woo nothing more then String Theory is, and to put it in same category with real crackpot science, New Age or woo, while equating Penrose (even Hameroff) with Chopra and Icke, is nothing short of perverse !--Santasa (talk) 15:44, 7 February 2015 (UTC)

I sort of weekly agree. The problem is , I suspect, that as so much woo involves "quantum" then sceptics are highly suspicious of anything which takes the word "quantum" out of its natural habitat. On the other hand "quantum biology" is a legitimate thing - as far as I am aware - so it seems to me that suggesting that quantum effects may be involved somewhere in brain functioning does not seem immediately outrageous.
But the problem is that as we don't really understand consciousness and few people fully understand quantum mechanics (I don't) - so there is a regrettable tendency to explain one magical poorly understood thing in terms of another.--Bob"I think you'll find it's more complicated than that." 16:00, 7 February 2015 (UTC)

Why not break the article in two?[edit]

Here is a suggestion, why don't we reorganize the article into proto science and woo sections? While Quantum Consciousness is not currently the scientific consensus it is still a topic of discussion and debate, it may even prove to be true it wouldn't be the first time in the history of science that the less popular idea prevailed and this isn't even all that out there. What I think Rationalwiki really wants to go after is the woo misters of the world but not discourage legitimate scientific and philosophical inquiry.-- (talk) 03:10, 13 July 2015 (UTC)

Um, is any of this good at all? Not really. The Penrose stuff is still ill-founded nonsense, even if he can actually do quantum - David Gerard (talk) 09:58, 13 July 2015 (UTC)