Brian Reynolds Myers

From RationalWiki
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Myers.
Oh no, they're talking about
Politics
Icon politics.svg
Theory
Practice
Philosophies
Terms
As usual
Country sections
United States politics British politics Canadian politics Chinese politics French politics German politics Indian politics Iranian politics Israeli politics Japanese politics South Korean politics Turkish politics
v - t - e
“”The overriding problem throughout Myers’s book translation. For his race theory of [North Korean] ideology to work, Myers translates the term minjok as race, but these terms are not synonymous.
—Suzy Kim[1]

Brian Reynolds Myers (1963–) or B. R. Myers (브라이언 [레이놀즈] 마이어스) is a professor of international studies at Dongseo University (동서대학교). Although he has politically biased views, his views are often reflected in English Wikipedia and the American media. His views are not neutral at all and make a biased political analysis close to the South Korean far-right, but his hawkish views on North Korea are accepted by mainstream academia, as they remain absolutely mainstream in American politics. He is even a pro-Japanese American imperialist who is hostile to the Korean anti-colonial agenda.[2][3][4]

He is a controversial scholar in South Korea, especially for his clever defense of South Korea's pro-American/pro-Japanese colonialistic/McCarthyistic ultraconservative far-right, while denouncing liberals and leftists in South Korea who seek unification with North Korea as "anti-American", "racial nationalist", and "anti-Japanese [pro-North Korean] ethnonationalist". To put it simply, he is just an advocate for South Korean-style wingnuts pretending to be an American-style liberal hawk; he identified himself as a supporter of the U.S. Green Party, but contradictingly, he defines himself as an anti-North Korean conservative in South Korea. Ironically, the U.S. Green Party (미국 녹색당) is interacting with South Korea's 'left-wing [Korean ethnic] nationalist' (좌파민족주의) [sympathetic to North Korean] political party, the Progressive Party (진보당).[5]

He tends to mistranscribe the word 민족 and 민족주의 unconditionally as "Korean race" and "race-based nationalism". However, in Korea, the word that has the same meaning as "race" in English is 인종, never 민족. For example, Koreans translate "racism" into 인종주의 and never into 민족주의. There is no English word that has the same meaning as 민족, and the synonym for 민족 is "Volk", a German word. Especially in South Korea, 'resistance minjok nationalism' (저항적 민족주의) or 'Korean ethnic nationalism' is an ideology shared across the political left that anti-imperialism, rdefending unification of the Korean Peninsula unjustly divided by great powers, and pursues pacifism, which is absolutely linked to the 1980s South Korean democracy movement, so Meyers, who describes it as a "pro-North Korean fanatic," can be seen as a South Korean far-right "[anti-ethnic] pro-state nationalist" (국가주의) supporter.[6][7] As will be described later, rather, in 20th Century Korean History, "[anti-colonial Korean] ethnic nationalism" (민족주의) was an anti-imperialist, anti-fascist and left-wing ideology (irrelevant to racism), and "state nationalism" or "statism" (국가주의) was related to pro-Japanese fascism.[8] Nevertheless, he ignores Korea's political history, supports the latter from an American point of view, and opposes the former.

Anti-North Korean sentiment[edit]

He compares North Korea's political system to "far-right" or "Japanese fascism". It is true that North Korea is an very isolationist nationalist country, but Myers tends to exaggerate North Korea's history to criticize it.

He and some of the Western liberals who support him argue that North Korea is a country built by 'pro-Japanese collaborators' (친일파) much better before 1945. Based on this, Myers and his supporters argue that the North Korean system is an extension of Japanese imperial fascism.[9] In an interview with South Korea's right-wing conservative journalist Chosun Ilbo (조선일보), he mentioned Choi Seung-hee (최승희), Kim Sa-ryang (김사량), and Song Young (송영) as evidence that North Korea welcomed pro-Japanese collaborators and hired them.[10] However, Choi Seung-hee and Kim Sa-ryang ere effectively purged in the late 1950s.[11] Many South Koreans, as well as Bruce Cummings, an expert on Korean studies much more than Myers, evaluate that North Korea, unlike South Korea, has cleared its pro-Japanese collaborators.[12][13] Rather, North Korea is so hostile to historical pro-Japanese collaborators that it socially abuses even the descendants of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Songbun ([출신]성분).[12] It is true that North Korea is an Orwellian-totalitarian state, but it is too much to directly associate it with "Japanese fascism".

Myers' equating North Korea's left-wing nationalism with Japanese ultra-nationalism ignores the context of nationalism. Nationalism in Nazi Germany and imperial Japan led to expansionist imperialism, but [anti-'state nationalist'] Korean [ethnic] nationalism was an ideology to resist such expansionist imperialism. In Germany and Japan, it is right to view mainstream ethnic nationalism as a far-right ideology, but it is questionable whether it is academically honest to regard Inter-Korea's resistance nationalism, which was a victim of colonialism, as a far-right. Kim monarchism is closer to the [reactionary] far-right, but North Korea's nationalism is strictly [anti-colonial] left-wing, NOT [fascist] far-right. In particular, while denouncing Inter-Korea's left-wing nationalism as the successors of Japanese fascism, denouncing them as "anti-Japanese racial nationalists" undermines the persuasive power of his logic.[note 1]

He condemns the anti-Americanism of the North Korean people as racism,[14] but deliberately avoids mentioning that the war crimes committed by the U.S. during the Korean War formed anti-Americanism of the North Korean people.

Right-wing, anti-Minjok and pro-American biased viewpoint of South Korean politics[edit]

B.R. Myers has been criticized by South Korean liberals and leftists for advocating hatred of North Korea, overly American interpretation of South Korean politics and pro-American/pro-Japanese colonialist views. He often expressed hostile perceptions of progressive [민족] nationalist movements in South Korea. He often translates the South Korean progressive nationalist concepts of 민족(Minjok, Korean nation) and 민족주의(Minjokjuui, Korean nationalism) into "Korean race" and "ethno-nationalism". He tends to link the motivations of the South Korean left-wing camp's protests critical of the United States to [anti-American] 'racism'. However, it is much more based on anti-imperialist sentiments than on racist in many cases.[15] He even makes a very biased claim that pro-Japanese collaborators have become left-wingers in South Korea.[16]

He defines himself as a "conservative" (보수주의자) and "anti-North Korea" (반북, 反北) in the context of South Korean politics.[17] He is giving political advice to key politicians of the People Power Party, a right-wing political party in South Korea.[18]

Since South Korea is very different from the Western political environment, liberals and left-wing politicians tend to put forward the concept of "Minjok". Therefore, South Korea's right-wing media tends to define themselves as "civic nationalist" (시민 민족주의, 시민 내셔널리즘 or [시민] 국민주의), denouncing the South's left-wing conciliatory foreign policy toward North Korea as "ethnic nationalist" ([종족] 민족주의, 민족 내셔널리즘 or 민족 국민주의). For example, far-right [extreme pro-Americam/pro-Japanese anti-communist] political commentators, such as former lawmaker Heo Hwa-pyong (허화평), who served the government of Chun Doo-hwan (전두환), a neoliberal pro-American dictator and mass murdererWikipedia reminiscent of Pinochet, denounce left-wing activists as "pro-North Korean"/"ethno-nationalists"/"anti-Japanese racist" from a McCarthyist point of view and define themselves as rational "civic nationalists".[19][20] 민족(minjok) is sometimes translated as "[Korean] race", but the official translation of "race" in Korea is 인종(Injong), and 민족 in Korea is usually closer to the meaning of "nation", "folk" (German word "[das] Volk") or "ethnic group".[21][22][23]

Nevertheless, B.R. Myers is very notorious for deliberately translating 민족 as "race," praising self-proclaimed "anti-Minjok" (반민족) South Korean McCarthyistic ultra-conservative and implying South Korean left-liberals and moderate conservatives as if they were racists. For example, Kim Young-sam, the most moderate right-wing president in South Korea's history and the only conservative president to support reconciliation with North Korea, said in his inaugural address in 1993, "No ally is better than one’s own Korean nation" (어느 동맹국도 '민족'보다 더 나을 수는 없습니다): In this sentence, although 민족 is close to "Korean nation" for context, but Myers translated it as "No ally is better than one’s own [Korean] 'race'." Myers argued that the prime minister of West Germany never uses these words.[24] However, Myers' comments are not true, even Helmut KohlWikipedia's famous reference to East German citizens as "Volk" ("[German ethnic] people", "[German] nation" or "[German] race") shows. Myers is an anti-Korean bullshit liar. The only South Korean scholars who support Meyers' argument are ironically radical pro-American/pro-Japanese, anti-'Korean ethnonationalism', anti-feminist, anti-leftist, extreme hatred of North Korea, adoration of anti-communist dictatorship, and the military hawk far-right[25] "뉴라이트" (New Right)Wikipedia.[26] Myers actually accuses South Korea's major left-liberals of being pro-North Korean/anti-Japanese/anti-American or ethno-nationalists, exactly the same view as the South Korean far-right [뉴라이트] McCarthyists.[27][28][29] The South Korean center-right wing is critical of North Korea, but rejects Myers and 뉴라이트 views. In fact, Myers even rated moderate conservatives, as well as South Korean left, very negatively because they were "pan-Korean nationalist" and openly defended the South Korean far-right 뉴라이트.[30]

Most 'leftist Minjok ideologies' (좌파민족주의 / "left nationalism") are aimed at condemning Japanese imperialism and supporting the unification of Korea, whose homeland is unfairly divided into two by the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, many conservatives in South Korea show anti-Islam, anti-Chinese, anti-feminist and xenophobic tendencies, and, paradoxically, multiculturalism and minority rights are supported by liberals and leftists who do not reject the Minjok concept. South Korean left-wingers who take an ethnonationalistic position on North Korea are more pro-immigrant than South Korean right-wingers who are hostile to North Korea.[31][32] The reason why South Korean liberals and leftists do not give up anti-imperialist (especially sympathetic to North Korea and critical of Japan) Minjok nationalism is that the misogynistic militarist culture, economic inequality, and remnants of Japanese colonialism in inter-Korean society are related to the Cold War system caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula.

In particular, considering that "minjok" is closely related to the post-colonialism in Korea and represents Diaspora Koreans abroad who were unable to return to their homeland due to Japanese colonialism and the Korean War, it can be seen that pro-Japanese right-wing scholars such as Myers and Shin Ki-wook's (extremely anti-North Korean and militaristic) defense of [right-wing pro-colonialist] 'state-based nationalism' by demonizing [left-wing anti-imperialist] 'Korean ethnic nationalism' (friendly to non-Japanese people immigrants).[33] There are still many people who suffer greatly from the division of the Korean Peninsula, or the 'division of minjok' (민족분열) in Korean expression.(hereWikipedia, hereWikipedia, here, here, etc) Moreover, because of this 'division of minjok', South Korea and North Korea point guns at each other, and in the case of South Korea, conscription is being implemented for young men, which is a major cause of anti-feminist misogyny culture centered on young men in South Korea,[34] and North Korea's extreme militarismWikipedia is not irrelevant to 'division of minjok'. Therefore, in order to eliminate militarism and misogyny in South and North Korea, Korean ethnic nationalism may be partially necessary in that it is necessary to reconcile with each other based on the same identity (=minjok).

Myers often criticizes South Korea's Minjok ideology and argues that South Korea lacks [non-Minjok] state-national spirit, supporting the position that it should be designated as an official anniversary since it was founded on August 15, 1948.[35] August 15 is a national holiday in South Korea, which liberals, leftists and some center-right in South Korea regard as a National Liberation DayWikipedia from Japanese imperialism (1945), but right-wing conservatives regard it as the founding anniversary of the Republic (1948). In addition, South Korean liberals tend to celebrate 1919 more than 1948. 1919 was the day of the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of KoreaWikipedia, and South Korean liberals and leftists saw the history of resisting Japanese fascism as more important.[36] South Korea's political leftist view is that it cannot celebrate the founding of half of its divided, unified homeland, because it is that the founding of the South in 1948 was done by anti-Korean(민족반역자)/pro-Japanese(친일파) fascist collaboratorsWikipedia blessed by the United States. Meyers condemns it as "[Korean] ethnic nationalism", arguing that 1948 should be celebrated because of the need for anti-North Korean state-patriotism.

Myers even criticizes the Yi Sun-sinWikipedia statue and Sejong the GreatWikipedia statue in Gwanghwamun PlazaWikipedia. According to him, the absence of statues related to the figure of the Republic of Korea since 1948 is evidence of weak "state-based nationalism" (국가주의) and strong "racial-based nationalism" (민족주의) in South Korea.[note 2][37] Of course, this is also similar to the views of South Korean pro-Japanese right-wing, which South Korean liberals/left-wing oppose.[38] Meyers' argument is ironically supported by the right-wing or even the far-right in South Korea, and will not be supported by almost all left-wing, center-left and some center-right. (The far-right in South Korea are more racist than anyone else and hate immigrants, but they condemn almost all left-wingers in South Korea and some center-rights' sympathetic "Korean ethnonationalism" toward North Korea.) For example, major politicians of the center-right Bareunmirae Party (now defunct) often opposed the view that the Republic of Korea was founded in 1948.[39] However, far-rightists based on South Korea's radical pro-Americanism celebrate 1948, but many politicians, including the center-right, do not celebrate it. Myers has no understanding of postcolonial nationalism. Korean Minjok nationalism or ethnonationalism is more similar to left-wing black nationalism than far-right white supremacy or Japanese fascism. (Both black nationalism and Korean ethnonationalism are based on anti-imperialism, while the former's main enemy is the white people, while the latter's main enemy is the Japanese people.)

Based on the fact that South Koreans celebrate 2333 BC or 1919 AC, not 1948, Myers interprets that "race-based nationalism" is stronger in South Korea than "state-based nationalism". Contrary to Myers' anti-Korean claims, even neighboring Japan does not commemorate the establishment of the State of Japan in 1947, but rather recognizes it as a country on the line with ancient Japan. Even the United States celebrates 1776, when the government 'declared' independence, not 1789, when it was established. 1948 was the establishment of a government limited to South Korea, not the entire Korean peninsula, and it cannot be seen as a day to celebrate the birth of a true Korean national state. Almost all liberals and leftists in South Korea view the Republic of Korea as being founded in 1919 through the provisional government, and the view that it was founded in 1948 tends to be regarded as a 'far-right' 뉴라이트 view that denies the independence movement. If 1948 is regarded as the date of national foundation, that means Japan’s 36 years of colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 are legitimized.[40]

Support for the extreme neo-McCarthyist 'far-right' in South Korea[edit]

Myers even defended Byun Hee-jae (변희재) with concerns about South Korea's [left-wing] pro-North Korean forces, opposing the change of South Korea's political system from a presidential system to a parliamentary cabinet system.[41] However, Byun, who Meyers supports, is a person classified as a far-right (극우) political scientist in South Korea.[42]

  • Byun Hee-jae is a historical denier who claims that the Gwangju UprisingWikipedia is not a pro-democracy movement (민주화운동).[43]
  • Byun is a member of Ilbe.[44] Ilbe is a sacred place for alt-rights who support anti-China, anti-feminist, anti-LGBT and anti-immigrant agendas in South Korea while opposing left-wing "ethno-nationalism"(민족주의) [based on postcolonial anti-Japanese sentiment], supports radical pro-Japanese diplomats, and supports South Korean state-based ultra-nationalism.
  • Byun was permanently suspended from 'Channel A' (채널 A) in 2014 for calling the people of Honam (호남), where political support for the Minjoo Party of Korea is strong in South Korea, "the slaves of the Minjoo Party" (민주당의 노예) and "the mentally ill" (정신질환). 'Channel A' is one of South Korea's main conservative broadcasting channels.[45] In American terms, Byun Hee-jae is Tucker Carlson, who was kicked out of Fox News, and Myers is a supporter of Tucker Carlson of South Korea.

He even posted image on his blog taken from South Korea's far-right Internet newspaper, 뉴데일리.[46][47]

Myers thinks that Yoon Suk Yeol, a South Korean anti-LGBT, anti-feminist far-right politician and incumbent South Korean president, is not "far-right" or "Trump". He even sees Yoon as "center-left".[48] He even compared the [right-wing] People Power Party to Tony Blair's Labour Party, and described the opposition Minjoo Party of Korea as "nationalist, anti-immigration, pro-Chinese".[49] It is partly true that liberals are more pan-Korean nationalistic than conservatives in South Korea, but liberals are more pro-immigrant/pro-LGBT than conservatives. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence that South Korean liberals are "pro-Chinese," and that being less friendly to the U.S. than conservatives does not mean immediately "pro-Chinese". Unlike Meyers' bullshit, the Minjoo Party advocates the right to vote in local elections for foreigners residing in South Korea, while the PPP opposes it, which shows who are advocates of immigrant rights.

Meyers opposes Trump in the United States, but supports Yoon Suk Yeol, which South Korean liberals call "Trump of South Korea" or "K-Trump"; even if he is a supporter of the U.S. Green Party, the analysis of South Korean politics is a very far-right view. The bigger problem is that the contents written in the articles of "Korean nationalism" and "Korean ethnic nationalism" in the English Wikipedia also reflect the contents based on Meyers' anti-Korean and white supremacist prejudices.

He was interviewed in 2024 by the Segye IlboWikipedia (세계일보), a far-right anti-communist newspaper run by the Unification Church; he said the impeachment of Park Geun-hyeWikipedia in 2017 was unfair and made the same claim as the pro-Park far-right, who called it a "parliamentary coup" (의회 쿠데타).[50]

Distortion of the 'Gwangju Democratization Movement' (or 'Gwangju Uprising')[edit]

Myers also has a sympathetic view of the far-right anti-communist revisionist view of South Korea's anti-dictatorship democracy movement in Gwangju in 1980.[51] Myers is sympathetic to this view, as far-right anti-communist revisionists in South Korea believe North Korea was involved in the protests at the time. Mainstream academia believes that Gwangju citizens had nothing to do with North Korea at the time. Myers argued that South Korea's mainstream view of history is progressive biased and criticized political centrists who claim punishment for far-right anti-communist revisionist views of Gwangju.[52] In South Korea, this is seen as equivalent to like Holocaust denial.[53]

Criticism of liberals and leftists in South Korea[edit]

He is unpopular with South Korean liberals. Also, he is mainly championed by South Korean conservatives, and interviewed by conservative media. Hankyoreh (한겨레), a South Korean center-left mainstream journalist, evaluated B.R. Myers as having a "typical view based on American conservatism" (미국 보수주의의 전형적인 시각).[54] In "Hankyoreh" (한겨레), "Han" (한) means "One" , and "Kyoreh" (겨레) means exactly the same as "Minjok" (민족).[55] Major columnists in the Hankyoreh newspaper oppose [anti-communist] state-based nationalism and favor [anti-imperialist] ethnic nationalism on issues related to North Korea and Japan.[56]

Pak Noja (박노자)[note 3], a South Korean socialist who opposes all forms of nationalism, believes that "state-based nationalism" (국민주의, 국가주의 or 대한민국주의) [supported by B.R. Myers] is much more dangerous than "[left-wing] nationalism or [left-wing] ethno-nationalism" ([좌파]민족주의). This is because state-based nationalism can strengthen South Korea's supremacist sentiment to justify discrimination against diaspora Koreans without South Korean Nationality and North Korean people, and heightens the conflict between South and North Korea. Thus, from the standpoint of the left wing of South Korea, Pak Noja makes the opposite conclusion of Myers's view, which represents the right wing of South Korea; he argues that a form of [Korean] 'ethnic nationalism' that does not have a xenophobic character may be partially necessary, but rather [South Korean] 'state-based nationalism' that is hostile to North Korea should be abandoned.[59][60][61] Pak identified Myers with New Right, a group of far-right scholars in South Korea who championed South Korea's extreme pro-Japanese/pro-American/anti-North Korean/anti-Chinese state based-ultranationalism and pro-anticommunist dictators.[62]

Brian Myers links South Korean ethno-nationalism to the pro-Japanese collaborator tradition in the Japanese imperialist South Korean colony, but many left-wing [ethno-]nationalists (좌파민족주의) think the opposite. South Korea's far-right anti-communist dictators in the 20th century were friends of pro-Japanese collaborators and pro-Americanists before 1945, thus advocating "state-people-based nationalism" (국민주의) hostile to North Korea. In opposition to this, South Korean left-wing activists denied the South Korean system and advocated anti-Japanese/anti-American "ethnic nationalism" (민족주의) sympathetic to North Korea.[63]

Many articles on South and North Korean politics, including "Korean nationalism" and "Korean ethnic nationalism" article in English Wikipedia, cite many sources based on Myers' anti-Korean prejudice, so we should not believe it as it is. For example, in English Wikipedia, the words "Korean race" and "race-based nationalism" are mostly mistranslations of the words 민족 and 민족주의, whose real meaning is "Korean nation"/"Korean volk" and "anti-colonial nationalism"/"ethnic nationalism".

While the translation of the term 민족주의 as "ethnonationalism" in South Korea is not wrong, it has little to do with what the West calls "ethonationalism" in the general sense (which has more to do with exclusionary sentiments towards immigrants from poor countries than anti-imperialism), but rather mainstream South Korean "ethnonationalism" is led by left-wing groups and "state-based nationalism" (국가주의) is led by right-wing groups, so mainstream "ethnonationalism" in South Korea does not discriminate against foreigners from poor countries, not Chinese and Japanese, but actively represents their rights and interests, South Korea's "ethnonationalism" has a stronger anti-imperialist and resistance Latin American character than a racist and fascistic European character.

Whataboutism[edit]

Myers has a pro-Japanese right-wing perspective that is close to whataboutism, citing North Korea's war crimes in Japanese war crimes issues.

On December 12, 2014, he expressed the following views on comfort women in Munhwa Ilbo (문화일보), a South Korean conservative media outlet.

Unlike the U.S. beef crisisWikipedia, it is strange for foreigners to see that even if North Korea attacks the ROKS CheonanWikipedia and shell Yeonpyeong IslandWikipedia, the people do not express their corresponding anger and are angry about the comfort women issues.[64]

On January 13, 2016, Myers spoke in support of the Japan–South Korea Comfort Women AgreementWikipedia led by Barack Obama, while at the same time he made the following remarks about South Koreans' past history of Japanese war crimes:

The bad relationship between the two countries, South Korea and Japan, adversely affects the security of the two countries as well as the U.S. security. ... From the perspective of young Westerners, Korea seems to be a much cooler, more energetic, brighter future, and more successful country than Japan. ... Continuing to say that Korea was a victim of Japan in the past does not help the development of Korean national brands or soft power. It is time to think about economic issues. A national brand means a substantial amount of money. What does it do for Korea to bring up 70 years of past history over and over again? Living well is a real revenge on Japan.[65]

However, Japan still refuses individual compensation for Korean victims of forced labor and other war crimes by the Japanese Empire,[66] rather making denials about war crimes.[67] Of course, South Korea's anti-American racism and anti-Japanese racism cannot be justified, but it is NOT right to criticize South Koreans' legitimate criticism and anger against Japanese historical revisionism from a whataboutic perspective. Above all, Myers' remarks are more dangerous because they seem to imply that the country's economic interests are more important than those of human rights of war crimes victims.

Contrary to Japan's anti-Korean racism in the first place, hate speech or hate crimes against the Japanese people rarely occur in Korea;[68] most "anti-Japanese sentiment" in South Korea is anger at the Japanese government's historical revisionism and harassment of the South Korea. Therefore, Myers' claim to weave it into [anti-Japanese] 'racism' is therefore Victim blaming.

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ↑ Some scholars, including Charles K. Armstrong, saw North Korea's ultra-nationalism as having little to do with Japanese fascism, but NK's ultra-nationalism similar to German fascism. In fact, left-wing nationalist movement in inter-Korea tends to be based on "Volk". (Even due to North Korea's strong anti-Japanese sentiment, North Korea is unlikely to pursue Japanese-style ultra-nationalism.)
  2. ↑ Myers defends 국가주의(Kukajuui; "state-based nationalism") and opposes 민족주의(Minjokjuui; "ethnic-based nationalism", it is what Myers calls "race-based nationalism"). However, in South Korea, the term 국가주의(國家主義) has a negative meaning reminiscent of Japan's Shōwa Statism and South Korea's right-wing anti-communist nationalism. On the other hand, the term 민족주의(民族主義) has a positive meaning reminiscent of a valiant anti-Japanese Korean [ethno-]nationalist independence activist who fought against the Japanese Empire.
  3. ↑ He is against the 'minjok' ideology. In addition, he is an anti-Putinist and supports Russia's democratization, despite being a Russian citizen before acquiring South Korean citizenship.[57][58]

References[edit]

  1. ↑ Suzy Kim (2014). Mothers and Maidens: Gendered Formation of Revolutionary Heroes in North Korea
  2. ↑ South Korea: The Unloved Republic? - B. R. Myers. Asia Society (2010-09-14) "How to deter another attack by peaceful means? The political left and right need to join together to move away from a focus on the 1940s and post-colonial heritage and shape a healthy loyalty to the Republic of Korea. Patriotism is not the last refuge of the scoundrel, as Samuel Johnson famously suggested; nationalism is.".
  3. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (September 22, 2011). "North Korea's state-loyalty advantage". Journal of International Affairs. "South Koreans' "good race, bad state" attitude is reflected in widespread sympathy for the people of the North and in ambivalent feelings toward the United States and Japan, which are regarded as friends of the republic but enemies of the race.".
  4. ↑ Myers, Brian Reynolds (FEB 22, 2017). "What Does North Korea Want?. SLATE. "To a radical Korean nationalist, the division of the nation, the race, is an intolerable state of affairs. So too is the continued presence of the foreign army that effected that division in the first place.".
  5. ↑ https://jinboparty.com/pages/?p=286&b=b_1_111&m=read&bn=8979
  6. ↑ A Thought Experiment (Re: Kim’s Purported Renunciation of Unification) - B. R. Myers (2024. 03. 01). "Imagine you’re Kim Jong Un. You’ve brought to fruition a nuclear program that your two predecessors developed with a view to “final victory,” meaning the completion of a hybrid unification drive unhindered by American meddling. During your rule, prospects for subjugating or at least dominating the rival state have improved steadily. Granted, the pro-North fanaticism of the 1980s protest movement has cooled into support for “symbolic unification,” but getting the upper hand through the envisioned pan-Korean congress in Kaesong would be child’s play."
  7. ↑ A Representation of Nationhood in the Museum - Sang-hoon Jang. "Korean ethnic nationalism which tended to be against authoritarian regimes and foreign powers". Routledge
  8. ↑ Post-War Korean Conservatism, Japanese Statism, and the Legacy of President Park Chung-hee in South Korea
  9. ↑ https://www.vox.com/2016/1/6/10724334/north-korea-history
  10. ↑ "共和國의 가치에 대한 자부심, 한국에선 왜 이상하게 취급받나" [Value of republic, why is it treated strange in South Korea?] 조선일보 (2016. 10. 24). "북한은 남한과 달리 친일파를 청산했다고 하지만 실제 그렇지 않습니다. 최승희·김사량·송영 등 친일파들이 월북해 최고의 자리까지 올랐습니다." [It is not true that North Korea, unlike South Korea, has liquidated its pro-Japanese collaborators. Pro-Japanese groups such as Choi Seung-hee, Kim Sa-ryang, and Song Young have risen to the top positions in North Korea.]
  11. ↑ 최승희 승무 사진 공개… 북한에서 숙청당한 ‘비운’의 운명도 주목 [Choi Seung-hee's (a kind of Korean traditional dance) 'Seung-mu' photo was released. The fate of her being purged in North Korea is also drawing attention.] 시사위크 (2014. 11. 21). "1967년 숙청당해 가택연금 처벌을 받았으며 1969년 사망했다." [She was purged in 1967 and sentenced to house arrest, and died in 1969.]
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 "브루스 커밍스, 한국전쟁을 말하다" [Bruce Cummings, he talks about the Korean War.] 중앙일보 (2016. 10. 24). "북한은 40년대 후반에 일제에 협력한 기술자(technician)들을 활용했다. 그들을 기술자라고 봐야지 친일파라고 할 순 없다. 북한은 특히 경찰 출신 친일파들을 청산했다. 일제 지배 기간에 가장 미움을 받은 사람들이다. 북한은 그 가족들에 대해서도 친일 경찰 가족이란 낙인을 찍었다. 따라서 친일 경찰의 자손들도 차별을 받았다. ... 북한 정권을 친일 정권이라고 표현할 순 없다. 북한이 그럴 수 있었던 이유 중 하나는 스탈린이 반일 정권을 원하고 친일파 청산을 지원했기 때문이다." [North Korea used the technicians of the Japanese Empire. However, they should be considered engineers, not pro-Japanese collaborators in the general sense. North Korea, in particular, has liquidated pro-Japanese collaborators of police. They were the most hated people (by Koreans) during the colonial period of the Japanese Empire. North Korea even branded the families of police officers from pro-Japanese collaborators (as a kind of sit-in system), and their descendants were discriminated against. ... The North Korean regime cannot be described as a regime of pro-Japanese collaborators. North Korea purged its pro-Japanese collaborators because Stalin wanted an anti-Japanese regime and supported the liquidation of its pro-Japanese collaborators.]
  13. ↑ Bruce Cumings (2010). The Korean War: A History
  14. ↑ The Cleanest Race - Brian Reynolds Myers (2010)
  15. ↑ B. R. Myers. The cleanest race. How North Koreans see themselves and why it matters, Brooklyn: Melville House, 2008. 200 pp. (ISBN 9781933633916) - Book Review. "Yet, Myers ignores counter-evidence to his thesis while exaggerating observations supporting it. One such observation is anti-American demonstrations, which Myers takes as proof that South Koreans harbour racist hatred towards Americans. While anti-American sentiment in South Korea may at times be irrational, criticism of U.S. foreign policy is by no means a Korean specificity, but a global phenomenon. What is specifically South Korean about anti-Americanism is the widespread perception that the American people used to support the dictatorial governments of the past, and turned a blind eye to human rights violations perpetrated during that time, culminating in the Gwangju massacre in 1980."
  16. ↑ On That March First Speech - B. R. Myers (2019. 03. 04). "Funnily enough, his line of logic could be used a fortiori to stigmatize criticism of the USA. After all, it was the Yankees and not Korean “reds” – a tiny force even in their 1920s heyday — whom the Japanese authorities were most intent on infamizing. After Hirohito’s surrender all the main tropes went straight into the agitprop of the South Korean left. Thus did the Workers’ Party vilify Yankees as “bloodsuckers” when agitating Jeju islanders, who had been subjected to especially intense Japanese propaganda during the war."
  17. ↑ “北도발에도 조용… 한국인엔 ‘민족’만 있고 ‘국가’는 없다”. 문화일보 (2014. 12. 19). "마이어스 교수와의 인터뷰는 원했든, 원치 않았든 초반부터 공격적으로 흐를 수밖에 없었다. 묻지도 않는 이념성향에 대해 “보수주의이자, 확고한 반북(反北)주의”라고 밝히더니 쏟아놓는 분석들이 범상치 않았기 때문이다."
  18. ↑ ‘박형준號 부산’ 돕는 사람은 누구? 부산시장 인수위 미래혁신위원 선정 아시아경제 (2021. 04. 11). "박형준 부산시장을 보좌하는 인수위원회 격인 부산 미래혁신위원회가 출범을 앞두고 12일 36명의 위원을 선정했다. ... 브라이언 마이어스 동서대 교수 ..." [The Busan Future Innovation Committee, a transition committee that assists Busan Mayor Park Hyung-joon, selected 36 members on the 12th ahead of its launch. ... Brian Myers professor at East and West University, ...]
  19. ↑ 반일, 반미, 민족주의 고찰.... 자유 가치 추구 ‘시민 민족주의’로 가야 - 허화평 [Anti-Japanese and anti-American [left-wing] ethno-nationalism... We should go to "citizen nationalism" in pursuit of freedom - Heo Hwa-pyeong] 미래한국 (2020. 03. 20). "일본을 향해서는 외면하고 미국을 향해서는 눈을 감거나 뒷걸음질하려는 정치인들, 지식인들, 좌파 친북인사들과 민족주의 사학자들, 좌파 언론인들이 줄어들지 않고 늘어나고 있는 현상은 평범한 이성으로서도 수긍하기 어려운 모순이자 역설이다." [The growing number of politicians, intellectuals, left-wing pro-North Korean nationalist, ethno-nationalist historians, and left-wing journalists who oppose Japan and the United States is a contradiction and paradox that even ordinary rational people cannot accept. ... ]
  20. ↑ Cloudy forecast for Moon’s ‘Sunshine Policy 2.0’ East Asia Forum (2017. 07. 20). "In South Korean politics, liberal political parties often support a policy of engagement with North Korea. This is because left-wing politicians tend to value miunjok (the Korean race) over the North–South ideological and political divide. In a broader sense, liberals embrace ethno-nationalism — the notion that sharing the same bloodline is superior to temporary national partition. Conservatives on the other hand support regime-based nationalism, which puts emphasis on being South Korean and stresses the differences in social and political values between the two Koreas."
  21. ↑ Race and Racism in Modern East Asia (2015). "... nations (Kor. minjok) and races (injong), and attempts to broaden the boundaries of the Korean ethno-nation by expanding it to include both Jurchen tribes and their purported Manchu descendants. ..." pp.268
  22. ↑ "NEW YORK TIMES SPOTLIGHTS RACISM IN SOUTH KOREA". Hyphen Magazine (Asian America Unabridged). November 4, 2009. "... racism in Korea is very different from racism in the U.S. In Korea, it is based on the idea of ethnic purity, the Korean "folk" (minjok) not "race" ..."
  23. ↑ Collinsdictionary: Korean-English "민족; /minjok/; nationality"
  24. ↑ Myers, B.R. (September 2017). "What the West gets wrong about North Korea's motives, and why some South Koreans admire the North". The Conversation. Archived from the original on 16 September 2017 "And they want the US Army to stay here in case he gets the wrong idea. It’s understandable enough, but this crisis will soon force them to pick one side, and one side only. “No ally is better than one’s own race,” President Kim Young Sam (president of South Korea from 1993 to 1998) said, which no West German chancellor would have dreamed of saying."
  25. ↑ Lee Ji-yun ed. (2021). Politics of Rhetoric of ‘Nation’ in Korean Conservative Discourse: Focusing on Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2019) and Struggle against Anti-Japanese Tribalism(2020). Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information.
  26. ↑ 역사왜곡의 기술 [the art of historical distortion]. 레디앙 (2016-02-04). "한국 일각의 “뉴라이트”와 상통되기도 하는 마요즈씨의 “학설”의 핵심은, 북한이 나름 변모를 겪은 좌파 정권이 아닌, 사실 극우정권이며 일제 말기 파시즘의 계승자, 즉 “파시스트 정권”이라는 것입니다." [At the heart of Myers's "view," which shares the same view as South Korean New Right scholars, is that North Korea is not a left-wing regime that has undergone its own transformation, but a far-right regime, and a successor to fascism at the end of the Japanese colonial rule: a "fascist regime."]
  27. ↑ On That March First Speech - B. R. Myers (2019. 03. 04). "Now, I have long argued on this blog that the Moon administration is ideologically and emotionally closer to Pyongyang than to Washington. I have predicted that the two Koreas will whip up anti-Japanese sentiment to rally public support around their “new peninsula system,” “peace system,” “peaceful unification plan” — the reassuring euphemisms for confederation are endless. I have been called McCarthyist for this, as if anyone ever saw less trace of communism on the peninsula than I do."
  28. ↑ Confederation (Again) - B. R. Myers (2018. 07. 26). "With these meshing tendencies and measures the ruling camp evidently hopes to bond with the Kim regime over a shared anti-Japanese tradition, to present today’s ROK and DPRK as branches of the same Shanghai tree, put nationalism above liberal-democratic principles, and minimize opposition to all these things. No less obvious is the larger goal."
  29. ↑ South Korea’s Nationalist-Left Front - B. R. Myers (2019. 04. 07). "The candlelight protests of 2016 are mythologized by Moon himself not as class struggle or anti-corruption drive but as the culmination of a long heroic fight for national liberation. The implication — kept tacit to let sleeping American dogs lie — is that by working with Washington against Pyongyang, Park Geun-hye betrayed the race, the minjok."
  30. ↑ Taking North Korea at its Word - B. R. Myers. NK NEWS. (February 13, 2016). "... My mistake lay in not realizing that moderate South Korean conservatives do not identify much more strongly with their republic than the left-wing does. They too, being pan-Korean nationalists at heart, will get angrier about Japanese claims to Dokdo than about their blood-brothers’ attack on an actual, populated island. ... There is a wider range of opinion in the ROK, but it would be a brave historian indeed who would discuss the North’s infiltration of certain parties, unions and church groups. A few veterans of the protest movement who are now in the so-called New Right have told me they fear the social repercussions of speaking out. The very least they could expect would be a libel suit."
  31. ↑ "이재명 "포용적 다문화 정책 펴겠다…이민자 컨트롤타워 설치"" [Lee Jae-myung said, "I will implement an inclusive multiculturalism policy. ... I will install an pro-immigration control tower."]. 연합뉴스. 7 March 2022.
  32. ↑ Is Yoon Suk-yeol the South Korean Trump?: K-Trumpism is part of the global rise of right-wing populism, experts say The Korea Herald (2022. 03. 02). "Both have made remarks that would be offensive to other countries, praised heavily controversial political figures, gone after foreigners and shown a poor understanding of feminism. On top of using anti-China rhetoric, the two also like to speak to their base on social media and announce policies that read like slogans. For example, Yoon’s “Abolish the Gender Equality Ministry” could be compared to Trump’s “Build the Wall."
  33. ↑ Changes in the concept of Minjok and the division of post-colonial agents - Korea’s identity dynamics after liberation (June 29, 2021) "the definition of Minjok transformed, then referring to a political sovereign body to establish a new constitutional order. It was the grounds for setting the unification of the Korean Peninsula as an undisputed goal. It is the basis of historiography that describes the history of the Korean Peninsula as the Minjok narratives and it is used to emphasize the ethnic unity of Korean diaspora living around the world."
  34. ↑ https://harvardpolitics.com/feminism-is-the-new-f-word-populism-patriarchy-among-young-south-korean-men/
  35. ↑ “北도발에도 조용… 한국인엔 ‘민족’만 있고 ‘국가’는 없다”. 문화일보 (2014. 12. 19). " 한국은 전 세계적으로 공화국 창립을 기념하지 않는 몇 안 되는 국가 중 하나입니다. 광복절은 민족 해방 기념일이지요."
  36. ↑ 정치권 건국절 논란 1919 VS 1948…왜? [Controversy is brewing in the political world over enacting National Foundation Day. 1919 VS 1948… Why?] KBS 뉴스 (2011. 12. 06). "문 대통령은 15일(그제) 8·15 광복절 경축사에서 "2년 후 2019년은 대한민국 건국과 임시정부 수립 100주년을 맞는 해"라고 선언함으로써, 대한민국의 건국은 1948년이 아닌 1919년에 이뤄졌다는 점을 강조했다. ... 한국당 혁신위원회는 이미 지난 2일 발표한 혁신선언문에서 "대한민국은 1948년 건국 이래 자유민주 진영이 피와 땀으로 일으켜 세우고 지켜온 나라"라며 '1948년 대한민국 건국'을 강조했다." ["In two years, 2019 will mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and the establishment of a provisional government," President Moon declared in a congratulatory speech on National Liberation Day on August 15, therefore, he emphasized that the founding of the Republic of Korea took place in 1919, not 1948. ... In a reform declaration released on August 2, the Liberty Korea Party's reform committee emphasized "the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948," saying, "The Republic of Korea has been raised and protected by freedom and democracy since its founding in 1948.]
  37. ↑ "共和國의 가치에 대한 자부심, 한국에선 왜 이상하게 취급받나" 조선일보 (2016. 10. 24). "교육과 선전·선동에 의한 것이든 체제에 대한 프라이드를 갖고 있는 쪽은 북한입니다. 북한에는 김일성 부자 동상만 3만개쯤 됩니다. 한국의 역대 대통령 동상이 공공장소에 몇 개 있습니까. 서울 중심인 광화문에도 세종대왕과 이순신 장군 동상이 있습니다. 공화국의 역사와 가치에 관한 것은 없습니다. 자신의 공화국에 대해 확신을 갖고 있지 못하면 북한을 적극적으로 이끌 수 없습니다." [It is North Korea that has pride in the system, whether by education, propaganda, or encouragement. There are about 30,000 statues of Kim Il-sung and his father in North Korea. How many statues of South Korean presidents are there in public places? There are statues of King Sejong and Admiral Yi Sun-sin in Gwanghwamun Plaza in the center of Seoul. There is nothing about the history and values of the Republic. If you are not confident about your republic, you cannot actively lead North Korea.]
  38. ↑ 김기현이 창립을 축하한 단체의 연단에 선 김씨는 이렇게 말했다: “Sejong the Great에서 세종과 이순신에 대해 문제의식을 못 느끼면 우익이 아니다” [Standing on the platform of the group Kim Ki-hyun celebrated his foundation, Kim said: "If you don't feel a sense of problem with Sejong and Yi Sun-shin in Sejong the Great, you're not [South Korean] right wing."] 경향신문 (2023. 09. 13). "그는 “그분들이 박물관이나 무슨 이순신 기념관이나 세종대왕 기념관에 있는 것은 괜찮다”며 “광화문은 어쨌든 간에 대한민국의 중심 가로이라 전부 다 조선 사람들로 채워져 있는 것은 공화국의 정체성을 알지 못하는 한국인들이 착종된 의식이라고 생각한다. 존중하는 것과는 별개”라고 말했다." [He said, "It's okay for them to be in a museum, some Yi Sun-shin Memorial Hall, or King Sejong Memorial Hall," adding, "Gwanghwamun is the central street of Korea anyway. Nevertheless, I think it is a twisted ceremony for Koreans who do not know the identity of the modern republic that the statues of Gwanghwamun are all filled with people from the Joseon Dynasty."]
  39. ↑ 바른미래 "백해무익 이념논쟁, 건국절 논쟁 그만해야" News1 (2018. 08. 14). "김 대변인은 그러면서 "건국기념일을 제정하지 않고 기존의 '개천절'과 '광복절'을 기념하면 되는 것"이라고 강조했다." [Spokesman Kim stressed, "We should not enact the National Foundation Day (1948), and we should commemorate the existing National Foundation Day (2333 BC) and Liberation Day (1945).]
  40. ↑ https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1153388.html
  41. ↑ Portrait of the Ally as an Intermediary (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2018. 03. 23). "For that matter, the shift to a parliamentary system now advocated by the conservative opposition may turn out to be an even greater threat to the republic, as Byun Hee-jae never tires of pointing out. One need only imagine a pro-North splinter party playing the sort of role in a coalition that the DUP now plays in the British government."
  42. ↑ 꼬리무는 논란… 박성진, 3년 전 극우논객 변희재 학교 초청 News1 (2017. 09. 08).
  43. ↑ 변희재,100분 토론서 "5.18, '광주 사태'라고 본다" ["I see Gwangju as an event, not a pro-democracy movement", Byun said during the 100-minute debate.] 조선일보 (2013. 05. 29).
  44. ↑ '일베 인증샷' 변희재 "오유·엠팍 고소" 왜?
  45. ↑ 변희재, 채널A ‘영구 출연 정지’…무슨 말 했길래? 한겨레 (2014. 03. 13). "변 대표는 채널 A ‘박종진의 쾌도난마’에 출연해 호남 지역을 두고 “민주당의 노예” “정신질환” 등의 막말을 해 물의를 일으켰다."
  46. ↑ On Jeju (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2023. 06. 16).
  47. ↑ 청와대 누리집 첫 화면 채운 극우언론, 이것이 ‘팩트’? 한겨레 (2016. 11. 24). "... 메인 이미지 속 기사들이 대부분 <뉴데일리> <미디어펜> 등 극우언론 기사들인 것으로 나타났다." [It was found that most of the articles in its main image were far-right media articles such as 뉴데일리 and 미디어펜.]
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 A Change of Power? (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2018. 03. 23). "I realize that if the folks back home are to show any interest in ROK politics, they need a team to cheer for and a team to boo, but correspondents wanting to frame Yoon Seok-yeol as Korea’s Trump are going to have their work cut out for them. He’s no conservative even by South Korean standards, let alone ours. Any local person who (waking from a long coma, say) knew only that Yoon helped imprison Park Geun-hye, that he plans to enshrine the spirit of the Gwangju uprising in the constitution, and that his political idols are Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, would naturally take him for a leftist. ... I’m not saying Yoon is on the nationalist left. Even his projected center-leftism seems more a matter of conformism and class-envy deflecting than conviction; in America he’d be moderately woke. No wonder the People Power Party was so quick to latch onto him."
  49. ↑ No, Kim Hasn’t Given Up on Unification (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2024. 01. 03). "The People Power Party currently ruling the country isn’t even center-right by American standards; I’d put it on a par with Labour under Tony Blair. Not to mention that President Yoon, according to his wife, is well to the left of the PPP. / It’s odd that such a docile neoliberal administration should get less sympathetic treatment from our NYT and Wapo than the opposition Minjoo Party, a nationalist, anti-immigration, pro-Chinese, Ukraine-indifferent, none-too-LGBT-friendly party of a sort those papers would rage against if it were in Europe. But the Council on Foreign Relations works in mysterious ways."
  50. ↑ “한국엔 ‘국가 자부심’이, 북한엔 ‘공산주의’가 없다” (2024. 08. 03)
  51. ↑ A Change of Power? (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2022. 05. 08). "Last month the PPP refused to allow Kim Jin-tae to run for governor of Gangwon province until he made a groveling apology for questioning the orthodox narrative of the Gwangju Democratization Movement."
  52. ↑ Back by Popular Demand (In archive) - B. R. Myers (2016. 09. 18). "I am far from convinced that the North Koreans organized the event. But it must at least be acknowledged (as the South Korean courts have had to acknowledge) that there is good evidence for believing that North Korea had its agents in Gwangju as in every large South Korean city, and that they did not sit quietly on the sidelines that tragic May. ... Ahn Cheol-soo’s People’s Party has called for a ban on “all cutting down or distortion” of the Gwangju uprising of May 1980, or the Gwangju Democratization Movement as it is routinely called. For “all cutting down or distortion” read: any mention of a possible North Korean role in the events. If the PP’s proposed law were to go into effect (a distinct possibility), offenders would be sentenced to up to 5 years in prison. And Ahn Cheol-soo considers himself the voice of centrist reason! So far there has apparently been no English-language reporting on the proposal, nor any complaint from the Western Korea scholars who recently protested the current ROK administration’s textbook policy. ... The uprising of 1980 is one of those many issues in regard to which South Korean historians express themselves very differently depending on the level of knowledge of the people they are talking to. In the company of monolingual Western academics and journalists, they tend to dismiss all talk of a North Korean presence in Gwangju as absurd right-wing slander. ..."
  53. ↑ 한국판 ‘홀로코스트 부정 처벌법’ 만들 때 됐다 [A Korean version of the 'the law of punishment for Holocaust denial'(= a law that absolutely punishes the far-right anti-communist revisionist view that claims North Korea intervened in the Gwangju democratization movement) is needed.] 한겨레 (2019. 10. 19). "피상적으로만 파악됐던 북한 이데올로기를 색다른 관점으로 분석했다는 점이 눈길을 끌지만 미국 보수주의의 전형적인 시각을 벗어나지 못한다는 점이 한계로 읽힌다." [The argument that legal sanctions are needed for distorting and disparaging the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement is gaining strength, like European countries that punish Nazi crime denials such as the Holocaust (=Jewish massacre). As even active members of the main opposition party agreed to the "May 18 North Korean military intervention" by some far-right commentators, there was a widespread atmosphere that malicious historical distortions should no longer be left unattended in the name of "freedom of expression."]
  54. ↑ “북한은 극단적 민족주의…극좌보다 극우” [[Myers said] "North Korea is closer to the far-right than to the far-left because it is extreme nationalism"] 한겨레 (2011. 12. 06). "피상적으로만 파악됐던 북한 이데올로기를 색다른 관점으로 분석했다는 점이 눈길을 끌지만 미국 보수주의의 전형적인 시각을 벗어나지 못한다는 점이 한계로 읽힌다." [It is noteworthy that it analyzed North Korea's ideology from a different perspective, which was only superficially understood, but the limitation is that it cannot escape from typical view based on American conservatism.]
  55. ↑ Kr.dictionary.search.yahoo.com (Archived)
  56. ↑ Distorting nation Hankyoreh. (Apr.2,2008). "When “nation” functions to rally and call the members of the community, you have “nationalism,” which in Korean could be either gukgajuui or minjokjuui, “isms” based on state or ethnic group. Shortened crudely, modern Korean history has been a fight between state-centered nationalism and nationalism that focuses on the Korean people as a group. It has been a process in which anti-communist and “divided” state-based nationalism suppressed, interrogated, and inflicted punishment on peace and reunification-oriented ethnic nationalism. This nationalism of the Korean people demands that we climb the walls of the Cold War and have reconciliation between North and South, and has only just recently been given full citizenship as a valid “ism” The intolerant view of history held by the New Right is riding the more conservative political and social atmosphere one sees in the emergence of the government of Lee Myung-bak. If their book really does get used as a “textbook” in the literal sense, it will be something that aggravates the wounds that have barely begun to heal and turns the peninsula back to the dictatorship years. It is scary to see signs of this happening."
  57. ↑ 한국 사회의 모순을 설파하는 좌파 지식인. 주간한국 (2011-02-08). "한국 지식인 집단에서 박노자의 스펙트럼을 그어 보자. 좌우의 이념을 가른다면 그는 분명 왼쪽에 있고('왼쪽으로 더 왼쪽으로'), 민족대 탈민족의 개념으로 나눈다면 탈민족에 속한다." [Let's draw a definite spectrum of Park No-ja in the Korean intellectual group. If the ideology of left and right is divided, he is clearly left, and if it is divided into the concepts of minjok and anti-minjok, he belongs to the anti-minjok.]
  58. ↑ <nowiki>[박노자의 한국, 안과 밖 전쟁, 혹은 진실의 순간]. [[Park Noja's South Korea, Inside and Outside] War, or a moment of truth]. 한겨레 (2022-03-22). "이 국면에서 세계 시민사회에 절실한 것은, 헤게모니 다툼의 어느 한 ‘편’을 드는 것보다는 자기 조국을 용감히 지키는 우크라이나 사람들, 그리고 반전과 독재 타도를 위해 목숨을 내놓고 투쟁하는 러시아 활동가들을 지원하고 지지해주는 것이다." [What global civil society needs at this juncture is not to side with the [U.S. and Russian] hegemony fight, but to support and support Ukrainian patriots who bravely defend their homeland, and Russian activists fighting for their lives to topple the anti-war movement and Putin dictatorship.]
  59. ↑ 민족주의를 통해 바라본 남북통일. 해피캠퍼스 [HAPPYCAMPUS] (2006-10-09). "한국의 젊은층은 민족주의보다는 국민주의 정서에 가깝다. ‘한민족’이라기보다는 삼성이 있는 대한민국, 월드컵 4강에 진출한 대한민국에 열광하는 국민주의에 가깝다. ... 민족주의를 내세우겠지만, 실질적으로 남한 보수층이 갖고 있는 정서는 경제력을 기반으로 한 대한민국주의라고 할 수 있다. ... 현재 남한과 북한은 국민주의와 민족주의 대립관계에 있다. 현재는 남북이 분단되어 있는 상황이기 때문에 사상의 직접적인 충돌은 일어나지 않고 있지만 만약 통일이 된다면 남과 북 사상의 충돌은 피할 수 없는 일이고 앞으로 풀어가야 할 과제인 것이다." [Young people in South Korea are closer to state-based nationalist sentiment than ethnic nationalism. They are not enthusiastic about "Korean Minjok(ethnic nation)," and they are more like state-based nationalism in that they are enthusiastic about South Korea, where Samsung is located, or South Korea, which has advanced to the World Cup semifinals. ... The sentiment of the conservative class in South Korea can be said to be 'ROK nationalism' based on economic power, it is not ethno-nationalism. ... Currently, South Korea and North Korea are in confrontation with [South Korean] state-based nationalism and [Korean] ethnic nationalism. Currently, there is no direct conflict between ideas because the two Koreas are divided, but if unification is achieved, the conflict between South and North Korean thoughts is inevitable and a task to be solved in the future.]
  60. ↑ "북한 빙자 반북 정서 이용하면서 국내 급진파 불법 탄압". 위클리서울 (2009-07-08). "박 교수는 "우리는 아직도 당위적으로 `민족`을 이야기하지만, 남북 통일에 적극적 의지가 있는 사람들은 사실 극소수고 다수는 현실적으로 앞으로의 장기간, 내지 영속적 분단을 수용한 셈"이라며 "그래서 한국인 다수의 내셔널리즘은 `민족주의`라기보다는 `국민주의`, `대한민국주의`에 가깝다"고 말한다." [He said South Korean nationalism is more of a state-based nationalism sentiment than ethnic nationalism. He analyzed that for South Koreans, Samsung is located rather than "Korean ethno-nation", and that state-based nationalism as South Korea, which has advanced to the World Cup semifinals, is deeply rooted. ... He criticized that this [state-based nationalism] sentiment can lay the groundwork for justifying the exploitation of Korean capital against North Korean workers after unification.]
  61. ↑ 한국 민족주의는 '국민주의'...대안 될 수 없다 [South Korean nationalism is state-based nationalism (not Korean ethnic nationalism). After all, there[=nationalism] is no alternative.]. 안산 이주민 센터 [Ansan Migrant Center] (2005-07-08). "그는 나아가 한국의 경우 민족주의 보다는 국민주의 정서에 가깝다고 말했다. ‘한민족’이라기 보다는 삼성이 있는 대한민국, 월드컵 4강에 진출한 대한민국이라는 국민주의가 뿌리깊게 자리잡고 있다는 것이다. ... 이러한 정서는 통일 뒤 북한 노동자 착취에 대한 한국 자본의 착취를 정당화시키는 토대를 마련할 수 있다고 그는 우려했다." [He said South Korean nationalism is more of a state-based nationalism sentiment than ethnic nationalism. He analyzed that for South Koreans, Samsung is located rather than "Korean ethno-nation", and that state-based nationalism as South Korea, which has advanced to the World Cup semifinals, is deeply rooted. ... He criticized that this [state-based nationalism] sentiment can lay the groundwork for justifying the exploitation of Korean capital against North Korean workers after unification.]
  62. ↑ 역사왜곡의 기술 [the art of historical distortion]. 레디앙 (2016-02-04).
  63. ↑ 김구의 "민족주의"와 이승만의 "국민주의"
  64. ↑ “北도발에도 조용… 한국인엔 ‘민족’만 있고 ‘국가’는 없다”. 문화일보 (2014. 12. 19). "미국산 ‘광우병 쇠고기 파동’ 때와 달리 북한이 천안함을 공격하고 연평도에 포격을 가해도 국민들이 상응하는 분노를 표하지 않고 일본군 위안부 문제에는 분노하는 게 외국인으로서 보기엔 좀 이상해요."
  65. ↑ “미국, 북핵실험 대응 위해 위안부 타결 이끌었다. 아시아투데이 (2016. 01. 18). "한·일 두 나라의 나쁜 관계는 양국 안보는 물론 미국 안보에도 악영향을 미친다 ... 젊은 서양 사람이 보기에는 한국이 일본보다 훨씬 쿨하고 활기차고 미래가 밝고 성공한 나라로 보인다. 그런 한국이 과거 일본의 희생자였다고 계속 말하는 것은 한국 국가브랜드나 소프트 파워에 도움이 안된다 ... 이제는 경제적인 문제도 생각해야 한다. 국가브랜드는 상당한 금액을 뜻한다. 70년이나 지난 과거사를 반복해서 꺼내는 것이 한국에 도움이 되는가. 잘 사는 것이 일본에 대한 진정한 복수다"
  66. ↑ "Japan, Korea and the messy question of how to pay for historic wrongs". Los Angeles Times. 2019-08-17.
  67. ↑ "S. Korea and Japan debate comments about being "forced to work"". The Hankyoreh. July 7, 2015. Retrieved 2015-09-13.
  68. ↑ "일본의 혐한, 한국의 반일". Hankyoreh (2022-01-22).
Retrieved from "https://rationalwiki.org/w/index.php?title=Brian_Reynolds_Myers&oldid=2671763"