Free will is the philosophical concept that a person has an element of control over their own actions, though this control may be subject to external influences and pressures. The concept of free will may be seen to conflict with the concept of "cause and effect". The most popular philosophical position that says humans have no free will is called hard determinism (although people may still be considered to have or not have a "free choice" in specific situations—the legal sense of "free will").
 The free will wager
This is similar in structure to Pascal's wager, but somewhat more logically sound.
- If you assume you have free will, and you do, then you can use it to direct your life; thus a huge gain.
- If you assume you don't have free will, and you do, then you are wasting the only thing over which you have any choice; thus a huge loss.
- If you assume you have free will, and you don't, there is no loss or gain since you had no choice in the matter.
- If you assume you don't have free will, and you don't, there is no loss or gain since you had no choice in the matter.
Therefore regardless of whether free will exists or not, you should live based on the assumption that you do have free will and that your choices do matter.
 Problems with 'free will wager'
This argument assumes that people who think they have free will will be able to determine their actions if it does exist, but people who don't think they do won't. This is a major assumption that, frankly, makes no sense—regardless of your philosophical position on the matter, we all live under the appearance of having choice, even the hard determinists. How does simply not believing in something make it so that it no longer applies to you? Particularly when it can be argued that the act of choosing to disbelieve in free will is, in itself, a demonstration of free will.
However, some research has suggested that belief in free will may affect behaviors and attitudes such as aggression, helping, and job performance. Along with its moral implications, this has led to debate over whether free will could be a "noble lie." One response to this is that the idea that free will is necessary for morality has been driven into their minds all their lives, so when they're finally told it doesn't exist they act less 'moral', as a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. Another is that the common folk confuse the nonexistence of free will with fatalism.
 Belief and action
When discussing "free will" there is the concept of belief and action that creates some degree of distinction. Doxastic voluntarism is the suggestion that belief—what someone considers to be true—is optional, and falls under free will. While this is mostly brought up in the context of people having the free will to believe in a deity if they like, a quick examination of what constitutes a belief can falsify the assertion of voluntary belief quite readily. For instance, watching a particular blogger on YouTube effectively forces certain beliefs on you; namely that there is a person going by the name ImAwesomeWatchMe1988, that they sat down and recorded a video, that your internet connection is working fine, amongst others. Believing these things to be true is very much non-optional for most people considered to be sane.
However, action still falls under the concept of "free" will. While what you consider to be the case is often non-optional, how you react to it can be. In the example above, you have no free will to believe ImAwesomeWatchMe1988 made a video, but you have the free will over whether you wish to write "Herp derp derp herp derp herp derp" in the comments section. Hence discussions of free will are often restricted to actions rather than beliefs—or at least the well-formed beliefs that have a direct relationship with reality.
The waters are muddied here by certain uses of terminology, and whether the distinction between "action" and "belief" blurs. For instance, people may suggest they have a belief, or not, in global warming. Yet this is very much a wilful position, and people have the free will to draw particular conclusions when deducing new truths from evidence. In this case, people don't have the free will to believe that they've been shown data—again, this is a well-formed belief that has a direct relationship with reality—but they do have the free will to act on it or act to ignore it. Deducing a conclusion from evidence, therefore, is part of an action where we have free will because the act of deduction is a method, and we have a free choice in what method we use.
 Person X and Person Y
It is often useful to employ hypothetical Person X, Y and Z when attempting to explain the ramifications of philosophical concepts. As Person Z is currently pondering the meaning of life in the fourth dimension, Persons X and Y shall be employed to great effect in an attempt to explain the differences between someone who believes in free will and someone who believes in determinism.
Person X and Person Y each drink a pint of beer. Whilst Person X (who believes in the concept of free will) chooses to go to the toilet approximately fifteen minutes after consuming their pint of beer, Person Y (who is a determinist) considers that they had no real choice to empty their bladder, as it was an inevitable consequence of drinking beer. Person X may argue that whether Person Y empties their bladder or not is entirely up to them, at any time they want, wherever they like, etc, and that this is the act of free will. Uncomfortable or even fatal outcomes do not necessarily prevent Person Y from being able to exercise their options.
Person X may argue that Person Y chose to drink the beer and therefore indirectly chose to relieve their bladder, but Person Y insists that they consume beer to alleviate woes brought on by external influences in their working environment.
Person X may argue that Person Y chose to work, and therefore indirectly chose to become worried with work-related issues, but Person Y insists that they did not choose to work; they had to work as a result of needing to meet the financial requirements of their family.
Person X may argue that Person Y chose to have a family and therefore indirectly chose to work in order to support it, but Person Y insists that they did not choose the faulty protection when copulating with their partner, and that their young family was essentially unplanned…
 Several months of discussion, and many beers later
…and so the argument between Person X and Person Y goes on until they reach the very first cause in the universe. Some people call this the Big Bang, some call it God, and still others ask "what caused this big bang, or God?" Some smart philosophical people often refer to the beginning of the universe, or the cause of the Big Bang, as the "uncaused cause". People who believe in the concept of free will often point to this event as an example of the illogical nature of determinism, ignoring the insistence made by Person Y that determinism is far too complex to be debunked in such a manner.
 A knotty thread
There are four main philosophical positions on Free Will:
- Determinism, in philosophy, is the position that 1) there is a single possible future which occurs necessarily and inevitably as the result of causal laws, and 2) human beings have no power of free will, or ability to choose a future. In science, "determinism" just means (1). The central argument of philosophical determinism is that since future events are already sufficiently caused,and fully accounted for, by a chain of cause and effect stretching back in time to the Big Bang, there is no "elbow room" for human volition to make any further difference.
- Compatibilism is the position that even if determinism is true, humans still have some form of free will. Disputes about what kind, and whether it is "worth having" arise inevitably. A typical formulation is that you are free so long as you are able to do what you want. Compatibilism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy, Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves being an eloquent defence.
- Pessimistic incompatibilism is the position that determinism isn't necessarily true, but free will still doesn't exist.
- Libertarianism is the position that humans do have free will, and that it is incompatible with causal determinism, which is therefore false. In other words, it is a form of incompatibilism opposite to hard determinism. (It has no particular relationship to political libertarianism). Most believers in libertarianism think that the power to originate events which are not a necessary and inevitable outcome of external events is invested in some kind of immaterial mind or soul; i.e, they are dualists or supernaturalists. This has, by associative thinking, created the impression that metaphysical libertarianism is a religious or non-naturalistic position which no rationalist should hold to. However, a few philosophers and scientists are naturalistic libertarians, holding that free will exists and is based on quantum indeterminism.
There is also methodological dualism, which is a methodology where human beings are only considered to have "free will" in practice and the ultimate answer to the question is not dealt with. This is often employed in the Austrian School of economics.
While classical mechanics is deterministic (leading some to argue for a position of hard determinism), discoveries in quantum mechanics have led to arguments positing quantum indeterminism and using various interpretations of quantum mechanics (such as Many Worlds) to argue for certain kinds of free will. However, there are valid interpretations of quantum mechanics such as the Bohmian interpretation, which is deterministic; and the ensemble interpretation, which is silent on the issue. Thus, discoveries in quantum mechanics do not settle the question. Also, it has little effect on the macro level.
Discoveries in special relativity have lead to the Rietdijk-Putnam argument, which notes that moving observers have differing planes of simultaneity and thus the only consistent interpretation of a real universe is the position of four-dimensionalism. According to this position, the past and the future are real and fixed. It follows that there cannot really be "free will" as people are enjoined by the fixed future to make specific choices and actions.
Scientifically informed sceptics of free will often quote a famous experiment by Benjamin Libet, which supposedly shows that a kind of signal called a "Readiness Potential," detectable by electrodes, precedes a conscious decisions, and is a reliable indicator of the decision, and thus—so the claim goes—indicates that our decisions are not ours but made for us by unconscious processes.
In fact, Libet himself doesn't draw a sweepingly sceptical conclusion from his own results. For one thing, Readiness Potentials are not always followed by actions. He believes it is possible for consciousness to intervene with a "veto" to the action (free won't):
"The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is there, then, any role for conscious will in the performing of a voluntary act? […] To answer this it must be recognised that conscious will (W) does appear about 150milliseconds before the muscle is activated, even though it follows the onset of the RP. An interval of 150msec would allow enough time in which the conscious function might affect the final outcome of the volitional process."
The neuroscientist Roger Sperry has also argued for a position called "emergent monism" or "mental monism," based on the concept of emergence. This could be seen as a type of compatibilism in that consciousness arises out of the deterministic physical properties of the brain and "free will" is part of consciousness.
 Science woo
 Non-materialist neuroscience
 Quantum consciousness
An attempt to "prove" free will (among other things) through quantum woo. When it comes to free will, science can easily bleed into woo (and many scientists have been guilty as well on this front) and what might seem like woo today could in fact be protoscientific. Nevertheless, when it comes to quantum consciousness, most of the arguments have either been falsified or shown to be not even wrong.
Most branches of Christianity teach that people have free will, although apparently on occasion God overrides it in order for events to play out according to His script. Ironically however, this belief is not biblically compatible. Even if it was however, this belief is also incompatible with an omniscient God, as if God already knows what you're going to do, then how are you making the choice to do it? The answer: God does not follow logic. However, other groups of Christians, especially Calvinists and other Reformed churches, further believe that God chooses who will be saved and who will be damned. This is called predestination, and means that those who have been chosen for damnation cannot exercise free will in order to become "saved".
In a literalist interpretation, Romans 9:18-21 can be seen as supporting predestination:
“”9:18 Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. 9:19 Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? 9:20 Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? 9:21 Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?
This arbitrary action is divine justice and divine love.Do You Believe That?
 See also
- Free Will in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Free Will in The Skeptic's Dictionary
- Freethought & Rationalism Discussion Board - Free Will Discussions (formerly Internet Infidels Discussion Board)
- Is Science Showing That We Don't Have Free Will? (lecture by Dan Dennett)
- The Incoherence of Free Will, Free Will Roundtable by Massimo Pigliucci
- Consciousness: An Afterthought by Stevan Harnad
- Study Narrows Gap Between Mind and Brain, NPR
- Dilbert on free will
- The Mind's I by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett
- Laws, Mind, and Free Will by Steve Horst
- The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland
- Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter (trans. Cynthia Klohr)
- ↑ Baumeister et al. Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness. Pers Soc Psychol Bull February 2009 vol. 35 no. 2 260-268.
- ↑ Stillman et al. Personal Philosophy and Personnel Achievement: Belief in Free Will Predicts Better Job Performance. Social Psychological and Personality Science January 2010 vol. 1 no. 1 43-50
- ↑ Do You Have Free Will? Yes, It's the Only Choice, New York Times
- ↑ Robert Kane
- ↑ Benjamin Libet. Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8–9, 1999, pp. 47–57
- ↑ Free Will is Not an Illusion After All, New Scientist
- ↑ Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them, Wired
- ↑ Can "Mentalist Monism" Save Mind and Morality from the Mechanistic Materialists? by Roger E. Bissell
- ↑ http://www.skepticsannotatedbible.com/says_about/free_will.html
- ↑ http://www.skepticsannotatedbible.com/rom/9.html