Talk:Arguments against the existence of God

This is really about the Christian God

I have a problem with the focus of this article as it is arguing against some presumed characteristics of one particular version of "God". In reality it is talking about some claimed attributes of one god in particular - the Christian god.

But would these same arguments apply to, for example, Zeus? Would they apply to Odin? Would they apply to the Deistic version of god: a god so abstract that virtually no claims are made about it?

Now, personally I don't think that any of these "gods" exist. But I think that this article risks accepting far to much of the burden of proof.

To come at this from another direction: I also don't believe that fairies exist. But I don't think that the best way to debate with a fairy-believer would be to argue about how difficult it would be for fairies to fly. The way to go is to ask for evidence that fairies exist.--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 21:24, 17 March 2017 (UTC)

The burden of proof. A concept often discussed, rarely rigorously defined. The lack of rigour gives me strong doubts about the entire concept. In mathematics, the burden of proof is on whoever makes a claim – Mary claims that there exists an integer greater than 2 which cannot be expressed as the sum of two primes; Peter denies any such integer exists. Who has the mathematical burden of proof? All mathematicians agree that both hold it equally – the person who asserts a mathematical conjecture and a person who asserts its negation are both equally required to submit proof. Now suppose furthermore that Mary is a theist who claims that God exists, while Peter is a strong atheist who claims that God does not exist–what is the burden of proof now? Many will say that for these claims, Mary has the burden of proof but Peter doesn't. Yet, that seems to me a case of special pleading – applying one set of rules to mathematics and another to philosophy. Why shouldn't we use the same burden of proof in both cases? How do we determine, objectively, who has the burden of proof with respect to any specific claim? Or is "burden of proof" just a matter of subjective opinion, without any objective reality? (((Zack Martin)))^™ 22:59, 17 March 2017 (UTC)

"Now suppose furthermore that Mary is a theist who claims that God exists, while Peter is a strong atheist who claims that God does not exist–what is the burden of proof now?"

In this case both would have a burden of proof. But most modern atheists do not express their beliefs in that way. Thye simply state that the evidence in respect of gods, unicorns, bigfoot, fairies or whatever is not convincing and they see no reason to believe in such things until there is evidence for them.

Someone with a lack of belief in the existence of unicorns has no obligation to prove the negative case.--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 07:59, 18 March 2017 (UTC)

So, one question is, if you don't have a belief that God doesn't exist, and you simply say you don't know (or can't know) whether God exists, why not call yourself an "agnostic" instead? I actually think, that if you go back a few decades or a century or so, people who lacked positive disbelief in God more commonly called themselves "agnostics", and it is only in more recent decades that such people have shifted more to the term "atheism". If you read the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article "atheism", it distinguishes three kinds of atheism, the dogmatic, the sceptical, and the critical–and argues the second kind of atheism is nearly indistinguishable from agnosticism. If you read the 1911 EB's article on "agnosticism", you find what it explains is pretty much the same as what many "atheists" today believe–that regarding God, immortality, etc., "there is no evidence which entitles us either to deny or affirm anything". So, if the term "atheist" is ambiguous – it could refer to either a belief that God doesn't exist, or simply a lack of belief either way – but the term "agnostic" lacks that ambiguity – why not prefer the less ambiguous term? (((Zack Martin)))^™ 08:38, 18 March 2017 (UTC)

I think we are going off-topic, but OK. If you want to label me an "agnostic" go ahead, I guess you can label me how you wish. Nevertheless, I call myself an atheist because I don't believe that gods exist. As I said, I don't believe in the existence of gods in the same way that I don't believe in the existence of unicorns.

I am also using the the word "atheist" in the same way that it's defined on RW's page atheism page. And it's also the way it's used by the famous agnostic fence-sitter Richard dawkins and the vast majority of modern atheists I am aware of.

But as I said - you are welcome to disagree with the definition , and I am sure you could find some atheists who disagree too.--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 19:20, 18 March 2017 (UTC)

Well, if we look at it from a viewpoint of epistemic probability, we can identify two poles – certain theism, P(God exists)=1.0, certain atheism, P(God exists)=0.0; and the midpoint between them, P(God exists)=0.5 – the point of having absolutely zero evidence either way – of course there are many other positions than these three on the continuum from 0.0 to 1.0, but these are useful as primary points of reference. Now, the question then, is what to label the point P(God exists)=0.5. I would say that theism owns the territory P(God exists)>0.5 and atheism owns the territory P(God exists)<0.5, so that P(God exists)=0.5 is neutral ground which belongs to neither. Yet, you seem to be suggesting we should apply the word "atheism" to P(God exists)=0.5 as well, which seems to me to be a form of (metaphorical) territorial imperialism, an attempt by atheism to expand its territory, maybe as part of a strategy to get the rhetorical upper hand against theism. By contrast, using a distinct term from either "theism" or "atheism", "agnosticism", to refer to P(God exists)=0.5 seems much fairer. Furthermore, labelling both P(God exists)=0.5 and P(God exists)=0.0 as "atheism" implies that P(God exists)=0.5 has more in common with P(God exists)=0.0 than with P(God exists)=1.0, when I don't see how that is true; 0.5 as the exact midpoint between theism and atheism has as much in common with one as with the other, so if P(God exists)=0.5 is to be called "atheism", it ought to be called "theism" too. Following that line of thought, maybe you are actually a theist? If having no idea is enough to be called an atheist, it ought to be enough to be called a theist too. Also, this is not as much a tangent as you think, because unless you are sitting exactly on P(God exists)=0.5, then surely you have a burden of proof to justify your movement away from 0.5, in whichever direction you go? Surely P(God exists)=0.25 has just as much burden of proof as P(God exists)=0.75, even though the proof it needs to meet its burden is opposite. So either you are at exactly P(God exists)=0.5, in which case I am trying to convince you it is illogical to call yourself an "atheist"; or, you are at P(God exists)<0.5, in which case you still have a burden of proof for your position (and the further you get below 0.5, the bigger the burden becomes). (((Zack Martin)))^™ 23:32, 18 March 2017 (UTC)

Would the same go for unicorns?--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 13:58, 19 March 2017 (UTC)

Basically yes. A person who says unicorns are more likely than not to exist (P(unicorns exist) > 0.5) is a unicornist, a person who says unicorns are more likely than not to not exist (P(unicorns exist) < 0.5) is an aunicornist, a person who says unicorns are as likely to exist as to not (P(unicorns exist)=0.5) is a unicorn agnostic. Now, for both unicorns and God, I would be willing to expand the territory of agnosticism around 0.5, beyond exactly 0.5, so long as it expands in both directions equally. So, if someone says unicorns are just very slightly more likely to exist than not, we might class them as a unicorn agnostic rather than as an unicornist–and the same goes in the other direction, and what is true for unicorn (dis)belief is true for God (dis)belief mutatis mutandis. I don't know where exactly to put the boundary between agnosticism and non-agnosticism (or we could call it "gnosticism", but not "Gnosticism"), and I don't think it matters very much so long as it is at the same point in both directions, but at 0.25 and 0.75 or at 1/3 and 2/3 are both easily defensible places at which to draw a line. (Drawing lines is inevitably somewhat arbitrary but not completely arbitrary–compare it to the debate around the legal age of consent for sex–obviously 5 is way too low and 50 is way too high, but whether it should be at 15 or 16 is a much harder question to answer.)

However, that said, there are some relevant differences between unicorns and God. Do I believe in unicorns? I would say universally yes but locally no. To expand: I think the universe is such a big and diverse place, more likely than not unicorns exist somewhere in spacetime, somewhere and somewhen. Maybe they exist on a planet in a distant galaxy. Maybe genetic engineering will produce them on this planet a century from now. I don't know, I can't know for sure, but I do think it more likely than not that unicorns exist somewhere in this spacetime. But, locally – as in on this planet right now – do I think unicorns exist? Probably not. I mean, they could, but if there were unicorns on this planet right now, you'd think we'd have better evidence for them. (Well, probably some silly person somewhere has surgically stuck a horn on a horse's head, but by 'unicorn' I expect we mean a horse-like creature which naturally grows a horn, like a rhino does, and without any surgical intervention, because its DNA codes for a horn just like how a rhino's does.)

Now, that's true for unicorns; what about God? Well, unicorns, whether they exist or not, are generally understood to be spatiotemporally limited beings. If they exist, they exist in some spatial locations and not others. If they exist, they exist for temporally finite periods, coming into existence at some times and going out of existence at others. By contrast, most theists don't understand God in this way. God is not the kind of entity which has a specific spatial location in this universe–either God exists everywhere equally (omnipresence), or God exists yet exists nowhere (as a being which inherently lacks any spatial location), or God exists somewhere outside of this physical universe (outside of this connected spatial region). And most theists say that God is not the sort of entity that can exist at some times but not others, either God exists outside of time entirely, or else God exists at every single moment of time.

(Now, of course, not all theists view God as being largely or entirely outside of spacetime. Mormons believe God has a physical body somewhere within this physical universe. So do some UFO religions. Many ancient pagans likely viewed their Gods as physical beings existing in the physical universe, although the more sophisticated pagans, such as ancient philosophers, possibly understood their God(s) in a more rarefied way. Mainstream Jewish/Christian/Islamic theology views God as being fundamentally outside spacetime, but some mediaeval peasant may well have literally believed that God was an old man sitting on a throne above the clouds. But, usually when we talk about the theism-atheism debate, we are talking about mainstream sophisticated theism according to which God is radically unlike unicorns.)

So, the relevance of this, is I think I am justified in believing unicorns probably don't exist locally, since entities that exist locally generally produce local evidence of their existence, so lack of local evidence is evidence of lack of local existence. But, I'm not justified in believing unicorns probably don't exist universally, since entities that exist in spatiotemporally distant parts of the universe cannot be expected to produce local evidence–we can't say the evidence doesn't exist somewhere/somewhen, because it may well, but if it does, it is inaccessible to us in the here and now. So "absence of evidence is evidence is absence" is universally false but locally true–it is evidence for local aunicornism but not for universal aunicornism. Now, many atheists try to apply "absence of evidence is evidence of absence" to God, but I don't think that works, because they are trying to apply a locally valid principle to an inherently non-local being – it is a category mistake. The distinction between local and universal existence works for some types of alleged entities (such as unicorns) but not for other types (such as God, or Platonic forms). (((Zack Martin)))^™ 23:17, 19 March 2017 (UTC)

So you would agree that the actual evidence we presently possess in favour of the existence of gods is on par with the evidence we have for unicorns.--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 06:59, 20 March 2017 (UTC)

I don't think there is such a thing as "the evidence we have"–you presume that there is some common body of evidence which both of us equally possess–or equally have access to–when I doubt that is true. You and I are more likely than not coming from different starting points, different sets of basic assumptions – given my basic assumptions theism is far more likely than given yours. But, are your or my basic assumptions based on evidence? I think basic assumptions are largely adopted apart from evidence. At some point we have to believe things without evidence–all evidence depends on some further propositions to justify its status as "evidence", and we can always demand evidence for those further propositions–which must result in either an infinite regress of evidence demands, or circular evidence, or accepting beliefs without any evidence (Münchhausen's trilemma)–we both believe things without evidence, we just believe different things.

I have spent a lot of time thinking about moral arguments for God's existence; but, my "moral arguments" are rather different from the classical ones. Classic moral arguments claim God's existence is necessary in order to explain some aspect of morality, such as the objective nature of moral demands. I have a very different approach – claim that we are morally obliged to believe God exists, and claim that (in certain cases) if we are morally obliged to believe something it must be true. Now, you probably think those two claims are a load of baloney – but I've got arguments in favour of them. But, at some point we are probably going to just conclude that you & I have different fundamental ideas about what it means to be moral and what it means to be rational. And are our differing fundamental concepts of morality and rationality based on evidence, or adopted apart from evidence? Well, for both you and me, probably the latter more than the former. But, we all have to believe some things without evidence, we just end up believing different things without evidence. (W. K. Clifford's dictum that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" is self-refuting, because his dictum itself lacks sufficient evidence to justify believing in it–oh, Clifford tries to marshal evidence, but the evidence he collects is insufficient to demonstrate his conclusion.) (((Zack Martin)))^™ 11:52, 20 March 2017 (UTC)

So what exactly is your evidence for the existence of gods?--Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 17:41, 21 March 2017 (UTC)

Argument for the existence of limited god

This discussion was moved to Forum:Argument for the existence of limited god.

Argument from the impossibility of omnipotence

Isn't this essentially the argument from incompatible qualities, just specified down to omnipotence only? I just want to see what the consensus on that is before I take any action about what I perceive to be an unnecessary reiteration. User:Representative SlipRepresent Yourself 16:47, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

The Problem of Good, the Omnipotence Paradox and commenting when you revert

Hey @Summa Atheologica, Regarding your revert of my changes, in the future, please put in some comments when reverting, or add an entry in the discussion page. As it is, I have no concrete idea what your issue was with the change, so I don't really know how to respond or re-apply them in a way that addresses your concerns (nor can I contradict or argue against your concerns, since I do not know what they are)

I am going to infer that you have some sort of affection for this "Problem of Good" argument (although, of course, when I infer, I might make an "inf" out of "e" and "r") and not that you are somehow against "The Omnipotence Paradox" being an argument against the existence of God. If this is so, I'd like to recommend, in the future, that you:

1. Include comments if you do decide to just blindly revert
2. Don't just blindly revert. Edit, instead. eg:

Embellish the "Problem of Good" section to try to meet my concerns

Do not remove a perfectly valid section

If you do disagree that the Omnipotence Paradox is a valid argument against God, I'd like to recommend, in the future, that you:

1. Include comments if you decide to just blindly revert!
2. Don't just blindly revert! Edit, instead! eg:

Improve the Omnipotence Paradox section.

Merge details about the omnipotence paradox into another section.

I'm not particularly invested in removing the problem of Good entry of arguments against God, although, I really don't think the present text makes sense. I do not at all see how the existence of good is an argument against an Abrahamic God. Is this section trying to say that the presence of goodness somehow contradicts the existence of an evil God? Couldn't such an evil God just, maliciously, be playing with our heads (which I would consider quite evil) Like Elipsis says, you can't just substitute pronouncements of Evil for Good into arguments

If you really like that section, improve it! --Bertrc (talk) 17:08, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

The thing is that the Abrahamic God indulges in actions most would not consider good, and maltheism is even more affected.𝔖𝔲𝔪𝔪𝔞 𝔄𝔱𝔥𝔢𝔬𝔩𝔬𝔤𝔦𝔠𝔞 (𝔮𝔲𝔢𝔯𝔢𝔩𝔦𝔰) (𝔰𝔠𝔯𝔦𝔭𝔱𝔲𝔯𝔞) 18:26, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

@Summa Atheologica, If I understand your thought, you believe that the Abrahamic God is described as having done evil things. Sure, that's a perfectly understandable opinion, but what does the "Problem of Good", as described in the article, have to do with it? (Or, perhaps, what does that opinion have to do with "Problem of Good", as described in the article?) The "problem of good" section does not say "Many things ascribed to the Abrahamic God seem evil, which contradicts the existence of such a God as omnibenevolent."

1. Such an argument/position seems more like a subset of "The Problem of Evil"; I have no idea why you would call such an argument "The problem of Good"
2. While "The problem of Good" description does not make much sense, what the section does describe is nothing like your argument/position.

Would my adding your argument/position as a subset under "The Problem of Evil" address your concerns, so that I can remove "The Problem of Good" section"? --Bertrc (talk) 22:04, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

Okay. Removing again, then. As I said, the Problem of evil doesn't really prove that a completely evil being exists, since an evil being could simply be in it for themselves. Who cares about good happening, unless it impacts me? --Bertrc (talk) 02:04, 4 April 2020 (UTC)

The Arguments

Taken in the context of Rationalism, one must ask, what is meant by an argument against the existence of a thing? That thing must itself be more than simply an idea, or a mental construct. For the ontological status of an idea may be assumed as a consequence of our own existence, which we must take for granted. So our ideas of a thing exist, in our own minds, even if the actual thing itself does not exist elsewhere. Thus, for God to be said to exist beyond the subjective idea of such an entity, that being must possess some form of reality that we recognize as consistent with our understanding of some ontologically objective thing. God is not like a bird in a tree, yet we believe that, were God real, we should be able to see and hear the presence of God. But an obvious problem arises. If one were confronted by such an entity, claiming to be God, how would one proceed to examine the truth of the claim? Clearly one would require a criteria for the identification of a deity. Thus one could never prove that the category of Gods is empty because it is not a well-defined set. In this way it is easy to assume that even if a God existed, we would never be able to prove it by any generally accepted form of argument unless provided with necessary and sufficient criteria for its existence. Therefore it would also be impossible to prove the category of Gods is non-empty. UncleKrampus (talk) 02:11, 1 February 2021 (UTC)

Unbound by time

If you believe that time and causality would work completely the same for an omnipotent being as for us bounded mortals, please edit to incorporate your thoughts and at least discuss them. It is hard to work out a consensus when changes are blindly reverted with no comment or discussion. --Bertrc (talk) 21:21, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

Also, trying to hide your reverts of another person's contributions as "minor" edits is not really cricket. --Bertrc (talk) 21:21, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

I'll only raise a minor concern here. With your addition, the section goes from talking about God as a general concept, to talking specifically about the traditional interpretation of the Abrahamic God, to talking about God in general. Content wise, as far as I can tell your addition is consistent with something like a Spinozic view of God. 68.56.144.8 (talk) 21:55, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

Perhaps you should be informed that edits that are reverted get automatically marked as minor. --It's-a me, LeftyGreenMario! 23:12, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

I did not know that about reverts. One more reason why people shouldn't use them! ;-) Thanks for the info. I'll also edit the section so that it uses "Omnipotent" instead of "Abrahamic" . . . Event though we all know Who we are talking about. This wiki needs a "wink wink" article! :-D --Bertrc (talk) 00:41, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

Poor arguments against the existence of God given

This page is filled with poor arguments against the existence of God.

For example, the "argument" that there are "millions of dead stars and galaxies". Stars and galaxies are not living nor have they ever been living. That's a fact.TommyG (talk) 22:59, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

🔌 --It's-a me, LeftyGreenMario! 23:07, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

"Dead" doesn't necessarily mean it was alive at some point, e.g. dead batteries. Plutocow (talk) 23:08, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

So why pray tell is a burned out star a tragedy? Nonliving matter merely changed form. It's not like there is a shortage of stars.

Furthermore, in the biblical model of the universe, we live in a fallen world due to sin. Free will is infinitely better than a world with a lack of free will where people are robots. A fallen world creates morale/character improvement through working through adversity. In the biblical worldview there will be a new heaven and new earth as well. TommyG (talk) 23:31, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

Gentlemen, I hate to do it, but on the behalf of all christendom I declare VICTORY! Olé! Olé! Olé! Chef Moosolini’s Ristorante Italiano^{Make a Reservation} 23:32, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

Black dwarves exist only in theory. Dead stars exist, but not from "burning out". --It's-a me, LeftyGreenMario! 23:37, 21 March 2021 (UTC)

I'm never particularly impressed by arguments against the existence of "God". Humanity has invented so many different Gods that finding an argument that works against every one of them is almost impossible. Many (perhaps most) of the arguments on this page wouldn't work against Zeus, for example. In any event the burden of proof does not rest with those who would dispute the existence of Zeus or any other God - the burden of proof lies with those who claim these beings do exist. Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 20:42, 22 March 2021 (UTC)

Those who would dispute the existence of Zeus or any other God do have a burden of proof, assuming we're taking the claim to be something like "Zeus does not exist." A theist would not be unreasonable to ask for proof of this statement, which probably won't be forthcoming, given that you can't really prove existential negation. The weaker claim that "There is no reason to believe that Zeus exists" effectively has no burden of proof: the proof would be a lack of evidence, so that the burden is immediately shifted to whoever claims there is reason to believe in Zeus. But "Zeus exists" and "there is no reason to believe that Zeus exists" are not incompatible, so that strictly, the latter claim justifies only suspension of judgement (agnosticism) rather than overt rejection (atheism). ^{— Unsigned, by: 68.56.144.8 / talk / contribs}

Nah mate. Compare "Zeus does exist" vs "Zeus does not exist". One of these statements must carry the burden of proof, and it's obviously the former - because as we agree, there is no reason to believe that Zeus exists. Kauri0.o (talk) 02:55, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

Both start with a burden of proof. I will admit that above, I do not account for the fact that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, and thus if it is true that there is no evidence of Zeus, this constitutes evidence that Zeus does not exist. I would thus argue that what is really going on is that both start with a burden, but the latter is immediately relieved of it by this fact, shifting the burden to the positive claim. Arguably, though, the agnostic position is still more strongly justified, as the conclusion that Zeus does not exist requires an inductive inference, whereas the agnostic just sits on the evidential claim, which technically has more direct empirical support. Possibly the most justified stance to take is “Zeus probably does not exist,” which is weak, but easily supported. This is going pretty far into the weeds, though. 68.56.144.8 (talk) 03:09, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

You can make the same argument about Bigfoot, faeries, the Loch Ness Monster or the Christian god. The best we can say is that they probably don't exist. But that is sufficient for us to say that we even though we don't categorically "know" that they don't exist, the lack of evidence in their favor justifies us in saying that we don't "believe" they exist.

In this case the burden of proof remains with those who would claim that Zeus, faeries or the various versions of the Christian god god exist.Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 13:19, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

I think we are in agreement. It's worth noting, though, that although a lack of evidence is evidence of a lack, its pretty weak evidence. Pretty much any piece of alleged evidence for the existence of faeries is enough to shift the burden back, and the burden is then to show that this doesn't constitute evidence, or that there is some additional counter-evidence that outweighs the faeries hypothesis. A single direct observation of a black swan is sufficient to override all evidence against it that comes from a lack of evidence. And if your idea is contrived enough, there are things that really would constitute evidence for it. If I believe in ghosts, and I define them in part as "beings that make creepy noises in old houses," then creepy noises in old houses really would constitute evidence for their existence (it's weak evidence, but it is evidence), at which point it's necessary to demonstrate that it constitutes better evidence for some alternative hypothesis, or that there is some other evidence that makes my ghost idea ridiculous to believe in. I feel that I should make it clear that I do not actually believe in ghosts or faeries or any such thing, nor do I believe that there is good justification to believe in such things; I'm merely being pedantic. Starting with "there are no faeries" and then retreating to the more easily justified "there is no reason to believe in faeries" is technically a motte and bailey. 68.56.144.8 (talk) 14:23, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

For sure. There is "evidence" and there is "good evidence". There is evidence for Bigfoot in the form of blurred photos. The same can be said of alien spaceships and the the Loch Ness Monster. The problem is that it's not good convincing evidence and we are justified in ignoring it.

Self evidently, a pair of living breathing squawking black swans would be pretty good evidence for the existence of black swans. So yes. I think we are in agreement.Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 14:36, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

I am having such deja vu. Apologies if I am repeating something I said somewhere else. I agree more with OmnicronReborn/@Serene/@Omicron. The burden of proof, imho, depends on context and on how the subject is brought up. If some person is ranting "God (or Bigfoot or the CIA) does not exist!!!" then I think the burden of proof and the burden of countering proffered evidence against their statement/proof lies with that person. If somebody says "I believe God (or Pete Abrams or Nessie) does exist" then I do not think there is a burden of proof on anybody, although there is an avenue for both sides to explain why they feel that way and why the other side's reasonings do not change their belief. --Bertrc (talk) 01:21, 6 April 2021 (UTC)

I would agree there is a difference between knowledge and belief (if that's the point yo are making). I do not know with 100 percent certainty that Bigfoot does not exist. However the lack of good evidence in favor of Bigfoot existing justifies my belief that Bigfoot does not exist.Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 09:11, 6 April 2021 (UTC)

Nah, I was just opining about who should be on the stand to defend their beliefs. "On whose shoulders does the burden of proof rest" was something OmnicronReborn (aka 68.56.144.8 / Serene / Omicron) brought up above. --Bertrc (talk) 16:01, 16 April 2021 (UTC)

Some of the strongest modern arguments/evidence for God are: the anthropic principle/fine tuning argument (the alternative is the multiverse hypothesis which has no intuitive appeal and is unscientific); the overturning of the atheistic steady state theory which has been replaced by scientists acknowledging that the universe having a beginning is far more plausible (Genesis 1:1 mentions a beginning) and the discovery of biological information (DNA/RNA codes) which points to intelligence being behind biological organisms (It is somewhat analogous to a unintentional "SETI project" for theists which came to theists without them having to expend any effort/expenses). Codes point to an intelligence. The Morse code was created by Samuel Morse.

The argument from beauty is an older argument which is a strong argument. Nature does not clash colors and is very beautiful. Granted there is some ugliness post what Christians call "The fall", but even post fall nature is very beautiful. A building demands a builder and a painting demands a painter.

The majority of the world's population are theists and find the evidence for God very satisfactory (Christians, Muslims, Jews, Sihks and deists are all monotheists and hold a majority of the world's population).S'chn T'gai Spock (talk) 09:48, 6 April 2021 (UTC)

You would be better advised making one argument and going with it. When you make multiple arguments simultaneously things get complicated. Also we probably don't want to rewrite large parts of the wiki on this talk pàge when they already exist as articles. So I suggest you might want to read - in order of your arguments:

1. See Argument from fine tuning, Anthropic principle, Argument from incredulity and Argument from design.

2. See Argument from beauty

3. See Argumentum ad populum

Then decide which particular one you want to put your dollar on and then come back on it.Bob^{"Life is short and (insert adjective)"} 12:12, 6 April 2021 (UTC)