Forum:Is there a philosopher in the forum?

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I've been mulling over the metaphysical topic of objective reality, namely the question "how do I know there is such thing?" I just read this essay and I'm curious as to what everyone at RW thinks of it. Is it a legitimate proof of objective reality, or did the author slip up somewhere. And if the author did commit an error, can someone direct me to a better proof? Tetronian you're clueless 01:07, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Mei isn't a philosopher but she does make lists!
  1. Logic is sort of the same thing as reality ("I will be using the terms objective truth and objective reality completely interchangeably: as far as I'm concerned, what's true is real, and what's real is true.")
  2. If logic can be objective, so can reality
  3. Hey look! this bit of logic is objective. ("So let us ask the meta-question Q': Q': Is there an answer to question Q? To which both objective realists and cultural relativists would agree that the answer A' is definitely: A': Yes.)
1 is where my big red warning light went off. If you think human logic is objective you're already an objectivist. I only read up to "objections to the proof" though. -- =w= 01:31, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I find the claim that eventually "both groups" will answer "yes" to some level of meta-question to be very dubious. However, further down, I liked "To which I have only this to say: even if the law of the excluded middle is not true, that doesn’t mean it’s false." - very elegant and funny. ħumanUser talk:Human 04:39, 7 January 2010 (UTC) (late sig)


The only objective fact in the world is that all you guys are super swell :) MarcusCicero (talk) 01:33, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Troll Acei9 01:36, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
If only there were a reformed person around to debate with Mei about baseness [1] or something. -- =w= 01:36, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Returning to Mei's point: I see what you mean, his argument seems somewhat circular. But check out the section titled "No Logic at All?". I think that might be his answer to your objection. Tetronian you're clueless 01:37, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Thanks Tetronian. "Since logical reasoning is invalid, it follows that illogical reasoning is valid" makes no sense to me at all. Can you explain it? -- =w= 01:43, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
That essay is terrible, and you shouldn't spend any time on it. Almost every logical "step" it tries to make, it fails. Right from the start, in fact: a cultural relativist could easily believe in objective reality.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 01:45, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Yeah, the more I look at it the less sense it makes to me. But ignoring the fact that he makes cultural relativists into something they aren't, is his proof incorrect? I think it is, but I can't identify the specific flaw in it.
Also, @Mei:- his argument is this:
  1. Assume that logical reasoning is invalid to begin with.
  2. Since logical reasoning is invalid, it follows that illogical reasoning is valid.
  3. Therefore, since logical reasoning is invalid, it must illogically follow that logical reasoning is in fact valid.
  4. QED.
Line #2 means this: if we assume logic is wrong, that means the universe is illogical. That makes sense to me, but at the same time it doesn't since it is a logical conclusion. Damn, now I am confused too, haha! Tetronian you're clueless 01:51, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Ok, I've got it: his conclusion is bogus because even though everyone would agree that there is an answer to question Q, that does not mean that all truths are objective. And I think the reasoning behind the proof is suspect as well. In that case, does anyone know of a legit proof of objective reality? Or do rationalists just assume solipsism is untrue and be done with it? Tetronian you're clueless 01:55, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
"if we assume logic is wrong, that means the universe is illogical" --- that itself assumes human logic is the same as physics. "In that case, does anyone know of a legit proof of objective reality? Or do rationalists just assume solipsism is untrue and be done with it?" --- Relaxed standards of proof can still be persuasive. -- =w= 01:58, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
It's impossible to prove reality if you reject all means of proof, so there's no concrete elimination of solipsism as a possibility. Not to say there haven't been attempts to deduce reality by pure reason, but they're generally pretty poor from my experience and stumble into using a prioris.--Tom Moorefiat justitia
(EC²)"Relaxed standards of proof can still be persuasive." Sure, but it would be nice to know that there is a metaphysical basis for rationalism, and that it's not based upon one huge assumption. The only assumption it should make, I would think, is a rejection of Pyrrhonism because such a philosophy automatically disqualifies itself from being able to find the truth. Tetronian you're clueless 02:04, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
This sounds like an "Open your mind" bit to me. Anyway, our understanding is all from our observations of the universe. True, there is a margin of error as all of our knowledge in mathematics and physics originally came from shots in the dark, but I think that in this modern age with computers we are beginning to cut down those margins of error and are actually acquiring real knowledge about reality. I can understand thinking outside the box, but throwing out every concept that we as a people have cultivated to suit your view is itself illogical--Thanatos (talk) 02:14, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
That's the problem with this, it is a metaphysical problem so it is very hard to use "evidence", meaning that logic alone is the only key to answering the question. Tetronian you're clueless 02:18, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Exactly. Unfortunately, inasmuch as I can see solipsism is unassailable. Eventually you just have to say, "Well, I can't prove that solipsism isn't correct, but I have to get to the store regardless, so I will assume it isn't." We all have to do it, since you must make that functional assumption in order to, well, function. Aristotle discussed this in his address of the principle of identity (a=a): when asked how he knew a chair couldn't possess both the qualities of chair and not-chair at the same time, he slammed the chair down on the ground and declared, "THIS is how I know it!" Even he fell victim to the same sort of "well I know it because I bloke hit me on the head" thing that Human gave earlier. But it's not logically satisfying. I think Tet is looking for that logical metaphysical proof against solipsism, mainly.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 22:06, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I realize that there is no metaphysical proof against it, I was just hoping that somewhere there was something more logically satisfying than Human's explanation. It seems very irrational to make such a large assumption, (it seems sort of like a cop-out), but since there is no "evidence" to be had I suppose rationalism doesn't really apply. Tetronian you're clueless 22:13, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Can you be certain in the knowledge that knowledge is uncertain?[edit]

Whenever anyone starts saying anything like, "Is there any objective truth?" I always say, "Either there is some sort of objective truth or it is an objective truth that there is no objective truth." Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 04:09, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

You echo the gentleman in question's argument. ħumanUser talk:Human 04:17, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Except that this fellow does not appear to know beans about logic, and trips at the starting line by fashioning for himself the logical analogue of a convergent geometric series in which r=\textrm{meta}. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 04:31, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Let me rephrase that, "you improve on the gentleman in question's argument". Anyone who is concerned that an objective reality exists should pick a barroom fight and try to wish themselves to another reality. Not that the damage to their face can be "proved" with logic... ħumanUser talk:Human 04:38, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
To take the devil's part here: it is entirely logically consistent to suggest that while objectively true statements can be made as pertains the abstract, we can still not know anything for certain about an objective reality. And the former is what is in question. While we can make logically consistent statements that don't allow contradiction ("There is objective truth") that doesn't rise further than wordplay.
In other words, solipsism is a logical fortress. The author of the essay makes a poor job and Listener makes an excellent one of the straw-man of an absolute relativism, but there are almost no holders of that view. You won't find the dreaded postmodernists of the essayist's imagining making blanket statements about logical contradictions, but instead suggesting that there is no foundational truth in any culture's demesne that is better than any other. That's not a view I hold, incidentally. I just thought it merited pointing out that no one's really fighting on the other side of the argument.
I have eagerly sought after a solid philosophical elimination of solipsism, but I don't see how one even could exist, much less evidence of a real solution. Pure reason simply doesn't go very far, as even Descartes found to his sorry. Around his fourth reiteration at the categorical argument for the existence of God in his Discourse, one starts to think the lady protests too much.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 08:22, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I have always hated solipsism, but never found a better rebuttal to it that when some asshole headbutted me in the middle of the street in Portsmouth. I blacked out for a 1/4 or so of a second, not enough to fall down. But my neck was all screwed up for a chiropractic while. ħumanUser talk:Human 08:26, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
(EC) The first point is true. Which is where the scientific method comes in, to determine the probability of some model of objective reality being correct.
What do you mean by a "culture's demesne"? Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 08:28, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I'm not sure what use the scientific method can be when it depends on some form of empiricism. If the senses cannot be trusted, neither could any experiments. And absent any true input, then probability can never be established. All your judgments about what is "probable" are based on an understanding of probability that is already predicated on the falsehood of solipsism. If the world is all an illusion by the classic Cartesian demon, then you have no knowledge of what is "really" more probable in a "real" world.
A culture's demesne includes those things it thinks are proper - its truths. For example, some cultures think female genital mutilation is a good thing, and others don't. A cultural relativist would say that neither view is correct or better and that no valid methods could make such a judgment in any case.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 08:57, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
One of course need only look at a fundamentalist's demesne to see what that is. As to the scientific method, although you cannot say for certain what objective reality is, you can make models of what you think it is, and then make predictions and carry out experiments to see if you have a consistent model. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 17:33, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Consistency is no argument for accuracy unless you have some evidence that the two correlate somehow, and in this situation you have no evidence of such because you have no evidence at all. It is as if you have lived in a soundless box for all of your life; the evidence you might gather would be entirely consistent and tell you that there is nothing but boxes in the world, but that could (and would) be entirely wrong. Since all of your experiences have been mostly boxish, you might even call the box theory the most probable one, but again that's because your information on probability is wrong. So I don't think the argument works against solipsism.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 19:46, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
But in that case, whatever experiments you performed in the soundless box would still be perfectly accurate within the box. What theories were obtained would be incomplete, but still correct in their scope. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 20:04, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Exactly! It would be practically true, but not objectively so! You would be wrong about the actual nature of the world, but because all of your input was wrong your conclusions would be consistent and self-coherent. And in the same way, such could be the world at large as you understand it: consistent and self-coherent, but entirely wrong.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 20:13, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I would not consider them "entirely wrong." Think Newton's laws: perfectly valid from an inertial reference frame, and still widely used, even though new experiments have falsified them in some contexts. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 20:20, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
But the point is that while they may be useful for determining the nature of the Boxworld, they are not at all useful in determining objective truth. The objective truth is that the world is not only Boxworld, no matter what your method says. And in the same way, we might all be in a larger Boxworld, and have developed consistent models of our world but not have attained any objective and real truth.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 20:27, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
It is not any less objective truth because it is only about the "Boxworld." Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:00, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
"The sky is hard cardboard" is not a correct objective truth, because it's not the sky. Saying "above me is hard cardboard" is not really a truth either, it's just a summary of sensory input. But I think you're treading on the edge of where the analogy is useful. Bringing it back to the real world: any truth you find out will be based on your sensory data. And if all that data is in question, then even if it is consistent in its wrongness, whatever truth you discover will be in question as well.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 21:03, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Neither of those two statements is scientific. And it is freely allowed that future experiments may require scientific models to be modified, but that does not invalidate any direct conclusions from the original experiments.
Also, the more you are able using your models to make correct predictions of further sensory data, the more it: (1) reduces the probability that your sensory data is dodgy, (2) diminishes any distinction between "objective truth" and "illusion," eventually to the point where making a distinction becomes superfluous. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:25, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
A solipsist would point out that any "scientific" statement would be a summary or conclusion of questionable sensory data. But what is an example of a statement you consider to be objectively true?
I disagree with (1), because repeated tests can confirm precise results, but not accurate ones. To borrow from my high school biology experience, if my slides are all washed in dirty water, then I'm going to consistently find that a set of blood samples all have clay from the backyard in them - in fact, I would consistently find that everything is partially made of backyard clay. It doesn't mean that I'm right in my conclusion, only that I am consistently wrong. As I said before, consistency or precision is not necessarily an indicator of accuracy absent confirmation of some kind, so without any confirmation then you can't say that you're "right."
I don't understand your second point. I'm not more than the basest amateur at philosophy, so that's probably my fault. Could you explain it?--Tom Moorefiat justitia 22:01, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Any true statements within a system of formal logic can be ranked that way, and I think that in similar fashion a statement like "Such-and-such experiments indicate such-and-such a conclusion" can also be objectively true.
(1) I had been assuming that the experiments were being carried out properly and under no procedural misapprehensions. The dirty water would only be a problem if you assumed the slides were being washed in clean water. Also, note that I only said such experiments increase the probability that some model is correct. Like Stephen Jay Gould said, "We can never prove absolutely, but we can falsify."
(2) TallMan is the philosophy expert around here, not I. But what I meant was, that when we think of an "illusion," we think of something that is highly volatile, conforming to no codifiable laws, and often times inseparable from the perception of one individual. If we allow that the universe might be an "illusion," scientific experiments and correct predictions can establish that this "illusion" is not terribly volatile, conforms in some degree to, e.g., the laws of physics, and does not go away when it ceases to be perceived by a certain person. This narrows the gap between what is commonly meant by "illusion" and "reality." Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 20:00, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

<- I thought I had already established that few people of any ilk will claim that you cannot make logically consistent statements. Only the hardest kind of solipsist (Pyrhhonism, I think it's called) will claim that you cannot do this, and so would argue that you cannot say "such-and-such indicates such-and-such as a conclusion." The point is that the veracity of your evidential such-and-such will always be inconclusive to a solipsist, and so your conclusion will always be uncertain.
(1) Of course you assume that the experiments are being carried out properly. That's the entire point of what I'm saying! The whole world is an assumption like that: that our senses are reliable to some degree. The point I have been making is that their reliability may be zero and that we can never prove absolutely that they are at all accurate.
(2) I agree. If the entire world is an illusion, then that illusion would be what we call "reality." But again, I'm not sure you see the point here: that illusion could be completely wrong even though it is very consistent. That is the point of solipsism... however tight you might close the "gap" between what you think is "probable" (terms I still think are without meaning in this context, but I'm through restating why), it will always remain.
I'll say it again in yet another way: We must act as though our sensory data has meaning, but we can never be completely certain it does. It is impossible to prove its certainty. And thus solipsism cannot be logically disproven, as far I as I have ever seen.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 20:40, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

The point was not to say that "reality" and illusion are identical in fact, but that according to the solipsist's world-view they are identical in principle — that there is no attribute of reality that could not also be ascribed to what the solipsist calls an "illusion." Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:09, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
That's what solipsism IS! Are you kidding me with this? Why did you present this scientific method nonsense if you didn't know what solipsism even was?!--Tom Moorefiat justitia 21:28, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
Because if the solipsist has in fact redefined "illusion" in that manner, and does not care that the redefinition destroys the meaning of the two words illusion and reality, then the distinction between them has to be stated in other terms. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:40, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
The redefinition does not destroy the distinction between the two. It is possible to have an entirely consistent illusion and call it "reality," and it just means you would be wrong. Reality would still presumably be itself and different from what you thought and measured "reality" to be. I'm not sure what you're trying to prove here; it's as if you're trying to semantically redefine solipsism out of existence. Saying that you don't see the functional distinction between a solipsistic illusion and reality is like saying you don't see the difference between left and right: they are defined solely by the quality of their difference and one other aspect; in this case, "objective reality." And that is what we have been discussing.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 21:47, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
What are these "functional distinctions" of which you speak? Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:55, 8 January 2010 (UTC)
I don't know if you're just messing with me now, but when they find your body they will have to check your dental records to identify it.
No seriously, my entire point was that there are no functional distinctions. Just like "left" and "right" are functionally the same except inasmuch as they're distinct only through perspective (i.e. arbitrary labels), in the same way a solipsistic illusion and reality could seem functionally identical. That's why there's no way to tell through the "scientific method" a difference between the two, because of that. A solipsistic illusion could be perfectly consistent.
So when you say "well then I don't see the difference and we might as well call them the same," do you see why that's absurd? Of course you don't see the difference to you between a perfect illusion and a true reality, that's the entirety of solipsism.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 22:01, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

on the senses and indirect access[edit]

I'm completely unqualified to step in here as if there is an objective reality I'm surely well removed from it, but it seems to me to be pretty well settled that human senses mediate/interpret/process the input they receive. While I presume this input comes from reality it is not necessarily so. Given this it would seem impossible to prove that reality exists as the only evidence we have of it is indirect and open to spoofing. I've the notion that there are multiple competing logics e.g. Quantum logic. The existence of these multiples (coupled with our inability to know everything) in my admittedly dim understanding invalidates the use of first order logic as the window into reality. The answer seems inaccessible; The point moot.

As a practical matter I've decided that reality must exist because of the horrible consistency of things like gravity, flu season and mortgages, but this is clearly a decision grounded on assumptions that I can't readily support (It's turtles all the way down). However, if you are a fan of the classic bad movie Creator you'll know that the Mariel Hemingway character responded to the central question thusly, Why don't you begin with the assumption that reality does not exist and see where that gets you. Me!Sheesh!Mine! 14:36, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Fundamental weakness of the argument which invalidates all subsequent arguments from said person[edit]

When a postmodernist asserts that 'there is no such thing as a fact, only a value judgement', the said person is in fact, making a value judgement and hence is not a fact. Therefore their statement is meaningless and the rest of the world should logically (According to this vacuous postmodernist philosophy) not do anything whatsoever, with any hope of certainty. Hence the world doesn't exist and everything is but the figment of something beyond our ability to explain with either philosophy or science. Note- Read In Defence of History by Richard Evans. MarcusCicero (talk) 18:24, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

True, your argument refutes the statement made by the author of the abysmal paper mentioned above. But, realistically, is there any proof of the opposing view, the "vacuous postmodernist philosophy" you mentioned? Tetronian you're clueless 18:46, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
As I mentioned earlier, this is just another attack on a straw-man postmodernism. Yes, it's possible to make statements that cannot be logically contradicted and which are therefore in some sense concrete and incontestable, but there are virtually no po-mo thinkers who would propose that no such statements could be made. A sincere postmodernist would point out that certainty is not required for any normal action. While you state that we should logically do nothing with no hope of certainty, it could be argued that you are seldom ever going to be truly certain about anything in your life, only reasonably satisfied with your correctness. For example, while you may think yourself certain of the principle of gravity, a postmodernist would point out that a serious examination of what you know as a "principle" is not certain, nor is the way you think gravity works in your life, nor even is the actual terminology used in your statement conveying a complete and absolute message, and nor could any terminology ever hope to because of a yawning and endless gap between the understood meaning of your words and your intended message. This lattermost point means that your own thoughts are inexact and uncertain because you must express them in terms of symbols with inexact meanings, and this uncertainty is only compounded overmore by verbal expression to someone with a different set of understandings about the signifier and what it signifies.
I'm not a postmodernist, but I've read my Derrida enough to know a little. But more importantly, I know that it seems like very few critics of postmodernism ever actually know what it is about, and seldom in life is a large set of theories ever going to be easily dismissed by someone ignorant of it.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 20:00, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Wow! Guys, gather round, Tom has read Derrida! On a slightly more serious note, my point above was intended to show that the basics of postmodernism is to question the mechanics of how we present complex information to one another, and how that impacts on the actual meaning conveyed rather than what is being done within our own minds. This is fair enough. Speaking as someone who has had to endure some of the most vacuous of postmodernist junk - verbose jargon with little basis in fact - I can say the entire process is galling to anyone with any experience of having writing something of an historical or empirical nature.
And I've read enough primary sources to know the difference between flawed interpretation and absolute fact :) I know that the postmodernist quest is a noble one, but also a completely blinkered one which relies on the basic assumption that facts do not exist, only value judgements. And how anyone can base anything on what is in effect, a value judgement, is beyond me. MarcusCicero (talk) 20:17, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Fair enough. I just wanted to point out that you were attacking a version of po-mo that doesn't typically exist, with the easiest argument - by assuming that postmodernism would oppose a logically consistent absolute statement. I agree that we tend to act as if we have certainties and that absolute postmodernism in the sense of "all truth and culture is relative" is not my cup of tea, but it's still a very useful discipline and worth more than these glib dismissals.--Tom Moorefiat justitia 20:36, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Or in the words of the great Connor O'Berst If you swear that there's no truth and who cares, why do you say it like you're right. But as a practical matter, (which this discussion is not), I doubt that there are many thorough going postmodernists left if there ever were any to begin with. The idea of the crazed dogmantic postmodernist who doesn't believe in anything is entirely a convenient strawman for fundamentalists who can say look how silly postmodernism is therefore my interpretation of absolute and unmediated truth handed down from the divine must be right The fundamental insight of postmodernism, that context and proximity changes the object of observation (or at least the reception and significance thereof) stands. Me!Sheesh!Mine! 19:42, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

Context and proximity do not change the fact that the world is well over 6,000 years old. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 19:46, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
The context is that you are saying this in the year 2010, so yes, it does. Me!Sheesh!Mine! 19:53, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
The world was also well over 6,000 years old in 4004 B.C., so no, it does not. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 19:58, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
I'm not sure of your point re 4004 B.C. but, assuming the world had a beginning, your statement is only true at a point 6k years after it's formation and only if we're talking about "standard" years. So yes, context does change it. If you had said that on the day the world was formed the various Martian construction workers within earshot would have every right to guffaw in derision at your naivete. Also, if you are trying to say that the scope of context I'm using is silly I'll point out that the context of that scope is a discussion of whether or not reality is real. Me!Sheesh!Mine! 21:00, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
To rephrase in more absolute terms, the world formed well over 6,000 years before I posted this message to the Wiki. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:05, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

and we're right back where we started. The statement is only true because of a raft of context based on when and where you said it. Note in particular your use of the relative phrase before. I understand that some of these shifts are non significant (to the point of being absurd) in most contexts that, however, does not make them disappear. Plus, I don't even know you or where you are posting from. We can make guesses that it does not matter, but that is simply walling off the unknown to something pragmatic which is of course cheating Me!Sheesh!Mine! 21:16, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

The latter statement is not dependent on "a raft of context," only on the time I posted the message. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:22, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Also where. Martian years are longer. Me!Sheesh!Mine! 21:29, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
You appear to be confusing the statement's meaning with the language used to express it. Mjollnir.svgListenerXTalkerX 21:33, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
Expressions like "6000 years ago" are indexicals, and indexicals are context-sensitive expressions. I'm not familiar with the cutting-edge treatment of indexicals in linguistics, but last I checked they generally build on Kaplan's account in "Demonstratives" in which the time and location of an utterance are features of the context. The content of the expression depends on these contextual features in Kaplan's account (and its descendants), though the character (which Kaplan thinks is the closest counterpart to meaning) does not. In any case, Kaplan would say that what is said by the sentence "The world formed well over 6000 years ago/before I posted this message to the wiki" is context-sensitive, and I'm not aware of any linguists who'd disagree.TallMan (talk) 15:45, 12 January 2010 (UTC)


Postmodernism started off as a bunch of interesting critiques, but disappeared up its own arse a long, long time ago. The Sokal hoax illustrated its eventual emptiness beautifully. Please to read and enjoy. --Robledo (talk) 20:44, 8 January 2010 (UTC)